Denver Law Review
Volume 84

Issue 2

Article 11

January 2006

Vol. 84, no. 2: Full Issue
Denver University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
84 Denv. U. L. Rev. (2006).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DENVER
UNIVERSITY

Published by the
University of Denver
Sturm College of Law

LAW

REVIEW

2006 Volume 84 Issue 2
CONTENTS
ARTICLES

ParentsInvolved & Meredith: A Prediction

Regarding The (Un)Constitutionality of
Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans .... Eboni S. Nelson 293
The Rise, Development and Future Directions
of Critical Race Theory and Related
Scholarship ....................................................

Athena D. Mutua 329

Back from the Margins: An Environmental
Nuisance Paradigm For Private Cleanup
Ronald G. Aronovsky
Cost Disputes ..........................................

395

Estate Taxation of Redemption Agreements:
The Treasury Loses "Control" .................... James M. Delaney 491
The New "Fetal Protection": The Wrong
Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate
Health Care for Women and Children ........ Linda C. Fentiman 537
The Constitutional Right to Privacy ............................ Lee Goldman 601
Assessing Alternative Compensation Models
for Online Content Consumption ........................

Tal Z. Zarsky

645

Andrew Fiske

721

Brown v. Sanders: Invalid Factors and
Appellate Review in Capital Sentencing ......... Karen Lamprey

743

COMMENTS

Disputed-Consent Searches: An Uncharacteristic
Step Toward Reinforcing Defendants'
Privacy Rights ....................................................

PARENTS INVOL VED & MEREDITH: A PREDICTION
REGARDING THE (UN)CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACECONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS
EBONI S. NELSON

t

ABSTRACT

During the October 2006 Term, the United States Supreme Court
will consider the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student
assignment plans as employed in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson
County Board of Education. These cases will mark the Court'sfirst inquiry regardingthe use of race to combat de facto segregation in public
education. This article examines the constitutionality of such plans and
provides a prediction regardingthe Court's decisions.
This article begins with an analysis of the resegregation trend currently plaguing American educational institutions and identifies two
causesfor the occurrence: (1) the shift in the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence regarding desegregation; and (2) school officials' adherence to
the "neighborhood school concept" when making student assignment
decisions. This article then examines the challengedplans, specifically
their attempts to create and maintain racially diverse student bodies
through the use of racial tiebreakers and guidelines. After considering
the Supreme Court'sprior decisions and rationale regardingthe use of
race in education, this articlepredicts that the Supreme Court will strike
down both plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In light of
this probable outcome, this article urges school officials to consider
race-neutralmethods to achieve diversity and to improve the quality of
educationprovided to disadvantaged,minority students.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2003, after a twenty-five year hiatus,1 the United States Supreme
Court reentered the passionate and controversial debate surrounding affirmative action in the context of public education. The Court's dual
decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and Gratz v. Bollinger3 sanctioned the
limited use of race as a factor in higher education admissions decisions.
During the October 2006 Term, the Court will revisit the issue of affirmative action, only this time the inquiry will concern the use of race in
elementary and secondary education rather than higher education.
In a somewhat surprising announcement, the Court decided to hear
the appeals of two cases challenging school districts' use of race in student assignment decisions.4 Six months prior to the Court's decision to
hear arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School DistrictNo. 15 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Boardof Education,6 the Court declined to grant certiorari in a similar case,7 thereby

1. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education).
2.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3.
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4.
See Charles Lane, Justices to Hear Cases of Race-Conscious School Placements, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2006, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/06/05/AR2006060500367.html.
5.
(Parents11), 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5,
2006) (No. 05-908).
6.
McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 861 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). The Supreme Court has set both cases for
argument on December 4, 2006. See Argument Calendars (October Term 2006) Session Beginning
November
27,
2006,
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/
argument_calcndars/MonthlyArgumentCalDecember2006.pdf.
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prompting speculation as to the reasons for the Court's apparent aboutface. One could attribute the Court's decision to its desire to reconcile
circuit court splits regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious student assignment plans pre- and post-Grutter.8 While this reason may be
plausible, it would not appear to be the primary reason given that such
splits existed prior to the Court's certiorari denial in Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn School Committee.9 Others have hypothesized that the
Court's decision to grant certiorari was precipitated by the change in its
composition-a change that some think may prove to be the death knell
of desegregation.' 0
The composition of the Court that declined to hear Lynn included
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who wrote the 5 to 4 Grutter opinion upholding the use of race in higher education. Often thought of as the
"swing vote" in controversial and pivotal cases," Justice O'Connor retired from the Court in 2006.12 Following the appointment of her replacement, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who is commonly thought to be
a conservative Justice,13 the newly constituted Court agreed to hear Par7. See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003),
af'd, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005) (upholding the use of race in
elementary and secondary education student transfer policies).
8.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-15, Parents H, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908),
2006 WL 1579631 (detailing circuits' conflicting holdings regarding the constitutionality of raceconscious assignment plans and urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari "to remove this uncertainty and confusion" regarding "how Grutter and Gratz affect the Equal Protection rights of students in public high schools"); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-11, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351
(No. 05-915), 2006 WL 165912 (arguing that the Court should grant certiorari because "[t]he decision of the Sixth Circuit directly conflicts with decisions of the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits
concerning voluntarily-adopted race-based student assignment plans designed to advance racial
diversity"); see also Lane, supranote 4.
9.
126 S. Ct. 798 (2005); see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-10, Lynn, 126 S. Ct. 798
(No. 05-348), 2005 WL 2275949 (noting conflicts between the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth
and Ninth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of public schools voluntarily adopting raceconscious student assignment plans to achieve racial diversity).
10. See Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Race as Factorin School Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, June
6,
2006,
at
Al,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/washington/
06scotus.html?ex= 1307246400&en-7b7blaf6cbef8911 &ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
(suggesting that the change in Supreme Court Justices prompted the Court to grant certiorari); Lane,
supra note 4 (quoting Professor Goodwin Liu's thoughts of the Court's granting of certiorari as "bad
news for desegregation advocates .... It looks like the more conservative [Jiustices see they have a
fifth vote to reverse these cases").
11.
See Tom Curry, O'Connor Had Immense Power as Swing Vote, July 1, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304484/ (describing Justice O'Connor as "often the swing vote that
decided
high-profile
cases");
see
also
High
Court
at
a
Crossroads,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9531661/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (detailing six significant Supreme Court decisions, ranging from partial birth abortion to state sovereign immunity, in which
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth deciding vote).
12.
Although Justice O'Connor announced her resignation on July 1, 2005, it was not effective until the confirmation of her successor, which occurred on January 31, 2006, with the swearing
in of Justice Alito. See William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice 0 'Connor Resigns, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/0l/
AR2005070100653.html; Alito Sworn In as Supreme Court Justice, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/l 1111624/ [hereinafter Alito Sworn In].
13.
See Alito Sworn In, supra note 12 (describing Justice Alito as a "conservative lawyer for
the Reagan administration"); Don Gonyea, All Things Considered: Republicans PraiseAlito 's Con-
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ents Involved and Meredith, which will be the first time the Court has
addressed the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race in elementary
and secondary school student assignment plans. 14 While no one can
know how any of the Justices will vote in the cases, many affirmative
action opponents hope that the additions of Justice Alito and Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.15 to the Court will result in the prohibition of
race-conscious assignment programs in public elementary and secondary
schools. 16 Supporters of affirmative action fear that such a ruling will
prompt and exacerbate resegregation trends currently plaguing public
education.17 Whether the Court upholds or strikes down the assignment
plans employed in the two cases, Parents Involved and Meredith will
significantly contribute to the jurisprudence concerning equality in public
education.
Many agree that public elementary and secondary schools are more
segregated today than they were prior to the Brown v. Board of Educaservative
Credentials (NPR
radio
broadcast
Oct.
31,
2005),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4983450 (describing Justice Alito as "a judicial favorite of the conservative movement"); Bill Mears, Alito 's Record Shows Conservative Judge,
CNN.coM, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/alito.record/index.html
(discussing Justice Alito's "conservative judicial philosophy" and relating views that he was "the
most conservative member of the [Third Circuit Court of Appeals]").
14.
Throughout the article, reference to the "voluntary" use of race in student assignment
plans refers to school districts' consideration of students' race absent the operation of a federally
mandated desegregation decree.
15.
Following the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed on September 29, 2005. See Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th
Chief Justice, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.htm. Although void of a lengthy judicial history, Chief Justice Roberts' commentary regarding race-based affirmative action prior to
taking the bench has led some to believe that he generally opposes race-based affirmative action.
As Acting Solicitor General, Roberts' approval of a brief opposing the Federal Communications Commission's affirmative action program for broadcast licensees and later, as a
private attorney, his brief on behalf of the Associated General Contractors of America in
opposition to the government's highway construction program in AdarandConstructors
v. Pena clearly indicate that had Roberts sat in the place of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
equal access to higher education (Grutterv. Bollinger) and contracting (Adarand v. Pena)
would have been foreclosed to minorities.
Press Release, American Association for Affirmative Action Opposes Confirmation of John Roberts
for Chief Justice of U.S. Supreme Court (Sept. 5, 2005) (quoting Robert Ethridge, President of the
American Association for Affirmative Action), available at http://www.affirmativeaction.org/
press.jsp.
16.
See Lane, supra note 4 ("Sharon Browne, principal attorney of the Pacific Legal Foundation, which supports the parents' lawsuits [in ParentsInvolved and Meredith], said she 'was pleased
that the Court has decided to hear these cases. Together, these cases could put an end to schools
using race as a factor to decide where children can attend school."'); Greenhouse, supra note 10
(quoting Sharon Browne as saying, "I think the writing's on the wall, or at least I hope it is.").
17.
See Gina Holland, Supreme Court to Hear Schools Race Case, CBS NEWS, June 5, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/05/ap/politics/mainD8I2AB70O.shtml
("A ruling against
the schools 'would be pretty devastating to suburban communities, small towns that have successfully maintained desegregation for a couple of generations,' he said. 'The same communities that
were forced to desegregate would be forced to re-segregate."') (quoting Gary Orfield, Director of the
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University); Bob Egelko & Heather Knight, Justices Take Cases on
Race - Based Enrollment, But Prop. 209 Means California Schools Likely to be Unaffected, S.F.
CHRON., June 6, 2006, at B I (noting views that the consideration of race in public elementary and
secondary schools is necessary to "reverse growing resegregation of the schools").
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tion'8 decision.' 9 Current resegregation trends threaten thirty years of
progress that have been made in the desegregation of African-American
students, 20 thereby impeding the fulfillment of Brown's promise of educational equality. Realizing the potentially devastating effects of segregated schools, 2' several school districts have voluntarily begun to employ
race-conscious student assignment plans, such as those challenged in
Parents Involved and Meredith, to prevent and remedy resegregation of
their schools. This article examines the constitutionality of such plans
and hypothesizes that the Supreme Court will strike down both student
assignment plans employed in ParentsInvolved and Meredith as unconstitutional.
Part I begins with an analysis of factors contributing to resegregation in elementary and secondary schools. Just as the Supreme Court has
been an invaluable tool by which to desegregate public schools, some of
its decisions have also enabled resegregation to flourish. Part I also discusses the negative impact that school districts' adherence to the
"neighborhood school concept" has had on the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students.
Part II examines the district court and Ninth Circuit opinions in
Meredith and Parents Involved. It discusses the compelling interests
asserted by the school districts to justify their narrowly tailored use of
race in student assignment decisions.
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans as employed in ParentsInvolved and Meredith.
Although difficult to predict, this article hypothesizes that the Court will
invalidate both student assignment plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This hypothesis is predicated on the Court's previous decisions and rationale concerning the use of race in the context of public
education.
This article concludes with suggestions regarding policies and programs that school districts can utilize in their attempts to combat the se18.
(Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
19. See Hon. Robert L. Carter, The Conception of Brown, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 99
(2004) (concluding that "[t]here are more segregated secondary and primary schools today than
existed before Brown"); Marvin Krislov, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Value, the
Method, and the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 906 (2004) (concluding that many parts of the
country are experiencing segregation at levels greater than those existing when Brown was decided);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed?: Brown's Past and Brown's Future, 107 W. VA. L.
REV. 625, 631 (2005) (noting that "public schools in many areas are more segregated than they were
before Brown"); Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: HypersegregatedHousing Patternsand the
Failureof School Desegregation,9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 65 (2002) (stating that "public schools
in many urban communities are more segregated now than they were in the pre-Brown era").
20.
See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., HARV. C.R. PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH
THE DREAM? 4 (2003), available at
SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS:
ARE WE LOSING

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (discussing
a twelve year decline in the desegregation of African-American students).
21.
See infra Part I (discussing the negative effects of resegregation on public education).
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vere costs imposed by racial and economic segregation in public education.
I. SCHOOL HOUSE ROCK: RESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS

Throughout our history, public education has occupied a significant
role in our society. Its importance has been the bedrock of legal decisions concerning the provision of educational opportunities to undocu24
23
mented children,22 children with disabilities, and minority students.
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Brown I:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made
25
available to all on equal terms.
Unfortunately, Brown Ps recognition of the inherent inequality of
racially segregated schools 26 has not prevented such segregation from
occurring. This section explores two factors that have contributed to the
resegregation of public educational institutions: first, the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding mandatory desegregation efforts;
and second, local school districts' adherence to the "neighborhood school
concept" when making student assignment decisions. The Supreme
Court's dilution of desegregation mandates and school districts' use of
racially segregated neighborhoods as criteria for student assignments
have both exacerbated the resegregation trends currently afflicting public
educational institutions.
A. The Court Giveth, the Court Taketh Away
The attainment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic
minority students has often been pursued via legal measures. From
22.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that denied
public education to children not legally admitted to the country).
23.
See Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 526 U.S. 66, 67 (1999) (holding that Congress' intent "to open the doors of public education to all qualified children" required the school
district to provide nursing services to a quadriplegic student in accordance with federal disability law
(citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 192 (1982))).
24.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating segregation
of races in public schools); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (upholding the narrowly tailored use of race in
higher education admissions decisions).
25.
Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
26.
Id. at 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separateeducationalfacilities are inherently unequal." (emphasis added)).
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Brown I to Grutter, Supreme Court intervention has helped to open the
school house doors for countless numbers of students of color.27 Despite
such access, however, African-American and Hispanic students continue
to lag behind their white counterparts in terms of academic achievement.2 8 This phenomenon can be explained, in part, by the environments
in which many minority students are educated.2 9
Due to the resegregation trend experienced by many public schools,
an astounding number of African-American and Hispanic children are
educated in racially and economically segregated schools. "[A]lmost
three-fourths of black and Latino students attend schools that are predominantly minority."30 Of the 2.4 million students attending schools
that are 99%-100% minority, African-American and Hispanic students
account for 2.3 million.3' Unfortunately, "[t]he schools that have the
highest minority enrollment also have the highest incidence of student
poverty: [i]n 87% of schools that are over 90% minority (AfricanAmerican and Hispanic), over half of the students come from families
living in poverty." 32 These figures are particularly disturbing when one
considers the disadvantages and challenges that students attending such
schools must overcome to succeed academically.33

27.

See Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement and Family

Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists in Support of Respondents at 8, Grutter,539 U.S. 306

(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 539178 (noting that the number of African-American college graduates has increased from less than 5% in 1960 to approximately 7.5% in 2000; in addition, the number
of African-American law students has increased from 1% in 1960 to 7.4% in 1996); Danielle R.
Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation Trend in our PublicSchools, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 1085, 1086 & n.4 (2004-2005) (discussing the positive impact of the Brown decision on
racial integration in public schools); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve
Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 791, 791 n.4 (2005) ("In 1965, only 15.2% of AfricanAmericans between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine had attended college; by 1995, that
number had risen to 44.9%. Among African-Americans in that age bracket, 15.3% had completed
four or more years of college in 1995, compared to 6.8% in 1965." (citing James T. Patterson,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 230

(2001))). "In the 1990s, college enrollment by students of color increased by nearly 50%." Id.
(citing William B. Harvey, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2001-2002:
NINETEENTH ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 2 (2002)).

28. See Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, But Are We
Losing the War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 8-9, 25-26 (2005) (discussing racial disparities in educational
achievement).
29. See Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 at 299-300 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that "AfricanAmerican and Hispanic children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming
institutions").
30.

FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 28.

31.
32.

Id.
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 273 (1999); see also

GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. C.R. PROJECT, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR

PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 22 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg04/brown50.pdf (concluding that "students in highly segregated neighborhood schools
are many times more likely to be in schools of concentrated poverty").
33.
See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 32, at 21-22 (detailing poverty concentrated school disadvantages such as school deterioration, lack of resources, less experienced teachers and fewer college
preparatory courses).
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Although the Supreme Court has issued decisions to help facilitate
the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students,34
the Court has also issued opinions-three, in particular, referred to as the
"resegregation trilogy" 3 5-that have hindered the progress of desegregation.36 The Court's decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell,37 Freeman v. Pitts,38 and Missouri v. Jenkins39 have relaxed
school districts' responsibilities and duties to eliminate all vestiges of
racial segregation, thereby permitting the premature dissolution of federally mandated desegregation decrees when racial imbalance persists.40
The Supreme Court's decision in Dowell evidences its reluctance to
continue taking an active role in the desegregation of public educational
institutions 4' as it had in previous cases. 42 The Court's decision appears
to be guided by its pronouncement that "federal supervision of local
school systems [was] intended as a temporary measure to remedy past
discrimination. ' 43 To hasten the return of educational decisions to local
school officials, the Court set forth a less stringent test to determine
whether a school system has successfully complied with a desegregation
decree so as to warrant its dissolution. Unlike the Court's demand in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County" that school boards
34.
See supra notes 24, 27; see also Green v. County Sch. Bd.of New Kent County, Va., 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (placing an "affirmative duty" on school boards operating segregated systems "to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11),
349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955) (instructing district courts to enter desegregation decrees that mandate the admission of
African-American students into public schools "with all deliberate speed").
35.
Ware, supra note 19, at 63.
36.
See id.at 65 (referring to the three cases as "a three-fold shift from an affirmative duty to
eliminate all vestiges of segregation to acquiescence to resegregation"). Arguably, Supreme Court
cases decided prior to the resegregation trilogy have also hindered the progress of desegregation and
educational equality. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting the imposition
of multi-district desegregation policies to remedy single-district intentional discrimination); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding local property taxation as a
constitutionally permissible method for school financing despite resulting disparities in per-student
expenditures).
37.
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
38. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
39.
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
40.
See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudenceof Choice and Diversity in
Race andSex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 455, 465-73 (discussing the impact of the
three cases on district courts' decisions to dissolve desegregation orders, "even if desegregation
actually had not been accomplished").
41.
See Holley, supra note 27, at 1090 & n.31 (describing the Supreme Court's decisions in
Dowell, Freeman and Jenkins as evidence of its "hostility towards federal court supervision of
school desegregation").
42.
See supra note 34; see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471,
487 (1982) (striking down a state initiative intended to "interfere... with desegregative busing");
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1971) (upholding the ordering of
a racial balance requirement and bus transportation as permissible tools of school desegregation).
43.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added); see also id. (stating that desegregation decrees
"are not intended to operate in perpetuity"). Some scholars suggest that such statements evidence
the Court's "impatience with the duration of desegregation orders," or perhaps, "an abandonment of
the original purpose" of desegregation. See Levit, supranote 40, at 472 & n.91.
44.
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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develop systems "in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch, 4 5 the Dowell Court instructed lower courts to ask only
"whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree . . .and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been

eliminated to the extent practicable.',46 This test appears to concede the
point that the complete elimination of segregation is impractical; therefore, school districts that demonstrate a good faith effort to desegregate
and eliminate traces of past discrimination can be released from judicial
control and supervision even though circumstances remain that hinder
desegregation.47
The Court reiterated the Dowell test in Freeman as it continued to
chip away at the desegregation safeguards that it had previously helped
to establish.4 8 In Freeman, respondents argued that a district court
should not relinquish its supervision and control over a school system
until the school district fully complies with all components of a desegregation decree. 49 The Court rejected this argument and sanctioned the
incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision once a school system is
determined to be in compliance with certain categories of a desegregation order.50 In arriving at its decision, the Court once again relied heavily on its desire to return control of school systems to state and local officials. 5'
Guided by the "ultimate objective . . .to return school districts to

the control of local authorities," the Court reasoned that such restoration
is "essential to restore [local authorities'] true accountability in our governmental system., 52 One must be mindful, however, that local authorities' previous control of school systems resulted in unequal and segregated dual systems-systems that necessitated the imposition of courtordered desegregation decrees in attempts to remedy them. Over ten
years passed before the local school officials in Freeman took affirmative steps to adhere to the Supreme Court's mandate that school districts

45.
Green, 391 U.S. at 438; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that the Supreme Court's
objective "remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation"
(emphasis added)).
46.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
47.
See Holley, supra note 27, at 1092 (concluding that the Dowell test excludes the possibility of resegregation as a factor for determining unitary status so as to warrant the dissolution of a
desegregation decree); Levit, supra note 40, at 464-65 (discussing the Dowell test as an invitation to
lower courts to dissolve desegregation decrees even if segregation continues to exist); Ware, supra
note 19, at 64 (concluding that the Dowell test allows for a finding of unitary status despite a showing that schools remained racially segregated due to housing patterns).
48.
Freeman,503 U.S. at 492.
49.
See id. at 471.
50.
See id. at 490-9 1.
51.
See id. at 489-90 ("Partial relinquishment of judicial control ... can be an important and
significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and control of schools to
local authorities.").
52. Id.at 489-90.
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desegregate "with all deliberate speed,, 53 and such steps were initiated
only after the respondents filed their lawsuit. 54 At the time the Court
decided Freeman, over thirty-five years had passed since its decision in
Brown I. Nevertheless, the local DeKalb County school officials continued to operate a school system that was violative of the desegregation
order. 55 Such failures and delayed action should cause district courts and
the Supreme Court pause when considering the arguably premature return of school systems to local control.
The Freeman decision may also hinder desegregation efforts because of its discussion regarding a school district's duty (or lack thereof)
to remedy racial imbalance that continues to exist in its schools. The
respondents in Freeman presented evidence demonstrating the continuance of racial imbalance in DeKalb County schools.56 Petitioners argued
that such imbalance was not caused by prior de jure discrimination;
rather, it was due to demographic changes within the county. 57 The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's contention that the school
district "bore the responsibility for the racial imbalance, and in order to
correct that imbalance would have to take actions that 'may be adminis58
tratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations.'
The Court clarified that "[o]nce racial imbalance traceable to the constitutional violation has been remedied, a school district is under no duty to
remedy an imbalance that is caused by demographic factors., 59 When
coupled with the Court's sanctioning of the incremental withdrawal of
judicial supervision once a school district has been deemed to have complied with certain provisions of a desegregation decree, this pronouncement begs the question: With whom does the duty lie to desegregate
schools if it does not lie with local school districts? If, as in Freeman,
school districts are partially or fully released from their desegregation
orders even though their minority students continue to attend racially
segregated schools, then the likelihood of achieving true desegregation in
public education and the benefits that arise from such educational environments is doubtful.
School districts' ability to remedy resegregation of their educational
institutions may be further hindered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Jenkins. The district court in Jenkins ordered a variety of educational
programs and initiatives in its efforts to improve the educational quality
53.
Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301.
54. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (describing the school system's reluctant response to desegregation mandates).
55.
See id.at 474 (discussing the district court's findings that the school system continued to
be segregated with regards to "teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of
education").
56. Id.at 476-77.
57. Id.at 478.
58. Id.at 485 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 28).
59. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
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of the Kansas City, Missouri School District and to eliminate all vestiges
of segregation. 60 The two measures challenged by the State were salary
increases for instructional and noninstructional staff and remedial quality
education programs. 6' The State argued that the requirement of salary
increases for teachers and non-teaching staff exceeded the district court's
remedial authority. 62 In upholding the State's challenge, the Supreme
Court agreed that a district court cannot use 'interdistrict' measures to
remedy 'intradistrict' constitutional violations. 63 Concluding that measures such as salary increases were motivated by the district court's pursuit of "desegregative attractiveness," 64 the Court rejected the Eighth
Circuit's contention that "[v]oluntary interdistrict remedies may be used
to make meaningful integration possible in a predominantly minority
district. 65 This rejection greatly restricts district courts' ability to fashion
effective measures that can be used to remedy the devastating effects of
segregation.
Perhaps one of the most harmful lingering effects of segregation is
minority students' lack of academic achievement. 66 Greater numbers of
African-American students fail to complete high school as compared to
white students. 67 African-American students, many of whom attend racially imbalanced schools, routinely score lower than their white counterparts on standardized tests.68 Fewer African-American adults, as
60. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 75-78 (1995) (describing the district court's ordering of class reductions, magnet school programs, capital improvements, and salary increases as
measures to improve academic achievement and remedy effects of segregation).
61.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.
62. Id. at 84.
63.
Id. at 89-98 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 80 (citation omitted). According to the Court, "desegregative attractiveness" refers
to the implementation of programs and initiatives that will improve the attractiveness of schools
within a school district such that nonminority students who are not presently attending schools
within the district will decide to enroll, thereby helping to desegregate the schools. See id. at 91-92.
65.
Id. at 91 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)).
66. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that segregation has a negative impact on the educational development of African-American children); Lisa J. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter: Ensuring Diversity in K-12 Schools, 52 UCLA L. REv. 563, 586-87 (2004) (discussing research suggesting
that segregated educational environments may have detrimental effects on the academic development of minority children); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equalityof EducationalOpportunity
in the Wake of JudicialRetreatfrom Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessonsfrom North Carolina,52 AM.
U. L. REv. 1477, 1485 & n.33 (2003) (citing research showing segregation's adverse effects on
minority students' academic achievements).
67.
In 2004, the drop out rate for African-Americans age 16-24 was 11.8% as compared to
6.8% for Whites. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006,
STATUS
DROPOUT
RATES
BY
RACE/ETHNICITY
tbl.26-1
(2006),
available
at

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=48 1.
68.
See Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII DisparateImpact: The Role of the 1991
Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of FederalJudges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 267-68 (2005).
Songer reported:
The most recent study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University found that 70%
of minority children attend American schools with majority-minority populations. More
than one-third of these children attend schools that are comprised of at least 90% African
American students. African American students continue to score significantly lower than
White students on standardized tests used in college and graduate school admissions.
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compared to white adults, obtain a college education. 69 Such achievement gaps are due, in part, to disparities existing between the quality of
teachers at poor, minority-concentrated schools and their more affluent,
white counterparts.
For example, novice teachers, who are obviously not as qualified as
more experienced teachers, are disproportionately assigned to high poverty, majority-minority schools. 70 The percentage of high school students attending high-minority, high-poverty schools that are taught English, science, and mathematics by "teachers who have neither a major nor
certification in the subject they teach" is twice the percentage of students
encountering the same experience at schools with low minority and poverty populations. 7' Obviously, such disparities have a detrimental impact
on minority students' academic achievement. If such disparities could be
rectified, then the positive impact on student achievement could be tremendous, and the hope of eliminating all vestiges of segregation could
become a reality.
This is what the district court in Jenkins attempted to accomplish by
72
ordering the State to fund salary increases in its desegregation efforts.
Remedial measures such as salary increases can positively affect teacher
quality disparities and, consequently, student achievement disparities, by
attracting more highly-qualified teachers and personnel to minorityconcentrated schools. Exposing minority students to more experienced,
more educated and more effective teachers will improve their educational opportunities and lessen the detrimental effects of segregation and
past discrimination.73 Unfortunately, by finding that the district court
exceeded its remedial authority by ordering salary increases for school
personnel, the Supreme Court deprived district courts of a valuable tool

Id. (footnotes omitted). Keith R. Walsh, Book Note, Color-BlindRacism in Grutter and Gratz, 24

B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 443, 450-51 (2004) (discussing the gap between African-American and
white students' scores on standardized admissions tests).
69.
See Walsh, supra note 68, at 450 & n.49 (noting that 28% of white adults are college
educated as compared to 16% of African-American adults and that "[a]s of 2000, only 17.8% of
African Americans over the age of twenty-five had completed four or more years of college, while
34% of their white counterparts could say the same" (citation omitted)).
70.
Novice teachers are assigned to minority concentrated schools at twice the rate as those
assigned to schools with low minority populations. HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, THE
EDUC. TRUST, TEACHING INEQUALITY: How POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED
ON
TEACHER
QUALITY
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/
rdonlyres/O1ODBD9F-CED8-4D2B-9EOD-91B446746ED3/0/TQReportJune2006.pdf.
71.
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, OUT-OF-FIELD
TEACHING BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENT
1 (2004), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2004/section4/indicator24.asp; see also PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra

note 70, at 3 (noting that "[iln secondary schools serving the most minority students, almost one in
three classes are assigned to an out-of-field teacher compared to about one in five in low-minority
schools").
72.
See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.
73. See PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 70, at II (noting research findings indicating the

positive impact interaction with highly effective teachers can have on low-performing students).
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in their efforts to eradicate vestiges of segregation and create educational
equality.
The establishment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic minority students is also threatened by the Court's admonition regarding the use of student achievement levels as a measure to determine
partial unitary status. 4 After finding that the school district "had not
reached anywhere close to its 'maximum potential because the District is
still at or below national norms at many grade levels,"' 75 the district court
ordered the State to continue funding quality education programs designed to improve the educational achievement of all students, especially
African-Americans.76 The State challenged the order on the grounds that
improvement on test scores is not a requirement to achieve partial unitary
status. 77 In upholding the State's challenge, the Court directed the district court to "sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on" student
performance on achievement tests in its determination of partial unitary
status.78 Although the district court maintained that a school district
must achieve its "maximum potential" regarding its desegregation efforts
before it can be deemed to have partially complied with a desegregation
decree, the Supreme Court rejected this test and re-imposed the lower
standard of "practicability" articulated in Dowell.79 By rejecting the district court's more stringent test, the Court invited premature findings of
partial unitary status despite the fact that minority students continue to
suffer from reductions in academic achievement.
The Court also extends this invitation by its directive to the district
court to be mindful of its end goal to return control of a school system to
state and local officials. 80 In its efforts to expedite the return of educational decisions to local control, the Court appears to have abandoned its
previous stance "that the court has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." 81 As
shown by the number of schools experiencing resegregation following

74.
A previously intentionally segregated school district achieves partial unitary status when a
district court determines that the school district has successfully complied with certain, although not
all, components of a desegregation decree so as to be deemed to no longer discriminate on the basis
of race with regards to that particular component. For further discussion of the term "unitary," see
Holley, supra note 27, at ! 091 n.33.
75. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 73.
77. Id. at 101.
78. Id.
79. See id. (stating the partial unitary test as "whether the reduction in achievement by minority students attributable to prior de jure segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable"
(emphasis added)).
80.
See id. at 102 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)).
81.
Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154
(1965)).
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the dissolution of desegregation decrees, 82 the withdrawal of judicial
oversight, based on the relaxed standards of Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins, has had a negative impact both on the elimination of discriminatory
effects and on the prevention of such harmful effects in the future.8 3
Such impact is due, in part, to local officials' reliance on the "neighborhood school concept" when making student assignment decisions. As
demonstrated in the following section, employing student assignment
methods that are based on racially segregated neighborhoods produces
resegregation in public education and the detrimental effects that accompany such environments.
B. The NeighborhoodSchool Dilemma
Historically, the neighborhood school concept, which calls for the
assignment of students to schools that are in close proximity to their
homes, has been a preferred method for making school assignment decisions. 84 Many argue that adherence to neighborhood schools provide
educational benefits ranging from increased parental and community
involvement that results in improved student achievement, 85 to reductions in transportation costs, which provide additional funding for teacher

82.
See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education s "Perfect Storm "? RacialResegregation,HighStakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina,81 N.C. L. REV. 1375,
1394-95 (2003) (noting the resegregation consequences flowing from the dissolution of a thirty-yearold desegregation decree) Boger stated:
The consequences flowing from the Capacchione [v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools]
ruling were swift and dramatic: in the 2002-2003 school year, the number of CharlotteMecklenburg schools with minority enrollment of 91% to 100% more than doubled from
the previous year-from seven elementary schools in 2001-2002 to sixteen in 2002-2003,
and from two middle schools to four. There was no change in the number of elementary
and middle schools with minority enrollment of 20% or less.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Holley, supra note 27, at 1095-96 & n.60 (noting that thirty-four of
the thirty-eight school districts that have achieved unitary status since the Dowell decision have
experienced resegregation as measured by "a decrease in the exposure of black students to white
students, and the exposure of Latino students to white students").
83.
See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 32, at 18 (attributing the resegregation trend "to the
impact of three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995 limiting school desegregation and
authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools").
84.
See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (noting the Supreme Court's recognition that "[aIll things
being equal.., it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes"); see also
Levit, supra note 40, at 456 & n.6 (referring to state initiatives to pass and implement "Neighborhood Schools Acts"). Student assignments based on proximity to one's home are especially favored
when compared to the alternative of busing. See Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the
Post-Brown South: Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 746-47
(2004) (quoting former North Carolina Governor Robert Scott as stating, "The neighborhood-school
concept has been the strength of our public education system in North Carolina and our state has
been committed to that policy for some time. It is sound educational policy and must be preserved."
(citation omitted)); Id.at 747 (quoting former President Richard Nixon as describing neighborhood
schools as "the most appropriate ... system" (citation omitted)); Levit, supra note 40, at 456 & n.5
(referring to Congressional anti-busing legislation setting forth the government's official policy that
"students attend neighborhood schools").
85.
Patrick James McQuillan & Kerry Suzanne Englert, The Return to NeighborhoodSchools,
ConcentratedPoverty, and Educational Opportunity:An Agenda for Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 739, 743 (2001).
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salaries and educational programs. 86 These benefits, however, are
greatly outweighed by the detrimental effects that accompany many
neighborhood school decisions: namely, the resegregation of elementary
and secondary schools and the overwhelming challenges that are present
in such environments.
Following the termination of desegregation decrees and the return
of educational decisions to local control, many school districts returned
to the neighborhood school concept when making their student assignment decisions.87 Considering the rate of residential segregation in
communities throughout the country, it is not surprising that such decisions have resulted in the resegregation of public schools. 88 "One-third
of all African Americans in the United States live under conditions of
intense racial segregation. 89 In 2000, over 230 American urban communities could be described as "hypersegregated" or "partially segregated." 90 Therefore, in accordance with student assignment policies that
assign students to schools based on neighborhood proximity, schools
populated by students living in these areas will also experience high levels of racial segregation, 9' which often brings about adverse educational
consequences.

86.
Kenneth O'Neil Salyer, Beyond Zelman: Reinventing Neighborhood Schools, 33 J.L. &
EDUC. 283, 287-88 (2004) (discussing the advantages of neighborhood schools). Other proffered
advantages of neighborhood schools include the following: reduction in student-teacher ratios,
reduction in travel safety hazards, creation of sense of community, and simplification of student
assignment policies. Id; see also Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De
Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (1992).
87.
Molly S. McUsic, The Futureof Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of
the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1342 (2004) (noting school districts' reversion to
"neighborhood schools placed in segregated neighborhoods"); Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and MetropolitanIntegration: The Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24
LAW & INEQ. 269, 294, 322-23 (2006) (discussing the impact of termination of desegregation decrees and reinstitution of neighborhood schools on the resegregation of Minneapolis schools);
Speech by Theodore M Shaw: From Brown to Grutter: The Legal Strugglefor Racial Equality, 16
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 43, 52 (2004) (recounting the incident in which the Norfolk Virginia School
District expressed "its intention to return to neighborhood schools by abandoning its desegregation
plan after a declaration of unitary status").
88. Michael Selmi, Race in the City: The Triumph of Diversity and the Loss of Integration,22
J.L. & POL. 49, 69 (2006) (noting that school segregation "follows housing segregation"); Ware,
supra note 19, at 56 (attributing the failure of desegregation efforts in many urban schools to pervasive "segregated housing patterns").
89. Ware, supra note 19, at 65 (quoting DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 (1993)).
90. Boger, supra note 82, at 1402 & n.97 (detailing residential segregation levels in metropolitan areas).
91.
Id. at 1400 (predicting that "residential segregation will prove especially likely to lead to
school resegregation if districts choose student assignment strategies based on neighborhood
schools"); see also id. at 1407-08 (discussing racial segregation increases in North Carolina schools
following the implementation of neighborhood schools assignment plans); GARY ORFIELD &
CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. C.R. PROJECT, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF

SEGREGATION 9 (2006), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/
RacialTransformation.pdf (noting that "[s]ince the Supreme Court authorized a return to segregated
neighborhood schools . . . , the percentage of black students attending majority nonwhite schools
increased in all regions from 66 percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 2003-4") (footnote omitted).
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Research shows that students attending racially segregated schools,
which are often economically segregated as well, 92 encounter tremendous
challenges that greatly hinder their educational achievement. Students
attending schools with majority minority student populations are often
educated in "substandard and deteriorating facilities. 93 Their learning
environments often suffer from "shortages of library books, computers,
or laboratory equipment., 94 The teachers who educate them are often
less qualified than those teaching at racially and economically diverse
schools. 95 This lack of resources leads to disparities in minority stu96
dents' academic achievement as measured by standardized tests scores,
98
high school drop-out and graduation rates, 97 college matriculation rates,
and post-graduate degrees. 99
Not only are students attending segregated schools forced to overcome educational resources deficiencies, but they are also deprived of
the educational benefits related to interacting with students who possess
higher educational aspirations. Unfortunately, many minority students
who live in lower-income, racially segregated neighborhoods and attend
lower performing schools within those neighborhoods have low expectations regarding academic achievement. In fact, some minority communities suffer from a culture that devalues academic success,1 00 which significantly undermines minority students' academic expectations and aspirations. As noted by scholar John Charles Boger:
[A] pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the
92.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
93.
Levit, supra note 40, at 497 (quoting Leland Ware, Redlining Learners: Delaware's
Neighborhood Schools Act, 20 DEL. LAW. 14, 16 (2002)).
94.
Boger, supra note 82, at 1382.
95.
Id. at 1447 (citations omitted); see also Levit, supra note 40, at 498; supra notes 69-70
and accompanying text.
96.
See Curt A. Levey, Racial Preferences in Admissions. Myths, Harms, andAlternatives, 66
ALB. L. REV. 489, 502 (2003) (discussing racial disparities in minority and nonminority students'
standardized test scores); Walsh, supra note 68 (discussing disparities between Blacks and Whites
regarding their performance on standardized tests).
97.
In 2004, the high school drop out rate for African-American students age 16-24 was
11.8% compared to 6.8% for their white counterparts. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, STATUS DROPOUT RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY tbl.26-1 (2006),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=481. In 2005, fewer
Blacks than Whites age 25-29 years old had completed high school (87% vs. 93%). NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATrAINMENT tbl.31-1

(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=492.
98.
In 2005, only 49.0% of African-Americans between the ages of 25-29 had completed at
least some college as compared to 64.3% of Whites. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATFAINMENT tbl.31-2 (2006), available at

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=493;
see also A. Mechele
Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1769-70 (2004).
99.
In 2005, 34.1% of Whites between the ages of 25-29 had obtained a bachelor's degree or
higher while only 17.5% of Blacks had achieved the same educational success. NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT tbl.31-3

(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=494.
100.
Nelson, supra note 28, at 26 & n. 127.
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school .... Thus ... if a minority pupil from a home without much
educational strength is put with schoolmates with strong educational
backgrounds, his achievement is likely to increase.101
If, in fact, "the social characteristics of a school's student body [are] the
single most important school-related factor in predicting minority student
achievement," 10 2 student assignment plans that rely on poor, racially segregated neighborhoods will only exacerbate the current disparities existing between minority and non-minority student achievement.
Considering the detrimental impact the creation of neighborhood
schools has on desegregation efforts and, consequently, the quality of
education received by many minority students, one wonders why school
boards continue to create and advocate for them. While school boards'
decisions to adhere to neighborhood schools may be attributed, in part, to
their purported benefits, 10 3 parents' vocal opposition to busing and school
boundary proposals has also greatly influenced school boards' actions.
Due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of school boards are
elected positions, 104 their members must confront political pressures that
are brought to bear upon them by their constituents. Having particular
influence on school board members are those voting parents who organize in efforts to oppose school boundary and student assignment proposals that attempt
to diversify schools, both in terms of race and socioeco10 5

nomic status.

101.
Boger, supra note 82, at 1415 (quoting JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL.,
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 22 (1966)).
102.
Id. (citation omitted).
103.
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
104.
BOARDS

EQUALITY OF

See FREDERICK M. HESS, SCH. OF EDUC. AND DEP'T OF GOV'T, UNIV. OF VA., SCHOOL
AT
THE
DAWN
OF
THE
21 ST
CENTURY
5
(2002),
available
at

http://www.nsba.org/site/docs/1200/1143.pdf (reporting that in a survey of 2000 school boards, 93%
were entirely elected).
105.
While parent groups comprise 52.1% of constituent groups that are "active" in school
board elections, ethnic or racial groups only comprise 18.1%. Id. at 37 tbl.42. See also Boger, supra
note 82, at 1399-1400 (discussing parents' resistance efforts to the proposal of assigning poor, lowperforming students to schools where their children attended and to the reassignment of white,
middle-class students to lower income, lower performing schools); Dana Banker, PlantationParents
Join Busing Debate, School Boundaries Face Challenge at Meeting, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar.
27, 1995, at lB (stating the goal of parents who oppose school boundary proposals that would require their children to be bused to a predominantly Black school is to "[m]ake board members realize that this Plantation [parent] contingent is a sizable group with which to be reckoned"); John Hill,
Good Schools for All Hillsborough, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 2006, at 12A (stating that
"[p]arents of upscale Westchase scolded, taunted and threatened the elected board with political
retaliation" because of their discontentment regarding the school board's student reassignment
proposal); Ginger Jenkins, Boundary Committee Endures Wrath of FallCreek Residents, HOUSTON
CMTY. NEWSPAPERS ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2004, http://www.hcnonline.com/site/index.cfm?
newsid=1 1289350&BRD=l 574&PAG=461&deptid=532207&rfi=8&xb=lutex (discussing parents'
vocal opposition to school boundary proposals that would zone their children to Title I schools,
which have high economically-disadvantaged student populations); Scott Travis, Parents Protest
Plan to Alter School Boundary, S. FLA. SUN-SENTNEL, Sept. 12, 2000, at lB (discussing parents'
opposition to a school boundary proposal that would add 163 predominantly poor, African-American
students to their children's elementary school).
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The school board members elected to govern the Humble Independent School District in Humble, Texas faced similar opposition in 2003
after announcing their proposals to redraw school boundaries.' 0 6 Because some of the boundary proposals called for certain middle-upper
class, predominantly white neighborhoods to be zoned to schools that
would have predominantly minority, lower-income student populations,
parents and residents residing in the predominantly white neighborhoods
voiced their dissent and lobbied school board members to vote to keep
their children at the "good" schools. 10 7 Although the decision was not
unanimous, the school board acquiesced and voted to accept boundary
proposals that would allow the parents' children to attend the more desirable schools. 10 8 Unfortunately, the same boundary decision also created
racially and economically segregated schools due to the extraction of
white, middle-class students. 10 9
If school board members continue to employ student assignment
policies that rely on racially segregated housing patterns and to yield to
political parental pressures that oppose diversification and, thereby, desegregation efforts, then the goal of attaining educational equality for
minority students will be unrealized. In attempts to avoid the harmful
costs associated with resegregation, some school districts have voluntarily implemented plans that consider students' race when making student
assignment decisions. The next section examines two such plans and
their attempts to further compelling interests via constitutional means.
II. TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS:
PUBLIC SCHOOLS' VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS

Due to the resegregation trend that is currently plaguing American
public educational institutions, school districts have begun to experiment
with various measures intended to diversify elementary and secondary
106.
Cindy Horswell, School Boundaries Draw Parents' Wrath/Humble ISD Stirs Campus
Controversy, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 15, 2003, at A3 1.
107.
Linda Gilchriest, Tough Choices/Humble ISD Must Decide ControversialLines Issues,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 10, 2003, at 1 (discussing Fall Creek's ("an upscale subdivision with million-dollar homes") opposition to being zoned to Humble High School "because it would have a
greater number of minority and economically disadvantaged students"); see also A. Mechele
Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: PricingRacial Housing Preferences, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1280
(2005) (suggesting that parents' desire to have their children attend "good" schools "may actually be
a code for a preference to ... have their children attend nonminority schools"); Jenkins, supra note
105.
108.
Kristen Wright, Humble ISD Adopts New Boundaries/New Kingwood Park to Be Scaled
Down, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 2, 2004, at 1.
109.
Following adoption of the new boundaries, Humble High School was projected to be
45%-65% minority and 45%-55% economically disadvantaged. Meanwhile, more affluent Kingwood High School was projected to have a student body that was only 10%-20% minority and 5%15% economically disadvantaged. The newly created high school (to which parents lobbied school
board members to have their children attend) was projected to be 30%-50% minority and only 15%25%
economically
disadvantaged.
RECOMMENDATION (on file with author).
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schools. School districts have implemented school choice programs
whereby parents can decide which schools they would like for their child
to attend.ll 0 To encourage parents to choose schools that may have high
populations of minority, economically-disadvantaged students, many
school districts have introduced programs that provide pre-college
courses of study such as the International Baccalaureate (IB) Diploma
Program at such schools."' School districts have also created magnet
schools and programs, which have a particular theme or curricular focus,
such as science, technology, mathematics2 or performing arts, in their
efforts to achieve diverse student bodies. 1
Schools have also taken a more direct approach to achieve their diversity goals by considering students' race and ethnicity when making
student assignment decisions. Such consideration has subjected school
districts to intense and, in some cases, fatal judicial scrutiny." 3 The
school districts in the following two cases, however, successfully overcame the constitutional challenges launched against their race-conscious
student assignment plans at the circuit court level. It remains to be seen
whether the same will be true following the Supreme Court's consideration of the plans.
A. McFarland v. Jefferson County Board of Education
In its attempts to maintain an integrated school system following the
lifting of a desegregation decree, the Jefferson County Public Schools
(the "Board") implemented a student assignment plan that includes racial

110.
Robert A. Frahm, Court Takes On Race Case, School DesegregationCould Be Affected,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2006, at Al (discussing Connecticut's use of school choice to promote racial diversity in elementary and secondary education).
111.
In 2006, the Humble Independent School District in Humble, TX announced its plans to
institute the IB Diploma Program at Humble High School, which is the most racially diverse and
economically-disadvantaged high school in the district. See What in the World is IB?,
http://www.humble.kl2.tx.us/ibpage.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). During the 2004-2005 school
year, 25.4% of Humble High School's student population was economically disadvantaged, compared to only 3.3% at Kingwood High School. The minority enrollment at Humble High School is
also significantly greater than that at Kingwood High School (50.6% vs. 14%). See 2004-2005
ACADEMIC

EXCELLENCE

INDICATOR

SYSTEM

CAMPUS

REPORTS,

available

at

http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2005/campus.srch.html.
112.
See Hill, supra note 105 (discussing a school district's implementation of school choice as
a means to "maintain integrated schools by making them more attractive to residents outside their
neighborhoods"); Harold A. McDougall, Brown at Sixty: The Casefor Black Reparations,47 HOW.
L.J. 863, 892 (2004) (discussing the goal of magnet schools "to accomplish or maintain desegregation").
113. See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123,
124-25 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating a race-conscious student transfer plan that denied students'
transfer requests if they would have an adverse impact on the assigned or requested school's diversity levels); Tuttle ex rel. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1999)
(invalidating an assignment plan that based admission into an alternative kindergarten in part on
students' race and ethnicity); Wessman ex rel. Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791-92 (1st Cir.
1998) (invalidating Boston Latin School's race-conscious admissions policy).
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guidelines. 14 While students have the ability to choose which school to
attend, their ultimate assignment can be affected by the operation of the
racial guidelines, which require African-American student enrollment to
be "at least 15% and no more than 50%" of the student body." 5 Although many other non-racial factors affect student assignment, the racial
guidelines prohibit some students' admission into particular schools or
academic programs based on their race. 1 6 Because of such effect, students and parents challenged the constitutionality of the Board's raceconscious student assignment plan.
In reviewing the constitutionality of the plan, the district court applied strict scrutiny, which required the Board to demonstrate that its use
of race furthers a compelling governmental interest and does so using
narrowly tailored means.' '7 In formulating what appears to be a novel
justification for the use of race in education, the court held that the maintenance of racially integrated elementary and secondary schools constitutes a compelling interest. 1 8 In assessing the Board's asserted interests,'19 the court found that the educational and societal benefits that are
derived from racial diversity in higher education are also produced in the
context of elementary and secondary education.1 20 The court accepted
the Board's argument that "school integration benefits the system as a
whole by creating a system of roughly equal components, . . . not one
rich and another poor, not one Black and another White.' 2 1 Finally, in
holding that the Board's interests are compelling, the court held that the
Board was not engaged in unconstitutional "racial balancing" because of
its demonstrated commitment to integration and educational equality and
the "academic, social and institutional benefits [they] achieve[ ]y,122
See McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836
114.
(W.D. Ky. 2004), aff'd 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith ex rel.
McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
115.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
116.

For instance, if an African-American student attempts to enroll into a school that already

has a black student composition of 50%, then the racial guideline will operate to deny him admission
into that particular school since his enrollment would cause the school to exceed its cap on AfricanAmerican enrollment. Although the Board's open choice policy permits the student to choose the
school he would like to attend, "a student's race ... could determine whether that student receives
his or her first, second, third or fourth choice of school." See id.
117.
118.

See id. at 837, 848-49.
See id. at 855.

119.
The Court's statement of the Board's asserted interests is as follows:
To give all students the benefits of an education in a racially integrated school and to
maintain community commitment to the entire school system precisely express the
Board's own vision of Brown 's promise. The benefits the [Board] hopes to achieve go to
the heart of its educational mission: (1) a better academic education for all students; (2)
better appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students; (3) more competitive and attractive public schools; and (4) broader community support for all [the
Board] schools.

Id. at 849 n.29.
120.

See id. at 853.

121.
122.

Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
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Not only did the district court find that the Board used race in its
pursuit of compelling interests, but it also concluded that, in most re23
spects, it utilized narrowly tailored means to pursue such interests.
The court applied the following four criteria in determining the constitutionality of the race-conscious student assignment plan:
(1) whether the 2001 Plan amounts to a quota that seeks a fixed number of desirable minority students and insulates one group of applicants from another, (2) whether the applicant is afforded individualized review, (3) whether the 2001 Plan "unduly harm[s] members of
any racial group," and (4) whether [the Board] has given "serious,
good faith consideration
of workable race-neutral alternatives" to
24
achieve its goals.1

In finding that the racial guidelines did not operate as a quota, the district
court reasoned that they represented a "quite flexible and broad target
range," such as that permitted in Grutter, and not a "relatively precise
target." 125 This reasoning, however, fails to address the fact that the
"target range" is actually a Board requirement that African-American
students comprise 15%-50% of a school's student enrollment.1 26 The
Board's formulation of its diversity goal as a numerical mandate may
prove to be fatal
in its quest to seek constitutional approval from the Su27
preme Court. 1
Related to the quota criteria is the narrowly tailored requirement
that race-conscious student assignment plans afford each student holistic,
individualized review. Unlike other courts that have held that the requirement is inapplicable in the context of elementary and secondary
education, 2 8 the district court considered the requirement and found that
the Board's plan allows for individualized review, albeit "of a different
' 129
kind in a different context than the Supreme Court found in Grutter."
The court reasoned that the Board considers many aspects of each student's application when determining student assignments. "[R]ace is
simply one possible factor among many, acting only occasionally as a
123.
See id. at 855-62.
124.
Id. at 856 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
125.
Id. at 857. The Court also relied on the varying actual percentages of Black students
present at individual schools (20.1%-50.4%) to support its conclusion that the guidelines did not
operate as a quota. See id.
126.
See id. at 842 (stating that "the 2001 Plan requires each school to seek a Black student
enrollment of at least 15% and no more than 50%" (emphasis added)).
127.
For further discussion, see infra Part Il1.
128.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (ParentsI1), 426 F.3d
1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[l]f a noncompetitive, voluntary student assignment plan is otherwise
narrowly tailored, a district need not consider each student in a individualized, holistic manner."),
cert. granted 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418
F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005), ("Unlike the Gratz and Grutter policies, the Lynn Plan is designed to
achieve racial diversity rather than viewpoint diversity. The only relevant criterion, then, is a student's race; individualized consideration beyond that is irrelevant to the compelling interest.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub noam. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
129.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
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permissible 'tipping' factor in most of the [Board] assignment process."' 30 Because the Board successfully demonstrated that its plan complied with this as well as the other narrowly tailored requirements, the
its use of race in student assignments was constitucourt concluded that131
tionally permissible.

B. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1
Employing similar rationale as that utilized by the Board in
McFarland, the Seattle School District No. 1 (the "District") also
adopted an open choice student assignment plan in its attempts to create
racially diverse schools and to prevent racial imbalance that would result
from adherence to the neighborhood school concept. 132 The plan allows
parents to choose which of the ten high schools they want their children
to attend, provided a particular school has availability. 33 To address
situations in which a school is oversubscribed, 134 the District employs
four tiebreakers, the second one being a student's race.135 Although the
District has never engaged in de jure segregation and, therefore, has
never been ordered to desegregate, 36 as had the McFarland Board, it
voluntarily uses the racial tiebreaker to ensure diversity or "balance" in
the racial composition of its public high schools. 137 The operation of the
racial tiebreaker is as follows: If a school's student population deviates
from the goal of 40% white and 60% minority (+1-15%), then the racial
tiebreaker is used to grant automatic admission to those students whose
race will enable the school to move closer to the desired racial composition. 138 Conversely, the racial tiebreaker also operates to deny admission
to those students whose race does not further the District's diversity
goals. 139 Because the District, a state actor, utilizes student assignment
policies that are based, in part, on race, such policies are subject to strict

Id.
130.
131.
The Court did conclude, however, that with regard to the traditional school assignments in
which African-American and white students are placed on separate assignment tracks, the narrowlytailored requirement was not met; therefore, the Board's use of race was constitutionally impermissible. See id. at 862-64. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment without issuing
a detailed written opinion. See McFarland ex reL McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d
513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub noma. Meredith ex rel. McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents1), 377 F.3d 949,
132.
954-55, (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351

(U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
Id.
133.
134.
A school is considered to be "oversubscribed" "when more students want to attend that
school than there are spaces available." See id at 955.
See id.
135.
136.
See id. at 954.
See id. at 955.
137.
138.
See id. at 955-56.
See id. at 955 n.7.
139.

2006]

PARENTS INVOLVED & MEREDITH

scrutiny, and thus, must employ "narrowly
tailored measures that further
1 40
compelling governmental interests."
In ParentsI, the Ninth Circuit found that the racial tiebreaker program did not pass constitutional scrutiny. While the court recognized the
pursuit of educational and societal benefits that accompany racially diverse learning environments as a compelling interest, 141 it found that the
1 42
racial tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored to further such interest.
Upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit in ParentsII sanctioned the
use of the racial tiebreaker and found that the measure was narrowly tailored to further the District's compelling interest in achieving racially
and ethnically diverse student bodies. 143 Similar to the district court in
McFarland, the court also recognized another compelling interest"ameliorating racial isolation or concentration in .. .high schools by
ensuring... [student] assignments do not simply replicate.., segregated
housing patterns."' 44
Both courts in Parents I and ParentsII agreed that "one compelling
reason for considering race is to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.' 45 Both courts found that the District's educational goals complied with the constitutionally permissible diversity rationale as set forth
by the Supreme Court in Grutter 46 In so doing, the court in Parents
I
147
alluded to the prevention of racial isolation as a permissible goal,
while Parents II directly held that "ameliorating real, 48
identifiable de
facto racial segregation" is a separate compelling interest.1
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized the elimination
of de facto racial segregation as a compelling interest,' 49 other lower

140.
Id. at 960 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)). Contra Parents II, 426
F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (advocating a rational basis standard of review "because the
Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable in cases where it
has applied strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring").
141.
See Parents1, 377 F.3d at 964.
142.
See id. at 969.
143.
See Parents11,426 F.3d at 1166.
144. Id; see also James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration:Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO
ST. L.J. 327, 334 (2006) (formulating the constitutional issue related to voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans as "whether [public schools] have a compelling interest in creating or
maintaining a racially integrated student body").
145. Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1173; see also Parents1,377 F.3d at 964.
146. See Parents 1, 377 F.3d at 962 (discussing the Supreme Court's sanctioning of the diversity rationale in Grutter); id.at 963 ("[E]ach of the School District's proffered interests in using its
racial tiebreaker falls comfortably within the diversity rationale as... articulated to (and embraced
by) the Court."); see also Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1173 (describing Grutter's compelling interest as
"the promotion of the specific educational and societal benefits that flow from diversity").
147. See Parents1,377 F.3d at 963.
148. See Parents 11,
426 F.3d at 1178-79 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) ("Racial balance is not to be
achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation." (emphasis added)).
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courts have. 150 In advocating for a new compelling interest for using
race in an education context, the Ninth Circuit employed the following
reasoning:
The benefits that flow from integration (or desegregation) exist
whether or not a state actor was responsible for the earlier racial isolation. Brown's statement that "in the field of public
education... [s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal"
retains its validity today. The District is entitled to seek the benefits
of racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the
of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. Constituabsence
51
tion.1
The court also relied on the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisof school districts' voluntary raceprudence to justify its sanctioning
152
efforts.
integration
conscious
Unlike the three-judge panel in ParentsI, the Parents II Court held
that the race-conscious student assignment plan used by the District was
narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests. The contrary holdings may be due, in part, to the differing narrowly-tailored tests utilized
by the courts. Parents I identified and applied the following six narrowly-tailored requirements: (1) prohibition of racial quotas; (2) flexible, individualized consideration of each applicant; (3) prohibition of
mechanical or conclusive consideration of race; (4) earnest consideration
of race-neutral alternatives; (5) minimization of adverse impact on nonpreferred group members; and (6) time limitation. 153 Parents II, however, identified the following five factors and only applied factors two
through five: "(1) individualized consideration of applicants; (2) the absence of quotas; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative action program; (4) that no member of any
(5) that the program had a sunset
racial group was unduly harmed; and
154
provision or some other end point.',
In finding the individualized consideration factor inapplicable to the
District's plan, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the different contexts
155
of higher education admissions and secondary education assignments.
The court argued that the protections afforded by individualized consideration in a competitive university admission context are not relevant in a

150.
See Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1178 (citing district and appellate court decisions holding that
the creation and maintenance of desegregated schools serve compelling governmental interests).
151.
Id. at 1179 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
152.

See id.

See Parents1, 377 F.3d at 968-69.
153.
ParentsH, 426 F.3d at 1180.
154.
155.
See Ryan, supra note 144, at 335-36, 339 (arguing that the narrow tailoring test must be
formulated in light of the context in which race is used).
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non-competitive student assignment context. 156 The Supreme Court in
Grutter and Gratz employed this requirement "in order to prevent race
from being used as a mechanical proxy for an applicant's qualifications."' 157 As asserted by the Ninth Circuit, the requirement is unnecessary in the present case because students' qualifications are unrelated to
their assignment to a particular school. 58 If students' qualifications,
such as performance on standardized tests, grades, and artistic and athletic abilities, are not factors in student assignment decisions, then a holistic, individualized
review or consideration of such factors is not neces159
sary.
The court also argued that the differences in compelling interests
advanced by universities and elementary and secondary schools warrant
the non-application of individualized review. 60 While the use of race in
both contexts seeks to obtain the social and educational benefits of diversity, the university context lacks the second compelling interest that is
present in the high school context, which is preventing the replication of
segregated housing patterns in public education.' 61 "Because race itself
is the relevant consideration when attempting to ameliorate de facto segregation, the District's tiebreaker must necessarily focus on the race of its
students."'' 62 In the court's opinion, to require school districts to focus on
attributes other than race, such as leadership potential, grades, or life
experiences, would undermine their ability to achieve and maintain racially integrated schools.
The court in Parents I did not appear to address the different contexts of higher and secondary education as they relate to the individualized consideration requirement. They merely recognized the requirement
as a narrowly-tailored factor and applied it to the case. In so doing, the
court found that instead of considering several different factors to determine student assignment (as constitutionally mandated in Grutter and
Gratz), the racial tiebreaker "automatically and mechanically admits...
[and denies] hundreds of white and non-white applicants solely because
of their race.' 6 3 The court concluded that such operation fails the narrowly-tailored test as set forth in Grutter by establishing a "dejure [pol156. See Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1180-81; see also Ryan, supra note 144, at 335-36, 339-44
(arguing that given the different context of employing non-merit based, non-competitive raceconscious assignment plans, public schools should not be required to give individualized consideration to each student).
157. Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1181.
158. See id.
159. See id; see also Holmes, supra note 66, at 595-96 (asserting similar arguments regarding
the inapplicability of Grutter's individualized consideration requirement to "non-merit-based raceconscious student assignment" programs).
160.
See Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1183.
161.
See id.
162.
Id. (emphasis added).
163.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents1), 377 F.3d 949,
969 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
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icy] of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[ ] single 'soft' variable."' 64 As demonstrated by the conflicting holdings in ParentsI and
Parents 11, the Supreme Court's formulation of the compelling interests
(if any) and the narrowly tailored requirements to advance such interests
will have a significant impact on its findings regarding the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans.
III. A GLIMPSE INSIDE THE COURT'S CRYSTAL BALL:
THE BLEAK FUTURE FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT

PLANS

When one considers the importance of the issues raised in Parents
Involved and Meredith and their potential impact on the provision of
educational opportunities to minority students, it is clear that the decisions will significantly contribute to the jurisprudence concerning public
education in this country. In determining the constitutionality of raceconscious student assignment plans, the Supreme Court will either sanction or prohibit school districts' use of race as a means to create and
maintain racially diverse learning environments. Unfortunately, the
Court's reasoning and holdings in previous cases involving the use of
race in education present difficult and, in all likelihood, insurmountable
challenges to the sanctioning of voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans as employed in the cases at bar.
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans, the Supreme Court must first determine whether
the plans serve a compelling interest. 165 Although the Court has never
provided a precise definition of what constitutes a "compelling interest,' 166 the term is generally assumed to refer to those interests that are
"of the highest order," "overriding," or "unusually important."' 167 To
date, the Court has recognized two compelling interests that justify the
government's constitutional use of race: (1) to remedy past discrimina164.
Id. at 970 (alterations in original) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337
(2003)).
165.
According to the Supreme Court's holding in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pehia, all
government imposed racial classifications "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." See. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Therefore, the school
districts' race-conscious student assignment plans "are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests." Id. For a contrary view regarding
the appropriate standard of review, Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (advocating a rational basis standard of review "[b]ecause the Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the
Supreme Court has found objectionable in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny and narrow
tailoring"), cert. granted,126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
166.
See Thomas R. Bender, Does the Right to Trial by Jury Place ConstitutionalLimits on
PrejudgmentInterest?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 950-51 (2006).
167.
Id at 950; see also McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F.
Supp. 2d 834, 850 (W.D. Ky. 2004) ("Whether an asserted interest is truly compelling is revealed
only by assessing the objective validity of the goal, its importance to [the government actor] and the
sincerity of [the government actor's] interest."), af'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted
sub nom. Meredith ex rel. McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5,
2006) (No. 05-915).
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169
tion; 168 and (2) to achieve student body diversity in higher education.
The school districts in Meredith and Parents Involved ask the Court to
recognize a third-to achieve and maintain racially integrated elementary
and secondary schools. 70 Considering the Court's prior discussions and
holdings regarding government's remedial authority in the context of de
facto segregation and its prohibition against racial balancing, it is
unlikely that it will "expand[ ] the range of permissible uses of race" 17' to
include the creation and maintenance of racially diverse public schools.
Even if the school districts succeed in demonstrating a compelling interest, the Court will likely prohibit their continued use of race under the
challenged plans due to their failure to meet narrowly-tailored requirements.

A. De Jure vs. De Facto Segregation
Directly addressing the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race
to remedy defacto segregation in public education will be a case of first
impression for the Court. 72 The Court, however, has had previous opportunities to consider the use of race to remedy de jure segregation in
the educational context. 73 In its desegregation jurisprudence, the Court
has permitted school districts to employ race-conscious measures in their
attempts to eliminate unconstitutional dual educational systems. 74 The
measures, however, were restricted to circumstances in which schools'
student bodies and faculties were racially imbalanced as a result of the
districts' intentional discrimination. Such circumstances do not exist in
Parents Involved and Meredith.
As previously discussed, the District in ParentsInvolved has never
experienced legal segregation and, therefore, has never been subject to a
desegregation decree.175 The District's use of race does not seek to remedy the effects of intentional discrimination but rather to prevent racial
imbalance that would result from student assignments based on racially
segregated housing patterns. The same is true for the Board's utilization
of race in McFarland.

168. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
169. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
170. See Brief in Opposition at 11-13, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
448513; Brief in Opposition at 16, Parents Involved in Community Sch., 126 S.Ct. 2351 (U.S. June
5, 2006) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 789611.
171.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (noting that "the Supreme Court has never decided a case
involving the consideration of race in a voluntarily imposed school assignment plan intended to
promote racially and ethnically diverse secondary schools").
173. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); United States
v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 225 (1969).
174. See Montgomery County Bd.of Educ., 395 U.S. at 234-36 (sanctioning the establishment
of racial ratios for school faculties as a desegregation measure); see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 25
(permitting the use of racial mathematical ratios to ensure student body diversity).
175. See Parents1, 377 F.3d at 954.
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Although the Board had previously been subject to a desegregation
decree, the decree was dissolved in June 2000, ten months prior to the
Board's adoption of the race-conscious student assignment plan. 176 To
justify the dissolution of the decree, the district court found that "[t]o the
greatest extent practicable, the Decree has eliminated the vestiges associ177
ated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects."
Therefore, arguably, the Board's use of racial guidelines is not necessary
to eliminate vestiges of racial discrimination since such effects have been
deemed to already have been eliminated. Instead, the Board utilizes the
racial guidelines to maintain the racially integrated schools created under
the desegregation decree.
As noted by the district court responsible for lifting the decree in
McFarland, student assignment racial guidelines and ratios "[a]re
shielded from normal constitutional scrutiny" if employed under a federally mandated desegregation order.' 78 Due to school districts' blatant
disregard for the Supreme Court's mandate to desegregate, there existed
an urgent need for courts to take an active role in directing desegregation
efforts. 179 Within this role, courts issued various desegregation mandates, and school districts implemented various policies and programs in
their efforts to comply with such mandates.1 80 Even though "voluntary
school integration" may be viewed "as an extension of the Supreme
Court's school desegregation jurisprudence,"' 81 it does not necessarily
follow that policies implemented under the legal protection of a desegregation decree will survive constitutional scrutiny once the order has been
lifted. 182
As argued in Parents Involved and Meredith, the context in which
state actors use race and ethnicity is extremely important when determin-

176.
177.

See McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. (Hampton l), 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D.

Ky. 2000).
Hampton If, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 377; see also Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.
178.
(Hampton 1) 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 777 (W.D. Ky. 1999) ("When the Board acts pursuant to the continuing Decree, it acts lawfully.").
179.
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471-72 (1992) (acknowledging school districts' delay
in complying with Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), desegregation mandates); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (instructing district courts to enter desegregation decrees to require schools to desegregate "with all
deliberate speed").
180.
See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968);
Swann, 402 U.S. at 25.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 851; see also Parents I, 426 F.3d at 1179 (concluding that
181.
the Supreme Court's reference to "the voluntary integrationof schools as sound educational policy

within the discretion of local school officials" supports the Court's finding that "[t]he District is
entitled to seek the benefits of racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the
absence of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. Constitution" (emphasis in original)).
182.

See, e.g., Hampton 11, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379, 381 (holding that the Board's race-

conscious magnet school student assignment plan that had previously been permissible under the
desegregation decree was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest).
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ing the constitutionality of their usage.183 Just as the benefits attained by
using race in elementary and secondary education may differ from those
attained from using race in higher education, the necessity of racial considerations in federally mandated student assignment plans may differ
from the necessity of such considerations in voluntary plans. In Jenkins,
the Supreme Court clarified that its pronouncement in Brown I "was tied
purely to de jure segregation, not de facto segregation."'' 84 Because
states had intentionally required Blacks to attend separate, inferior
schools, states had an affirmative duty to implement those measures that
would effectively eliminate dual educational systems.' 85 The Court
found that measures involving racial guidelines and ratios were necessary to remedy the harms caused by dejure segregation. 86 Once states
had practically eliminated the harms associated with dejure segregation,
the Court held that desegregation duties had been fulfilled since "mere de
facto segregation (unaccompanied by discriminatory inequalities in educational resources) does not constitute a continuing harm after the end of
dejure segregation. ' 87 In Freeman, the Court further clarified that with
regard to its jurisprudence concerning the imposition of "'awkward,'
'inconvenient,' and 'even bizarre' measures to achieve racial balance in
student assignment," such measures were reserved to the context of de
the imbalance is attributable . . . to
jure segregation, not phases "when
' 188
independent demographic forces."
The current Supreme Court may rely on this rationale to find that
the elimination of racial isolation attributable to de facto segregation in
public schools does not justify the use of racial guidelines and tiebreakers in voluntary student assignment plans. In its reluctance to expand the
justifications for the voluntary use of racial classifications, the Court may
confine such race-based measures to the context of de jure segregation,
89
which, as previously discussed, is inapplicable in the present cases.'
B. RacialBalancing
Despite the various contexts in which race and ethnicity have been
employed to achieve governmental interests, the Supreme Court has routinely rejected voluntary racial balancing as a permissible interest to jus426 F.3d at 1173 ("[C]ontext matters when reviewing race-based govern183.
See Parents 11,
mental action under the Equal Protection Clause." (quoting Gnitter, 539 U.S. at 326)); McFarland,
330 F. Supp. 2d at 849 ("The different context 'matters' because, under the Equal Protection Clause,
'not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable."' (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at
327)).
184.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
185.
See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
See supra note 168.
186.
187. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring).
188.
Freeman,503 U.S. at 493.
189.
See Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1208 n.17 (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme
Court's desegregation jurisprudence sanctions the use of race "to combat past de jure segregation,"
not "to achieve racial balance absent dejure segregation").
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tify their usage.' 9° In rejecting racial balancing "for its own sake," the
Court in Freeman limited its pursuit to those circumstances in which
"racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation."1' 91 Considering the arguments advanced by the petitioners in Parents Involved
and Meredith,192 it is apparent that both school districts will have to
overcome the Court's prohibition against racial balancing to sustain their
utilization of race-conscious student assignment plans.
In Grutter,the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between racial balancing and the pursuit of a "critical mass" of minority students.
According to the Court, a school's attempt "to assure within [a] student
body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because 1of
93
its race or ethnic origin" amounts to unconstitutional racial balancing.
If, however, a school defines its diversity pursuits "by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce," then such
pursuits may be constitutionally permissible. 94 The respondents in Parents Involved and Meredith argue that their race-conscious plans satisfy
this test.
The respondents in Parents Involved argue that the District's plan,
including the integration tiebreaker, does not amount to racial balancing
because it does "not seek to achieve a pre-determined racial distribution
in any school," as proscribed by the Constitution. 9 5 Rather, the plan
seeks to afford white and minority students the opportunity to attend
popular schools that may not be close to their neighborhoods. 196 Similarly, the respondents in Meredith also argue that their use of racial
190.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 ("[O]utright racial balancing . .. is patently unconstitutional."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (rejecting racial balancing
as facially invalid).
191.
Freeman,503 U.S. at 494.
192.
For example, one of the questions presented by the petitioner in ParentsInvolved asks the
following:
May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally permits a student to
attend any high school of her choosing deny a child admission to her chosen school
solely because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racialbalance in particular
schools, or does such racial balancing violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126
S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 1579631 (emphasis added); see also Brief of Petitioner at
5, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
2433475 (arguing that the Board's imposition of racial guidelines "is simply an action for the sake of
reflecting racial distribution").
193.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 329-30.
194.
Id. at 330. The Majority's proffered distinction drew much disagreement from other
Justices. See, e.g., id.
at 355 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning how
the Law School's interest in educational benefits is not racial balancing considering the Law
School's apparent belief "that only a racially mixed student body can lead to the educational benefits
it seeks"); id.at 379, 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "[s]tripped of its 'critical mass'
veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing" due to its
precise attention to numbers when making admissions decisions).
195.
Brief in Opposition at 17, Parents Involved, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL
789611.
196.
Id.
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guidelines in student assignments is not motivated by constitutionally
impermissible interests.'1 97 Rather, the guidelines are used to promote the
Board's good faith interest in maintaining racial integration in its schools
and the educational benefits that flow from such environments.198 The
district court agreed with this argument and relied on the fact that the
Board had "precisely described the academic, social and institutional
benefits it achieves from integrated schools" to demonstrate that it had
not implemented the racial guidelines to achieve racial balancing
"merely for its own sake."' 199 This argument, however, fails to adequately address the potentially defeating counterargument that the 15%50% racial guidelines are mechanical mandates intended to assure a
specified percentage of African-American students in each school.2 °°
Such racial mandates, which could be termed "quotas," are absolutely
proscribed by the Constitution.20 '
As defined by the Supreme Court:
Quotas "impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded," and "insulate the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." In
contrast, "a permissible goal.., requires only a good-faith effort...
to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself," and permits
consideration of race as a "plus" factor in any given case while still
ensuring that each candidate "competes with all other qualified applicants. 2 °2
The attainment of a student body that is composed of no fewer than 15%
and no more than 50% African-American students is not a "goal" that the
Board strives to achieve. Rather, it is a fixed percentage with which
Schools are required to seek compliance.2 3 The respondents, in fact,
state that "[t]he Plan provides that each school (except preschools, kindergartens, alternative and special schools, and the four exempted magnet schools) shall have not less than 15% and not more than 50% black
students. 20 4 Including such directive does not appear to comport with
the Supreme Court's sanctioning of the use of race-conscious measures
in public education.
Considering that both student assignment plans seek to create and
maintain racially balanced schools, both are vulnerable to the Court's
proscription of unconstitutional racial balancing. Now that Justice
O'Connor, the drafter of the Gruttermajority, is no longer on the bench,
197.

See Brief in Opposition at 14, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 448513.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id.
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 855.
See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (citations omitted).
See supra note 126.

204.

Brief in Opposition at 3-4, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915) (emphasis added).
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it is not apparent that the current members of the Court will accept the
racial balancing test as articulated by the majority in Grutter. Rather, the
Court may employ a more exacting standard to ensure that the interests
motivating the utilization of voluntary race-conscious plans are constitutionally permissible.
C. Individualized Consideration
A final impediment to the constitutionality of the race-conscious
plans is their failure to meet narrowly-tailored requirements. As required
by the standard of review set forth in Grutter, all admissions plans that
use racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to further compelling
interests.205 Constitutional race-conscious admissions plans are "flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity" and "ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes
race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application." 206 Unfortunately, the race-conscious student assignment plans utilized in Parents
Involved and Meredith fail both criteria.
Although the Ninth Circuit held that the non-competitive context of
elementary and secondary education does not require individualized review,20 7 it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will adopt a similar view.
While it is true that "context matters when reviewing" race-based measures; 20 8 the context of elementary and secondary education does not warrant the inapplicability of individualized consideration. Rather, it is,
perhaps, the most pertinent context that necessitates individualized review.
All racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny to guard
against the infringement of personal rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.20 9 Strict scrutiny is necessary to protect individuals from the potential stigmatic harms imposed by groupbased racial classifications. 210 More so than in other contexts, such protections must be afforded to children in elementary and secondary education. There is, perhaps, no other more necessary context for such protections than elementary and secondary education. The potential harms that
can result from telling a child that he or she cannot attend a particular
school because he or she is of the wrong race are immeasurable. "Harms
such as promotion of racial inferiority, strengthening of racial stereotypes, [and] heightening of racial hostility" 2 11 are precisely those harms

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See Grutter,539 U.S. at 308.
Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
See Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1183.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 308.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
Nelson, supra note 28, at 38.
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that the Court's desegregation cases attempted to remedy.2t 2 It is, therefore, highly improbable that the current Supreme Court would permit the
use of racial classifications in elementary and secondary education without requiring that they meet every element of strict scrutiny.
Contrary to the narrowly-tailored criteria set forth in Grutter, the
student assignment plans in question do not afford meaningful consideration to diversity elements other than race and ethnicity. The district court
in McFarland found that the Board's plan is constitutional because it
considers other diversity factors "such as place of residence and student
choice of school or program., 21 3 Such argument cannot sustain the constitutionality of the plan because the operation of the plan is such that
these factors are effectively irrelevant if a student attempts to enroll in a
school where the racial composition will fall outside the racial guidelines
if he or she is admitted. Despite the student's other "diversity factors,"
he or she will most likely be denied admission. 214 The racial tiebreaker
employed in ParentsInvolved operates in a similar manner. Depending
on the racial makeup of a particular school to which a student is applying
for admission, his or her race can be the determinative factor in deciding
whether he or she is admitted or denied.2t 5 In both plans, race operates
as the defining and decisive feature of a student's application, not as a
constitutionally permissible "plus" factor.2 16 Therefore, the plans are not
narrowly tailored and, thus, cannot pass constitutional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION: FULFILLING BROWN'S MANDATE
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious stu-

dent assignment plans in the context of de facto racial isolation in elementary and secondary schools, the Supreme Court will be guided by its
previous holdings and rationales. As it attempts to balance the proffered
interests in creating and maintaining racial integration against the constitutional protections provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Court will be guided by the principle that "[t]he Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to live together, to work
212. See, e.g., Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that legally sanctioned racial segregation
produces feelings of inferiority, which detrimentally "affects the motivation of a child to learn").
213.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
214. As noted by the district court:
[W]here the racial composition of an entire school lies near either end of the racial guidelines, the application of any student for open enrollment, transfer or even to a magnet
program could be affected. In a specific case, a student's race, whether Black or White,
could determine whether that student receives his or her first, second, third or fourth
choice of school.
Id. at 842.
215.
See Parents 1, 377 F.3d at 955-56 (explaining that the racial tiebreaker operates to grant
automatic admission to students who are of the preferred race needed to help schools attain the
desired racial ratio of white and minority students).
216. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003) (invalidating a race-conscious admissions policy because of its use of race as the decisive factor in an admissions decision rather than as
a "plus" factor along with many different diversity criteria).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

together, or to send their children to school together, so long as the State
does not interfere with their choices on the basis of race."2 17 Once the
inquiry has been completed, the challenged plans will most likely be
invalidated. In light of this probable outcome, local, state, and federal
officials should immediately engage in the development of race-neutral
programs and policies that can effectively address the harmful effects of
resegregation of public schools.
School officials should not retard the progress that has been made in
the provision of educational opportunities to minority students by paving
"a one-way street" to racially and economically segregated neighborhood
schools.2t 8 As previously discussed, students attending such schools face
challenges, which are often insurmountable, that range from less qualified teachers 2 19 to a culture of lower academic expectations. 220 To combat these challenges, schools should employ race-neutral student assignment plans 22I and implement educational policies that effectively address
deficiencies in the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students.
Some schools have already begun to experiment with race-neutral
measures in their efforts to achieve racially diverse student bodies. 22
Such measures include the consideration of "diversity in student
achievement" and "diversity in socioeconomic status. 223 Limiting concentrations of low-performing students in schools will impact student
body diversity since minority students often perform lower than their
white counterparts on academic measures.2 24 Similarly, assigning students to schools based on their socioeconomic status can also achieve
racial diversity because of the existing racial gaps in socioeconomic
status.225 Such "class-based" assignment plans are also beneficial be217.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).
218.
Hampton 11, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
219.
See supra notes 70-71, 93-99 and accompanying text.
220.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
221.
In the context of student assignments, "race-neutral" refers to those plans that do not
classify students based on their race or ethnicity. Such plans are not "race-blind" in that they ignore
the effects of race on educational opportunities. They simply do not consider a student's race when
assigning him or her to a particular school. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 7-11 (discussing the meaning of "race-neutral" alternatives in the context of higher education admissions decisions).
222.
See, e.g., Boger, supra note 82, at 1397-1400 (discussing the implementation of raceneutral student assignment plans in Wake County, North Carolina).
223.
Id.at 1397.
224.
For example, in 2004, black and Hispanic children age 9, 13 and 17 had lower average
reading scale scores than white students. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION
STATISTICS:
2005
tbl. 108
(2006)
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dtO5108.asp. The same was true for their performance
in
mathematics.
See
id.
at
tbl. 118,
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dtO5_l 18.asp. In 2001, the average geography and
U.S. history scores for white students were higher than those achieved by black and Hispanic students. See id.
at tbl. 116, available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt5_1 16.asp.
225.

See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006 tbl.6-1

(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/sectionl/table.asp?tablelD=440 (indicating that 70% of black Fourth graders and 73% of Hispanic Fourth graders are eligible for free or

2006]

PARENTS INVOLVED & MEREDITH

cause they provide the added benefit of socioeconomic diversity, which
may, in fact, be more educationally beneficial than racial diversity.
Some scholars have concluded that "[n]o other single social measure is consistently more strongly related than poverty to school achievement., 22 6 Consequently, "overall socioeconomic composition of schools
seem[ ] more predictive of academic achievement than [does] a student's
individual socioeconomic status. 227 If this is true, school officials
should direct their attention to achieving and maintaining socioeconomic
diversity rather than racial diversity. Presumably, such efforts would not
be subject to the heightened and, potentially, fatal standard of strict scrutiny because they neither employ racial classifications nor seek to
achieve racial diversity benefits.2 28 Rather, they seek to achieve the educational benefits of socioeconomic integration.
In their attempts to provide equal educational opportunities to all
students, school officials should implement policies to remedy the disparities that currently exist between minority, economically disadvantaged schools and their non-minority economically advantaged counterparts.229 As often noted by many scholars, "to those who need the best
our education system has to offer, we give the least. The least welltrained teachers. The lowest-level curriculum. The oldest books. The
least instructional time. Our lowest expectations. Less, indeed, of everything that we believe makes a difference., 230 As previously discussed,
one glaring disparity is the level of teacher quality.23' Students attending
high minority, low socioeconomic schools are disproportionately subjected to being taught by less qualified teachers.232 Such inequitable
reduced lunch, as compared to only 24% of white Fourth graders); see also Dickerson, supra note
98, at 1756-68 (noting significant racial disparities in wealth as shown by levels of home ownership,
personal assets and business ownership).
226. Boger, supra note 82, at 1416.
227. Id.at 1416-17; see also supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text; Orfield, supra note
87, at 280 (concluding that peer socioeconomic status accounts for more than 75% of the difference
between minority and white students' academic achievement).
228. See Boger, supra note 82, at 1398-99 (concluding that race-neutral student assignment
plans should not be subject to strict scrutiny as long as they have not "been adopted as a mere pretext
for continuing racial assignments"); see also Levit, supra note 40, at 511 (encouraging schools to
"first try experiments that are more likely to be successful and less likely to be unconstitutional" in
their efforts to achieve educational goals).
229. See Dickerson, supra note 107, at 1291 n.82 suggesting the following:
School disparities also could be eliminated by increasing the attractiveness of "bad"
schools (for example, by giving the school a disproportionate share of new technology,
equipment or supplies, addressing its facility maintenance needs before the needs of other
schools, allowing smaller classes and student/teacher ratios, by giving the teachers in the
school greater flexibility in the classroom, etc.).
230.
See Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Educationfor All Maryland's
Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD.L. REV.
1137, 1142 (1993).
231.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
232. See id; see also Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDuC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1,
85 (2000),
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8nl/ (reporting findings that poor minority students are taught by less
qualified teachers than their non-minority socially advantaged peers).
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learning environments negatively affect not only the quality of education
that students receive, 233 but also their psychological well-being by sending and reinforcing messages "that society doesn't care enough about
whether they learn. 234
To combat such debilitating effects, school officials should invest in
the quality of their teachers, especially those teaching in lowerperforming schools, by implementing initiatives that are designed to improve teacher qualifications and effectiveness, such as pre-service
teacher education, mentoring programs, and continual professional development.23 5 School officials should also provide incentives to encourage more qualified teachers to teach at lower-performing schools. Such
incentives could be immediate, such as salary increases or bonuses,236 or
they could be long-term, such as early retirement opportunities. More
qualified teachers may be enticed to teach at high minority, low socioeconomic schools if doing so afforded them the opportunity to be eligible
for retirement five or ten years earlier than their counterparts teaching at
more affluent schools. Coupled with intensive recruitment efforts at the
high school and college levels, schools implementing such beneficial
policies could see a significant improvement in the quality of their teachers and, consequently, the academic quality of their students.23 7
Implementing race-neutral assignment policies and teacher quality
initiatives is merely the beginning in addressing the significant costs imposed by segregated learning environments. To fulfill Brown's mandate
of educational equality, economically disadvantaged minority students
must have the opportunity to interact with peers from diverse backgrounds to broaden and heighten their educational goals and possibilities.23 8 Whether or not the Supreme Court allows schools to facilitate
this interaction through the use of race-conscious student assignment
plans, our schools and our country have the moral responsibility to ensure that such interaction takes place and that it occurs within educational institutions that provide all students access to equal resources necessary to create and fulfill their academic dreams.

233.
See id.(concluding that student outcomes and student achievement are negatively affected
by poor teacher quality).
234. See Jeannie Oakes, Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and FailedState Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Preparedfor Williams v. State of California 1, 9-10, available at
http://www.decentschools.org/expert-reports/oakes-report.pdf.
235.
See Darling-Hammond, supra note 232, 57.
236.
See Dickerson, supra note 107, at 1291 n.82 (proposing the awarding of bonuses to highly
qualified teachers as incentives to teach at low-income, minority schools).
237.
See Darling-Hammond, supra note 232,
56-57 (describing significant student achievement gains made in North Carolina and Connecticut following the states' enactment of substantial
reforms targeting teacher quality).
238.
See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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INTRODUCTION

This essay tells the story of the rise, development and future directions of critical race theory and related scholarship. 1 In telling the story,
I suggest that critical race theory (CRT) rises, in part, as a challenge to
the emergence of colorblind ideology in law, a major theme of the scholarship. 2 I contend that conflict, as a process of intellectual and institutional growth, marks the development of critical race theory and provides
concrete and experiential examples of some of its key insights and
themes. These conflicts are waged in various institutional settings over
the structural and discursive meanings of race and the role that race plays
in society, an argument made in part, by Kimberl6 Crenshaw,3 and a
story drawn in parts from her, Stephanie Phillips, 4 and Cheryl Harris.5
1.

See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY:

THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE

MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRT: KEY WRITINGS]; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CRT: CUJTING EDGE]; RACE AND RACES: CASES AND
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, & Stephanie
Wildman eds., 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (Dorothy A.
Brown ed., 2003) [hereinafter CRT: CASES]; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001) [hereinafter DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION]; CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco

Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A
CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE LATINO/A
CONDITION]; FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002);

Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467
(1996); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism,andNarrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993), reprintedin CRT: CUTTING
EDGE, supra, at 354-68 and reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS
READER 211-15 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995) [hereinafter POWER, PRIVILEGE AND
LAW]; Cheryl I. Harris, CriticalRace Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215 (2002);
Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien andNon-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," andRacialHierarchyin
American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997); Symposium, CriticalRace Theory, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741
(1994); Symposium, CriticalRace Lawyering: Reopening the Emmett Till Case: Lessons and Challengesfor CriticalRace Practice,73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2101 (2005).
2.
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critiqueof "Our Constitution Is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1991), reprintedin CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supranote 1, at 257-75; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, 115-35 (5th ed. 2004); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 21-22; Harris, supranote 1, at 1229-30; Tanya Kateri Hernandez,
"Multiracial"Discourse: Racial Classificationsin an Era of Color-BlindJurisprudence,57 MD. L.
REV. 97 (1998); discussion infra notes 25-36, 78-88, 168-203 and accompanying text.
3.
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii-xxxii; Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, The First
Decade: Critical Reflections, or "A Foot in the Closing Door," 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2002),
reprintedin CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 9-31.
4. See generally Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the CriticalRace Theory Workshop with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247 (1999).
5.
See generally Harris, supra note 1. In telling the story of CRT's development, Crenshaw
specifically notes at the outset that CRT did not develop in the "abstract but in the context shaped by
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Conflict within CRT in turn, to some extent spurs the development of
CRT-related scholarship, such as Asian American Legal Scholarship,
Critical Race Feminism and specifically Latino and Latina Critical
Schools (LatCrit).6 Though this related scholarship could be seen as
fragmenting the CRT movement, 7 I suggest, focusing primarily on LatCrit, that it has actually deepened it. However, a significant area that
CRT has not adequately addressed is the issue of class and its relationship to race and other subordinating structures. I examine reasons why
this is the case even though CRT scholars have repeatedly called for
analyses of the relationship between race and class and propose critical
class analyses or classcrits as a necessary future direction of CRT and
related scholarship.8
A few caveats are in order. This story could be told in as many different ways as there are CRT theorists. 9 Further, although this rendition
presents CRT as a "fully unified school of thought," this is not the case,
as CRT remains a work in progress. 10 In addition, while I present what
specific institutional struggles over concrete issues that were set in motion by certain individuals."
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 9.
6. See infra notes, 46-52, 104-16 and accompanying text.
7. See Otis T. Bryant, Factualism Within the CriticalRace Theory Movement: Fact or Fiction? A Comparative Analysis of the Emerging LatCrit and AsianCrit Self-Identification Theories
and a Continued Critique (andDefense) of the Black/White Binary (discussing the fragmentation of
the movement and suggesting that the differences are small) (manuscript on file with author).
8. Martha McCluskey and i, with support of the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy at
University at Buffalo recently planned a workshop scheduled for January 2007 to explore the possibility of launching a new network of scholars interested in developing a progressive legal economic
theory and politics. We explained that the term "ClassCrits'" (taken from an earlier draft of this
paper) reflected "our interest in focusing on economics through the lens of critical legal scholarship
movements, such as critical legal studies, critical feminist theory, critical race theory, LatCrit, and
queer theory. That is, we start[ed] with the assumption that economics in law is inextricably political and fundamentally tied to questions of systemic status-based subordination." We explained our
interest and posed a number of questions in an invitation roughly as follows:
Economic inequality has become a growing problem locally, nationally and internationally. In light of this central social and political reality, it is time to foreground economics in progressive jurisprudence and to reconsider longstanding assumptions and approaches in legal scholarship and practice. We aim to provide an alternative to the predominant discussions of "law and
economics" grounded in neoclassical economic theory and its denial of "class." Many legal scholars
are now interested in challenging or broadening some of the assumptions of neoclassical economics.
Nonetheless, the question of class and the role of institutionalized inequality still lurks beneath the
surface of most discussions of economics in legal academia.
Here are a few of the questions we want to explore through a critical analysis of economic
inequality. How might a critical class analysis of law and economic inequality build on, differ from
or respond to other approaches to analyzing law and economic inequality, such as Law and Economics, poverty law, labor law, socioeconomic and legal realism? How might a focus on class contribute to the debates within critical theory and practice, such as how to address legal and societal subordination? What insights from earlier work in critical legal studies and legal realism might be
revived, updated, and improved to better address contemporary concerns and debates? What is the
relationship between subordinated identity based on economic class and institutionalized structures
of economic subordination? How might the perspectives and insights of critical feminism and
critical race theory help develop previous work on economic class in law? How might ClassCrits
build upon the idea of anti- subordination praxis and intersectionality? What can we do to build a
ClassCrits network?
9. See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 9; see also Harris, supra note 1, at 1218 (making a similar
point).
10.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 20.
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are commonly agreed to be the "tenets" of CRT, " not every precept presented here is held valid by every self-described critical race scholar.
Perhaps that is as it should be. And finally, although I provide an overview of Asian American Legal Scholarship, Critical Race Feminism, and
LatCrit as CRT-related scholarship, I primarily focus on the thematic and
institutional development of "LatCrit" because it in part grows out of
internal conflict within CRT and because of its deep institutionalization,
especially given the cessation of the CRT workshop. 12
Parts One through Four of this article present a narrative of the origins and development of Critical Race Theory. Part One provides an
overview of CRT and related scholarship and some of its basic themes.
Part Two discusses CRT's intellectual antecedents. Part Three discusses
a series of four sets of conflicts that I suggest have contributed to its intellectual content and institutional development. These involve conflicts
between future critical race scholars with the Harvard Law School administration in the early eighties, later conflicts with critical legal studies,
and a debate at the University of California Los Angeles Law School
(UCLA) around the issue of affirmative action in the context of the California Proposition 209. They also involve conflicts internal to CRT, one
challenging CRT views on sexual oppression and another involving the
experiences and perspectives of non-black people of color, the latter in
part leading to the establishment of LatCrit. Part Four then lays out
CRT's basic tenets and methodological fingerprints.
Part Five builds upon the context developed in the first four sections
of the paper and applies critical theory insights and methods to an historical analysis of law and race. In doing so, I seek to provide a counternarrative, as Derrick Bell suggests, 13 to the dominant story about race
and law. The dominant story suggests that the struggle for racial justice,
though long and incremental, is nevertheless forward-moving, progressive, and eventually triumphant, given the American creed and precepts. 14 The counter-narrative challenges this, suggesting that racial
justice has not triumphed and that the white supremacy of American law
first based explicitly on a theory of white superiority and black inferiority continues now under the guise, through the operation, and on a theory
of colorblindness. Part Five, thus, seeks to do Critical Race Theory. Part
Six, summarizes a number of the key insights of related CRT scholarship
with a particular focus on LatCrit. While it has been suggested that the
development of this related scholarship has fragmented the CRT pro-

11.
12.

See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.

13.

BELL, supra note 2, at 21-22; see also DELGADO & STEANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION,

supra note 1, at 40-41.
14.

BELL, supra note 2, at 21-22.
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ject,15 I suggest that these movements and insights necessarily inform the
CRT project.
Part Seven briefly takes up an important refrain and critique of
CRT: that it more systematically explore the relationship between class
and race. 16 This I think requires serious engagement with the notion and
structures of class. Drawing on similar work and critiques by Richard
Delgado,17 I explore possible reasons why CRT, which has made significant contributions to feminist legal scholarship, 18 and gay, lesbian, and
queer legal scholarship,1 9 in addition to race scholarship, has not adequately engaged the issues of class. I suggest class analyses or the
founding of classcrits as a future direction of CRT scholarship and advocacy.
I. OVERVIEW

One of the most significant developments in law on issues of race
and ethnicity in the last twenty years is the development of Critical Race
Theory (CRT) and related scholarship. 20 The name, "Critical Race Theory" was coined in the late 1980's by Kimberld Crenshaw who explained
that the theory represented a racial analysis, intervention and critique of
traditional civil rights theory on the one hand, and of Critical Legal Studies insights on the other. 2 1 Its basic premises are that race and racism
are endemic to the American normative order and a pillar of American
institutional and community life. Further, it suggests that law does not
merely reflect and mediate pre-existing racialized social conflicts and
relations. 22 Instead law, as part of the social fabric and the larger hegemonic order, constitutes, constructs and produces races and race relations
15.
16.

See infra note 117.
See infra note 247.

17.
See generally Richard Delgado, Crossroadsand Blind Alleys: A CriticalExamination of
Recent Writings About Race, Crossroads,Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 82 TEX. L.

REV. 121 (2003) [hereinafter Delgado, Blind Alleys]; Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About
Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO.

L.J. 2279 (2001) [hereinafter Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race]; Delgado, The Current
Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2006) [hereinafter

Delgado, The CurrentLandscape of Race]; infra notes 247-98.
18.
1 am thinking, for instance, of intersectional theory as a significant contribution to feminist legal theory. See Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991), reprinted in part in CRT:
KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 357-83 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins]; KIMBERLt
CRENSHAW, A BLACK FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND POLITICS, in THE

POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356-80 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
THE POLITICS OF LAW], see also infra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
19.
Here I am thinking about multidimensionality theory as a contribution to gay, lesbian, and
queer theory. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999); Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism,Multidimen-

sionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998); see
also infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
20.
See generally, supra note 1.
21.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 9-31; CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii-xxxii.
22.
Harris, supra note 1, at 1216-17.
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23

in a way that suppoAs white supremacy.
Critical Race Theory, as
Cheryl Harris explains, "coheres in the drive to excavate the relationship
between the law, legal doctrine, ideology, and [white] racial power and
the motivation 'not merely to understand
the vexed bond between law
24
it.'
change
to
but
power
and racial
Critical Race Theory arose during the ascendance of, and as a challenge to the ideology of colorblindness in law,25 which asserts that race,
like eye color, is and should be irrelevant to the determination of individuals' opportunities. A noble sentiment perhaps, but Critical Race
Theory, while maintaining that race is not like eye color,26 argues that
legal colorblindness operates as if a colorblind society already exists and
has always existed in the United States.27 In doing so, it ignores and
cements the racial caste system constructed in part by law.28 Inother
23. Id. For recent discussions of the construction of racial identity at the personal level, see,
e.g., Michelle Adams, Radical Integration,94 CAL. L. REV. 261 (2006); Angela Onyuachi-Willig,
Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REv. 873 (2006).
24.
Harris,supra note 1, at 1218 (quotingCRT: KEY WRITINGS, supranote 1, at xiii).
25. See CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xvi-xvii (noting that at the emergence of CRT,
many of its principle figures experienced the "boundaries of 'acceptable' racial discourse as becoming suddenly narrowed" and explaining that while there were differences between liberal and conservative positions they "defined and constructed 'racism' the same way, [in contrast to future CRT
scholars] as the opposite of color-blindness"); see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that
CRT came into "existence at the twilight of what had been a transformative social period" referencing the civil rights movement of the sixties and seventies). In retrospect, it becomes clear that
CRT's initial conflicts are related to the colorblind perspectives of their adversaries. See infra notes
78-92. Further, CRT emerges at the same time that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause in the racial context increasingly shift toward and are based on notions of colorblind individualism. See infra notes 30-36, 171-206 and accompanying text. For discussions of
colorblindness, see BELL, supra note 2, at 115-35; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 21-22; Gotanda, supra note 2, at 257-75. See generally MICHAEL
K. BROWN ET. AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 193 (2003)

[hereinafter BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE] (reviewed, from a CRT perspective by Delgado,
The CurrentLandscape of Race, supra note 17); Cheryl Harris, Review Essay: Whitewashing Race:
Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL. L. REv. 907 (2006); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and
Discrimination,39 How. L.J. 1 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minyer, & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HoW. L.J. 241 (2006).
26. Harris, supra note 1, at 1229. Critical race theorists would argue that race is socially
constructed in a process, in which social and materially relevant meanings are assigned to certain
biological traits, whereas eye color is a biological trait to which no overriding social meaning has
been assigned. For good treatments of the social construction of race, see BELL, supranote 2, at 5-8;
Robert S. Chang, Critiquing "Race" and Its Uses: CriticalRace Theory's Uncompleted Argument,
in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 87-96; IAN F.
HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) reprintedin CRT:
CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 626-34; MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WiNANT, RACIAL FORMATION
IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 9-13 (2d ed., 1994); Gotanda, supra note 2,
at 257-75; Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Constructionof Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1994), reprinted in part in CRT:
CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 191-203. W.E.B. Du Bois anticipated this position. See The Conservation of Race, in W.E.B. DU BOIS SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, 1890-1919, 50-54
(Philip Foner ed., 1998); see generally FRANZ BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE 3-195
(1940) (these pages include multiple essays discussing race).
27.
This argument is not meant to suggest that the ideal society in the future would be a colorblind society. An ideal society might be one that embraces and respects human diversity.
28.
See BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supranote 25, at 193; Gotanda, supra note 2,
at 274; see also BELL, supra note 2, at 126-27; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, AN INTRODUCTION supra
note 1, at 21-22; Harris, supra note 1,at 1229-30; Harris, supra note 25 (arguing in reference to
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words, it maintains the oppressive conditions and lack of opportunities
for subordinated groups that continue to be structured by the historical
and modem use of race in law and throughout
the society. It amounts to
29
what has been called "colorblind racism.
30

Colorblindness, or more specifically, "colorblind individualism,,
as an ideology applied in law, fully emerges after the civil rights movement but has deep historical roots even in American law itself. One of
its earliest and clearest articulations is found in the dissent to the infamous U.S. Supreme Court case, Plessy v. Ferguson.31 In Plessy, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, enacted as part of the Civil War amendments
that abolished slavery, allowed the separate but equal treatment of racialized people. Plessy thus made legal the practices of racial, "Jim Crow"
segregation in the United States 32 that the civil rights movement, almost
one hundred years later, would challenge. Justice John Marshall Harlan,
the lone dissenter in the case, in rejecting the holding asserts the colorblind claim: "[I]n the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens ...Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. 33 The separate but
equal legal doctrine of Plessy was overturned in the Brown v. Board of

conservative interpretations that race was not a factor in the aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina, that
colorblindness is a perspective that narrows the definition of race to that arising from the aberrant
individual's intentional action); Hernandez, supra note 2. From this colorblind perspective, the
response to the question of whether race played a role in the government's slow response to hurricane victims, the argument is no one or group of individuals could be said with certainty to have
intentionally delayed governmental action. Of course this does not address more unconscious influences in individuals and it does not explain why, out of the 1.3 million people who make up the New
Orleans metropolitan area-all hit by the hurricane-the 120,000 or so people stranded in New
Orleans after the hurricane were overwhelmingly black? See Virginia R. Dominguez, Seeing and
Not Seeing: Complicity in Surprise, in SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING
KATRINA:

PERSPECTIVES

FROM

THE

SOCIAL

SCIENCES

(2005),

http://understandingkatina.ssrc.org/Dominguez/pf/ (providing these statistics and making a similar
point); see also infra notes 297-316 (discussing class, race and Hurricane Katrina).
29.
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POSTCIVIL RIGHTS ERA 137-66 (2001); LESLIE G. CARR, "COLOR-BLIND" RACISM 107-170 (1997).
30.
This term is used to capture both the ideas of race neutrality and the emphasis in American law on the individual. For instance, Kevin Brown uses this term to capture these two different
dynamics in discussing the demise of school desegregation efforts in the U. S. See KEVIN DION
BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON
DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 103-28 (2005); see also John 0. Calmore, New Demograph-

ics and the Voting Rights Act: Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1271-72 (2001) (discussing the way the Supreme Court is
transporting "individualized colorblindness" across different context and explaining why this is
ridiculous in the voting dilution context, a context that only makes sense in the terms of identifiable
groups and yet blind to white group bloc voting).
31.
163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGALHISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987).
32. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed., 1974). "Jim

Crow" laws were laws that imposed racial separation in schools, common carriers, public accommodations, and in public facilities generally, both governmental and private.
33. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Education case, 34 decided in 1954, which made segregation in schools
unconstitutional.
The rediscovery in the seventies of colorblind notions in law, was
given a boost by the appropriation by conservative forces of colorblind
discourse within the civil rights movement, 35 as captured in the 1963
speech of Martin Luther King, Jr., a civil rights hero. King aspired to a
time when every person would be judged "by the content of his character
rather than the color of his skin." 36 However, while Dr. King believed,
worked, and died fighting for peace and racial and economic justice, the
application of legal colorblindness has worked to undermine that dream.
A central theme of Critical Race Theory, therefore, is to explore the ways
in which legal colorblindness, in supplanting overt legal racial ordering,
has not only allowed law to ignore the social and institutional structures
of oppression created historically and recreated presently in law and
practice but also has blunted efforts to dismantle the racial caste system,
working instead to maintain it. Critical Race Theory's main goal is the
liberation of minorities and other
socially subordinated people; its stance
37
is one of "antisubordination.
Critical Race Theory supports its claim by analyzing cases, laws,
and legal patterns that unearth the many ways in which law constitutes
and/or supports the status quo of white racial power and black and nonwhite subordination. For example, CRT scholars have examined the
34.
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2d ed., 2004).
For consideration of the consequences of Brown, see generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
:EDUCATION (2004); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS

MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLING LEGACY (2001), reviewed by Carlo A. Pedriali, Under a Critical
Race Theory Lens, 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 93 (2005).

35.

See BELL, supra note 2, at 115 (referring to modem-day colorblind ideology as a redis-

covered constitutional rationale). For early conservative misappropriations of the civil rights aspiration as captured by King, see generally PAUL SEABURY, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (Barry Gross
ed., 1977); NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1975).
36.
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 217, 219 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986), quoted in
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xv. Dr. King was obviously speaking of judgments of per-

sonal moral worth, not about a theory of constitutional interpretation. Constitutional colorblindness
is part of the Supreme Court's rationale for the application of strict scrutiny to all racial classifications, even those intended to remedy the effects of discrimination. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); BELL, supra note 2, at 115-35.
37.
See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987), reprintedin part in POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW, supra note 1, at 479-81; Ruth Colker,

Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005
(1986); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and "OutCrit" Perspectivity:
Postsubordination Vision as JurisprudentialMethod, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 399-409; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination? Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VI1 and the LLRA. Not, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 395 (1993), reprintedin part in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 317-32 (Adrien Katherine Wing 1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM]; Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes,

Afterword to LatCrit V Symposium: LatCritat Five: Institutionalizinga Post-SubordinationFuture,
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1249, 1265-66 (2001).
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ways that past naturalization laws,38 together with cases such as Dred
Scott both constructed whiteness and defined it as a condition of citizenship. 39 They have examined how current laws legitimate racial profiling
of black and other non-white peoples, thereby reinforcing elements of the
caste system developed throughout the nation's history. 40 And they have
analyzed the ways in which race-neutral housing laws facilitated white
flight and suburban sprawl after the Brown decision, perpetuating in new
form the old pattern of racial residential segregation. 4 1 From this perspective, CRT rejects the conventional claims of lawyers, judges, and
others that law, through the professional processes of reasoned analysis
of abstract rules such as equality, is neutral, objective, and distinct from
and outside the realm of politics and political choices.42 Having emerged
from a critique of civil rights, Critical Race theorists initially focused on
constitutional and civil rights issues. However, they now explore the
relationship between white racial power and law in a range of topics
from business law 43 to international law."n
38.
39.

Uniform Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195 (1922); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 419-20

(1857). See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).

40.
See Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-BalancedFourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the
Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002); see, e.g., Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also BELL, supra note 2, at xx; William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, US. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?: Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on
the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 387 (2001); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and
Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All
Other Traffic Offences: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); Tracey Maclin, Race and the FourthAmendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 338
(1991), reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 206-28; Katheryn K. F. Russell, "Driving
While Black": Corollary Phenomena and CollateralConsequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 (1999);
United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 114 (6th Cir. 1994) (Keith, J., dissenting).
41.
John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-theFuture Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1492-94 (1993), reprinted in part in SOCIAL JUSTICE:
PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 884-92 (Martha R. Mahoney, John 0. Calmore, &

Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2003) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE].
42.
See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV.
741, 746 (1994). See generally Phillips, supra note 4.
43.
See, e.g., CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 138-177; Keith Aoki, The Stakes of Intellectual
PropertyLaw, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 259-78; Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender
and Race Discriminationin Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991), reprinted in
part in A WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE MARKETPLACE: GENDER AND ECONOMICS 295-318 (Emma
Coleman Jordan & Angela P. Harris eds., 2006) [hereinafter A WOMAN'S PLACE]; Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discriminationin New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 109 (1995); Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protectionfor Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only "::
ehe Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1996); Anthony R. Chase,
Race, Culture, and ContractLaw: From the Cotton Field to the Courtroom,28 CONN. L. REV. 5, 6-7
(1995); Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725 (2004);
Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer
Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. I (2003); Cheryl L. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993), reprintedin part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 279-87, and in CRT:
KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1,at 276-91, and in A WOMAN'S PLACE, supra at 357-71; Emily M.S.
Houh, Critical Interventions: Towards an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good
Faith in ContractLaw, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2003); Blake Morant, The Relevance of Race and
Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889 (1997); Muriel Morisey,
Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89 (1993),
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In addition, CRT helped spawn the development of the Latina and
Latino Critical Theory (LatCrit)45 and Asian American critical legal
analyses and movements.46 By shifting the Critical Race Theory lens to
other racialized groups, these analyses brought in important discussions
of both historical and contemporary issues of citizenship and immigration law as sources of racial and ethnic subordination, as well as, for example, language suppression and stereotypes (Latina/os) 47 or the model
minority myth (Asian Americans). 48 These issues were less visible in the
original context of CRT's employment of the white over black paradigm
and the particularities of the African American experience as analytical
frameworks.
The LatCrit movement is particularly interesting because it explicitly incorporates and builds upon feminist legal insights and queer theory
as foundational philosophies, explores international issues, and explicitly
and consciously articulates the social justice position of antisubordination-a stance against all forms of oppression. Further, LatCrit scholars

reprintedin part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 160-64; David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of
Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695 (2004); Mylinh Uy, Tax and Race: The
Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN L.J. 117 (2004); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and
Improper Considerations:A Common-Law Modelfor the Prohibitionof Racial Discriminationin the
ContractingProcess, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (1994), reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra
note 1, at 138-43, 165-68, 176-77.
44.
See generally CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra
note 1, at 303-75; Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in International Law and CriticalRace Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000), reprinted in part in SOCIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 880-82; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in InternationalEconomic
Law: Locating Latinas/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361 (1996);
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 339-85; GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN
INTERNATIONAL READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000) [hereinafter GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM]; Chantal Thomas, CriticalRace Theory and PostcolonialDevelopment Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195 (2000).
45.
See Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method
and ComparativeJurisprudentialExperience - RaceCrits, QueerCrits,and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1266, 1266 (1999).
46.
See generally WU, supra note 1; Chang, supra note 1, at 355; Margaret Chon & Donna E.
Arzt, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered Examining the Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215
(2005); Frank H. Wu, The Arrival of Asian Americans: An Agenda for Legal Scholarship, 10 ASIAN
L.J. 1 (2003). Recently these scholars have called their work Asian American Jurisprudence. See,
e.g., John Hayakawa Torok, Asian American Jurisprudence: On Curriculum, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 635.
47.
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Literature: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1273 (1992), reprintedin part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 82-89.
48.
Frank H. Wu, ChangingAmerica: Three Arguments About Asian Americans and the Law,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 811, 813-14 (1996); Chang, supra note I; Uy, supra note 43, at 131-32. See
generally NAZLI KHRIA, BECOMING ASIAN AMERICAN: SECOND-GENERATION CHINESE AND
KOREAN IDENTITIES (2002); DIANA TING LfU WU, ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS IN THE WORKPLACE
(1997); STACEY J. LEE, UNRAVELING THE "MODEL MINORITY": LISTENING TO ASIAN AMERICAN
YOUTH (1996).
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have established an institutional framework for the future development
of LatCrit and other Critical Race Theory scholarship.49
While feminist theory, particularly feminist legal theory and black
feminist theory, were inherent in the original Critical Race Theory scholarship through the work of people like Crenshaw and Angela Harris,50
Critical Race Feminism, a term coined originally by Richard Delgado,
and a field adopted and promoted specifically by Adrien Wing, has taken
51
off as a separate, newly-developing theory and body of scholarship.
Critical Race Feminism builds on Critical Race Theory as well as insights specifically from black feminist theory and is also a leftist legal
critique that primarily focuses on the intersections of race, ethnicity,
and/or colonialism on the one hand and gender on the other. In addition,
it explores the international manifestations of racialized gender oppression. The exploration of the sex/gender system, generally, its relationship to the racial order, and the living reality of sexual minorities of
color, coupled with Critical Race Theory's embrace of the larger social
justice project of working toward the liberation of all, has resulted in
many critical race theorists also examining the ways in which law subordinates sexual minorities.5 2
Together these issues have led to insights about the ways in which
identity is multidimensional. For instance, critical race theorists, among
others, point out that people are not simply raced (black, white, yellow,
or "Hispanic"); they are also gendered, (masculine, feminine or transgendered) and possess sexual identities (heterosexual, homosexual, or
bisexual), etc. From this perspective, every person's identity is multidimensional. 53 This insight of multidimensionality goes further. The so49.
LatCrit literature is readily available at the LatCrit website, Latina and Latino Critical
Theory (2004), http://personal.law.miami.edu/-fvaldes/latcrit/latcrit/index.html (listing, inter alia,
16 colloquia and symposia on LatCrit). See generally, THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 1;
Colloquium. Representing Latina/o Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice,9 LA RAZA
L.J. 1 (1996); Panel: Latinalo Identity and Pan-Ethnicity: Toward LatCrit Subjectivities, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 175 (1997); Joint Symposium: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087
(1997).
50.
See generally CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990), reprintedin part in POWER, PRIVILEGE
AND LAW, supra note 1, at 484-85, 539-43, and in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 253-66,
andin CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 35, at 11 -18.
51.
See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 1; GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM,
supra note 44; CRT: CUTrING EDGE, supra note 1, at 261-74; Adrien K. Wing & Christine A.
Willis, From Theory to Praxis: Black Women, Gays, and Critical Race Feminism, 4 AFR.-AM. L. &
POL'Y REP. 1 (1999); see also Women of Color in Legal Academia: A Biographicand Bibliographic
Guide, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1993).
52.
See generally Hutchinson, supra note 19; Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "'SexualOrientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997).
53.
Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights - Rules and Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formulafor Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605, 667-68 (1996). See
generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality," "Multidimensionality,"
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001),
reprintedin part in SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 4 1.
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cial structures of race, gender, sexuality, and class as systems of power
are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. They create multiple and intersecting positions of subordination for members of the groups they disadvantage. So for example, racism in the United States is patriarchal and
patriarchy in the United State is racist. As Dorothy Roberts points out,
some of the first laws passed in America involved changing the legal/social practice of children inheriting the status of their fathers, to
children inheriting the status of their mother if their mothers were (black)
slaves, while patrolling and later prohibiting sexual relations between
white women and black men. "Black women [were forced to] produce[]
children who were legally Black to replenish the master's supply of
slaves . .. [while] White women [were compelled to] produce[] white

children to continue the master's legacy." 54 Black men passed on little."
The racism that both black men and women experienced was thus, also
gendered. To these analyses, scrutiny of the specific relations of class
could be added as wc ll as an analysis of compulsory heterosexuality. As
such, the structure of black oppression was and has remained multidimensional.
CRT theorists have often explored the material harms caused by
race, gender, and sexuality as mutually reinforcing social systems embedded in and constructed, albeit not exclusively, by law; and they have
suggested that these systems reinforce the reproduction of class within
the United States. However, they have not in any sustained manner theorized the ways in which class functions as a site for identity formation, or
the various ways in which class as a specific function of the creation and
distribution of resources, operates both independently and mutually with
other subordinating structures to limit the material well-being of people
including racial and other minorities. These kinds of analyses await further development and constitute a necessary future direction of CRT.
II.

INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Many scholars have described the origins of Critical Race Theory.
They suggest that it owes its intellectual genesis to three intellectual
movements. The first is the civil rights movement and the critical assessments of its effects in changing the actual conditions of black life.
Second, CRT builds upon the themes and critical understandings of law
exposed by the Critical Legal Studies movement. 56 And third, it incor54.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and the Patriarchyin the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 8 (1993), reprintedin FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, VOLUME 1I(Frances
E. Olsen ed., 1995). See generally JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW:
BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985).
55.
Presumably where black men were free and had children with a free woman, he passed on
his legacy.
56.
See generally CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1; CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1.
For a discussion on the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, see generally CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (Jones Boyle ed., 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989);
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porates many of the
insights and theorizing of feminist legal and other
57
feminist scholars.
Richard Delgado traces CRT genesis to the early seventies when
several legal scholars began to express doubt about the effectiveness of
the civil rights movement's legal strategy to racial justice. For instance,
Derrick Bell, considered a forefather of CRT, in an essay in 1976, suggested that civil rights attorneys' approach to litigating school cases for
purposes of desegregating entire school districts (and balancing them
racially) might be at odds with their clients'-African American families-very real hopes and concrete goals of immediately improving their
children's educations. 58 In another article, Bell argued that the result in
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, although heralded as a
triumph of the civil rights legal strategy, might be better explained by
what he called "interest convergence,"" a theme that has become a
mainstay of critical race analysis. 60 Brown, he suggested, came about
not because of some belated realization by whites of the harms black
children suffered under segregation, 6' but rather, because of its value to
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:
ARTICLES, NOTES, AND BOOK REVIEWS SELECTED FROM THE PAGES OF THE HARVARD REVIEW
(1986); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Symposium: CriticalLegal Studies, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1-674 (1984); Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: A PoliticalHistory, 100 YALE
L.J. 1515 (1991).
57.
See generally CRT: CUTrING EDGE, supra note 1, at 499-550.
58.
Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), reprintedin CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1,
at 5-19, and in partin CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 228-38, and in SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra
note 4 1, at 328-33; see DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supranote 1, at 30-3 1.
59.
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980), reprintedin CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 20-29 [hereinafter Bell, Interest Convergence Dilemma]; see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51-74 (1987). Bell's theory had a precursor in the "Slave
Power" theory constructed by antislavery elements, such as future Chief Justice Samuel P. Chase,
prior to the Civil War. They argued that the South was under the political control of slave owners
who, through the Democratic Party, dominated all branches of the national government, which was
its tool for the denial, in the interests of slavery, of the freedoms of Northern whites. This became
part of the ideology of the Republican Party whose original commitment was to prevent the extension of slavery. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 (1970); MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE POLITICAL
CRISIS OF THE 1850s (1978).
60.
Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17, at 124; see, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs
Plan and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What to
Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1583 (2004); Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII after Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence,48 HOW. L.J.
937 (2005); John Hayakawa Torok, "'InterestConvergence" and the Liberalization of Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization Laws Affecting Asian Americans, 1943-1965, 1995 CHINESE
AMERICA: HISTORY & PERSPECTIVES 1-15; Marlia Banning, Critical Race Theory and Interest
Convergence in the Desegregationof Higher Education, in RACE IS - RACE ISN'T: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN EDUCATION (Laurence Parker, Donna Deyhle, & Sofia
Villenas eds., 1999).
61.
Bell, Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, supra note 59, at 523-24. The Brown decision also
ignored, and apparently could not contemplate, the harms segregation visited upon white students.
These harms as Kevin Brown suggests include a false sense of superiority. See BROWN, supranote
30, at 164-67. He notes that prominent social scientists filed an amicus brief in the Brown cases
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whites-a value and interest that converged with black aspirations for
freedom and well-being.62 The decision, he suggests, was intended to
and "helped to provide immediate credibility to America's struggle with
Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third
world peoples. 63 Bell's argument that the goal of the U.S. government
in advocating for the decision in Brown had little to do with improving
the education or life chances of black children, rang particularly accurate
in 2004 when, fifty years after the decision, education in the United
States was found to be as segregated (and disadvantaging) in terms of
race as it had been at the time of Brown. 64 Bell later argued that racism
was pervasive in the American social order, that law was imbued with it,
and that racism was a permanent feature of American society including
its legal system. 65

suggesting that segregation hurt all children both black and white, not simply black children. The
scientists noted that children taught prejudice learn:
to gain personal status in an unrealistic and non-adaptive way. When comparing themselves to members of the minority group, they are not required to evaluate themselves in
terms of the more basic standards of actual personal ability and achievement. The culture
[allows] ...them to direct their feelings of hostility and aggression against whole groups
of people ... perceived as weaker than themselves. They often develop patterns of guilt
feeling, rationalizations and other mechanisms which they must use in an attempt to protect themselves from recognizing the essential injustice ....
Id. at 165. Brown concludes that "if segregation created a false sense of inferiority within blacks,
then it must have also generated the psychological harm of a false sense of superiority in whites."
Id.at 165-66. He explains this as the dual psychological harm of segregation, the two different sides
of the same delusion suffered by the entire society. Id.at 166.
The difficulties experienced by minority teachers (as well as women) in the classroom in
many ways capture this harm in that white students who often know little about the subject matter of
the class act as if there is little a minority teacher can teach them. Consider Derrick Bell's experience at Stanford Law School in 1986 when first year law students presumed to know more about
constitutional law than Professor Bell did and therefore critiqued the class as not covering the appropriate subject matter. The Stanford administration, though later apologizing, initially capitulated to
the student's estimation. See Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective,STAN. L. SCH.
J., May 9, 1986, at 5. In fact these teachers have written quite a bit about their classroom difficulties
as minority teachers and the other challenges they face in the context of the predominately white
male American law school. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors'
Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 360 (1989); Okianer Christian
Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 21, 23 (1993); Trina Grillo, Tenure, and
Minority Women Law Professors: Separating the Strands, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 747, 753-54 (1997);
Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teachingfrom the Margins: Race as a PedagogicalSub-text: A Critical Essay, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 151, 152 (1997). For the perspective of critical students, see
Kathryn Pourmand Nordick, Essay: A CriticalLook at Student Resistance to Non-TraditionalLaw
School Professors,27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (2005).
62.
Bell, Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, supra note 59, at 524.
63.
Bell, Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, supra note 59, at 524; see also Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregationas a Cold War Imperative,41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1998), reprintedin CRT: CUTTING
EDGE, supra note 1, at 106-17 (noting that the government stated this in their amicus brief submitted
in the Brown case and further substantiating Bell's intuition).
64.
This point was made during celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of Brown. See,
e.g., Greg Toppo, IntegratedSchools Still a Dream 50 Years Later, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2004, at
Al.
65.
BELL, supra note 2, at 1; see Bell, supra note 59, at 518; DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 3 (1993).

Ignored in the rush to proclaim color blindness as the judicial panacea to claims of racial
injustice is the fact that virtually all policies adopted as protections against racial injus-
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At about the same time, the Critical Legal Studies movement based
in the legal academy was growing. This movement questioned the entire
edifice of law as an objective arbiter of social conflict distinct from the
messiness of politics and political choices. This movement, which included scholars such as Alan Freeman, Peter Gabel, Duncan Kennedy,
and Mark Tushnet, successfully demonstrated the ways in which legal
rules were, in and of themselves, not determinative of a particular result. 66 They showed that, for any given rule, there were multiple, contrasting and conflicting rules whose resolution required actors to make
choices. These choices were political ones that generally reflected, supported, and legitimized the social power of dominant classes.67
However, they rejected what they termed "vulgar instrumentalist"
or "structuralist" accounts of law that understand it as merely a tool and
reflection of bourgeoisie/elite interests and ideas, or as a merely superstructural phenomenon determined by the underlying economic base.
Rather, drawing in part on the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio
Gramsci's idea of hegemony, 68 Critical Legal Studies scholars understand law as a complex system with many functions, one of which is to
exercise and simultaneously legitimate the use of institutional violence
within the prevailingsocial arrangements in a way that gains the consent

tices suffered by blacks and other people of color in this country have actually proven to
be of more value to whites.
BELL, supra note 2, at xx; see also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992);
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism -After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial
Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393 (1990), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 2-8
[hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism].
66. See THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 1-7 (providing a good overview of Critical
Legal Studies themes). This book has been revised several times. The first edition in 1982 was
updated and followed by a revised edition in 1990, and then again in a third edition in 1998, supra
note 1. I like each of these editions but find the 1982 publication the best for introducing many of
the basic CLS concepts and initial ideas. In this edition the ideas tend to be more fully explained,
whereas in later publications some key insights are merely summarized. The later editions, however,
introduce new thinking developed in a covered area and introduce additional essays that explore a
wider breadth of legal fields.
67. See Victor Rabinowitz, The Radical Traditionin the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 18, at 686; see, e.g., ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEWIS & RICHARD DELGADO,
JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 402-

13 (2002).
68. Hegemony is an illusive concept, but is to be counterposed to "direct domination" as a
paradoxical "'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position
and function in the world of production." SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI 12, 161, 170, 416-17 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971); see also
Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 18, at 647-48; Douglass Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV.
515, 515-16 (2000); ALAN HUNT, DICHOTOMY AND CONTRADICTION INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, in
MARXISM AND LAW 86-87 (Piers Beime & Richard Quinney eds., 1982); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio
Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 32 (1982). For an application of Gramsci's concept
of hegemony to antebellum slavery, see EUGENE V. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD
THE SLAVES MADE 25-49 (1976), reprintedin part in MARXISM AND LAW, supra at 279-94.
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and acquiescence of the subordinated to their conditions. 69 Law does
this political work by deploying a distinct and elaborate discourse and
body of knowledge (popularly perceived as objective and apolitical) to
justify its decisions. These decisions, while generally supporting the
power of elite groups, sometimes actually restrain the exercise of power
and occasionally provide justice to ordinary people. In doing so, however, they lend legitimacy to law and to many of the existing social arrangements and institutions of which law is a part. Thus, while there
may indeed be "a difference between arbitrary
power and [the] rule of
70
law," law may also be "in some part sham.",
So for example, in a path-breaking article, Alan Freeman argued
that antidiscrimination law offered a credible measure of tangible progress without in any way disturbing the basic class structure of the
American society. 71 This was accomplished by using concepts such as
intent, fault, colorblindness and formal equality, which over time ultimately located the problem of racism in the intentional actions of bad
actors instead of the established caste system that included the conscious
and unconscious habitual human and institutional practices of racial ordering. The remedy to the problem, defined in this manner, was to compel the bad actors to act differently instead of changing or dismantling
the caste system of embedded racial arrangements. 72 Thus, although
judges declared that law would treat everyone the same, they did so
without regard to and so without changing the conditions that stratified
people(s) socially and materially in the first place. As such, antidiscrimination law outlawed the obvious and explicit manifestations of racism (the "white only" signs of the Jim Crow era) and thereby provided
credible evidence that the law and the basic structure of society were fair,
69.
My notion here of legal discourse as backed by violence and justifying its use comes from
Robert Cover. See generally, Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). I
thank my colleague John Henry Schlegal for pointing out that I should clarify this.
70.
Rabinowitz, supra note 67, at 688 (citing E.P. Thompson, the celebrated English radical
historian who acknowledged the element of false consciousness induced by the legal order, but
affirmed the rule of law as a potential basis for progressive change; see E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265-66 (1975), reprinted in part in MARXISM AND

LAW, supra note 68, at 130-37). Another of Gramsci's concepts is the "organic intellectual," who is,
not a social technician (like most lawyers) but rather someone who instructs popular consciousness
"precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the
intellectual progress of the race and not only of small intellectual groups." SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI, supra note 68, at 332-33.

For a CRT application of

these concepts which regards Martin Luther King as one such organic intellectual, see ANTHONY E.
COOK, BEYOND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE RECONSTRUCTIVE THEOLOGY OF DR. MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1,at 90-91.

71.
Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978), reprinted in MARXISM
AND LAW, supra note 68, at 210-35 [hereinafter Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination];see
also Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainity, Contradiction,Rationalization,Denial,in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 285-311.
72.
Freeman also suggests that the Court's momentary flirtation with attacking the actual
structural conditions of subordination through ordering school desegregation lent support to its
rhetoric of change.
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without disturbing the structural and systemic manifestations, including
the maldistribution of resources, of that same deeply embedded racism.
And finally, though perhaps not initially obvious, CRT owes a debt
to yet another school of thought: feminism. As Delgado notes, CRT
builds upon feminist "insights into the relationship between power and
the construction of social roles, as well as the unseen, largely invisible
collection of patterns and habits that make up patriarchy and other types
of domination." 73 In addition, the idea of antisubordination, the central
stance of "race crits," can be traced not only to race scholars but also to
feminist scholarship.7 4
III. CONFLICT AS AN ENGINE OF CRT INTELLECTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH

These ideas, according to Kimberl6 Crenshaw, met in the actual
persons of students attending Harvard Law School in 1981 where a
struggle raged over the meaning of race. This struggle was a part of a
larger continuum of student movements at universities in the 1970s and
1980s advocating for ethnic study departments, against South African
apartheid, and for diversity in student admissions and faculty staffing.7 5
The struggle implicated notions of race consciousness, affirmative action, and the presumptive existence of meritocracy and proved to be a
catalyst for the theory's institutionalization. It also began a pattern of
conflict that would engender crucial CRT insights and fuel its growth
and entrenchment.
Specifically, the conflict at Harvard led to the Alternative Course,
described by Crenshaw as CRT's first institutional expression. Second,
conflict with Critical Legal Studies helped to inspire the formal establishment of the CRT workshop. Third, internal conflict and critique over
the commitments and focus of the workshop led to the exploration of the
experiences of additional racialized and oppressed groups. The later
founding of LatCrit, resulting in part from these conflicts, brought about
concerns about fragmentation of the movement. 76 Nevertheless, it embodied and represented a continuing site for the germination of "Race
Crit" insights. And last, the conflict over Proposition 20977 and its visions of colorblind justice in the context of the University of California
Los Angeles Law School led to CRT's entrenchment.

73.
74.
75.

DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supranote 1,at 5.
See supra note 37.
Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory's Cutting Edge: Key

Movements That Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377 (2000), reprinted in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1,at 32-70.

76.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1356-57.
77.
California Civil Rights Initiative, California Ballot Proposition 209 (adopted Nov. 6,
1986) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31) [hereinafter California Proposition 209].
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A. Alternative Course: ConfrontingColorblindness
After the departure of Derrick Bell from Harvard Law School in
1981, a group of students asked the administration to continue to offer
his semester-long course on Constitutional Law and Minority Issues.7 8
This course, according to Crenshaw, fore-grounded race in the context of
legal issues rather than analyzing laws from the typical liberal individual
rights perspective of "how do we get blacks some rights" while reconciling other vested interests. 79 Further it assessed laws on the basis of their
effectiveness in changing the actual conditions of black subordination
while also analyzing the ways in which many of these same laws actually
contributed to racial subordination.80
These students, seeing the hole in the curriculum created by Bell's
departure as an opportunity to "desegregate the faculty," asked the administration to hire a person of color to teach the course. 81 The Dean's
response, in particular, was instructive to students who later institutionalized Critical Race Theory. He questioned any value a course on "Constitutional Law and Minorities Issues" might add to a curriculum that already offered courses such as constitutional law and employment discrimination law, both of which dealt with "those" issues. 82 The Dean
asked "why the students would not prefer an excellent white professor
over a mediocre black one." 83 And he suggested that there were no people of color in the country "qualified" to be hired at Harvard Law
School.84 His comment reflected a particular perspective that provoked
what later came to be key CRT themes. First, his comments suggested
that qualifications or merit were something other than socially defined
worth that themselves might embody racial meanings and structure.85
Second, although this merit supposedly had nothing to do with color because merit was colorblind; 86 it was nonetheless captured by the then
current predominantly white professors and not in any black professors
in the country at the time. 87 And, third, that Harvard, as a race-neutral
78.
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1348. Bell later returned
to Harvard Law School. During his second stay, he staged a protest in support of Harvard hiring
black women. The protest is documented in part in his book, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY. See
generally DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTOR

(1994).
79.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1347.
80.
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxi; Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1347.
81.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1345.
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxi.
82.
Id.at xx.
83.
84.
Id.;
Harris,supra note 1,at 1221 n.10.
85.
See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1452-1453 (1997).
Harris, supra note 25, at 911-12 (on colorblindness).
86. See, e.g.,
87.
See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1348-49 (discussing the pool problem); see also CHO &
WESTLEY, supra note 73, at 46 (explaining that the "pool argument" was not credible and noting that
the percentage of faculty of color teaching in law schools grew by 85% in two years (1989-1991)
after the first nationwide strike by students advocating for faculty diversity).
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institution, supposedly did not hire people on the basis of color, and yet
the faculty was overwhelmingly white. Crenshaw notes: "This framing
of the issue gave many of us involved in that struggle a clear sense about
how conceptions such as colorblindness and merit functioned
as rhetoric
88
of racial power in presumptively race-neutral institutions."
Harvard responded to the students' request by hiring two distinguished civil rights lawyers, neither of whom was a person of color, to
teach a three-week mini course. The students rejected this offer, setting
off a national debate on affirmative action. 9 Instead they organized an
alternative course in which they invited a number of professors to teach
various parts of the course. 90 Several of the participants later became
prominent figures in CRT, including such scholars as Denise CartyBenia, Richard Delgado, Linda Green, Neil Gotanda, and Charles Lawrence, who were already law professors, Kimberld Crenshaw, a law student, and Mari Matsuda, a graduate student at the time. Crenshaw marks
the "Alternative Course" as CRT's first institutional expression. Its second institutional expression was in 1989 when Crenshaw, together with
Stephanie Phillips, Neil Gotanda and others and with the support of
Richard Delgado and the backing of David Trubek, then the director of
the Institute of Legal Studies at Wisconsin, organized the first CRT
91 Budding scholars such as Angela Harris were
workshop in Wisconsin.92
workshop.
to attend this
B. Conflict with CLS: The African American Experience as an Analytical andMethodologicalFramework
In the intervening time, many of these and other future "race crits"
had been meeting informally, and in separate sessions, at the Critical
Legal Studies meetings, retreats, and summer camps. This engagement
had both an intellectual and institutional contribution to CRT. First, the
CRT workshop was patterned after the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
summer workshops involving small groups of people to "explore a range
of topics. ' 93 Further, future race crits had clashed with CLS scholars in
the 1985 and 1987 conferences, when they sought to critique CLS both at
the level of practice and theory. At the level of practice, they questioned
the whiteness of CLS (as well as the elite maleness of it) and the way
these social positionings affected, and potentially limited, CLS analyses.
At the level of theory, race crits questioned one of the major theoretical

88.

Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1345.

89.

CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxi.

90.

Id.

91.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1361.
92.
Id. at 1361 n. 19. Other participants at the Wisconsin workshop, according to Stephanie
Phillips, included Paulette Caldwell, John Calmore, Harlon Dalton, Kendall Thomas, and Patricia
Williams. Id.
93.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1359.
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critiques of CLS scholarship, the trashing of rights. 94 Some CLS scholars argued that the idea of legal rights and "rights talk"-"I have this or
that right"-engaged in by the legal and popular public alike, actually
obscured and narrowed the actual concrete conflicts that underlie the
talk. Further, they suggested that rights talk limited people's ability to
creatively imagine alternative frameworks and solutions to problems that
might include measures or activities outside the realm of law. Some
CLS scholars thus advocated abandoning and trashing rights. 95 Future
race crits partly rejected this line of argument because it neglected the
reality that blacks and other people of color had in fact used the language
of legal rights through the civil rights movement to effect some change in
had failed to alter
their social treatment, even if using the rights discourse
96
oppression.
their
of
conditions
fundamental
the
In using the lens of the African American experience to critically
examine and challenge the CLS critique of rights, African American
insights and experience became a central part of Critical Race Theory's
analytical framework. Further, testing CLS insights against the actual
experiences and perspectives of African Americans, as embodied in the
civil rights movement for instance, informed CRT's methodology. And,
use of the African American experience also arguably fueled CRT's optimism and commitment to the progressive use of law and to the modernist ideals of justice, equality, and dignity.
Nonetheless, CLS scholars' hostile resistance to this critique, and
the maelstrom it created, cast a shadow on the race crits' continued engagement with CLS. In doing so, it sowed the seeds that a leftist, critical
law engagement with race required its own space. The critical theory
race workshop became that space.
See generally Minority Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.94.
C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987) (including articles by Richard Delgado, Mar Matsuda, Patricia Williams,
and Harlon Dalton); Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, RaceReform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356-86 (1988), reprinted in part in CRT: CASES, supra note 1, at 27-38; Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar:
Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 302
(1987).
95.
See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination,supra note 71; Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1563, 1590 (1984); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 387, 427 (1984); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supranote 1, at 549-55; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1386, 1382-83 (1984). The CLS critique of rights, just as some other CLS
ideas, was drawn from the Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s. See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 18, at 34-35; see, e.g., Felix
Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxiv; DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN
96.
INTRODUCTION supra note 1, at 23-25; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW,
supra note 1, at 35-36, 558-64; Crenshaw, supra note 94, at 1334; Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249;
GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER, supra note 44, at 3. Some in
CLS by now acknowledge the partial validity of the CRT counter-critique of their rights critique.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 68, at 657-58.
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C. Internal Conflict within the CRT Workshop: Expanding the Analytical Frameworkand Building the Commitment to Antisubordination
97
The critical race workshop met annually from 1989 until 1997.
Attendance at the workshop was by application and "invitation only"--a
policy that contributed to the critique of CRT as elitist. 98 However, according to Phillips, the policy was meant to facilitate sustained engagement over a five-day period of a small group of people committed to
"radical transformative politics." 99 As such, the workshop did not issue
"a general invitation to all legal scholars of color, no matter how conservative or parochial, to simply come hang out."' 100 Rather, she suggests,
this was the workshop's attempt to institute what Frank Valdes later
called "a move from color to consciousness," the idea that "alliances are
best built on shared substantive commitments, perhaps stemming from
similar experiences . . .with subordination, rather than traditional fault
lines like race or ethnicity.' 0' 1 But, this principle was not extended to
include white scholars with similar commitments. White scholars were
excluded from participating in the workshop, a decision which generated
debate as to whether this was a pragmatic attempt to construct safe space
and inhibit the reproduction of white racial hierarchy, or simply an unprincipled decision.' 02 In either case, the question became moot with the
cessation of annual CRT workshops and the almost simultaneous founding of the annual LatCrit conferences with its commitment to antiessentialist practice and its open-door policy that welcomed whites. 103
LatCrit developed in part in response to the conflicts in the workshop over two primary issues. 04 According to Phillips, the first issue,
erupting during the 1990 workshop, was whether CRT's commitment to
97.
The reason for the cessation of the CRT workshops, as far as I can tell, was that the workshop lacked a firm institutional framework to perpetuate its continuation. CRT scholars attending a
workshop would be asked or volunteer to host the next workshop at their school the following year.
A committee would then be established to guide the program. This differed from the process even-

tually established by LatCrit conference where host were identified and secured two years in advance and worked with standing officers and officials.
At the 1997 CRT workshop, Robert Westley, a coordinator of the workshop together with
Sumi Cho, approached Stephanie Phillips about hosting the CRT workshop for the following year.

1, who was attending the CRT workshop for the first time and was at that time an adjunct faculty
member at the University at Buffalo Law School, encouraged her. Stephanie, however was always
reluctant to host the conference again, having hosted a workshop in the early nineties. I did not push
her on this and later went on to host another project. Thus, we unwittingly became part of the story
of the workshop's demise.
98.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249 n.4.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1362-63; Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249 n.4.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1251-52; see generally Francisco Valdes, Foreword. Latina/o

Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From

Practicesto Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Valdes, Ethnicities]; see also Francisco Valdes, Under Construction - LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1087, 1090 (1997) [hereinafter Valdes, Under Construction].
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racial justice included a commitment to justice and liberation from other
forms of oppression, particularly the oppression of gay, lesbian, and
transgendered people. 105 It took, she suggests, almost eight years for the
workshop to fully embrace the position that antiracial struggle does or
should include the fight against oppression of sexual minorities. 106 The
second issue involved many of the nonblack people of color participants
at the 1992 workshop challenging the workshop's almost exclusive focus
on the history and conditions of African Americans to the exclusion of
the conditions of nonblack/nonwhite people. Phillips suggests that this
was one of the earliest critiques of what is typically known as the blackwhite paradigm, 107 but which came to be called the white over black
paradigm 10 8 to emphasize the hierarchal ordering of race and alluding to
its inclusion of other groups in between whites and blacks.1 09 Unlike the
issue of sexuality, she notes that the collective response of the workshop
to this critique was confessed ignorance," ° apologies and the embarrassment of some who perceived their actions as CRT having done to
nonblack peoples of color what CLS did to them. She argues that the
workshop thereafter began to explore the experiences of other racialized
groups and came to agree that:
[R]acism is not only historical slavery, Jim Crow laws and gerrymandered voting districts in the South; it is also immigration laws
and internment camps; it is stolen land grants and silenced languages;
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1250.
105.
106.
Id. at 1250-51.
Id. at 1252. Many scholars have critiqued and examined the limits of the white/black or
107.
white over black paradigm. See, e.g., Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race, supra note 17, at
1272; Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61, 81-82 (1997); Juan
F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial
Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1220, 1254 (1997) (arguing that the black/white paradigm promotes
the invisibility and marginalized Latina/o experiences). Devon W. Carbado has surveyed and examined a variety of these critiques. See Devon W. Carbado, CriticalRace Studies: Race to the Bottom,
49 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1305-12. I agree that there are limitations to the paradigm, it cannot possibly capture the many valences of race in America. See Athena D. Mutua, Mapping Intellectual/PoliticalFoundations and Future Self Critical Directions: Shifting Bottoms and Rotating
Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMt L. REV. 1177,
1179-80 (1999) [hereinafter Mutua, Shifting Bottoms]. However, I see the black experience and
blackness as central to and paradigmatic of a colorized racial system in which blackness or anything
but blackness is the chief obsession of white power. Id. at 1181-82. See also Harris, supra note 25,
at 916 ("[T]he Black/White paradigm may not accurately reflect racial demographics, because, in
part, it does not seek to do so. Instead, it describes racial power."). Further, I see no problem in
focusing on the African American experience, or the Latina/o experience, or any other group histories or experiences for that matter. It seems to me there is a difference between a practical focus concentrating your attention or efforts on one set of experiences-and assuming that this one set of
experiences is the whole or represent all there is. See Athena D. Mutua, Theorizing Progressive
Black Masculinities,in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES 34 (Athena D. Mutua ed., 2006) [hereinafter PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES] (discussing the multiple struggles inherent in a project
to transform the structures of domination that order American society, and noting the difference
between a practical focus on one struggle, and assuming that it is the only one as opposed to part of a
larger struggle).
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1252.
108.
Mutua, Shifting Bottoms, supra note 107, at 1189.
109.
110.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1253.
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it is standardized tests based on standardized culture; it is invisibility
and lost identity. III
The critique of the white over black paradigm opened the window
of recognition into the ways that the racialization of other groups involved the interplay of laws and practices not readily exposed by looking
at the domestic experiences and conditions of blacks in the United States.
It thus, opened doors for CRT to examine the relationship between race
and ethnicity, racism, and nativisim, and racism, nationalism, and colonialism. "1 2 It also brought into focus laws related to immigration, citizenship, foreignness, language, and assimilation, among other issues as they
related to U.S. foreign policy, and transnational and international law.
These insights together with the way in which some Latina/o scholars, such as Francisco Valdes, experienced the workshop conflicts led
them to institutionalize a separate space for the exploration of issues
germane to Latina/o communities and Latina/o identity. 1 3 The insights
also led to a call for (initially made by Robert Chang) and the subsequent
development of a line of Asian American legal scholarship.' '4 Further,
these insights intermittently drew in scholars who understood the Native
American experience both in terms of national oppression and racial oppression.'" 5 And finally it led to and encompassed work that explored
whiteness as a practice of exclusion and genocide, as a hidden norm and
as a site of unearned privilege by whites through the work of "white
6
, 11

crits.

The establishment of the LatCrit annual conference together with
the development of other related scholarship raised concerns over the
fragmentation of Critical Race Theory and the potential explosion of
multiple identity categories and projects. 117 However, not only did these
111.
Id.at 1254.
112.
For those CRT theorists who were familiar with black nationalist discourses, for example,
which understood black America as an internal colony and pushed Pan-Africanism, these theorists
may have made the connections between racism, nativism, and colonialism, even in the context of

the African American experience.
113.
Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 8-9.
114. See Chang, supra note 1, at 1247-49; Aoki, supra note 1, at 1476-79.
115.
See, e.g., ROBERTA. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990), reprinted in part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra

note 1, at 169-72; Robert A. Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237 (1987), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 98-109.
116.
See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING
BEHIND THE MIRROR 316 (1997); RUTH FRANKENBERG, DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM (1997); PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE
PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN
WOMEN'S STUDIES, reprinted in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 23; DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING

CLASS (1991); Barbara Flagg, "'Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement ofDiscriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1993).
117.

See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 6;

Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1364. See generally, Bryant, supra note 7.
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developments spur and contribute many important and necessary intellectual insights, they expanded CRT's analytical framework to include
other racialized or otherwise oppressed groups' experiences."18 It also
expanded CRT's commitment to the liberation of black and other oppressed people of color to include a commitment to the liberation of all
oppressed and subordinated peoples.
Though critical race scholarship continued to grow through individual scholarship and group-initiated symposia, the founding of LatCrit
filled an institutional gap left by the cessation of the annual CRT workshop. Even though various iterations of CRT workshops have since
been held sporadically, another more permanent institutional framework
for promulgating Critical Race Theory has not developed. 119
D. UCLA, Proposition209 and the Entrenchment of CRT: Confronting
the Whiteness of ColorblindnessAgain
CRT continues to become more entrenched in the legal academy.
Many law schools now offer courses in CRT. 120 In 2002, the University
of California Los Angeles (UCLA) established the first concentration in
CRT offered by an elite law school. 121This event, like the birth of CRT,
owes its establishment to the racialized conflict over affirmative action
generated by California's Proposition 209 and the ways in which this
played out in the institutional context of UCLA. Proposition 209 made
illegal the consideration of race in California schools' admissions policy.

22

The result was a significant decline in minorities attending

UCLA.123

The Proposition appealed to and enforced an ideology of co-

118.
One tension that arose with this expansion was whether critical race theory should maintain the black experience as a central focus or whether the CRT label should represent and act as an
umbrella group for all of the different racial and other antisubordination projects. This idea was
broached at the third annual conference of LatCrit where a panel explored whether a separate "black
crit" enterprise should be established and devoted to the African American experience, and the
experiences of others perceived as racially black such as black Latinos. Phillips, supra note 4, at
1251 n.10. Phillips suggested CRT be an umbrella group but seemed simultaneously opposed to
establishing yet another separate critical race/black enterprise. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 125455. As a practical matter, CRT seems to serve as an umbrella label but one that is often qualified
with the term "related scholarship," an approach I have tentatively adopted in this piece. See, e.g.,
Harris, supra, note 1, at 1215 (also using these terms). At the same time, CRT has maintained a
central focus on the African American experience, with analysis of other racialized experiences
captured by the labels of LatCrit, Asian American Legal Scholarship, etc. This centrality, in part is
due to how CRT, though always multicultural in membership, developed but also because the African American experience is often viewed as paradigmatic of race in the U.S. See supranote 107.
119.
For instance, scholars have held subsequent iterations of the workshop at the American
University Washington College of Law. These were distinct from the Critical Race Theory Conference held at Yale in 1997.
120.
In a survey conducted by LatCrit in 2002, some 23 law schools (out of approximately 180
ABA approved law schools) had courses called or related to Critical Race Theory. See Robert S.
Chang, "Forgetthe Alamo ". Race Courses as a Struggle over History and Collective Memory, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 113 (2002) (LatCrit 2002 symposium).
121.
Harris, supra note 1, at 1215-16.
122.
Id.at 1221-25.
123.
Id. at 1223-25.

CRITICAL RACE THEORY

20061

lorblindness.124 But as Cheryl Harris notes, "the ideology ... could not
hide from view what was before our very eyes; racial diversity was eroding."' 125 In fact, the imposition of colorblind rules in the community context of UCLA revealed, what much of CRT implies-that, given the
normative and social structure of the United States, colorblindness is a
proxy for whiteness. Harris describes UCLA after Proposition 209:
Given the fact that the school is physically located in southern California-an area teeming with racial complexity-the virtual absence
of the full range of diversity within its walls is a constant and stark
reminder of the entrenched nature of racial difference in terms of geography, educational opportunity, and access. Admission into the
law school community is defined and constituted by rules that capture and reinforce certain background difference and inequalities,
126
particularly those regarding race and class. ...However, colorblindness does not in fact ignore race; it rests upon and reflects an investment in a particular conception of race in which race is divested
of its historical, societal, or experiential meaning. 127
In reaction, the UCLA faculty, as Cheryl Harris explains, after serious debate, decided to establish a CRT concentration called Critical Race
Studies. 1 28 They did so in part to signal UCLA's continuing commitment to racial equality despite Proposition 209.129 Thus, while proponents of 209 pushed color-blindness as an appropriate approach to race,
they made the color of colorblindness clear-whiteness; and further entrenched critical race consciousness of difference and Critical Race Theory in the legal academy.
IV. CRT TENETS AND METHODOLOGY

The basic tenets of Critical Race Theory remain true to the original
ideas discussed in the 1990 CRT workshop. With little modification,
Critical Race Theory:
and endemic to, rather than a de1. holds that racism is pervasive
130
viation from, American norms;
2. [rejects] dominant claims of meritocracy, neutrality, objectivity
and color-blindness;

124.
125.
126.

Id.at 1229-30.
Id.at 1230.
Id.at 1229.

127.

Id.

Id.at 1232-34.
128.
Id.at 1230.
129.
As W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the
130.
color-line." W.E.B.Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 7 (Henry Louis Gates Jr. & Terri Hume
Oliver eds., 1999) (1903).
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3. [rejects] ahistoricism, and insists on contextual, historical analysis of law;
4. challenges the presumptive legitimacy of social institutions;
5. insists on recognition of both the experiential knowledge and
critical consciousness of people of color in understanding law and
society;
6.
is interdisciplinary and eclectic (drawing upon, inter alia, liberalism, poststructuralist, feminism, Marxism, critical legal theory,
postmodemism, and pragmatism) with the claim that the intersection
of race and the law overruns disciplinary boundaries; and
7. works toward the liberation of people of color as it embraces the
larger project of liberating all oppressed people 131
The purpose of CRT, its raison d'etre, is twofold. First its purpose
is to demonstrate the many ways in which white supremacy is endemic to
American society by "exposing the facets of law and legal discourse that
create racial categories and legitimate racial subordination.' ' 132 Second,
its purpose is to destabilize and change this relationship, in part by challenging or proposing alternative laws, among other things, in order to
contribute to the liberation of oppressed people. As Jerome Culp notes,
Critical Race Theory may mean many different things to different peo' 33
ple, but "there is a common belief in an opposition to oppression."'
And, CRT scholars such as Matsuda and Hutchinson, as well as LatCrit
and others have issued a clarion call that Antisubordination, a stance
against all forms of oppression and subordination, be both the commitment of race scholars and the principle upon3 4which racial justice, particularly equality, be understood and practiced. 1
These tenets and the overall commitment to antisubordination that
CRT scholars evidence also provide crucial insight into CRT methodological tendencies. CRT is said to have no single, unifying methodology. 35 Rather it is eclectic, drawing from various schools, disciplines
and approaches. 136 Harris, in providing some examples of the different
methodologies employed by Race Crits, notes that they include structur-

131.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
132.
CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at xiii.
133.
Jerome McCristal Culp., Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege,83 MINN. L. REv.
1637, 1638 (1999).
134.
See Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1329-1404 (1991), reprinted in part in
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 557-61; see
also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race ": The Inversion of
Privilegeand Subordinationin Equal ProtectionJurisprudence,2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 622.
135.
See e.g., Harris, supra note 1, at 1218; infra note 146 (Dorothy Brown making a similar
point).
136.
Harris, supranote 1, at 1217-18.
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alism and historical, doctrinal (legal), empirical and economic analyses. 137
CRT approaches can, however, be said to possess some unifying
themes or methodological tendencies. These include a particular focus
on context and history. 38 CRT suggests that a rule or principle may
mean different things in different contexts and/or historical periods. So,
for instance, they have argued that the idea of colorblindness, first expressed in Justice Harlan's 1896 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, can be
understood at that time as a progressive idea in the context of a society in
which law sanctioned the explicit and systematic oppression of blacks
after slavery. However, a colorblind approach to race in the current era,
when the subordination of blacks is no longer explicit but remains systematic, is no longer a progressive approach. 39 Thus, as an abstract
principle its meaning and progressive potential is neither universal nor
trans-historical. CRT, therefore, pays particular attention to the specificity of context in order to understand the meanings of a particular concept
or practice, to evaluate a particular position and to render additional information and ideas.
Further, CRT argues that as rules and principles mean different
things in different contexts that they should mean different things in different contexts. So for instance, equality might mean symmetrical or
"same treatment" in a society without vast racial, gender, and class inequalities but might mean and require affirmative practices to bring about
equality for historically disadvantaged groups, treating them differently
140
than the privileged, in a society with these alarming disparities.
In addition, CRT scholars listen to and scrutinize the voices, understandings and experiences of marginalized and oppressed peoples to situate, test, and inspire the examination of particular and/or novel approaches to law. 141 The idea of distinctive minority voices recognizes,
for example, that not every Native American critiques the American
holiday "Columbus Day."' 142 But it does understand that, given Native
137.

Id.at 1218 n.6.

138.

Id.at 1229; see Houh, supra note 43, at 1061-62.

139.
140.

But see Gotanda, supra note 2, at 257.
See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 134, at 646 (discussing equality as not symmetrical).

141.

See e.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,

22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (urging CLS to draw on the experiences and writings of
marginalized groups to inform their theory).
142.
In 1992, the five hundredth anniversary of Columbus' arrival in the Western Hemisphere
was marked by Indian protests across the country. MATTHEW DENNIS, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE
LETTER DAYS: AN AMERICAN CALENDAR 154-55 (2002). Columbus Day had not been officially
celebrated until the tercentenary in 1892, one hundred years earlier, when "some - especially African-Americans - began to contest the Columbus celebrations, not so much the accepted view of
Columbus the Man but rather the image of Columbia the land of freedom, opportunity and progress." Id.at 148. See generally IDA B. WELLS, FREDERICK DOUGLASS, IRVINE GARLAND PENN, &
FERDINAND L. BARNETT, THE REASON WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN Is NOT IN THE WORLD'S

COLUMBIAN ExPOSITION (Robert W. Rydell ed., 1999); Sylvia Wynter, 1492: A New World View,
in RACE, DISCOURSE AND THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAS: A NEW WORLD VIEW 5-57 (Vera Law-
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American history, the conditions of oppression, and the cultural nature of
their resistance, Native Americans might find the idea of Columbus dis43
covering America problematic, and not exactly a cause for celebration. 1
This understanding has led CRT scholars to excavate forgotten or overlooked histories, rules, and cases, as well as the cultural practices, stories,
and perspectives of marginalized groups as sources for grounding their
analysis.
In this vein, race crits have often successfully employed storytelling or narrative to explore alternative meanings, insights, and perspectives on an issue. Some of the leading legal storytellers include Derrick Bell (And We Are Not Saved (1989), Faces at the Bottom of the Well
(1993), and Gospel Choirs (1996)), Richard Delgado in his Rodrigo series (1996) and When Equality Ends (1999), and Patricia Williams in The
Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991). 144 Legal storytelling has garnered
significant critique, including criticisms (1) that such stories are not subject to empirical or other typical methods of evaluation; (2) that challenge the idea of a particular minority voice or perspective; and (3) that
charge that such stories tend to distort the "truth,"' 145 a truth understood
by many CRT theorists, as simply the common sense understandings that
arise under the current hegemonic ideologies and practices. It has further
led to the suggestion as Dorothy Brown points out, that CRT stands
against empiricism as a form of argumentation and verification because it
refutes narrative. 146 This idea is buttressed by CRT's embrace of CLS'
rence Hyatt & Rex Nettleford eds., 1995) (for a critique of Columbus and what he stands for from a
modem black perspective).
143.
See James Barron, He's the Explorer/ExploiterYou Just Have to Love/Hate, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1992, at B1.
144.
See generally Bell, supra note 59, at 20-29; Bell, supra note 65; DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL
CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME (1996); RICHARD DELGADO,
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1996), reprintedin part
in CRT: CUrTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 388-396; RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS:
STORIES ABOUT RACE AND RESISTANCE (1999); WILLIAMS, supra note 96; DELGADO & STEFANCIC,
CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 37-49; CRT: CUTrING EDGE, supra note 1, at 41-91;
Margaret E. Montoya, CelebratingRacialized Legal Narratives, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1,at 243-301; Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My
Grandfather'sStories, and ImmigrationLaw: The Slave Traders' Chronicle as Racial History, 34
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425 (1990), reprinted in CRT: CUTTING EDGE, supra note 1, at 9-20; Thomas
Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 381 (1989), reprinted in CRT: CUTrING EDGE,
supra note 1, at 42-51; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives,46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994);
Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990), reprintedin part in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supranote
1, at 565-81; Rachel F. Moran, Full Circle, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 113-17;
CARL GUTIERREZ-JONES, CRITICAL RACE NARRATIVES: A STUDY OF RACE, RHETORIC, AND INJURY
(2001).
145.
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). But see Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S.CAL.
L. REv. 255 (1994); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farberand Sherry,
46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993).
146.
Dorothy A. Brown, in the Symposium, CriticalRace Theory: The Next Frontier: Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1485 (2004), suggested that CRT
rejects numbers as neutral, that the privileging of numbers refutes narrative, and thus empirical
research may be incompatible with CRT. Id. at 1486-87. But she argued that empirical evidence is
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critique of the Law and Economics movement, 147 a scholarly tendency
that often employs empirical data. While most law is viewed from the
liberal perspective of individual rights perceived as neutral and objective,
the Law and Economics School, like CLS, is critical of that approach.
Law and Economics, however, is a conservative approach, which according to crits, simply replaces law's claims of impartially and neutrality
with similar claims for the field of economics. 148 Economics, however,
is neither neutral nor objective. Rather, it too involves political choices
both at the level of practice and study. And, arguably, both are replete
with the values, assumptions, presumptions and dictates about human
behavior and the operation of society as 49
determined and understood by
the current economic order of capitalism. 1
Harris, however, notes that CRT scholars have employed both empirical data and economic analysis. 150 Nevertheless, an argument based
on empiricism or economic analysis, according to CRT, is just that, a
form of argumentation in which political choices are made as to what
should be included or excluded and what is important or not, as well as
how the facts or statistics should be interpreted. Similar empirical data
could presumably be used, like various rules,
to support contrary and
51
alternative arguments and interpretations. 1

necessary to reach out to white America. Id. at 1489. Darren Hutchinson argues that CRT theorists
usually rely on law and legal reasoning, but could buttress their arguments by also relying on political science data that, for instance, have used polling to demonstrate that the Supreme Court largely
responds to majoritarian concerns in its decision-making and facilitates majoritarian interests. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race Theory: History, Evolution, and New Frontiers: CriticalRace
Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1213-14 (2004). That was also a common theme in
the public law subfield of political science. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1994); MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT:
NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1964); 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION (Richard Loss ed., 1981); 2 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION (Richard Loss ed., 1987); 3 CORWIN ON THE
CONSTITUTION (Richard Loss ed., 1988); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Role of the Supreme Courtas a NationalPolicy-Maker,6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
147.
See generally RICHARD I. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS (2005); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2002); GORDON TULLOCK, LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005).
148.
Mark G. Kelman, Critical Legal Studies Symposium: Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293,
294 (1984); Mark G. Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of
"Law and Economics, " 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274, 274 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 387 (1981); Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Property and ContractEfficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711,713 (1980).
149.
James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV.
161,176 (1986).
150.
Harris, supra note 1, at 1218 n.6. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law
and Economics of CriticalRace Theory: Crossroads,Directions,and a New CriticalRace Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1757 (2003) (book review), reprintedin part in A WOMAN'S PLACE, supra note
43, at 140-53; Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 N. ENG. L.
REV. 913, 914 (1994) (critiquing Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the
Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978)); William Bratton, Anti-Subordination and the Legal
Struggle Over the "Means of Communication ": Law and Economics of English Only, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 973, 973-74 (1999).
151.
See supra note 148; see also Harris, supra note 25, at 907-14 (reviewing the empirical
study undertaken in the book Whitewashing Race, see BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE, supra
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Finally, the tendency of CRT to deconstruct and expose the racial
meanings of law betrays its post-modem sensibilities and contradicts its
commitment to modernist ideals of justice, truth, and dignity 5 2 (because
as race crits and other post-modem scholars might argue a principle in
one context may mean something radically different in another). However, in view of the dual vision that W.E.B. Du Bois located in the oppressed, and the dual respect and disdain that oppressed people have
shown for the law, 15 3 scholars have encouraged race crits to inhabit the
tension between its post-modem insights and its modernist ideals of justice because within that tension lie CRT's creative potential. 154
V. LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
Below I provide a brief structural history of the relationship between race and law focusing primarily on case law, and drawing on and
applying some of the insights and methodological tendencies of Critical
Race Theory. Specifically, I employ historical analysis and narrative to
tell the story of this relationship between law and race. The narrative
emphasizes the longevity of American racial ordering and practice, the
breadth of that racial ordering, and its depth in regulating American life.
It does so to demonstrate the ways in which law both constructs and produces races and racism and the deeply structured nature of race in U.S.
society. Further, it is meant to show, focusing on the United States Supreme Court, how the law's increasing reliance on colorblind individualism works to maintain, rather than undermine the racial caste system
created over several hundred years. 155 In doing so, it provides a counternarrative to the dominant and ever popular story about race and law that
note 25, and arguing that although the study thoroughly contested the colorblind conception of
racism as the function of individual bigoted action, empirical evidence alone is insufficient to dislodge the theory). Harris, examining the various interpretations of whether race played a role in
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, explains that empirical evidence was not enough, in part, because
colorblindness is a well-funded ideology promoted over the last several decades; but primarily
because "the ability to process empirical facts into a different understanding [is] ... compromised by
the divergent . . . perspectives through which the facts are viewed." See Harris, supra note 25, at
913. She argues that there are frames or frameworks, in this case racial frames, which allow us to
make sense of facts; they are "what lies between the facts and our perceptions - the mediating structures that allow us to make sense of the world." Id. at 914. Regarding Katrina she ventures:
... while people of all races agree that Katrina exposed the social costs of poverty, most
Whites consider race largely irrelevant in explaining what happened (or did not happen)
while Blacks tend to view race as a crucial part of the story. In the aftermath of Katrina,
the question that is being debated is less a matter of what happened - what is at issue is
why - and here the absence of a consensus demonstrates how racial divisions in the interpretation of seemingly uncontested facts can result in entirely divergent assessments of
causation. The facts in this case did not seem to lead to a new racial paradigm; indeed,
initial differences in the perceptions of the salience of race seemed to persist, notwithstanding relative agreement on the facts.
id. at 913.
152.
See generally Harris, supranote 42, at 743.
153.
WILLIAMS, supra note 96, at 35-36; see DU BOIS, supra note 130, at 3.
154.
Harris, supra note 42, at 760, 778 (suggesting that in inhabiting this tension, CRT racecrits aspire to and attempt to make real the dreams that modernity promised).
155.
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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suggests that the struggle for racial justice, though long and incremental,
is nevertheless forward-moving, progressive, and eventually triumphant,
given the American creed and precepts. 156 Instead it suggests the stagnation of racial progress because of the continuity of the underlying structures of white supremacist thought, operation, and social arrangements,
though accomplished through new and changing forces and rationalizations.
A. Early Constructionof Race by Law
Throughout most of American history, legislators, legal practitioners, and judges have made and interpreted various legal doctrines, rules,
and procedures to define, construct, produce, and preserve white privilege and black subordination, as well as the subordination of other people
of color. Throughout most of its history, American law has been decidedly race conscious and specifically white supremacist whenever it has
encountered what it, itself, has often defined as Other.
For instance, in order to perpetuate a white state, judges defined
whiteness through case law to determine whether a Japanese man was
white for purposes of citizenship, whether a Chinese person was black or
Indian for the purpose of determining whether he could testify against a
white, and whether Mexicans were white and thus entitled to serve on
juries. 157 American law facilitated, defined, and established white privileges by limiting the rights of Indians to their land and facilitating white
appropriation of the same land. 158 It did so using slave laws, black
codes, and Jim Crow laws to exploit Black labor and maintain Black
subordination for the purposes of white wealth accumulation and white
racial class consolidation. 5 9 It has constructed race for the purposes of
determining who might vote, the manner in which those who presumably
were entitled to vote could do so, and whether such people could actually
and effectively vote. 160 It delineated a range of businesses practices af-

156.

See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 1; BELL, supra note 2,

at 22.
157.

Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477, 482 (1954); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.

178 (1922); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399 (Cal. 1854); see also Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1695 (2000)

(comparing People v. Hall and the Dred Scott case); Miguel A. Mdndez, Hernandez: The Wrong
Message at the Wrong Time, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 193 (1993), reprinted in part in THE
LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 1, at 602-04.
158.
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587-88 (1823); see also Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case ofJohnson v. M'lntosh, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67,67 (2001).

159.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-06
(1857).
160. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. ART. 3107 (Vernon 1925). In "1924, the Texas statute, Art.
3093a, afterwards numbered Art. 3107 (Rev. Stat. 1925) declared 'in no event shall a Negro be
eligible to participate in a Democratic Party primary election in the State of Texas.'" Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944) (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)).

In Breedlove v.

Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 280-281 (1937), the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia provision requiring
payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. Though a white man brought the case, the estab-

360

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

fecting everyone from laborers to professionals including who could be
treated by a doctor or a nurse. It has used racial categories to the detriment of people of color to determine questions concerning where people
can live, 16 1 who they can marry, 162 what schools they can attend, 163 and
where they sit on a train, and in a cafeteria, or theater. 164
From a CRT perspective, the movement from overt racial oppression sanctioned by law to law's racial neutrality or colorblindness has
done little to undo the systemic and accumulated conditions of racial
oppression created by and through law over several hundred years. For
that matter, except for two very brief though significant periods, American law has been and remains a bulwark of white supremacy. The promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the ratification of the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, 165 should have disrupted
lishment of poll taxes was one of the many ways in which blacks were prohibited from voting.
Breedlove was overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
161.
Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946) (upholding restrictive covenants in
housing). Kraemer was overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 23 (1948). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 33-34 (1948) (companion case invalidating
racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia-to which the fourteenth amendment did
not apply-by applying the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 258 (1953)
(damages not awardable for breach of a racially restrictive housing covenant). But see BELL, supra
note 2, at 294-96 (describing subsequent history and current problems of housing discrimination).
See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959). Three Justices did not participate in Shelley and Hurd,

reportedly because they owned property subject to racially restrictive covenants. C. HERMAN
PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 142 (1954). For other discussions of housing
segregation, see Calmore, supra note 41; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); DAVID DELANEY,
RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836-1948 (1998).

162.
Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (1954). Bell notes that "[a]ccording to one study, 38
states had miscegenation statutes at one time or another during the nineteenth century, and as late as
1951, 29 statutes were still on the books." BELL, supra note 2, at 256. The United States Supreme
Court struck down these laws in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See RACHEL F. MORAN,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 6 (2001).

163.
Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), rev'd,339 U.S. 629, 635636 (1950) (ruling that a black student could attend a white university). However, while the Court
granted relief in this case it did not address the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine.
Rather this doctrine was finally overturned in Brown.
164.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545, 548 (1896).
165.
U.S. CONST., amend. XIII-XV. It should be noted that between 1777 and 1817, slavery
had been abolished in the Northem states by, variously, constitutional provisions, constitutional
interpretation, judicial decisions, and most often by gradual emancipation statutes. See LEON F.
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 3-20 (1961); BELL,
supra note 2, at 22-23; ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF

SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 169-89 (1967). Slavery had already been abolished by judicial decision in
England-but not in its colonies-in 1772. Somersett v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772); see
also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL

PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 313 (1978). The American national government, however, protected slavery through the fugitive slave clauses of the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest
Ordinance, and the U.S. Constitution, among other provisions, although these instruments studiously
avoided using the word. Articles of Confederation, art. 6 (1781); Northwest Ordinance, art. 6
(1787); U.S. CONST., art. IV, §2, cl. 3. Other provisions of the original Constitution implicitly
upheld slavery. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (slaves counted as three-fifths the number of free
persons for purposes of apportionment of representation in the House of Representatives); U.S.
CONST., art. 1, § 9, cl. 1 (no Congressional prohibition of the importation of slaves before 1808).
Generally, courts enforced the fugitive slave clause despite its increasing unpopularity in the North.
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the legal construction of white racial supremacy and nonwhite racial
subordination, but ultimately failed to do so. Nonetheless, wrenched
from a civil war, these laws helped radically change the status of most
blacks from slaves to free people and might have held the promise of
providing the economic, social, and political rewards of citizenship and
belonging. 166 But the promise of Reconstruction was short-lived, as the
nation's political leadership capitulated to the southern elites' efforts to
reassert white control over black life. 167 Various legal actors including
judges, enacted laws and interpreted legal doctrine, to narrow the rewards of citizenship based on race helping to legitimate the Jim Crow era
of racial segregation. Significant among these developments was the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment in Plessy permitting the segregation and subordination of black people.
The legal strategies of the NAACP and others beginning in the
1920's 168 and culminating in decisions such as Hernandez and Brown,
helped to spark the civil rights movement, renewing the promise of
equality in the 1960's. It was successful to the extent that it unraveled
the explicit manifestations of racial ordering. 169 Crucial to this limited
success was the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of equal protection as
sanctioning the use of racial measures, such as affirmative action and
school desegregation to potentially
undo the racialized social and institu70
tional patterns of oppression.

See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175-89
(1975).
166.
See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 36-39 (1960);
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 12 (1965); RECONSTRUCTION:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS 473-531 (Kenneth M. Stampp & Leon F. Lutwack eds.,
1969); WILLIAM BROCK, CONFLICT AND TRANSFORMATION: THE UNITED STATES, 1844-1877 36061 (1973); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 7779 (1988); DAVID HERBERT DONALD, JEAN H. BAKER & MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 536 (2001).
167.
WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879 3-7 (1979); C. VANN
WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF
RECONSTRUCTION 3-4, 246 (1951); RECONSTRUCTION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS,
supra note 166, at 473-53 1. Whatever the reasons for the judiciary's rapid retreat from enforcing the
constitutional and statutory law of Reconstruction, they did not include any overall aversion to socalled judicial activism. In this period, the courts regained the prestige and increased the power they
enjoyed before the Dred Scott case.
See STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 31-35 (1968); William F. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of FederalJudicial Power, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969), reprinted in part in AMERICAN LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 237-45. (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988).
168.
KLUGER, supra note 34, at 100-750; MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 xi (1987).
169.
Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 247 (1968)
(Carter, a veteran NAACP litigator stated "[F]ew in the country, black or white, understood in 1954
that racial segregation was merely the symptom, not the disease; that the real sickness is that our
society in all its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of white superiority").
170.
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971); Brown v.

Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955).
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The highlights of this period were the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of
1968, and the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.1 7' The latter case
involved hiring practices, based on standards not related to job performance, which had the effect of disqualifying disproportionate numbers of
blacks relative to whites. In Griggs, the Supreme Court took an approach to race (not the colorblind approach) that might have engendered
actions that would result in actual changes in the conditions of black
lives in terms of poverty, wealth accumulation, health, etc. This was so
because it potentially rendered successful, suits brought on evidence of
racial disparities and the impact of laws (demonstrated largely through
statistical evidence of continuing disparities),
instead of on proof of some
72
individual's intention to discriminate.
B. Colorblindnessin Law Blocking RacialProgress
However, just as during and after Reconstruction, 173 courts began to
narrow these laws, thereby stabilizing and legitimizing the prevailing
order of white privilege and nonwhite disadvantage. So for example,
though the desegregation (integration) of secondary schools in the United
States had only begun in earnest in 1964 due to the Court's initial hesitancy and massive white resistance; 7 4 the Court had already signaled its
retreat from desegregation by 1973 by allowing a school board to poten171.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000a (2006); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C.S. § 1971 (2006); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.S. § 3601 (2006); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971) (construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
172.
Cf McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329-330 (1987) (involving the Georgia sentencing
system, which does not mention race (race-neutral) but has a disparate and disadvantaging impact on
blacks). Georgia's capital sentencing system had been invalidated three times and Georgia had a
long history of a "dual system." In the case, McCleskey, a black man, was sentenced to death for
murdering a white police officer. Id. at 283. He challenged the death sentence in his case based on a
sophisticated statistical study, finding that prosecutors in Georgia sought the death penalty in seventy
percent of cases involving a black defendant and white victim, compared to only thirty-two percent
of the time where both defendant and victim were white. Id. at 286-87. It also showed that the death
penalty was assessed in twenty-two percent of cases involving black defendants and white victims,
as compared to only 8 percent in cases involving both whites. Id. at 286. The Court rejected the use
of the statistical reports to document discriminatory effect in the absence of proof of intentional
discrimination. Id. at 297-99. The Court nevertheless stresses its "unceasing" efforts to overcome
racism in the criminal justice system, id. at 309, but undercut this assertion near the outset of the
case by limiting the examination to one of "purposeful discrimination." Id. 292. Thus, the Court's
unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice in the criminal justice system stopped at the door of
proof of intent against and in an individual defendant's case without an examination of the systemic
context in which the case was decided. See Hernandez, supra note 2, at 141-43 (discussing this
case).

173.
See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-26 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36, 77-79 (1873).
174. See, e.g., OLGETREE, supra note 34, at 10 (discussing the Court's "deliberate speed"); see
also BROWN, supra note 30, at 167-74 (discussing the massive white resistance to Brown ranging
from protest, and violence against black students attempting to attend white schools to white officials entirely eliminating public schools while publicly funding white children's private school
attendance and including rapid and substantial movement of white families to the suburban areas in
order to avoid sending their children to schools where the possibility of integration with blacks was
slimmer).
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tially escape the imposition of desegregation (integration) orders if it
could show that segregation had occurred in the district owing to acts
other than the board's intentional activities. 75 The Court held this despite the fact that the de facto practice of racial segregation in society
was nearly universal.
In Milliken v. Bradley,176 decided a year later, the Court dealt the
"deathblow to the [nation's] ability to successfully integrate public
schools."' 177 It effectively made U.S. suburbs safe havens for whites who
did not want their children to attend integrated schools with black children, and in doing so, the Court contributed to "white flight" to those
suburbs. 178 Further, that blacks and other minorities would have to prove
that some individual or institution had engaged in individual and identifiable discriminatory acts in order for the Courts to redress their grievances or remedy discrimination, was later confirmed in Washington v.
Davis, 179 despite the pervasive and systemic presence
of racism, racial
180
segregation, and racial discrimination in the country.
The Supreme Court, however, narrowed the laws, not only by focusing primarily on intentional, identifiable acts of discrimination, but
also by focusing on the individual and by virtually banning the use of
racial categories-arguably long before affirmative uses of these categories could affect any significant change in the social arrangements and
structure of white racial power. In focusing on the individual, the courts
175.
BROWN, supra note 30, at 208-10 (discussing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.,
413 U.S. 189 (1973)). In Keyes, the plaintiffs proved the Denver county school board had operated
to deliberately segregate schools in a core section of the city district in which over one-third of the
black children attended, but the Court held the school board could rebut the presumption of systemwide segregation by proving that they had not intentionally segregated the schools system-wide.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 252-53.
176.
418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken was one of the first desegregation cases to be pursued in
the North, where there had been few laws requiring segregation, but de facto segregation was prevalent. The plaintiffs sought a remedy for the segregation of Detroit schools, which would involve the
adjoining, predominantly white suburban school districts. Id.The trial court had held that the State
of Michigan was responsible for designing the school district system in which the city of Detroit was
effectively racially segregated. Id. The Supreme Court held that, absent a showing that a constitutional violation in one district produced a significant desegregation effect in another, there could be
no "cross-district remed[ies]." Id. at 744; see BROWN, supranote 30, at 213. According to Kevin
Brown, the effect of the decision was that the suburbs were deemed safe havens by whites who could
afford to move and who wanted to avoid integration. BROWN, supra note 30, at 210. Although the
Keyes and Milliken cases represented the Court's initial retreat from school desegregation, Brown
argues that the primary reason for the complete abandonment of desegregation throughout the
1980's and 1990's was the result of the application of the ideology of colorblind individualism to
school desegregation cases.
177.
BROWN, supra note 30, at 210-11.
178.
BROWN, supra note 30, at 211.
179.
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
180.
Justice Thurgood Marshall-the first black U.S. Supreme Court Justice and the attorney
that had argued Brown before the Court-responded to a similar idea in Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke: "It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact." 438 U.S.
265,400 (1978).
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were able to ignore or trivialize societal-wide racial ordering that burdened minorities as a group and individuals based on group membership,
and pretend that racism was an unfortunate feature of the past only currently existing in the aberrant individual. 181 In taking a colorblind approach, the Court prohibited almost all uses of racial categories regardless of whether they were being used to subordinate blacks and other
non-whites ("invidious discrimination") or to redress systemic white
racial oppression of and on behalf of blacks and other nonwhites ("benign discrimination"). In essence, the Court increasingly applied the
approach of colorblind individualism. 182 And, because Brown and its
progeny had largely eliminated explicit racial subordinating laws, the
focus and targets of this colorblind approach became the remedies and
measures meant to address racial oppression (measures opposed mostly
by whites as reverse discrimination), even as minorities have sought to
expand these.
The Supreme Court has not, in so many words, declared colorblindness to be the new interpretation of equal protection, but rather it has
largely accomplished it through various procedural and other standards
drawing on its logic. 183 These include not only limiting remedies to intentional conduct, but also applying the Court's highest and toughest
level of review, strict scrutiny now to all cases involving racial classifications, even if they are employed remedially to redress the consequences
of earlier intentional discrimination. The Court's rationale is that "any
official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or
ethnic origin is inherently suspect," and that "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a
free people." 184 The Court is motivated by a number of concerns, but
seems particularly concerned about protecting86 "innocent people,'' 85 a
phrase used generally to refer to white people. 1
181.
See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)); see also, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION,
supra note 1, at 7.
182.
See BROWN, supra note 30.
183.
Prior to 1995, the Supreme Court had been divided as to whether strict scrutiny should
apply to all cases involving racial classifications. Strict scrutiny had been applied to "invidious"
discrimination cases where discrimination built over centuries of practice was meant to disadvantage
minorities. The Court, however, had applied a more lenient level of scrutiny to remedies that relied
on race to benefit minorities and undo the past discrimination. This had been termed by the Court
"benign" discrimination. However, in 1995 a solid majority of the Court held in favor of applying
strict scrutiny to all uses of race-specific laws. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 222 (1995).

184. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-25 (internal citations omitted). Strict scrutiny requires that the
use of a racial classification be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.
185.
See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 (using the phrase "innocent
persons" meaning innocent third parties).
186.
See BELL, supra note 2, at 123; Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, Un-Natural
Things: Constructions of Race, Gender, and Disability, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW

CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 1, at 180; Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43
VAND. L. REv. 297, 297-301 (1990), reprintedin CRT: CUTING EDGE, supranote 1, at 635-47;
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But the Court has also expressed a concern for protecting subordinated racial groups from stereotypical stigmas associated with remedies
such as affirmative action, claiming "it may not always be clear that a socalled preference is in fact benign." 187 The effect of the requirement to
prove intent and the application of strict scrutiny in the context of equal
protection defined as individual as opposed to group protection and increasingly influenced by colorblind ideology are many. They include,
the Court: (1) treating racial classifications as if they are the source of
racial oppression as opposed to the systemic racial ordering in the human
and institutional decision-making and operation of white power in the
United States; (2) treating claims of white people to maintain the unearned privileges bestowed by the racial caste system as if they were the
same as nonwhite claims to change and make the social system more
fair; (3) ignoring societal wide racial ordering and the racial caste system
by isolating and remedying only those practices that can be specifically
identified and proven as the products of intentional actions; and (4) thus
severely limiting anti-discrimination or anti-oppression measures, either
forward-looking or past-correcting, thereby preserving the status quo of
racial inequality.
188
For example, in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,
a suit bought by a white applicant denied admission to a medical school,
the Supreme Court struck down an admissions program that reserved a
number of seats for minority students in the entering class. 189 The Court
noted, "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individualand something else when applied to a person of
another color."' 190 According to Justice Powell's majority opinion, then,
strict scrutiny-which had hitherto been applied primarily in cases where
the government had used racial identification to disadvantage minorities-should apply to any racial classification for any purpose. The
Court thus struck down a program meant to undo the racial ordering of
white privilege and nonwhite subordination, arguing that equality protected the individual regardless of his "race," or should be blind to "race"
(biology), despite the socially-constructed meaning, both material and
expressive, of race in America that rendered admissions into the medical
school predominantly white in the first place. 191 In addition, Justice
Powell expressed concern for "innocent [white] persons," noting that it
was impermissible for them to be forced "to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making,"' 192 but seemed blind to the fact that
that his decision left blacks bearing the burdens of exclusion, subordination and discriminationnot of their own making.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Adarand,515 U.S. at 226 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id.at 289-90.
Id.(emphasis added).
See supra note 26 and accompanying text (on the meaning of race).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
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Further in 1986, the Court struck down provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement that in response to past integration litigation provided black teachers greater protection against layoffs than it provided to
white teaches with higher levels of seniority. 193 In absence of the agreement, an agreement, again, meant to undo the racial ordering of white
privilege and nonwhite subordination, black teachers would have been
the first fired because they were the last hired, their hiring presumably
occasioned in the first place by affirmative action measures. 194 Brought
by white teachers seeking to protect their positions through the seniority
plan, the Court, referring to whites, noted that the level of scrutiny did
not alter "because the challenged classification operates against a group
that historically had not been subject to governmental discrimination."'1 95
Commenting on societal-wide racial discrimination as a basis for upholding the agreement, the Court notes:
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy ....No one doubts that there
has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and overexpansive. 196
Apparently it was acceptable for blacks and other nonwhites to suffer the
cost of societal discrimination operating to the benefit of whites, but inappropriate and over-expansive for whites to bear any costs in eliminating this same societal discrimination that primarily and inappropriately
privileged them.
And in 1989, the Court struck down a plan by the city of Richmond
requiring those who received city contracts to subcontract thirty percent
of the contract's value to businesses owned by minorities.' 917 The city
enacted the plan to remedy past discrimination in the construction industry based on a number of factors including, (1) testimony about racial
discrimination in the industry, (2) the fact that, although black residents
constituted almost fifty percent of the city, they received less than one
percent of public contracting funds; (3) that there were almost no minority contractors in local and state contractors' associations; and (4) that
"in 1977, Congress [had] made a determination that the effects of past
discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction industry nationally."' 198 The Court explained that these facts did not "provide the city of Richmond with a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclu-

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273; see also Ross, supra note 186, at 638 (discussing this case).
Ross, supra note 186, at 638.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
Id.at 276 (emphasis omitted).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477, 498 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id.at 499 (plurality opinion).
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sion that remedial action was necessary."' 1 99 The Court reasoned that

the wrong was so "ill-defined" that "relief'-apparently incredulously
and impermissibly-"could extend until the percentage of public contracts awarded to [minority-controlled businesses] in Richmond mirrored
the percentage of minorities in the population as a whole., 20 0 And although the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,20 1 ultimately allowed
applicants' "race" to be considered in the limited area of admissions in
higher educational institutions in a case involving a white student denied
law school admission; 20 2 it did so on a theory of diversity that abstracted
and disconnected the meaning of diversity from exclusionary practices
and racial/social justice concerns.20 3
However, it is in the complicated area of voting where the colorblind ideology seems to have received its greatest boost. Here, despite
the fact that the 15th Amendment was initially enacted to provide the
newly emerging slaves a right to vote and there has been and continues
to be a long and appalling struggle to ensure meaningful enfranchisement, 2° 4 the Court, according to Bell, has established a new constitu199. Id. at 500 (plurality opinion) (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion)).
200. Id. at 498 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor also seemed concerned by the fact, in a
section of the opinion lacking a majority, that Richmond was 50 percent black and five of the nine
council officials that passed the ordinance were black. She suggested that this presented a stronger
need for the application of strict scrutiny since it was not a majority of whites acting in a way that
burdened themselves but was the act of minorities doing so. Id. at 495-96 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
"Many commentators, the Court dissenters included, were astonished by the Croson decision."
BELL, supra note 2, at 666; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Patricia
Williams, Legal Storytelling. The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 at 2129-30 (1989); Ross, supranote 144, at 381.
201.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
202. The decision came on the heels of lower court decisions and statutes applying colorblind
approaches to similar affirmative action cases. The effects of these laws were that fewer black and
brown students gained admission into these institutions, leaving them overwhelmingly white. See,
e.g., California Proposition 209, supra note 77; Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
These events revealed not only the social embeddedness of white supremacist racial ordering but
demonstrated the way in which colorblindness policies were a proxy for and a mechanism for maintaining white access and privilege.
203.
Who Gets In: A Quest for Diversity after Grutter - The 2004 James McCormick Mitchell
Lecture, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 531, 579, 584 (2004) (transcript of discussion by Frank Wu and Charles
Daye). Other panelists included Athena Mutua, Shedon Zedeck, Margaret Montoya and David
Chambers. Law school admissions continue to be a focus of CRT attention. See, e.g., Dorothy A.
Brown, Taking Grutter Seriously. Getting Beyond the Numbers, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006); Kevin
R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of "A Systemic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools," 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1, 1-5 (2005). The
decision was then justified in part on proclaiming the benefits of diversity as teaching presumably
white students that "there is no minority viewpoint," and "visibly" lending legitimacy to the system
by signifying that the "path to leadership [is] ... open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity." Grutter,539 U.S. at 320, 332 (internal citations omitted).
204. This struggle of course continues up until this very day. Consider the efforts to disenfranchise minorities in Florida during the 2000 Presidential election and again in Ohio in the 2004 election. For discussions of these events, see, e.g., Calmore, supra note 30, at 1267-71; Hugh M. Lee,
An Analysis of State andFederalRemedies for Election Fraud,Learningfrom Florida'sPresidential
Election Debacle, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 159, 159-160 (2001); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, DRAFT REPORT: VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTION (approved by the Commissioners on June
8, 2001), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/main.htm; Monique L. Dixon, Constructive Disenfran-
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tional injury. First articulated in the case of Shaw v. Reno,20 5 the injury
seems to be that of a state by "a predominant use of race in redistricting"
impermissibly sending the message "that racial identity is and should be
an American citizen's most salient political characteristic., 20 6 The point
is that redistricting should be race-blind.2 °7 Unsurprisingly, the case
involved blocked efforts to create a voting district that would render
black votes meaningful, while ignoring the pervasive historical and current realities of racial bloc voting by whites who often have been reluctant to elect black representatives or elect whites who will effectively
represent black or other nonwhite interests and ignoring the racialized
politics and gerrymandering of white politicians.20 8 The ultimate effect
of these interpretations is that law, while denying blacks and other nonchisement: The Problems of Access & Ambiguity Facing the American Voter: Minority Disenfranchisement During the 2000 GeneralElection: A Blast from the Past or a Blueprintfor Reform, 11
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 311, 311-313 (2002). On felony disenfranchisement, one of the
major forms of minority disenfranchisement used in Florida, see, e.g., Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note,
Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109,
109-14 (2003); Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The ExceptionalHistory of the Right to Vote,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345-46 (2003); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution,
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement,56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1147-50
(2004); Marc Mauer, Disenfranchisement of Felons: The Modern-Day Voting Rights Challenge,
CIVIL RIGHTS JOURNAL, Winter 2002, at 40; J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The
Modern Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 435, 435-36 (2001); Elena Saxonhouse,
Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felon's Challenges to Disenfranchisement and
Employment Discrimination,56 STAN L. REV. 1597, 1598-1601 (2004); Christopher Uggen & Jeff
Manza, Disenfranchisementand the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in CIVIL PENALTIES,
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 67, 68-72 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005); Note, One
Person,No Vote: The Law of Felon Disenfranchisement,115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1939-42 (2002).
For a discussion specifically on the 2004 election, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of
Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid ElectoralMeltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 937, 938-39 (2005) (discussing problems with the 2004 presidential election); Daniel P.
Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,and the Help America
Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1220-39 (2005) (discussing problems with the 2004 presidential election in Ohio).
205.
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
206.
BELL, supra note 2, at 516.
207.
Id. (explaining that the new objective of the Court was to enforce a color-blind approach);
see also Calmore, supra note 30, at 1271-74 (arguing that the Supreme Court is undermining the
Voting Rights Act through an imposition of colorblind injustice and commenting that "[w]hile the
Supreme Court majority opinions are death to black race consciousness, they are amazingly naive or
intellectually dishonest when it comes to appreciating that whiteness is also deployed in bloc voting
ways"). Calmore goes on to argue that:
The race opinions of a five-to-four majority on the Supreme Court achieve a false coherence through an incredible process of decontextualization. As a consequence of this radical decontextualization, the Supreme Court majority appears literally blinded by color as
it - the same five characters each time - neither acknowledges nor recognizes the degree
of racially polarized white bloc voting and therefore will not permit black bloc voting in
what really amounts to self defense. The Court acts as if black bloc voting is the first
move rather than the second, the initial fire rather than the return fire. Through this misrecognition of whiteness, the Court majority subjects this second move to strict scrutiny
as it claims to be unable to distinguish invidious from benign racial discrimination. The
second move, blacks taking race predominantly into account, violates the equal protection rights of whites, because they are deemed to suffer individual 'expressive harm.' Individual rights trump efforts to redress vote dilution, a group harm.
Id.at 1273 (internal citations omitted).
208.
See also BELL, supra note 2, at 489-527 (tracing the cases and various obstacles to meaningful enfranchisement for blacks).
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whites justice, has protected vested white interests accumulated over
time, such as seniority systems, educational advancement, wealth, and/or
or white expectations, through the racialized orderings of the society,
first on a theory of white superiority and increasingly on the theory of
colorblindness.
Until the job of racial justice is done, CRT theorists might argue,
CRT will expose the whiteness of colorblindness, the white supremacist
effects of colorblind laws and rulings, and the white consciousness of
American society and power. And CRT theorists will do so, from inside
the experiences, consciousness, and perspectives of Black, Native
American, Latina/o, and Asian American people, etc., using these essentialized categories that white power created to oppress, strategically as
sources of solidarity, empowerment, and analysis.
VI. CRT-RELATED SCHOLARSHIP, THE LATCRIT EXAMPLE: DEEPENING
AND BROADENING THE CRT PROJECT?
The development and proliferation of other scholarship and alternative institutions such as LatCrit, Asian American legal scholarship, and
critical race feminism, and the writings of sexual minorities of color to
explore race, law, and other systems of oppression has raised concerns
about the fragmentation of the Critical Race Theory (CRT) project. The
development of this CRT-related scholarship, and for instance the separate institutionalization of the LatCrit project, also raised concerns over
the multiplication of identity-based groups and thus the elevation of identity politics as opposed to the formation of a broad political movement, a
criticism widely made in reference to identity politics. 20 9 However,
though a broad political movement has yet to emerge, this "fragmentation" has actually deepened and broadened the Critical Race Theory project by providing the necessary intellectual expansion and theoretical
bridges between identity politics and a politics of solidarity based on
difference.210 So, for instance, these bodies of scholarship broadened the
racial lens through which the workings of white racial privilege were
revealed, such as through Asian American legal scholarship's exploration of Asian-American experiences, and deepened the commitment to
the project of antisubordination by focusing on other systems of social
subordination, such as the patriarchal gendered oppression of women
explored in the context of critical race feminism, as discussed earlier.
However, in addition, they spurred the development of other theories
209.
See, e.g., discussion supra note 118; Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17 at 127-28;
Bryant, supra note 7.
210.
A politics of solidarity based on difference stresses common projects and commitments
and embraces difference and diversity. But it rejects assimilation of one group into another as a
prerequisite to or on basis of that solidarity. It also rejects the universalization of one group's experience. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 157-158 (1990);
NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST"
CONDITION 197-205 (1997) (examining and critiquing this idea).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

through which to analyze the systems of subordination and developed
concepts that emphasized coalition and praxis. Multidimensionality is
one such emerging theory which is based on the insights of antiessentialism and intersectionality, insights foundational to the formation of related scholarship communities; while the concept of antisubordination
praxis has stressed coalition building in addition to and through theoryinformed practice and practice-informed theory. And finally, LatCrit, in
particular, in institutionalizing the LatCrit conference also institutionalized the practice of continuing to develop critical theory, building coalitions, and engaging practice.
A. Antiessentialism andIntersectionality:Informing Formation,Leading
to Multidimensionality
The depth of LatCrit institutionalization and the conscious theorizing around this institutionalization and development is unique among
much of the CRT-related scholarship, and I focus on LatCrit for this reason. 2 11 But several of the themes I discuss here as basic to LatCrit theory have been built upon, shared and/or mutually developed by the work
of scholars who identify as CRT scholars or with one or another related
body of work.
People such as Robert Chang, Jerome Culp, Angela Harris, Berta
Hemindez-Truyol, and particularly Frank Valdes and later Elisabeth
Iglesias,21 2 among others, were the spirit behind the establishment and/or
blossoming of LatCrit. They saw LatCrit as a first cousin of CRT and
were committed to building on its strengths and avoiding its mistakes.2 13
The first mistake they sought to avoid was the perceived elitism and exclusivity of CRT, while nonetheless focusing on issues germane to the
Latina/o community and Latina/o identity (a focus that could be perceived as exclusive). 214 The latter was a challenge, in part because
Latina/o identity as a practical matter seemed to embrace people representing a host of different nationalities with different cultural perspec211.
LatCrit also is now an incorporated non-profit organization. While not heavily institutionalized, there are at least two journals committed to the promotion of Asian American legal scholarship focusing primarily on Asian Pacific American communities. These are the Asian Law Journal
at University of California Boalt Hall School of Law and the Asian Pacific American Law Journal at
University of California Law School. Adrien Wing has done the most work in theorizing and pulling together materials that represent critical race feminist insights by publishing two readers, one on
Critical Race Feminism, see CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, and another on Global Critical Race Feminism, see GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supranote 44.
212.
I believe few people would argue with my characterizing Francisco "Frank" Valdes as the
father of LatCrit. However, for many of us, Elizabeth "Lisa" Iglesias is the mother of LatCrit. From
what I can figure out Lisa became a central part of LatCrit by around LatCrit's second annual conference. She remained immersed in LatCrit very much guiding its efforts with Frank and bringing to
the fold people like myself. She left LatCrit sometime after Latcrit VIII (I was out of the country
during that year). But the parting and its aftereffects seemed anything but amenable and for some of
us represented a low moment for LatCrit as a community committed to life affirming practice, scholarship and safe space.
213.
Valdes, Ethnicities,supra note 104, at 3-7.
214.
1d; Valdes, Under Construction,supranote 104, at 1090.
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tives and historical experiences; and who were raced differently, as
black, white, and/or mestizo, among other differences. Valdes envisioned a larger pan-Latina/o identity, but one which both respected and
explored the diversities within the group while building solidarity among
the differently positioned individuals and groups within the larger panethnic collectivity.2t 5 From this perspective, to exclude white people,
black people or lesbian people or just about anybody else committed to
social justice, had the potential of excluding someone who might identify
as Latina/o. Further, the founders of LatCrit understood that those who
identified as non-Latina/o might have analogous experiences that would
also contribute to the building of LatCrit theory.
In this way, LatCrit faced the issue of antiessentialism in Latina/o
identity concretely in its experience of politically promoting group formation for the purpose of producing knowledge and building community. 216 The anti-essentialism critique had engendered substantial prior
debate in CRT, feminist, and other intellectual circles.2 17 It recognizes
that there is no single Latinalo essence, no coherent collective identity or
single experience that could reflect the common interests of the people
constituting the group "without acknowledging the intra-group differences, 218 and rejects the idea of essentialism in Blackness, Asian Americanness, women and the like. For example, CRT scholars joined other
women of color who had long challenged the category of "woman" in
feminist writings as largely reflecting the interest and priorities of white
middle class women in the United States and thus not representative of
all women's experience; a quintessential anti-essentialist critique. 219
Although LatCrit and other CRT related scholarship took an antiessentialist approach to the categories of blacks, Latina/os, AsianAmericans, and/or women with regard to the dynamics and definition of
the groups, their formation was simultaneously premised on the pragmatic idea that these essentialized group identities, having arisen in part

215.

Valdes, Ethnicities,supra note 104, at 9.

216. Asian-American legal scholarship faced similar challenges. It focused on the unique and
varied experiences of Asian Americans in U.S. society. Asian Americans, like Latina/os, consist of
people from widely varying Asian communities and nationalities. Like Latina/os they experience a
racialized identity that often flattens misunderstands their differing ethnic diversities. Their experiences often include an American view of them as foreign, thereby delegitimizing and limiting their
human potential while simultaneously holding them up as model minorities, as against other minorities. ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 1-2
(1999); Aoki, supra note 1, at 1477; Chang, supra note 1, at 1303; Chang, supra note 26, at 87-96;
Gotanda, supra note 2, at 28; Saito, supra note 1, at 294-95.
217.
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Introduction:ExpandingDirections,
Exploding Parameters: Culture and Nation in LatCrit Coalitional Imagination, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 203, 227-232 (2000).
218.
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Toward Progressive Conceptions of Black Manhood - LatCrit and
Critical Race Feminist Reflections Thought Piece, May 2001, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK
MASCULINITIES, supranote 107, at 55.
219.
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 42, at 755.
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in response to oppression based on essentialism, had been and could
be
220
oppression.
fight
to
consciously
and
politically,
strategically,
used
The antiessentialist insight was complemented by intersectional theory, which allowed for a more nuanced understanding of intra-group
difference. It simultaneously demonstrated the links between different
systems of subordination such as racism, sexism, and heterosexism as
located in the particular social positions of racial subgroups, such as Latinas or black women. 221 Intersectional theory, first articulated as a theory by Kimberl6 Crenshaw, drew upon black feminist thought which had
consistently argued that black women were not only oppressed by the
white supremacist system of racism but were also oppressed by the patriarchal practices and system of sexism.

222

The theory thus explored the

experiences of black women at the intersection of racism and sexism,
rejecting a single-axis framework (race or gender) for understanding the
arguably doubly burdened conditions of black women.223 As such,
Crenshaw's concept of intersectionality, found a ready home and a site
for its further development in LatCrit 224 Asian American legal scholarship, 22 5 and Critical Race Feminism, 226 as it had in CRT. 227 Each of
these bodies of scholarship has made substantial contributions to further

220.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 53-60 (suggesting that oppressed people come together
strategically for survival because they are oppressed based upon essentialized categories); see also
Robert S. Chang & Natasha Fuller, PerformingLatCrit:Introduction, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1277,
1291-92 (2000) (citing Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, CriticalRace Coalitions. Key Movements that
Performed the Theory, 33 U.C DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1414 (2000)) (noting that: "unbounded antiessentialist theory can be disabling to community organizing, and 'once set in motion, antiessentialism unmodified has no limiting principles to prevent minority groups from being deconstructed until
all that remains are disunited and atomized individuals themselves.' Cho and Westley criticize the
second wave's fascination with anti-essentialism as 'the ahistorical pursuit of the 'theoretical' that
represents an abdication of political engagement and the relinquishment of the full promise of antisubordinationist intellectual production.' Anti-essentialist theory is understood here to be antithetical
to effective political organizing. If this is right, those within the field of CRT may be working at
cross purposes; perhaps CRT needs to reform itself and embrace what Professor Cho describes
elsewhere as 'essential politics."' (citations omitted)).
221.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, reprintedin part in POWER, PRIUEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 465-72 [hereinafter Crenshaw, DemarginalizingIntersection];see also K.L. Broad, Critical Borderlands & Interdisciplinary,Intersectional Coalitions, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2001); Crenshaw, Mapping

the Margins, supra note 18, at 1299; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7-9 (1989);.
222.

See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins,supra note 18, at 1252.

223.
Id.
224.
See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemrndez-Truyol, Women 's Right as Human Rights-Rules and
Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formulafor Reform, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 605, 610-11
(1996); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 1; see also discussion supra note 212 (role of Valdes
and Iglesias).
225.
See. e.g., Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories,48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1257, 1288 (1997).
226.
See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 37, at 177-79.

227.
See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 9-12; Matsuda, supra note 221, at 9. Much of the
discussion on multidimensionality is taken from and appears in my chapter on progressive black
masculinities. See PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 105, at 21-23.
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developing the idea of intersectionality, including using it as a basis for
the emerging theory of multidimensionality.
B. Multidimensionality:An Emerging Theory?
The theory of multidimensionality captures three separate ideas.
First, it recognizes that an individual has many dimensions, some of
which are embodied human traits such as skin color, sex, ear-lobe length,
eye color; and others which are expressive, such as being Methodist or
Catholic, a cat owner or dog owner, etc. Second, multidimensionality
identifies some of these dimensions as materially relevant, 228 meaning
that a particular society has taken some dimensions such as color, sex, or
a particular religious belief (but not ear-lobe length or owning a cat or a
dog) and constructed meanings about the groups that possess them. It
then allocates or denies both material and status-related resources
through systems of racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism, for example.
These systems operate on the individuals who belong to groups that inhabit or express a particular trait producing a host of experiences, rewards or demerits. Said differently, multidimensionality captures the
way society disadvantages people or benefits them primarily on the basis
of their possessing a particular trait. Thus, the second idea of multidimensionality is a focus on systems
229 of subordination and privilege, such
heterosexism.
and
sexism,
racism,
Third, multidimensionality recognizes that these systems intersect,
inter-relate, and are mutually reinforcing so that for example, racism is
patriarchal and patriarchy is racist. In addition, however, the intersection
of two or more systems of disadvantage or privilege often produces
unique categories and experiences. So for example, intersectional theory
might suggest that black men are privileged by gender and oppressed by
race. 230 But this might not sufficiently explain racial profiling as a phenomenon that happens most frequently to black men.2 3' Multidimensionality, however, might better capture the idea that black men are
sometimes oppressed because they are "blackmen" one word, one position, one socially, multidimensionally constructed oppressed group of
people-they are both black and men.232 The positionality of blackmen-one word-could be further analyzed by looking at the class or
another materially relevant status of those who are, in this example, racially profiled. In this sense, it replaces an approach that is additive, that
is, one that says, for instance, that poor black men are poor + black +
228.
229.

Valdes, Under Construction,supra note 107, at 1094.
Hutchinson, supranote 144, at 1199.

230.

PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 107. However, Stephanie Phillips has

pointed out to me that these interpretations may not be correct interpretations of the intersectional
theory. She argues instead that there is no meaningful difference between the theory of intersectionality and multidimensionality.
231.
Id at 21-22.
232. ld at 23.
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men, to one that allows the analyst to explore the way that axes of classism, racism, and gender oppression mutually construct unique positions
for individuals and groups, while simultaneously demonstrating that
these same forces are implicated across identity categories.
And finally, multidimensionality is an approach. In recognizing, for
example, that racial oppression is also gendered, sexualized, and classed,
a multidimensional approach conceptually links the struggles of racial
justice, gender justice, and class justice; and has the potential to link the
differing groups fighting for these different types of justice. As such a
multidimensionality approach is an approach to building solidarity and
potentially coalitions.233
C. AntisubordinationPraxis
Ideas about solidarity, multidimensionality and coalition-building
are meant both to inform and to serve the principle and project of antisubordination. In LatCrit, the commitment to antisubordination stated
explicitly at the beginning of the movement meant that LatCrit embraced
participation of people from other groups that had been historically oppressed. Thus, LatCrit embraced those who were fighting also against
heterosexism, and other sexually-based oppressions. This effort was
made easier by Valdes' participation, as he was known affectionately in
some quarters as the Queer Theory Philosopher after the publication of a
path-breaking piece on sexual identity.234 At the same time, LatCrit's
anti-subordination commitment 235 and its kinship with CRT led the organizers to consciously pursue both a theory and the practice of coalition
building as well as a theory of praxis-theory-informed practice and
practice-informed theory, as explored by Eric Yamamoto, among others. 236 So for example, LatCrit developed a number of programmatic
devices that have been employed in LatCrit conference planning to help
balance the demands of facilitating their commitment to both antiessentialism and coalition building. One such device was the practice at
each conference of rotating centers, in which a non-Latina/o group's
experiences and insights were "centered" in a conference workshop for
exploration. In this way, LatCrit hoped to expand its theory, deepen its
knowledge about various groups' histories, and having brought these
groups into the conference, potentially to build coalitions with them.237
233.

Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at 1094.

234.

Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructingthe Conflation of

"Sex, " "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation " in Euro-AmericanLaw and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 3
(1995).
235.
Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1265-67.
236.
Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis:Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practice
in Post-CivilRights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 829 (1997).
237.
Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1267. Another device not related to coalition building
was the practice of "streaming a topic," such as class. Streaming required that LatCrit would return
to a topic over a period of years in order to build upon previous and new insights.
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The idea of coalition building is also at the center of LatCrit, CRT
and other related scholarship's commitment to critical race praxis, as
developed by Eric Yamamoto.238 This concept is often termed "antisubordination praxis," to encompass the many justice projects that inform
the antisubordination commitment. Yamamoto had been involved in
justice struggles that brought different but conflicting minority groups
together.239 Thus, the idea of coalition and alliances are a part of the
idea. But, a critical race praxis or antisubordination praxis also refers to
the idea that critical theorizing should and needs to be informed by practice, by active engagement with developments on the ground while practice should and needs to be informed by theorizing and theories about
what is happening, all for the benefit of oppressed communities. Yamamoto's notion of critical race praxis is summarized as:
[Combining] critical, pragmatic, socio-legal analysis with political
lawyering and community organizing to practice justice by and for
racialized communities. Its central idea is that racial justice requires
antisubordination practice. In addition to ideas and ideals, justice is
something experienced through practice... It requires in appropriate
instances, using critiquing, and moving beyond notions of legal justice pragmatically to heal disabling wounds and forge intergroup alliances. It also requires, for race theorists, enhanced attention to theory translation and deeper engagement with frontline practice; and
for political lawyers and community activists, increased attention to a
critical rethinking of what race is, how civil rights are conceived, and
why law sometimes operates as a discursive power strategy.240

While this definition raises a number of provocative issues, two
seem particularly important. The first is the recognition that justice is
experienced through practice and that racial justice in particular requires
an antisubordination practice.24 These ideas capture and reinforce CRT
238.
Yamamoto, supra note 236, at 829. For a fuller examination of the idea of critical race
praxis, particularly its focus on interracial healing or community building by CRT-related scholars,
see, e.g., Keith Aoki & Margaret Chon, Nanook of the Nomos: A Symposium on Critical Race
Praxis, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 35, 36 (1999); see also Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, Note, Taking Account of
Another Race: Refraining Asian-American Challenges to Race Conscious Admission in Public
Schools, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1283, 1312 -1318 (2001) (explaining critical race praxis as the pursuit
of interracial justice through antisubordination practice, political lawyering, and education. Antisubordination practice "seeks to disrupt the use of law as an instrument for perpetuating hierarchical
power relations. Political lawyering calls for "lawyers to play a more active role in working with
their minority clients to shape and guide antidiscrimination litigation" and "could involve bringing
lawsuits as part of a comprehensive impact strategy." The "educative function of litigation seeks to
increase "awareness of the court and parties alike about the interdependence of the legal rights of
opposing minority litigants as well as the distinctions between their historical and current experiences of racial subordination" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Reginald Leamon
Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of
Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U.L. REv. 1361, 1365-66 (2004) (defining critical race praxis
in similar ways as antisubordination praxis but critiquing the race consciousness implicit in the idea).
239. Yamamoto, supra note 236, at 829.
240. Aoki & Chon, supra note 238, at 36 (summarizing Yamamoto, supra note 236).
241.
See Yamamoto, supra note 236, at 880.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

notions that context is important and that what is considered fair will be
contextual on the one hand, and on the other that different groups will
have to work together to accomplish justice, the justice for healing their
intergroup wounds or otherwise. Second, Yamamoto insists that CRT
theorists translate theory into practical use for activist and legal practitioners and that these practitioners think critically and theoretically about
what their work means and the ways it may be limited.2 42 This is best
accomplished by these groups working together, theorist and activist, to
mutually inform one another's work; and more importantly, to do so on
behalf of and in conjunction with communities of color. Critical race
and related scholarship theorists believe that engaged community work
and practice as well as attention to this work should dictate and inform
the contours of CRT theorizing, grounding it and potentially rendering it
more useful for community advancement. This idea is reminiscent of
their experiences of having grounded their critique of CLS scholarship in
the African American civil rights experience.24 3 However, antisubordination praxis requires something more than knowing an experience, it
requires active engagement.
These commitments and ideas, for instance, were institutionalized
in annual LatCrit conferences. The conferences were organized around
four functions, namely, "(1) the production of knowledge; (2) the advancement of social transformation; (3) the expansion and connection of
anti-subordination struggles; and (4) the cultivation of community and
coalition,",244 both within and beyond the confines of legal academia in
the United States. Further LatCrit established "early guideposts," that in
some ways mirrored but greatly expanded CRT tenets, evidencing a
and
multidimento
antisubordination
praxis
commitment
sional/antiessentialist theorizing. These were to:
[1] Recognize and Accept the Political Nature of Legal "Scholarship" Despite Contrary Pressures.
[2] Conceive Ourselves as Activist Scholars Committed to Praxis to
Maximize Social Relevance.
[3] Build Intra-Latinalo Communities and Inter-Group Coalitions to
Promote Justice Struggles.

242.
Id. at 828-30.
243.
See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note, 141 at 344-45. But antisubordination requires more than
just knowledge of an experience, it requires engagement. In a time of backlash; however, where
there is increasing ideological pressure to be blind to racial and racialized events, such as Hurricane
Katrina. See infra notes 300-16 and accompanying text (noting that being engaged may be simply
naming and re-naming, hearing, and re-telling the hearing of our experiences from our collective
perspective). But even this telling and retelling must be done in community or in some sort of minority public sphere.
244.
Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1262; see Valdes, Ethnicities, supra note 104, at
1095; see Valdes, supra note 19, at notes 161, 175.
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[4] Find Commonalities While Respecting Differences to Chart Social Transformation.
[5] Learn from Outsider Jurisprudence to Orient and Develop LatCrit Theory and Praxis.
[6] Ensure a Continual Engagement of Self-Critique to Stay Principled and Grounded.
[7] Balance Specificity and Generality in LatCritical Analysis to
Ensure Multidimensionality.2 45
In addition, LatCrit institutionalized a host of projects in order to facilitate the production of critical scholarship and antisubordination prac246
tice.
In these and other ways, LatCrit, CRT related scholarship and others, such as queer legal theory, critical work on whiteness and on Native
Americans, have contributed valuable insights to the CRT project. The
insights into various social groups supply the knowledge base of CRT
and inform efforts to build coalitions among various groups. The information and coalitions are meant to service the goal of antisubordination
praxis, a goal to which each of the groups is committed. In this sense,
what could be understood as a process of fragmentation can be seen as a
period of intense contextualized study that deepened the CRT project of
exposing the connections between race and law from a variety of perspectives. These efforts also have broadened the CRT project by bringing more people to the table who understand and see the connections
between their and others' subordination and who might join coalitions
and the CRT project of fighting against racial oppression and all other
forms of subordination. This move from "color" to consciousness informed by the understanding and appreciation of difference arguably
allows the multidimensionality of oppression to be attacked from a number of vantage points, ventures, and enterprises.
VII. CLASSCRITS?
Nevertheless, several scholars including critical race scholars themselves have criticized CRT scholarship for its focus on the words, discourse, and discursive patterns that support race, gender, and sexual consciousness as opposed to the material determinants of these social sys-

245.
Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1263; Valdes, Ethnicities,supra note 104, at 1095.
246.
These include publishing essays from every conference and workshop resulting in published symposia of LatCrit scholarship, securing coordinators and funding for future conferences
several years in advance, incorporating LatCrit into a not-for-profit corporation, establishing the
website www.latcrit.org, securing organizational NGO status for the purposes of participating in
international foray, founding CLAVE, a peer-reviewed periodical, and establishing numerous programs including a Student Scholar program. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 37, at 1325.
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tems of subordination. 247 Specifically these scholars, in a variety of
ways, have called for analyses of the class system in U.S. society and the
way in which race, gender, and other forms of oppression mutually construct and are constructed by it. 248 Although these calls may critique
CRT for ignoring "material factors," which Delgado defines as "issues
that turn on tangible events in the social or physical world,, 249 they more
often refer to and include 1) calls for exploring the economics of race, a
call that narrows the concept of materiality to ideas about the economy as
a significant determining factor in racial outcomes, or 2) calls for specifically exploring the class system as the product of economic relations and
economic ordering-the product of the production and distribution of
goods and services.2 5 °
While much of CRT scholarship seems focused on discourse, race
as a function of ideas, and race as culture, individual CRT and LatCrit
scholars have consistently focused on the class/materialist elements of
race, such as John Calmore's focus on housing, 25 ' Enrique Carrasco's
253
focus on development, 252 and Kevin Johnson's focus on immigration;
247.
Harris, supra note 42, at 777-78 (suggesting that mce-crits "return to the vexed question
of the relationship between race and class" and noting that "[t]he current interest in theories of
culture has all but crowded out materialist work on race and racism"); see, e.g., Delgado, Blind
Alleys, supra note 17, at 122.
248.
See, e.g., Delgado, Blind Alleys, supranote 17, at 125-28 (calling for CRT to return to the
materialist traditions of the first generation of CRT scholars such as Derrick Bell). Delgado also
calls specifically for an examination of the relationship between race and class. Id. at 151; see also
Carbado & Gulati, supra note 150, at 1757 (suggesting that CRT use the insights being developed
within the field of law and economics to analyze workplace discrimination); Harris, supra note 42, at
777-78. See generally Jennifer Hochschild, Symposium: Going Back to Class? The Reemergence of
Class in CriticalRace Theory, 11 MICH.J. RACE & L. 99 (2005).
249.
Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race, supra note 17, at 2280 n.20 (defining material
factors as those "that turn on tangible events in the social or physical world").
250.
I am defining class very broadly in order to leave open for discussion and later consideration new theories that better define the idea. At the same time, I am adopting the multiple meanings
that I believe Delgado seeks to capture in talking about the material determinants of racism. For
instance, though Delgado defines material factors as those "that turn on tangible events in the social
or physical world[,]" he explains that he, at times, uses "the terms 'material' or 'economic determinism' as synonymous with 'racial realism."' at n.38. He encompasses the ideas of economic relations by suggesting that it is racial realist, referring specifically to Derrick Bell, who understands that
"racism is a means by which our system allocates privilege, status, and wealth." Delgado, Blind
Alleys, supra note 17, at 123. Further, he captures what I consider in part class dynamics when he
notes that racism serves "the 'political and economic ends' of 'powerful whites."' Id at n.16 (citing
Bell, supra note 65). These ideas are partially captured in his comments: "[W]hile text, attitude, and
intention may play important roles in our system of racial hierarchy, material factors such as profits
and the labor market are even more decisive in determining who falls where in that system."
Delgado, Blind Alley, supra note 17, at 123.
251.
See generally Calmore, supra note 41; John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersectionof Race, Space, andPoverty, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1927, 1948-49 (1999); John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The FairHousing Act
at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067 (1998).
252.
Enrique R. Carrasco, Critical Race Theory and Post-ColonialDevelopment: Radically
Monitoring the World Bank and the IMF,in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, supra note 1, at 366-75; Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and
Particularity:Intersections between LatCrit Theory andDevelopment Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REv. 313, 327-35 (1997); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in

Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J.

2006]

CRITICAL RACE THEORY

while others have written one or more class-related articles. 254 Further,
LatCrit has periodically, but repeatedly, focused on class, economic inequality, and the economics of race in their conferences, 255 as have CRT
scholars in symposia such as the Washington and Lee Symposium "CRT
and the Next Frontier., 256 In addition, promising new work in the area
of class and race has emerged in law and in other fields. 257 However, a
systematic analysis of class, particularly as a product of economic ordering, as well as its relationship to race has not yet emerged, even though
critical race scholars have arguedfor years that the class system in the
U.S. mutually constructs race, gender, and otherforms of oppression.
Below I briefly proffer a number of reasons that may explain why
CRT and related scholarship has not yet developed a more systematic
analysis of class. I then posit that the critical study of law and class or
classcrits, while open to further definition, is necessary to examine the
ways in which class mutually constructs race, further grounds analyses of
racism, and guides antisubordination praxis.
A. Tendencies, Tensions andFears as Obstacles to CriticalClass
Analysis
There are three central tendencies within CRT and related scholarship that may explain why this scholarship has failed to adequately engage in critical class analyses. Each tendency involves a tension between
material/class and discourse-focused examinations. The discursive sides
INT'L L. 221, 221-45 (1994); Enrique R. Carrasco & Randolph Thomas, EncouragingRelational
Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in the Aftermath of the Mexican FinancialCrisis,
34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 545-55 (1996).
253.
Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, PopularDemocracy, and California's Proposition 187: The PoliticalRelevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV.
629, 633-642 (1995). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Fearof an "Alien Nation ": Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 1(1996); Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or
"Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997),
reprinted in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 173 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in
ImmigrationEnforcement, 78 WASH. U. L. REV. 675 (2000).
254.
See Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven: "A CriticalExamination of Recent Writing
about Race," 82 TEX. L. REV. 717, 722-26 (2004) (responding to Delgado's critiques in Delgado,
Blind Alleys, supra note 17 and critiquing him for overlooking much scholarship that addresses the
concerns he raises and exploring the plethora of articles that have a class/materialist focus).
255.
Two of the eleven LatCrit conferences held thus far specifically focused on class and
economic issues. See LATCRIT Latina & Latino Critical Theory, http://personal.law.miami.edu/
-fvaldes/latcrit/latcrit/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). These were LatCrit V titled "Class in
LatCrit: Theory and Praxis of Economic Inequality," and Latcrit X titled "Critical Approaches to
Economic Injustice." Id. See also Johnson, supra note 254 (listing numerous examples of the essays discussing the relationship between class and race).
256.
Brown, supra note 146, at 1499.
257.
See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 35-38 (2d ed. 2006); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note

161, at 4. Legal scholars too have begun to investigate these issues from a variety of perspectives.
See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY, AND ECONOMICS (2005); A WOMAN'S PLACE, supra note 43;
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

DIMENSIONS (Jeanne M. Woods & Hope Lewis eds., 2005).
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of these tensions, however, are complementary in ways that reinforce the
discursive turn in CRT scholarship. The first tension lies in the inherent
nature of the legal profession, which while structuring material conditions does so through language and discourse. The second tension lies in
CRT's embrace of post-modernist theories, which focuses on discourse
as a significant site of power, in part because humans primarily understand the material world through ideas and language.258 These theories,
however, recognize that humans are material beings in a material
world.259 The third tension is found in CRT's embrace of the idea that
race is socially constructed, which given its development in CRT lends
itself toward a focus on consciousness, 260 even though consciousness is
shaped by and shapes materiality. These tensions are compounded by
additional political and academic issues that may further reinforce the
tendencies toward discourse analyses as opposed to the materiality of
economic relations, economic ordering, and class.
The first tension is implicated in the nature of law itself. Legal
work primarily consists of manipulating language and discourse in the
process of structuring arguments. Though these arguments are sometimes meant to effectuate particular material arrangements and may both
unleash and justify the use of coercive power, these events are accomplished through legal discourse. This occupational feature may mean
that legal academics in particular, who may be removed from the rough
and tumble of legal practice, are more comfortable mining text, language, and discourses for their meaning, rather than tracking their material effects or responding with concrete strategies to a particular material
event. Nevertheless, law through discourse structures material conditions in part by allocating and regulating resources. It decides who the
winners and losers are, on what terms trade will be conducted and what
kinds of property will be protected.
While many of these issues
through the traditional liberal legal
and corporate law, or even welfare
examined through the overlay onto

are explored as individual concepts
discourse of contract, property, trade,
and poverty law; and are increasingly
law of the standard neo-classical eco-

258.
See Shane Phelan, (Be)Coming Out: Lesbian Identity & Politics, 18 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN
CULTURE & Soc'Y 765, 768-69 (1993) (describing the poststructuralist and postmodernist project as
one challenging and seeking to unravel the historicity of truth claims rather than engaging in argumentation about whether something is true or not). Phelan describes poststructualism as being more
modernist in tone, "retaining some measure of confidence in the Enlightenment ideas of reason and
freedom while indicting modem Western societies for betraying these categories even as they ostensibly serve them." Id.at 768. In this sense it uses deconstruction or engages genealogy to note gaps
between what the West says it is or promises and what it does. On the other hand, postmodernist
such as Derrida seek "continually to disrupt modem categories even as they rely on them." Id at
768. Phelan notes one can be both a poststructuralist and a post modernist but "no affinity necessarily exists between the two." Id.
259.
John Lye, Some Post-StructuralistAssumptions (1996-97), http://www.brocku.ca/english/
courses/4F70/poststruct.htm.
Delgado, Two Ways to Think aboutRace, supra note 17, at 2285; Delgado, Blind Alleys,
260.
supra note 17, at 123.
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nomic discourse as in the Law and Economics tradition, it might be helpful to begin to examine the web of historically-decided economic policies
that constitute the background and hegemonic economic code of law.
Litowitz describes this code, worldview or web of social policies as including "private ownership of property, employment at will, inheritance,
freedom of contract, limited liability for business organizations, patriarchy, and a regime of negative rights that ensures that individuals must
secure their own health care, day care, and other benefits.",261 Here, one
might add white supremacy as an economic imperative of the code.26 2
And, one might question who and which social groups may have pushed
and/or been best served by these policies and their combination. So for
instance, while notions of private property may have a history that predates the founding of the United States, arguably the fact that the founding fathers belonged to the property owning class may be a significant
factor in its being enshrined in the U.S. Constitution to protect such ownership. In any event, this web of policies, I believe, help to mark the
boundaries of the reproduction of class within the United States that operates both independently and mutually with other subordinating structures to limit the material well being of many people including racial and
other minorities. This code, perhaps to the chagrin of its author, provides
us an entry into class.263
The focus on language and discourse as an inherent feature of modem legal work is reinforced by the post structuralism/modemism of CRT
that suggests that power is located in discourses. That is, power is located in rule-governed discourses that shape the features of a society and
individual identity and are constructed over time (historically deter261.
Litowitz, supra note 68, at 540.
262.
While this may seem like a political imperative rather than an economic one, it is not clear
if these two things can be separated in the American social order. Slavery was a racialized economic
system; it was both economic and political. See Matsuda, supranote 141, at 334; see also, Anthony
Farley,Accumulation, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 51 (2005) (suggesting that race and class are created in the same moment of primal accumulation in which the differences between the haves and the
have-nots is marked on the body, marked racially). Slavery and Jim Crow later did not simply block
access to equal services, but also to equal access to resources, jobs, and the like. See WOODWARD,
supra note 32, at 7-16. Similarly Colorblindness may do the same by leaving intact and allowing
white communities to build on the historical advantages locked in through slavery, segregation, and
discrimination. See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9
MICH. J. RACE & L. 31, 33-34 (2003); reprinted in 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 197 (2004) (discussing
the manner in which advantages get locked-in over time using the economic model that in part
explains the advantages monopolies maintain long after
the anticompetitive behavior has ceased). In
addition, an easily managed or "efficient" workplace may require homogeneity in personnel, or in
America, whiteness. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 150, at 1762. Pleasing the affluent customer
may mean hiring salespeople with whom this particular type of customer may be most comfortable.
See generally id.In the United States, white people are proportionately more affluent than say black
people.
263.
Litowitz certainly rejects the notion of class in the Marxian sense as the fount of all oppression. See Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534. He also rejects the idea that law is an instrument of
class. Id.But he more generally seems to reject notions of class because the modem economy has
begun to "blur class divisions." Id.; see also infra note 293-95 and accompanying text. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY (2005) (making a similar point).
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mined) through social action. 264 Though these discourses appear as instruments of some sort of specific knowledge, to in fact reveal knowledge,265 there are multiple and overlapping discourses and all manner of
people have some power to contest these discourses-these sites of
power. This is so even though some people have more power to influence the content and development of discourse than others.266 For lawyers and non-lawyers alike, these insights might easily be seen as a description of law. Law appears as a specialized body of knowledge, that
often establishes, or rather reveals the boundaries of appropriate action,
and perhaps-though less apparent-thought. Further, just about anyone
can bring a suit or contest the discourse, and it is clearly a site of power.
It is a site of power not only because it is backed by coercion but also
because the language of law as socio-historically developed, itself is socially meaningful and powerful-"I know my rights; this is my property." At this level the post-structuralist description of discourse as
power not only seems to describe law but also reinforces the centeredness of discourse in law.
Delgado captures this idea when he suggests that CRT scholars favor analyses that emphasize "texts, narratives, ideas, and meanings" because they understand these as giving rise to racial discrimination by
conveying messages "that people of other racial groups are unworthy,"
and thus locating racial power in discourse.267 He criticizes these types
of analyses as leading writers to focus on and "analyze hate speech, media images, census categories, and such issues as intersectionality and
essentialism. 2 68 But he argues that "while text, attitude, and intention
may play important roles in our system of racial hierarchy, material fac-

264.
Here I am drawing particularly on Michel Foucault's work and understanding him as the
central poststructuralist theorist. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY
OF STORY OF INSANITY 1N THE AGE OF REASON (Richard Howard trans., 2001); Litowitz, supra note

68, at 534 (describing this work in part); see also Roger Jones, Post Structuralism, by Roger Jones,
http://www.philosopher.org.uk/poststr.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (describing Foucault as the
central poststructuralist theorist).
265.
Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534 (drawing on Michel Foucault's and explaining the way in
which discourses appear as instruments of knowledge and noting, "psychoanalysis favors the male
experience (the Oedipal drama) and thereby marginalizes women, just as the discourse of medicine
tends to medicalize the behavior of those who stand outside established social categories (e.g., homosexuals were considered 'sick')"). See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 264.
266.
FRASER, supra note 210, at 154. The idea of multiple sites of power seems to be in some
tension with the idea of a single hegemonic order. Litowitz, in arguing for a reconsideration of
Gramsci's theory of hegemony suggests that the critical legal studies in using Gramsci, never resolved the tension between Gramsci's understanding of hegemony as a tool of the dominant economic class and other ideas of hegemony as a product of structure. See Litowitz, supra note 68, at
549. He rejects the idea that law reflects a dominant class and appears to reject the idea of class in
general given this moment of advanced capitalism but he argues there is a dominant or hegemonic
code that relates to economic issues socially constructed over time. Id. He suggests that someone
fighting for welfare rights is not fighting against a class but rather a code, a worldview. Id.
267.
Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 17, at 123.
268. Id.
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tors such as profits and the labor market are even more decisive in determining who falls where in that system. 2 69
The strong focus of post structuralism/modemism on discourse and
CRT's embrace of it, however, may squeeze out other poststructuralist
insights about materiality.270 So for instance, post structuralism understands human beings as "material beings, "embodied and present in the
physical world, entrenched in the material practices and structures of
their society -- working, playing, procreating, living as parts of the material systems of society., 271 Thus while humans may dream of crossing
the Atlantic, and may do so by engaging materiality using a boat or
plane, it is unlikely they can swim across it, even if they think they can.
In this sense, the idea of discursive power does not negate the reality of
material constraints, and equally important, it does not negate the reality
of coercive power-violence-as a creator, consequence and tool of
power. Coercive power is simply another axis of power in addition to
discursive power. 272 And the idea of discursive power, itself, though
said to reside in many places and posited as contested and contestable
rather than as a "one-way imposition by a dominant" group, 73 does not
negate the idea of dominant groups or classes (which may have greater
power to say what is authoritative). Rather, these dominant groups may
be powerful and their views may be hegemonic, but they are neither
monolithic nor are their views the only game in town. 7 4 Further, the
very notion of discursive power also points to lopsided or unequal relationships that are all too often the products and producers of unequal and
in-egalitarian material relations. 275 In this sense, post-structuralism may
remind us that "it's more than the economy, stupid." But, it does not
negate economic conditions even if human understanding of these conditions is mediated through language. Thus while post-structuralism's
analyses of discourse may reinforce the centeredness of the discourse of
law, it, in and of itself, need not preclude a focus on economic structures
269. Id.
270. See generallyFRASER, supra note 210 (indicating a need for both).
271.
See Lye, supra note 259. This is so even though they suggest that human beings can only
appreciate the material world though ideas and language.
272.
Litowitz, supra note 68, at 518-19.
273.
Id. at 534; see also Jones, supra note 264.
274.
Litowitz, supra note 68, at 550-51 (noting that postmodemists recognize that there are
dominant groups and arguing that just because there are multiple discourses at the local level does
not negate that there is a hegemonic discourse at the meta level of law). See generally Mutua, Theorizing Progressive Black Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES supra note 107
(discussing ideal American masculinity as hegemonic, but not the only idea of masculinity that
exists in society); Patricia Hill Collins, A Telling Difference: Dominance, Strength, and Black Masculinities, in PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 107, at 73 (noting that while there is
a dominant hegemonic masculinity, all masculinities across racial, ethnic, and other groups contain
hegemonic ideas such as, white men encounter a hegemonic masculinity that dictates what white
men should be and do and black men encounter ideas that tell them what they, as black men, should
be and do).
275.
See FRASER, supra note 210, 11- 33 (noting that it is difficult to have dignity and respect
for all identities in the absence of an egalitarian society).
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and relations as decisive determinants of class status and significant features in the construction of race.
If the practice of law is centered on discourse and CRT's post structuralism emphases on examining discourse reinforces the tendency toward a focus on discursive maneuvers, then the development of CRT's
basic premise that race is socially constructed, has sometimes been understood in ways to further bolster the discursive turn. Delgado argues
that it is the idea of the social construction of race that is at the crux of
the discursive turn. He suggests it leads to a focus on "race" instead of
race. 276 By this he means that CRT has tended to focus on defining race,
thinking about how it works, theorizing its processes as located in
"[i]deal factors -- thoughts, discourse, stereotypes, feelings, and mental
categories[,] '' 27 7 rather than focusing on how race works in the real
world, and the way it functions as an ordering principle in a world of
power, resources, and privilege. 278 The idea of race as a social construction suggests that race is not some immutable biological characteristic
but rather a socio-historical process through which society assigns meanings to different types of human bodies. 279 These meanings are unstable
and changing but deeply structured over time not only by consciousness
but also by material constraints, economic imperatives, institutionalized
practices, and other social ordering features of society. 280 That is, it is
shaped by materiality as much as by consciousness. And yet, somehow
the idea that race is socially constructed has developed in a way to suggest that race is simply a product of consciousness unrelated to materiality-a consciousness that seems to hover above and beyond social life
281
and practice.
So, for instance, some CRT scholars see unconscious racism as the
biggest obstacle to racial justice.2 82 This is true to the extent that unconscious racism allows people to continue to act in racist ways while simultaneously believing that racism no longer exists. This may engender in
them apathy or hostility to racial justice activism. But this view ignores
the ways in which race is economically, socially, and institutionally
grounded and reproduced even where individuals are present and consciously committed to eradicating racism. Others seem to suggest that as
race is simply a product of consciousness and not real, that race con276.
Delgado, BlindAlleys, supra note 17, at 1 36.
277.
Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race, supra note 17, at 2280.
278.
THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 1, at 17.
279.
OMI & WiNANT, supra note 26, at 55.
Id. at 56 (noting that race is a matter of both structure an cultural representation).
280.
281.
Much in Delgado's piece leads me to think his understanding of the social construction of
race as an "idea" focused and as a product of consciousness is related to Lawrence's notion of "unThe Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
conscious racism." Charles R. Lawrence, 11I,
With Unconscious Racism, in CRT: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 235-57. I in someone ways
share this intuition, and thus see this idea as a quirky function of the development of the idea of
social construction rather than something inherent.
Brown, supra note 146, at 1489-91.
282.
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sciousness should be eliminated as a strategy for addressing racial injustice. Instead, they emphasize spiritual transformation.28 3 While I am
sympathetic to this type of thinking, it does not provide a theory about
the process of transformation, given embodiment. That is, it does not
contemplate the limitations and compromises that material (human) embodiment imposes on spiritual consciousness as manifested in the world
or the way constraints are further materialized in social systems and institutional structures. Nor does it suggest the process for transforming
them.284 In addition, to say race is not biological is not to say it is not
real. 85 Further, to say race is a social construction, again, is not to say
that race is not real. Money is the preeminent social construction as a
medium of exchange. No one seems to suggest that money is not real or
rather that the consequences of having or not having money in the context of modem economies is somehow unreal.286 These ideas detach the
consciousness of social construction from the materiality of social construction and they mistakenly uproot racism from its material basis as
well as detach race from class.
Nevertheless the idea and prominence of racial consciousness or
unconsciousness as developed within the idea of the social construction
283. See Robinson, supra note 238, at 155-58.
284. Here, the process of transforming these material constraints on consciousness or calling
into existence a different reality requires something more than consciousness or thought but may
well entail a combination of thought, speech, and action or action and speech that changes the conditions of consciousness. As such it might well require or be well served by race consciousness that
produces the actions that would help dismantle the structural and material conditions that reinforce
the conscious conceptions. See generally NEALE DONALD WALSCH, CONVERSATIONS WITH GOD:
AN UNCOMMON DIALOGUE (Book 1) (1996).
285.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 55.

286.
One can argue that money is a social construction. It is certainly not biological but it is a
function of human interaction. Money is a medium of exchange. Further, expressions of money,
such as the one-dollar bill and a twenty-dollar bill can be said to be the same, in the way that people,
are viewed the same, as humans. That is, these bills are made out of the same sort of paper, with
roughly equivalent amounts of ink, thus their value from this perspective is the same. However,
people do not value the twenty-dollar bill the same as they do the one-dollar bill, nor do they say the
bills have equal value. This difference is real, not as a matter of biology or substance, but is real
because a zillion transactions every day make them real and make the difference between the bills
real. This difference is buttressed not only a billion people believing that the difference between the
dollar bills is real, and acting like they are different everyday (consciousness made real,) but is also
buttressed and made real by a variety of systems and institutions such as the U.S. economy and the
global economy, the federal reserve bank, the stock market, the real estate agent, and the grocery
store down the street, etc.
In addition, people's belief systems about the dollar in general could rapidly change,
leading to its abandonment as a system or medium of exchange. However, such an outcome would
likely be precipitated by some enormous event, and not because a small group of people, marginal
and outside the mainstream, with limited control over the production of money and its accumulation
wished or believed it so. Additionally, the value or perception of say, twenty dollars does not remain
the same over time, twenty dollars thirty years ago was more valuable. And finally, and more important to analysis of class to the extent that access to money is allowed to determine a person's
access to status, goods and services, the systems by which it produced and allocated creates classes,
races, genders etc., designed to perform both and different economic and psychological functions.
Race is structural and made real in a similar way that money is. Further, capitalism, the system we
now inhabit, guides this process buttressed and ordered in part by law and makes access to money in
its various forms the key to accessing resources, the absence of which helps delineate class and race.
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of race, further fortifies the discursive turn in CRT. This turn, to the
extent it focuses on discourse, may occlude a focus on materiality and
therefore on economic and class issues.
But political and other analytical pressures also exist that may have
hindered the development of class analyses within CRT and strengthened
the tendency toward the discursive turn. For example, hesitancy to take
on class may result from fear of analyzing or critiquing capitalism, the
reigning economic order, given the political environment that champions
unfettered capitalism as a panacea for all ills despite its apparent tendency to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. This tendency uninterrupted by policy decisions to curb it or disrupt its lopsided material
distributions, has increasingly created and cemented vast economic inequalities in the social system, widening and hardening the gap between
the rich and the poor.287 However, engagement with class issues as a
potential critique of this situation may be seen as politically difficult and
unpopular given the politics of triumphant which celebrate the failure of
communism and conclude the inadequacy of Marxist analyses with their
particular emphasis on class divisions.288
This fear may be bolstered by economic analyses which understand
current economic arrangements as necessary and natural and which inform us everyday that the maintenance and creation of the rich are indispensable and beneficial to the rest of us, including the middle, working,
and poor classes, 289 while suggesting that policies which put the wellThe London Financial Times published a three-part series discussing growing economic
287.
inequality in the United States and the stagnation of wages. See Krishna Guha, Edward Luce, &
Andrew Ward, Anxious Middle: Why Ordinary Americans Have Missed Out on the Benefits of
Growth, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2, 2006 (commentary) (part one of three); Krishna Guha, Edward Luce, & Alim Remtulla, Seeking Shelter: Why Democrats are in Retreat From Their Free
Trade Record, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 3, 2006 (commentary) (part two of three); Alan Beattie,
Sans Safety Net, 'CreativeDestiny' Spurs America, Nov. 6, 2006 (commentary) (part three of three);
see also Lawrence Summers, The Global Middle Cries out for Reassurance, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 30, 2006 (commentary); ROBERT PERUCCI & EARLY WYSONG, THE NEW CLASS SOCIETY 3-34

(1999) (suggesting that class mobility is stagnating); JEFF FAUX, THE GLOBAL CLASS WAR: HOW
AMERICA'S BIPARTISAN ELITE LOST OuR FUTURE - AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN IT BACK 49-

75 (2006) (noting the increasing gap between rich and poor and commenting that while racism,
sexism and other forms of oppression seem to be decreasing, class inequalities are growing); Robert
D. Atkinson, Inequality in the New Knowledge Economy, in THE NEW EGALITARIANISM 52, 54-55
(Antony Giddens & Patrick Diamond eds., 2005) (discussing growing inequality that began in the
late 1970's and explaining that this phenomenon covers not only inequitable distribution of income
but also the distribution of jobs with the share of jobs with middle income also shrinking). The
result is an economy that is crating a U-shaped job-market with more job increases found at the top
and the bottom. Id.
Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534-5.
288.
Recall for instance, President Ronald Reagan's supply-side economics, derisively termed
289.
"trickle-down economics," which put the rich at the center of tax-reduction for the so-called benefit
of greater production. Marjorie E Komhauser, The Morality Of Money: American Attitudes Toward
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 154-56 (1994). The rich, the theory suggested would
take the money saved from lower taxes and invest it, stimulating the economy and therefore providing overall growth and benefits that would trickle down to the rest of us. Id. Instead, the rich got
richer and the United States deficit soared, later restraining investment in social spending because
the deficit had to be reduced. Id; see, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation ofFederal Tax Policy
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being of the vast majority humanity at the center of economic ordering
and development are destructive. And it may be further bolstered by the
legal code of economic policy choices, described earlier, that protects the
regime of "private ownership of property, employment at-will, inheritance, freedom of contract, limited liability for business organizations,
patriarchy, and a regime of negative rights that ensures that individuals
must secure their own health care, day care, and other benefits. 2 9 °
At the same time, a hesitancy to take on class may arise from deep
within CRT itself. Race in America cuts across class. So for instance,
the working class is and has historically been divided by race. 29 ' But
class also divides race,2 92 a fact CRT recognizes in its antiessentialist
notions, which call for racial solidarity and unity as a political commitment rather than as an essential fact. However, a class analysis may
nonetheless require race crits to acknowledge their own class standing
and interest as part of an educated elite. This interrogation might suggests among other things, that their interest in being and remaining a part
of this elite class is in tension with the empowerment of the racialized
underclass, which empowerment is both the producer and product of a
radically transformed social order. Said differently, in order for the
masses of racialized underclasses to live well, the current system which
privileges the educated elite will need to be transformed. Empowerment
of these classes is both the prerequisite and desired outcome of this transformation. Seen from another perspective, race crits may not look at
class because they are less affected by the oppressive mechanisms of
class, even as these accompany racial oppression.
There may also be a number of other analytical obstacles to CRT
taking on class analyses. For instance, Litowitz argues that central insights of Marxism (as the most important theory of class relations) are no
longer adequate explanations of or salient factors in advanced capitalism

Based on Judeo-ChristianEthics, 25 VA. TAx REv. 671, 729-734 (2006) (providing brief discussions of trickle down economics and explaining trickle down theory, noting that there is no reliable
proof that tax cuts for the rich will stimulate growth and explaining that although George W. Bush
calls himself a Christian that his tax policies fail to meet a Christian ethics that would require those
who benefit the most from society to contribute-as part of sacrifice-more for its upkeep and
requiring that revenues raised be sufficient to ensure vulnerable people an opportunity to live up to
their God given potential); see also Audrey Farlane, The New Inner City: Transformation, concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 4-5 (2006) (discussing recent city urban planning goals of attracting a more affluent population on the theory that
they will bring needed resources to the city by which poorer communities will benefit but finding
that the poorer communities disappear, get relocated and do not benefit from this focus).
290.
Litowitz, supra note 68, at 549 (referring to the code also as a worldview and explaining
that "social reform involves subversion of a dominant rationality").
291.
See, e.g., Herbert G. Gutman, Black Coal Miners and the Greenback-Labor Party in
Redeemer, Alabama: 1878-1879, The Letters of Warren D. Kelley, Willis Johnson Thomas, "Dawson," and Others, 10 LAB. HIST. 506, 506 (1969); Herbert G. Gutman, Reconstruction in Ohio:
Negroes in the Hocking Valley Coal Mines in 1873 and 1874, 3 LAB. HIST. 243, 243-44 (1962). See
generally ROEDIGER, supra note 116.
292.
1 owe this line of argument to Robert Chang.
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where class lines have become blurry. 93 For example, he poses the following situation and question. "A female computer consultant for IBM
speculates on the stock market at night and owns a studio apartment that
she rents to a janitor. To what class does she belong?, 294 While a definitive answer may not arise under traditional Marxist theory of class,
rethinking class in light of modem theories, current practices, and concrete economic developments may provide a sophisticated analysis of
this scenario.29 5 Equally important however, is that the demonstration of
blurry class lines does not render class as an economic feature or an analytical or political tool non-existent. In fact critical race analysis may be
helpful in this regard. So for instance, race, Latinos, blacks, as groups,
as political projects, as analytical categories are "blurry"-in-essential,
non-monolithic, unstable, socially constructed, and difficult to define.
Yet, they exist because we create and recreate them structurally, politically, intellectually and discursively. Though a slightly different process
is at work in the case of class, and perhaps gender, these social processes
and phenomenon exists at multiple levels.
And finally, CRT may have failed to adequately engage class analysis because, as Angel Harris suggests, we may simply have lost the language for talking about class given the declining currency of Marxist
theory.296 Or it may be that in light of the law and economics tradition,
CRT scholars believe it necessary and are reluctant to master another
field such as economics. In any case, this failure is puzzling given
CRT's suggestion that class mutually constructs race on the one hand,
and on the other, given its success in contributing to the examination of
other subordinating systems, such as gender oppression, (intersectionality) 297 and potentially gay, lesbian, and queer oppression (multidimen-

sionality).29 8
B. Why ClassCrits?
My thoughts on what class is and what a critical class analysis
might reveal are provisional. However, it appears important for CRT to
engage and develop a critical class analysis because mapping out the
different economic classes, the power relations between them, and the
way law operates on them, as it has in the context of the systems of race,
gender, and sexuality is crucial to understanding the ways in which class
mutually supports these other systems. In addition, a class analysis may
further ground examinations of racism and racist practices and potentially guide CRT's antisubordination praxis.
293.

Litowitz, supra note 68, at 534.

294.
Id. at 534; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 263.
295.
For new ideas about class, see, e.g., PERUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 287, at 3-34; FAUX,
supra note 287, at 49-75 (discussing the existence of an international elite class).
296.
297.

Harris, supra note 42, at 777.
See supra note 18.

298.

See supra note 19.
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Classes arguably arise out of the division of labor and the stratification of society in producing, distributing, and perhaps even in consuming
goods and services. 299 A critical class analysis, then, presumably not
only interrogates such concerns as supply and demand, wages and productivity and ultimately how goods, services, wealth, and surplus are
created and allocated, but also interrogates the power relations and power
differentials between different economic groups in society and the ways
they are being maintained or changed. From a critical perspective, particularly in the context of CRT, there is a special concern about oppressive class relations and ways to eliminate them as well as a focus on context. That is, a critical class analyses rejects abstract notions of efficiency, insisting instead on inquiries as to who the players are, who the
beneficiaries are, whose needs are accommodated, 30 0 and whose needs
are not, why some allocations are deemed efficient and others not, and,
which is skeptical of claims of neutrality and efficiency where the crystallized protections of a privileged group status have not been investigated in the given context. In this vein, critical class theory might have
something to say or to ask about the groups produced in the modern social economic processes and the current moment in which segmented
joblessness and stagnating wages for the overwhelming majority of the
population exist in the face of increasing productivity, a growing economy, staggering profits, and incomprehensible executive pay as mediated
by the corporation and justified by an array of people institutionally and
otherwise placed. 301

In addition, a class analysis may further ground examinations of racism and racist practices because it focuses on the economic allocations
of material resources accumulated over the last several hundred years,
much of which has been racialized. It is unlikely that these racialized
allocations (whether productive or distributive) will be eliminated without addressing the structural and economic foundations of class. Nor is it
clear that class and the economic harms of lower class status can be
eliminated without addressing both the material and psychological seductions embodied and structured by race. Ultimately, the best way to address these issues may not simply be calling for the edification and respect of different groups but the difficult work of building coalitions to
demand concrete economic and material changes for those oppressed by
race and class as well as those oppressed by class across race. Four
These are relatively typical elements in the definition of class. See FRASER, supra note
299.
210, at 17 (making a similar point).
300. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Illusion of Efficiency in Worker's Compensation "Reform, " 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 657, 666-67, 716-50 (1998) (unraveling the neoeconomic rhetoric of
efficiency versus redistribution distinction makes redistribution claims seem suspect).
James Bernstein, Q&A: Working Harder and Taking Home Less, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29,
301.
2006; Rex Nutting, Bernanke Overstates Wage Growth: Earningsare not Catching up with Productivity, Government Figures Show, MAKETWATCH, Jul. 19, 2006; see also Steven Greenhouse &
David Leonhardt, Real Wages Fail to Match A Rise in Productivity,N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006.
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questions raised in the context of Hurricane Katrina might exemplify
these points.3 °2
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many commentators questioned
whether the government's slow, seemingly disinterested response and
inadequate rescue of the thousands of mostly African American people
30 3
stranded in the flooded city of New Orleans was the result of racism.
That is, they wondered whether the government's pitiful response was
not just evidence of incompetence but rather occurred because the victims were black. 304 This is a typical race consciousness question and
race questions are increasingly formulated in this manner. 30 5 It gets at
what Rory calls the sadism of the American social order. It is about the
motivation and lack of it of white Americans, white officials providing
justice to black Americans. It is about conscious and unconscious racism. It is about the current and momentary intent of individuals, about
the intentional conduct of current players. It is often countered by efforts
to shame the perpetuators, but has the effect of making invisible those
affected by such policies.30 6 This shaming, in turn, reinforces calls for
what Fraser has called a politics of recognition, a politics that advances
the edification and respect of different positioned groups.30 7 A politics
of recognition focuses on cultural solutions, which might include the
celebration of a subordination group's culture or heroes such as in black
history month, Martin Luther King Day, or advocate for participation in
gay parades? But a politics of recognition, while necessary, may not
address the structure of racial segmentation, stratification, and caste.
Assuming the legitimacy of the first question, a second question
nonetheless arises. It is: Why did so many black people stay behind or
find themselves stranded or left behind in New Orleans? Presumably,
these people did not stay behind because they were black but rather because they were poor. They lacked the means required to leave New
Orleans and to sustain themselves while away from their homes. 30 8 Why
they were so poor that they could not leave in the face of a serious hurri302.
H.R.J. Res. 437, 109th Cong. (2005); Elizabeth Fussell, UnderstandingKatrina:Perspectives from the Social Sciences (2005), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Fussel/ (detailing arguments highlighted here). For example, 27.3% of New Orleans households did not have cars, compared to 9.4% of the U.S. population as a whole. See id. See generally MICHAEL ERIC DYSON,
COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER (2006).

303.
DYSON, supra note 302, at 17-33 (explaining the ways in which race played a role in the
failure of the federal government to respond to the Katrina hurricane victims and noting that malicious intent may not have been involved but indifference as part of a southern, national, and historical script where black grief and pain is involved are among the factors at work).
304.
Id.
305.
This may be the result of an understanding of racism as largely the product of intentional
individual action, a concept that ignores race as a caste system and a limited concept of race that is
promoted by colorblindness ideology. See Harris,supra note 42, at 750-52.
306.
Delgado, Two Ways of Thinking about Race, supra note 17, at 2295.
307.
FRASER, supra note 210, at 11-66.
308.
DYSON, supra note 302, at 5-6 (discussing poverty in New Orleans and noting that one in
four people in New Orleans lacked access to a car).
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cane when most others in the area were able to leave, in the richest country in the world, is the class question. Though this question may ultimately implicate American sadism, it has much more to do with what
Rorty calls American selfishness. 30 9 That is, it is no doubt about economics, but it is primarily about the policy choices and practices that
structure the production and maldistribution3 of resources that render
some groups well off and others much less So. 10
The third question was why the majority of the poor people in New
Orleans appeared to be overwhelmingly black when they constitute only
31 1
a little over a third of the metropolitan area of 1.3 million people.
These are the questions of class and race, the way class and race are related and have developed over time through structural elements, and
policies developed throughout the United States and in elements and
policies specific to Louisiana.312 Unraveling this question would presumably demonstrate the way in which racism is a co-constituent and
feature of the economic order in that it further delineates and allocates
certain economic functions and distributions to particular racialized and
classed groups. As such, race itself is a system for allocating resources
but one that is part and parcel of, or intertwined with the class system,
even as it operates independently and relatedly as a belief system that
provides a ready justification for the racialized results of various distributions, as well as providing cohesion to the overall system. Race provides
cohesion or stability, in part, by seducing the more privileged in the class
delineated by race (white working class v. black working class) to support the system in order to maintain both material and psychological
privileges.3 13 From this perspective, race arguably developed as part of
the U.S. economic system of slavery, to legitimate both it and other
forms of exclusion, and then was used, consciously and institutionally for
309.

See generally RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN

TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998).
310. See generally id.
311. See
New
Orleans
Demographics, Population
(LA),
CityRating.com,
http://www.cityrating.com/citystats.asp?city=New+Orleans&state=LA (last visited Oct. 21, 2006)
(discussing the metropolitan area with a population of 1.3 million and a black people constituting
37.5% of the population); see also Dominguez, supra note 28 (discussing the term of "third world"
as applied to hurricane victims and discussing who was seen and unseen in this diverse metropolitan
area). Other questions might include whether it was only poor blacks stranded by Hurricane Katrina.
Though the majority of those stranded in New Orleans seemed to be black, were there others? Were
there poor whites also affected, and if so why were they less visible? And who might be served by
the invisibility of poor whites? For instance, as Dyson notes, some of the regions hardest-hit by
Katrina are suffer from extreme poverty. DYSON, supra note 302, at 5. The include Mississippi as
the poorest state in the nation and Louisiana the second poorest. Id Further, more than 90,000
people in these areas as well as parts of Alabama where Katrina hit made under $10,000 a year. Id.
312. DYSON, supranote 302, at 1-14 (discussing race and poverty and explaining that those left
behind in New Orleans had been socio-economically left behind years ago). That is, they suffered
from poverty and New Orleans in particular like many urban other urban areas in the US, suffered
from concentrated poverty. Id.
313.

See, e.g., BELL, supra note 2, at 8 (citing EDMUND S. MORAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY,

AMERICAN FREEDOM 8 (1975)) (discussing how the development and maintenance of a poor black
subclass enabled and enables poor white to identify with wealthy whites).
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years to structure, perpetuate, and legitimate the resulting order of what
bell hooks calls the "white supremacist capitalist patriarchy. ' 3 14 That
racism can be addressed without addressing the economic class configurations that structure race is doubtful. Similarly, the kind of massmovement needed to challenge dominant--economic-class3 15 power
would require dealing with the racial issues that divide those who must
work for their living as opposed to those, along with those with specialized skills, who live off the work of others.3 16
And finally, there is the question of the evacuation order, a policy
that seemed blind to the classed realities of poverty in New Orleans and
yet help to make visible the racialized maldistribution of resources in
New Orleans. Though the government was said to have had an evacuation plan for New Orleans that recognized that over a hundred thousand
people might be stranded and included government efforts to locate and
move people out of the city who were unable to do so themselves, this
was not the evacuation plan carried out. Rather, the evacuation plan,
bungled no doubt, consisted primarily of an order for people to vacate
New Orleans, an order that which while recognizing that some people
might get stuck, assumed that most people had adequate and enough
wealth to evacuate. It was a policy and plan based on assumptions of
adequate wealth where for many no such wealth existed and in a country
where poverty levels and gaps between the rich and the poor, though
ignored, are increasing. That a policy of assumed wealth often disadvantages a racialized population reflects the way that classed policies have
racial impact.
In a similar way, consider the famous case of San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez.3 17 Here the Supreme Court upheld
a school financing system that allowed one district's schools to be vastly
under funded as compared to another. 318 The under-funded school district consisted mostly of Mexican Americans. 3 19 The Court's decision
did not rely on race but rather on wealth and assumptions of adequate

314.
bell hooks, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 78 (1995).
315.
See, e.g., Manning Marable, INTRODUCTION: BLACK STUDIES AND THE RACIAL
MOUNTAIN, in DISPATCHES FROM THE EBONY TOWER: INTELLECTUALS CONFRONT THE AFRICAN

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1, 19 (Manning Marable ed., 2000) (explaining a transformationist idea as
one seeks to "transform the existing power relationships and the racist institutions of the state, the
economy and society," and noting that this requires "the building of a powerful protest movement,
based largely among the most oppressed classes and social groups, to demand the fundamental
restructuring of the basic institutions and patterns of ownership within society[]").
316.
Here I am relying on Jeff Faux description of the global elite class as comprising those
with specialized skills, those who control large corporations and those who live off their capital
earnings as opposed to living off of their work. See FAUX, supra note 287, at 64.

317.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

318.
319.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5-6.
Id. at 12.
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wealth. 320 The effect was that the racialized class of poor people would
continue to be so because they would attend inferior schools that would
render inferior jobs and thus maintain them as a relatively poor racialized
group. In this sense, race crits as lawyers should analyze class because
law makes decisions on the basis of wealth that have racial implications
and makes decisions on the basis of race that have wealth and class implications.
These last three questions relating to race, class, and race- and classbased policies and laws, may also better guide CRT's antisubordination
praxis. That is, it may counsel the kind of activities that are more effective in eliminating both racial and class subordination. These activities
may be those that do not simply call for the respect of subordinated
groups but seek to challenge, change, or transform the social arrangements that structure the subordination itself. Fraser argues that the valuation and respect of different groups is more likely in an egalitarian society, a society where significant material inequalities between groups do
not exist. 321 She contends that though a politics of recognition, which
call for respect of differently positioned groups is important, a "politics
of redistribution" that seeks to change the processes and conditions that
create and structure the devaluation of differently-positioned individuals
and groups is a more effective strategy for accomplishing the edification
of different groups in a pluralist society. 322 Rorty agrees, noting that
sadism may be more effectively undermined by policies and activities
that attack the selfish maldistribution of resources that create classes and
help to racialized groups. 3 23 The difference in strategy may be the difference between creating an outcry to force an incompetent and potentially racist politician to resign his post after the hurricane or celebrating
the cultural mix needed to create a rich culture such as New Orleans, in
distinction to creating a movement to push for policies such as new and
affordable housing built on higher-ground, plans to locate, track and help
return poor evacuees back to the city, improved health care, adequate
living wages, greatly expanded public transportation system and/or increased credit or other opportunities to buy cars, etc. Surely the first is
helpful, but the latter is indispensable.
CONCLUSION

I have suggested that critical race theory rose in response to, and as
a challenge to the ascendance of a colorblind ideology, an ideology that
seeks to ignore the structural, persistent and current manifestations of
320.
1 owe the insight of "assumed wealth" to Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman, editors of
Power, Privilegeand Law. See POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW, supra note 1, at 381-98 (discussing
Braveman's analysis of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez).
321.
FRASER, supranote 210, at 27-33.
322. Id.
323.
See generally RORTY, supranote 309.
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racism that inure from the social historical process of race formation in
the United States. The goal of colorblind ideology, while ostensively to
promote equality as symmetry among the races, in fact cements the privileges of whiteness. CRT's insights about colorblindness, as well as a
number of its other themes and methodologies result in part from a process of conflict inspired growth which provided CRT scholars the opportunity to experience the meaning and impact of their insights as part of
their development. These conflicts also however, in some ways spur the
development of CRT related scholarship. This scholarship while potentially fragmenting the movement has in fact contributed much to the
theoretical project of CRT. This scholarship has expanded the CRT
knowledge base of different groups, historical experiences, it has expanded CRT's knowledge around different kinds of oppression, and it
has aided CRT in the development of new theories. In doing so this
scholarship has also strengthened CRT's commitment to coalition building and antisubordination praxis.
Classcrits becomes another frontier for CRT. The expectation is
that classcrits will expand CRT knowledge about another type of subordination and set of power relations that, like gender and sexuality, is differently constructed than race, even as it mutually reinforces race. In
addition, classcrits becomes another way, in the face of the expansion of
colorblind ideology, to get, in part, at the materiality and economic foundations of race. That is, while colorblind advocates continue to attempt
to reduce race to who did what, the question reappears in the form of
why the poor are disproportionately black or why blacks are disproportionately poor. And though a cultural reply that blames the victim is
expected, the tools will be developed to challenge these replies in ever
more sophisticated economic and class terms. And finally, though strategies that attempt to overcome white cultural domination and promote
black and other non-white edification continue, these efforts will be complemented by coalitions built across race and across types of oppression
to challenge the material, classed and economic structures and resource
allocations that shape them.

BACK FROM THE MARGINS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL
NUISANCE PARADIGM FOR PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES
RONALD G. ARONOVSKY

t

ABSTRACT

The law governingprivate cleanup cost disputes is in disarray. For
over twenty years, owners of contaminatedproperty voluntarily cleaned
up pollution caused by others in reliance on a federal law right under
CERCLA to recover from those who contributed to the contamination
theirfair share of cleanup costs. That changed with the US. Supreme
Court's decision in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, Inc. Aviall held
that liable persons under CERCLA (such as the current owners of contaminatedproperty) who voluntarily incur cleanup costs cannot sue for
contribution under CERCLA, calling into question any future role for
federal law in most private cleanup cost disputes. Current state law fails
to offer a meaningful alternative to federal law for allocating cleanup
costs at many of the nation's hundreds of thousands of contaminated
sites. This need not be so.
Private nuisance is a flexible doctrine that is potentially well-suited
for resolving cleanup cost allocation disputes. Doctrinallimitations and
inter-state inconsistencies, however, currently shackle private nuisance
law and prevent its application to many common problems involving
contaminatedproperty. CERCLA has pushed nuisance and other state
law theories to the margins ofprivate cleanup cost litigation. After Aviall, private nuisance could emerge to play a major role in resolvingprivate cleanup cost disputes, but only if states seize the opportunity to reexamine and modernize the law of private nuisance in soil andgroundwater contamination cases. This article analyzes the deficiencies that
currently riddle private nuisance law and proposes an environmental
nuisance paradigm. The paradigm would expand private nuisance law
to address contamination created by priorproperty owners and encourage site cleanup through a rebuttable presumption that chemical contamination constitutes a continuing nuisance that remains actionable
until the contaminationis abated.
t
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INTRODUCTION

The law governing private cleanup cost disputes is in disarray. The
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (Aviall),1 called into question the availability of federal
cleanup cost contribution rights under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 In Aviall, the
Court held that a potentially responsible party (PRP) 3 who voluntarily
spent millions of dollars in cleanup costs could not use CERCLA's contribution provision 4 to recover from another PRP who caused much of
the contamination its fair share of cleanup costs. 5 In so doing, Aviall cast
doubt on the future role of federal law in private cleanup cost disputes. 6
1. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
2.
Pub. Law No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 96019675 (West 2006)). CERCLA is sometimes referred to as the "Superfund" statute. See infra notes
42-63 and accompanying text.
3.
Individuals or entities falling within one of the four categories of "covered persons" set
forth in (CERCLA sections 107(a)(1)-(4)), are often referred to as PRPs. See infra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
4.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f(1).
5. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text; see also Ronald G.
Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Re-Thinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup
CostDisputes, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 45-50 (2006) (discussing the Aviall decision).
6.
As used in this article, the phrase "private cleanup cost disputes" refers to disputes between private parties regarding the allocation of contaminated property cleanup cost responsibilities.
These disputes may concern reimbursement (by a direct action for damages or a derivative action for
contribution) by a PRP of its fair share of cleanup costs already expended by a current landowner or

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

The absence of a federal cleanup cost contribution right, of course,
would not implicate major national environmental policy concerns if
PRPs could recover cleanup costs from other PRPs under state law. Often, however, no such state law remedy is available. 7 It should be. Private nuisance is potentially well suited for resolving contaminated property cleanup cost allocation disputes. Doctrinal limitations and interstate inconsistencies, however, currently shackle private nuisance law by
restricting its application to neighboring land use disputes and shielding
from liability a defendant's continued failure to abate long-standing contamination.
Indeed, the inadequacies of nuisance law (and other state law theories) helped inspire CERCLA's passage in 1980 to provide for the remediation of contaminated sites.8 For over two decades, CERCLA pushed
nuisance and other state law theories to the margins of private cleanup
cost litigation as the owners of contaminated property and other PRPs
voluntarily incurred cleanup costs in reliance on CERCLA cleanup cost
contribution rights. Aviall proved this reliance was misplaced. The
states should seize the opportunity created by Aviall to modernize the
law of private nuisance by eliminating anachronistic limitations that currently prevent it from playing a vital role in common cleanup cost allocation disputes.
States should not ignore this opportunity. The underlying problem
is significant: there are hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites
across the United States 9 that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars to
remediate.1 0 Voluntary cleanup of these sites is essential because state
and federal government agencies lack the resources either to directly
remediate the pollution at these sites or force private parties to clean
them up by prosecuting thousands of regulatory cleanup obligation enforcement lawsuits." Cleanup cost recovery rights are crucial to promoting voluntarily remediation 12 because at most sites more than one
PRP contributed to site contamination. 13

other PRP. They may also concern the allocation of future cleanup cost responsibilities, including
claims for (a) damages covering future cleanup costs, (b) declaratory relief allocating future cleanup
cost responsibilities, or (c) injunctive relief directing one or more PRPs to remediate contamination.
7.
See infra notes 150-360 and accompanying text.
8.
See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
9.
See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
10.
See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
11.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 42-43, 56-57. As used in this article, the phrase "voluntary cleanups" refers to remediation undertaken by a private party short of a court order, i.e., at the
party's own initiative or at the direction of a regulatory agency.
12.
See James B. Brown & Michael V. Sucaet, Environmental Cleanup Efficiency: Private
Recovery Actions for Environmental Response Costs, 7 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 363, 387 (1990) ("A

liable party is more likely to expend cleanup funds if it is reasonably certain that response costs
expended on contamination may be recovered. Moreover, a PRP armed with knowledge of legal
rights against others is more likely to initiate a prompt cleanup."); cf Andrew R. Klein, Hazardous
Waste Cleanup and Intermediate Landowners: Reexamining the Liability-Based Approach, 21
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Cleanup cost contribution is particularly important for owners of
contaminated property. Current landowners typically bear regulatory
responsibility to clean up their property, including pollution caused by
others. 14 Cleanup cost contribution rights thus can affect both the incentive of current property owners to voluntarily take the lead in site cleanup
short of government enforcement action and the fairness of cleanup cost
responsibility allocation.
This article proposes an environmental nuisance paradigm 5 that
would allow private nuisance to play a significant role in allocating the
costs of cleaning up the nation's polluted soil and groundwater. This
paradigm, if adopted by state courts or legislatures, would transform the
ancient law of nuisance to meet the realities of modem contamination
disputes in the following respects. First, it would permit private nuisance
claims against the former owners of contaminated property, not just
neighboring owners. Second, it would eliminate the antiquated doctrine
of caveat emptor as a defense to former owner nuisance liability while
continuing to allow market-related factors to affect nuisance remedies.
Third, it would revitalize the continuing nuisance doctrine by basing it on
a defendant's continued failure to abate the soil or groundwater contamination caused by the defendant. Finally, it would create a rebuttable presumption that soil and groundwater contamination constitutes a continuing nuisance by placing on any party contending that the contamination
was a permanent nuisance the burden of proving that the contamination
could not reasonably be abated.
Under this paradigm, private nuisance claims would compliment
any private cleanup cost remedies remaining under CERCLA after Aviall. The inadequacy of current state law requires a uniform federal remedy to ensure nationwide availability of contribution rights for PRPs who
voluntarily incur cleanup costs. 16 Such a CERCLA "safety net" remedy,
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 337, 346 (1997) (noting that "[j]oint and several liability, in particular, can
lead to PRPs facing exposure far out of proportion to any damage they actually caused").
13.

See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE

STUDY, 1998 UPDATE 33 ("Most hazardous substance sites have more than one potentially responsible party."); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n. 13 (1994) ("CERCLA
is designed to encourage private parties to assume financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing
them to seek recovery from others."); At. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 836 (8th
Cir. 2006) ("Contribution is crucial to CERCLA's regulatory scheme.").
For example, CERCLA section 107(a)(1) imposes response cost liability on the current
14.
owner of contaminated property even if the current owner did not cause any of the site contamination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West 2006).
15.
As used in this article, the phrase "environmental nuisance paradigm" refers to a model
framework for private nuisance claims regarding the allocation of remediation or cleanup cost responsibilities for soil or groundwater contamination of plaintiff's property.
16.
In Aronovsky, supra note 5, from which some background information in this article is
drawn, I argue that while significant litigation and remedial efficiency and flexibility interests could
be served if state law provided the primary source for rules of decision in private cleanup cost disputes (as described infra at notes 133-48 and accompanying text), a federal "safety net" cleanup cost
remedy for all PRPs is necessary because of the inconsistencies and doctrinal limitations of current
state law. Aronovsky, supra note 5 at 68-79. This article addresses how private nuisance law, as
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however, would not necessarily provide a rule of decision superior to
private nuisance law in contaminated property disputes. To the contrary,
the proposed paradigm for private nuisance law could: (a) facilitate
prompt site remediation through the presumption that the contamination
can be abated; (b) create incentives for informal cleanup cost dispute
resolution by expanding current landowner cleanup cost rights; (c) promote efficiency by permitting all contaminated property related claims
be resolved under a common body of state law; and (d) encourage flexibility by allowing PRPs to pursue technically sound, cost-effective
cleanups.1 7 The paradigm's benefits thus extend far beyond addressing
the aftermath of Aviall. At some point, the uncertainty created by Aviall
about the availability of PRP cost recovery rights under CERCLA will be
resolved by federal legislation or case law.' 8 Whether or not all PRPs
ultimately come to enjoy a federal right to cleanup cost contribution,
states should adopt the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm to
promote litigation and remedial efficiency and flexibility.
This article argues that states should adopt this proposed paradigm
by statute or case law. Part I describes the contaminated property problem facing the United States, the emergence of CERCLA in the 1980s as
the primary rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes, and the uncertain future role of federal law in contaminated property litigation after
Aviall.19 Part II evaluates current nuisance law as applied to private
cleanup cost disputes (including an analysis of its doctrinal and practical
limitations) and argues that states should seize the opportunity caused by
post-Aviall uncertainty to claim a significant role for private nuisance
law in cleanup cost disputes. Part III proposes the means to accomplish
this goal through adoption of the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm, and analyzes how the paradigm would expand cleanup cost remedies for the current owner of contaminated property, encourage prompt
and efficient site remediation, and promote the informal resolution of
cleanup cost disputes.

revitalized by adoption of the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm, could serve these efficiency and flexibility goals and offer a meaningful (if not superior) alternative to a CERCLA "safety
net" remedy for current owners of contaminated property.
17.
For example, the right to recover cleanup costs under a private nuisance theory would not
be dependent on a current landowner plaintiff proving that claimed costs were incurred in a manner
consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 el seq., (2005), a set of U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations setting forth the often costly and timeconsuming procedures required for conducting a cleanup under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B) (private party may only recover response costs that are consistent with NCP). See
infra notes 54, 63, 140-45 and accompanying text.
18.
See infra notes 88-121, 133-48 and accompanying text.
19.
As used in this article, the phrase "primary rule of decision" refers to the body of law most
frequently relied on by private parties to resolve disagreements regarding the allocation of cleanup
costs. For a discussion of the emergence of federal law as the primary rule of decision in private
cleanup cost disputes, see Aronovsky, supranote 5, at 9-35.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Scope of the Problem
Soil and groundwater contamination is an enormous national problem. 20 Estimates of the number of contaminated sites throughout the
country reach into the hundreds of thousands, 21 from seriously contaminated National Priorities List (NPL)22 sites to properties presenting relatively discrete remediation issues. All levels of government-federal,
state and local-are involved in regulating the investigation and cleanup
of contaminated sites. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is actively involved at only a small percentage of the nation's contaminated sites; 23 state and local government authorities serve
as the lead agency at the vast majority of sites. 24 It will take
decades to
remediate these sites, costing hundreds of billions of dollars.2 5

20. See Aronovsky, supranote 5, at 7-9.
21.
The EPA has estimated that approximately 77,000 contaminated sites have been discovered throughout the United States, and that approximately 217,000 additional sites across the country
will eventually be identified. EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES: MARKETS AND
TECHNOLOGY TRENDS viii (2004), available at http://www.clu-in.org/download/market/2004market.
pdf [hereinafter EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES]. The EPA estimates that there are
"more than 450,000 brownfields" in the United States. EPA, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/about.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006); accord U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT:

LOCAL

GROWTH

ISSUES-FEDERAL

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 118 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
rc00178.pdf. CERCLA section 101(39)(A) defines "brownfield" as property, "the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39)(A) (West 2006).
22. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (requiring that EPA list "national priorities among the
known or threatened releases of hazardous substances throughout the United States" and "revise the
list no less than annually"). As of October 2006, 1,243 sites were listed on the NPL, with another 61
sites proposed for addition to the NPL. See EPA, NPL Site Totals by Status and Milestone,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtn/npltotal.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
23. According to the EPA, the "vast majority" of contaminated sites will be cleaned up under
state (rather than federal) regulatory authority oversight. See EPA, State and Tribal Response Programs, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/state tribal.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (quoting S. REP.
No. 107-2 (2001)) [hereinafter EPA, State and Tribal Response Programs]; see also EPA, CLEANING
UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES, supra note 21, at viii (estimating that 90% of contaminated sites
will likely be managed under state or underground storage tank programs).
24. EPA, State and Tribal Response Programs, supra note 23; see also Richard L. Revesz,
Federalismand EnvironmentalRegulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 59698 (2001) (describing state regulatory agency role at most contaminated sites); Roger D. Schwenke,
Applying and Enforcing InstitutionalControls in the Labyrinth of EnvironmentalRequirements - Do
We Need More Than the Restatement of Servitudes to Turn Brownfields Green?, 38 REAL PROP.

PROB. & TR. J. 295, 297 (2003) ("[S]tates are responsible for the bulk of environmental enforcement
activities, including contamination detection, site remediation, and notification requirements.");
Philip Weinberg, Local Environmental Laws: Forginga New Weapon in EnvironmentalProtection,
20 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 107 (2002) (discussing use of local environmental controls to fill state
and federal regulatory gaps).
25.
See, e.g., EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES, supra note 21, at viii (estimating that 294,000 sites will need cleanup during the next three decades at a cost of $209 billion).
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At most of the nation's sites more than one PRP contributed to site
contamination.26 A site may have been contaminated by the activities of
successive owners or operators of that property. For example, several
companies may have operated businesses disposing of hazardous wastes
on a parcel of industrial property. Similarly, hundreds or thousands
waste generators may have sent hazardous substances to a landfill. At
other sites, contamination on one parcel may have been caused by the
migration (e.g., in groundwater or surface water, or through the air) of
contaminants from a neighboring parcel. An environmental regulatory
agency will often name the current owner as a respondent on a cleanup
order at multi-PRP sites, requiring the current owner to comply with
regulatory requirements, or risk administrative or judicial enforcement
proceedings as well as severe penalties for non-compliance. 27 Private
cleanup cost disputes arise when the current owner or another PRP at a
multi-PRP site incurs cleanup costs in excess of what the PRP perceives
to be its fair share, but is unable to informally obtain reimbursement or
contemporaneous cost contribution from other PRPs.
B. Private Cleanup Cost Disputes Before CERCLA
Before CERCLA was enacted in 1980, federal law did not provide a
private cleanup cost dispute remedy.2 8 Instead, state law provided the
sole rule of decision governing private disputes regarding the allocation
of responsibility for soil or groundwater contamination. 29 Four common
law theories provided the primary potential bases for private cleanup cost
claims 30 : negligence, 31 nuisance, 32 trespass, 33 and strict liability for ultrahazardous activity.34
26.
ENvTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE STUDy,
1998 UPDATE 33 ("Most hazardous substance sites have more than one potentially responsible

party.").
27.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(b)(1) (West 2006) (imposing $25,000 per day fines for noncompliance absent "sufficient cause"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing treble cost punitive
damages for failure "without sufficient cause" to "properly provide removal or remedial action upon
order of the President" under CERCLA sections 104 or 106).
28.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 9-12 (discussing legal framework of pre-CERCLA private cleanup cost disputes); see also Robert B. Mckinstry, Jr., The Role of State "Little Superfunds"
in Allocation andIndemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 86 (1994) ("Prior to 1980, no federal legislation
existed which addressed past disposals of hazardous wastes; all existing laws were directed only at
regulating current activity."); Steven T. Singer, An Analysis of Common Law and StatutoryRemedies
for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERs L.J. 117, 147 (1980) (before CERCLA, no federal statute "would support a claim for damages from toxic chemicals").
29.
See, e.g., Theodore Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy,
11 ENVTL. L. 133 (1980) (discussing common law theories potentially applicable to the Love Canal
site); Singer, supra note 28, at 122-38 (reviewing available common law theories of recovery).
30.
Cleanup cost claims (e.g., claims for breach of contract, waste, misrepresentation) also
can arise as a consequence of contractual privity. See Klein, supra note 12, at 374 ("The cause of
action that most directly protects 'vertical' landowners in hazardous waste litigation is fraud."); see
also Ronald G. Aronovsky, Liability Theories in Contaminated GroundwaterLitigation, 1 J. ENVTL.
FORENSICS 97, 111-113 (2000) (discussing common law theories).
31.
See, e.g., Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So.2d 604, 606 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
(defendants negligently permitted toxic waste to leak from disposal pits onto plaintiff's property); P.
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With growing awareness in the 1970s about the extent of the nation's soil and groundwater contamination problems, the perception grew
that existing state law could not adequately address site remediation and
the allocation of cleanup responsibilities.3 5 Tort law varied dramatically
from state to state. Moreover, for reasons equally applicable today,
common law tort theory often fit poorly with the realities of private
cleanup cost disputes. First, nuisance, trespass, and negligence all required proof of culpability, 36 while strict liability for ultra hazardous
activity required an unpredictable multi-factored analysis of whether the
defendant's activity was abnormally dangerous. 37 Second, common law
tort theories typically required proof that the defendant's conduct caused
plaintiffs damage (e.g. cleanup costs)--a potentially significant evidentiary problem at older contaminated sites. 38 Third, a range of liability
defenses could prevent recovery under common law tort theories. 39 The
Ballantine & Sons v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.J., 91 A. 95, 96 (N.J. 1914) (tar products escaping from
defendant's plant leached through soil to groundwater that migrated to plaintiffs well).
32. See, e.g., Assoc. Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 197 A.2d
569, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (escape of sulfur dust to neighboring property); Helms v.
E. Kan. Oil Co., 169 P. 208, 208-09 (Kan. 1917) (migration of refinery oil and other hazardous
materials to neighboring property).
33. See, e.g., Curry Coal Co. v. M.C. Amoni Co., 266 A.2d 678, 683 (Pa. 1970) (sludge
dumped on ground surface seeped into mine); Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403, 405-08
(Pa. 1956) (water from defendant's spraying slag pile contaminated plaintiffs underground water
supply); Elsey v. Adirondack & St. Lawrence R.R. Co., 161 N.Y.S. 391, 393 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (subsurface migration of pollutants from defendant's railroad embankment to plaintiff's property).
34. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (breach
of waste reservoir damaging public waters); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309,
314-15 (Tex. App. 1974), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975) (contaminants released into stream that
crossed plaintiff's land), abrogatedby Neely v. Cmty. Prop., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1982). See
generally Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 903, 917-18, 934 (2004)
(discussing pre-CERCLA strict liability environmental contamination cases).
35. A House of Representatives report on the CERCLA legislation concluded that: "Existing
state tort laws present a convoluted maze of requirements under which a victim is confronted with a
complex of often unreasonable requirements with regard to theories of causation, limited resources,
statutes of limitations and other roadblocks that make it extremely difficult for a victim to be compensated for damages." H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 63-64 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6140-41.
36. See infra notes 151, 153, 174 and accompanying text.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (engaging in an activity which is
abnormally dangerous subjects the actor to strict liability for harm caused to his neighbors resulting
from the abnormally dangerous character of the activity, even though the actor has exercised the
utmost care and has acted without negligence). The Restatement identifies six factors as guidelines
to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate
the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter
of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Id. § 520.
38.
See Gary Milhollin, Long-Term Liabilityfor Environmental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
6 (1979) ("Whether the theory is negligence, nuisance or strict liability, the plaintiff must prove that
it was the defendant's act which caused the harm.").
39.
These potential liability defenses included the doctrine of caveat emptor, discussed infra
at notes 222-46 and accompanying text.
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statute of limitations in particular often barred private cleanup cost
claims at many sites where contamination occurred decades ago.40 In
sum, by the end of the 1970s, the nation had begun to appreciate the
magnitude of its soil and groundwater contamination problem, and the
inadequacy of the existing state law framework for addressing the problem. In December 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, which for the next
twenty-five years provided a uniform, nationally applicable rule of decision for private cleanup cost disputes . 4 That is, until the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the Aviall case in 2004.
C. CERCLA
1. CERCLA Liability
The liability scheme established by CERCLA in 1980 dramatically
departed from state law governing cleanup cost disputes.4 2 CERCLA
liability does not req-aire proof of causation. 43 It imposes status-based,
strict, 44 and retroactive 45 liability on four categories of "covered per-

40.
See infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text. The "discovery rule" (tolling the statute
of limitations until plaintiff knows or has reason to know of her claim) may preserve otherwise timebarred claims involving older contamination problems. See, e.g., McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc.,
86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (under California law, the period of limitations runs
"without regard to whether the plaintiff is aware of the specific facts... , provided that he has a
Isuspicion of wrongdoing,' which he is charged with once he has 'notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry."' (citations omitted)).
41.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5 at 12-35 (discussing evolution of pre-Aviall PRP cleanup
cost claim case law under CERCLA).
42.
See Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 2006) (CERCLA,
enacted to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and place cleanup costs on those
responsible for contamination, "effectively transformed centuries of real property and tort liability
law by making those who contaminate a site strictly liable for the costs of subsequent cleanup by
others."); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor
HazardousSubstance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 421, 425-26 (1990) (describing
enactment of CERCLA).
43.
See, e.g., Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menosha Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 656-57 (6th
Cir. 2000). However, a defendant may show a lack of causation as part of a divisibility affirmative
defense. Id.; see also infra notes 60, 71 and accompanying text. CERCLA section 107(b) provides
a "covered person," including the current landowner who did not contribute to site contamination,
with only three affirmative defenses to liability: (1) act of God; (2) act of war; or (3) act of a third
party. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(b)(l)-(4) (West 2006). Equitable defenses (e.g., laches, estoppel) do
not bar CERCLA liability. See, e.g., W. Props. SerV. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 692-93
(9th Cir. 2004) ("[E]quitable defenses such as laches are not available as a bar to section 107(a)
liability"). CERCLA also exempts certain activities from liability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 96070)
(federally permitted releases); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(i) (federally registered pesticide discharges); 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(d) (persons acting pursuant to the NCP or following orders given by an on-site
response coordinator appointed under the NCP). In 2002, Congress added two narrow affirmative
defenses to CERCLA liability, found in sections 107(o) (de micromis generators of waste at NPL
sites before April 1, 2001) and 107(q) (certain owners or operators of properties contiguous to upgradient contamination sources).
44.
See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable ....
").
45.
See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that CERCLA liability is retroactive and that application of retroactive CERCLA liability is
constitutional), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004).
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48
47
sons:" 46 (1) the current owner and operator of contaminated property;
(2) anyone who owned or operated contaminated property when it was
polluted; 49 (3) anyone who arranged to dispose of hazardous substances
on another's property; 50 and (4) anyone who transported a hazardous
substance to the contaminated property. 5' CERCLA applies to the release or threatened release of "hazardous substances," a broadly defined
term covering a wide variety of pollutants.52 Petroleum, however, is
expressly excluded from CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substances. 53 The national contingency plan (NCP), 54 a set of EPA regulato a release of hazardous
tions, sets forth the procedure
55 for responding
CERCLA.
under
substances

2. Cost Recovery
CERCLA provides regulatory agencies with several enforcement
remedies. EPA may issue a unilateral administrative order requiring a
PRP (i.e., a CERCLA covered person 56) to undertake specific remedia46.
CERCLA section 107(a)(l)-(4) identifies the four categories of covered persons. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(l)-(4).
CERCLA defines the "owner or operator" of a facility as "any person owning or operating
47.
such facility," excluding "a person who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the . . . facility."
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
48.
Section 107(a)(1) imposes liability on the current owner or operator of a "facility." 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1). Section 101(9)(B) broadly defines "facility" to include "any site or area
where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of or placed, or otherwise come to
be located [except] any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel." 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(9)(B). Liability under section 107(a)(1) applies to a current owner of contaminated property
without regard to whether the current owner caused any site contamination. 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601(9)(B), 9607(a)(1).
49.
Section 107(a)(2) imposes liability on "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2). Section 101(21) defines "person" to include "an individual,
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United
States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21). Section 101(29) incorporates the definition of"disposal" used
in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(3) (West 2006), which provides that: "[t]he term 'disposal' means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking,
or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste
or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(29).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3). Courts have expansively interpreted the scope of "arranger"
liability to include such persons as those who arrange to dispose of hazardous substances at landfills,
toll formulators, and persons who send material containing hazardous substances to recyclers with
the knowledge that some of the material will not be returned. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 13
n.48.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4).
51.
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14)
53.
Id.
54. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. pt.
300 (2005).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9605. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (the purpose of NCP is "to provide the organ55.
izational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases
of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants").
56. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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tion tasks.57 The government may also conduct the cleanup itself, and
then sue under section 107(a), CERCLA's direct cost recovery provision,
to recover its costs of responding to the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances (response costs). 59 Under section 107(a)(4)(A), a
PRP is jointly and severally liable 60 for "all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan., 61 Section
107(a)(4)(B) permits a private party who incurs response costs to bring a
cost recovery action, providing that PRPs are liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any otherperson consistent with the
national contingency plan." 63

57.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a).
58.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1).
59.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA refers to cleanup costs incurred in response to
the release or threatened release of hazardous substances as "response costs." See 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(25) (defining "response"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (referring to "costs of response").
60.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA is silent regarding the scope of response cost
liability. By the mid-1980s, courts generally concluded that liability to the government under
CERCLA section 107(a) was joint and several. See John M. Hyson, "Fairness" and Joint and
Several Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 21 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV.
137, 150-60 (1997) (discussing evolution of CERCLA joint and several liability case law). The
courts similarly came to hold that liability under section 107(a) for costs incurred by private parties
was joint and several. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1998)
(explaining section 107(a)(4)(B) claim imposes joint and several liability at sites with indivisible
harm); Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining section 107(a)(4)(B) claim imposes joint and several liability and may be maintained by current
landowner who did not add contamination to site).
61.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Defendants can argue as an affirmative defense that liability should be apportioned severally if the harm at the contaminated site is divisible. See, e.g., United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270-71 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining several liability
appropriate if PRP proves divisibility and reasonable basis for apportionment).
62.
Claims for personal injury or property damages caused by hazardous substance contamination are not available under CERCLA. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285 (D. Del. 1987) ("Congress in enacting CERCLA clearly manifested an intent not to provide compensation for economic losses or for personal injury resulting
from the release of hazardous substances.").
63.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The phrase "any other person" refers to
persons other than the United States, States, or Indian tribes who have a right of cost recovery under
section 107(a)(4)(A). Post-Aviall decisions have disagreed about whether the term "other" in the
phrase "any other person" also excludes PRPs, i.e., "covered persons" falling within the categories
of liable parties set forth in § 9607(a)(l)-(4). Compare, e.g., Atd. Research, 459 F.3d 827 at 835-36.
("'any other person' means any person other than the statutorily enumerated 'United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe."' (citation omitted)), and Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423
F.3d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a PRP who voluntarily incurred cleanup costs could
state a section 107(a)(4)(B) direct cost recovery claim, reasoning that it would be inappropriate to
impose an "innocence" condition on the "any other person" language of section 107(a)(4)(B)), with
Aviall Servs., Inc., v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-1926-D, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at
*21-25 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006) (granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment following remand from U.S. Supreme Court, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a section
107(a)(4)(B) claim and reasoning after "examining CERCLA holistically" that the phrase "any other
person" in section 107(a)(4)(B) refers to any person other than section 107(a)(l)-(4) covered persons
as well as section 107(a)(4)(A) entities). See also Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 82, n.350.

2006]

BACK FROM THE MARGINS

407

3. The Section 107 / Section 113 Conundrum
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 64 The SARA amendments included two express CERCLA contribution provisions: (1) section 113(f)(1), which
provides that any person may seek contribution during or after an EPA
administrative order judicial enforcement action 65 or cost recovery action,66 and (2) section 1 13(f)(3)(B), which provides that any person may
seek contribution after settling its CERCLA liability with the government. 67 Section 113(0 was intended to "clarify" and "confirm"
CERCLA contribution rights. 68 Section 113(0 did not, however, expressly address the most common CERCLA "contribution" plaintiff: a
current landowner (or other PRP) who voluntarily incurs cleanup costs
but has neither been sued in an EPA judicial enforcement action or cost
69
recovery
ment.70 action, nor settled its CERCLA liabilities with the govern-

64.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
65.
CERCLA section 106 authorizes the federal government to (a) issue unilateral administrative orders directing parties to investigate and remediate site contamination and (b) initiate a judicial
enforcement action in the event of non-compliance. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606. Few private plaintiffs
would have contribution rights triggered by a section 106 action. Section 106 actions may only be
brought by the federal government, which is actively involved at only a handful of the nation's
contaminated sites. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Larry Schnapf, Impact of
Aviall on Real Estate and Corporate Transactions, 20 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 607, 610 (2005)
("[S]tates bring over 70 percent of enforcement actions and the vast majority of contaminated sites
are remediated under [state Superfund] programs .. "). Even at sites where the EPA plays an
active role, there would be no reason to initiate a section 106 action unless a PRP was not in compliance with a section 106 administrative order or otherwise was not adequately responding to site
contamination.
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1). Section 113(0(1) provides that:
[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title [EPA administrative order enforcement action] or under section 9607(a)
[cost recovery action] of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this
section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law.
In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1).
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2)-(3). Section 113(0(2) contemplates a settlement by a "person
who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State " while section 113(f)(3)(B) allows the
settling PRP to pursue CERCLA contribution against non-settling PRPs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2)(3).
68. S. REP. No. 99-11, at 4 (1985) (objective of proposed new contribution provision was to
"clariq[y] and confirm[] the right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek
contribution from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a
share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances");
H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 79 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861.
69.
A PRP, rather than a government agency or non-PRP private party, usually takes the lead
in site cleanup; accordingly, a PRP seeking contribution likely would not first have been sued for
cost recovery under section 107(a). A PRP may be sued under section 107(a) by a non-PRP (1) in
the rare circumstance where an "innocent" private party incurs cleanup costs, 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B); cf City of Bangor v. Citizens Comm'ns Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 222-23 (D. Me.
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This statutory interpretation issue, however, did not appear to trouble the courts or PRPs. After the SARA amendments, the issue before
the courts was not whether a PRP could recover cleanup costs from other
PRPs. Rather, litigation arose across the country about which provision
of CERCLA provided the basis for such an action-the direct cost recovery provision of section 107(a)(4)(B) or the contribution provisions
of section 113(f)(1). 71 By the time the Supreme Court decided Aviall in
December 2004, each court of appeals to have addressed this section 107
/ section 113 conundrum had held that a plaintiff who was a liable party
under CERCLA could not bring a direct action for cost recovery under
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).72 These courts assumed, expressly or
2006) (holding that a PRP may bring a section 107(a) action and noting that "it is hard to imagine
many cases in which purely 'innocent parties' would ever be motivated to initiate an action under
section 107"); or (2) where a government agency seeks to recover its direct cleanup costs or its costs
of overseeing a private cleanup. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A); United States v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 179 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc) (federal government oversight costs
recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(A)).
70.
The last sentence of section 113(0(1) provides that "[n]othing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under [sections 106 or 107(a)]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1). CERCLA and its legislative history,
however, say nothing about what "contribution" rights (e.g., direct or implied contribution rights
under CERCLA section 107(a), state contribution law contribution rights) were left "undiminished"
by section 113(0(1).
71.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 24-33 (discussing the section 107/section 113 conundrum). This issue mattered to CERCLA defendants, who argued that claims by one CERCLA-liable
party against another sounded in contribution and thus should be brought under section 113(0(1).
They reasoned it would be unfair for a liable plaintiff to impose a joint and several liability direct
cost recovery section 107(a) claim, see supra note 60, which would place on defendants (a) the
burden of showing the divisibility of environmental harm caused by the defendant's conduct, see,
e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 & n.4
(4th Cir. 1998) (instructing district court under section 113(f) to allocate costs according to appropriate equitable factors but, unlike a joint and several liability action under section 107(a), not to impose a divisibility of harm allocation burden on defendants); and (b) the risk of any "orphan shares"
of liability. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 24-26. An "orphan share" is the equitable share of
cleanup cost liability attributable to a PRP that is unable to pay, such as a PRP who cannot be located or who is insolvent, deceased or bankrupt. See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a PRP cannot assert a joint and several
section 107(a) claim against other PRPs, because "those defendant-PRPs would end up absorbing all
of the cost attributable to 'orphan shares'-those shares attributable to PRPs who either are insolvent
or cannot be located or identified").
72.
As of December 2004, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each had held that a PRP could not bring a section 107(a) cost recovery
action against another PRP, and that a PRP seeking to recover cleanup costs from another PRP under
CERCLA was limited to a contribution action for several liability under section 113(f). See, e.g.,
United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100-01 (1st Cir. 1994); Bedford
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1998); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,
111 F.3d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1997); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R.
Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153
F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 123940 (7th Cir. 1997) (section 107(a) action also available to current landowner PRP who did not contribute to site contamination; all other PRPs limited to section 113(f) contribution action); Dico, Inc.
v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118
F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995); Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit's three-judge panel in Aviall concluded that "a PRP cannot file a section 107(a) suit against
another PRP; it must pursue a contribution action instead." Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc.,
263 F.3d 134, 137 (5thCir. 2001), reh'g en banc, 312 F.3d 677 (2002), rev'd, 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
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implicitly, that the PRP plaintiff instead could and should sue for contribution under section 113(f). 73 As a result, a current owner of contaminated property or other PRP who had taken the lead cleaning up a multiPRP site typically filed a section 113(0(1) cleanup cost contribution action, and CERCLA contribution law became the primary rule of decision
in private cleanup cost disputes.7 4 Owners of contaminated property,
other PRPs, and government agencies alike came to rely on the nationwide availability of a CERCLA cleanup cost remedy. 75 CERCLA contribution rights provided an incentive for PRPs to voluntarily comply
with regulatory agency cleanup orders. Similarly, businesses factored
the potential for obtaining cleanup costs from PRPs in deciding whether
to acquire or develop brownfield or other real property that was or might
be contaminated.76 All this was changed when the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Aviall.

This decision was supplanted by the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Aviall that ultimately was
reversed by the Supreme Court. Id.;
see also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("When one liable party sues another to recover its equitable share of response costs, the
action is one for contribution, which is specifically recognized under CERCLA" (citing section
113(0). But see OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1582 n.l (5th
Cir. 1997) ("We express no opinion ... whether a PRP may seek to hold other parties jointly and
severally liable under section 107(a) for response costs."); Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at
*11-14 (granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment following remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a section 107(a)(4)(B) claim, reasoning that the
Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Aviall was not binding on the district courts after the U.S. Supreme Court's Aviall decision so that in light of OHM no binding Fifth Circuit decision had yet
addressed whether a PRP could bring a section 107(a) action against another PRP).
73.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 26-35. These courts implicitly or explicitly assumed that
a section 113(0(1) contribution would be available to a PRP, regardless of whether the PRP first had
been sued under CERCLA section 106 or 107(a) or had settled its CERCLA liabilities with the
government. See, e.g., Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 832-33 (describing as judicial "[t]raffic-directing"
the pre-Aviall cases that limited PRPs to a section 113(f) contribution action, noting that "[i]n the
pre-Aviall analysis, section 113 was presumed to be available to all liable parties including those
which had not faced a CERCLA action"); City of Waukesha v. Viacom, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 975,
979 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (explaining absence of reported decisions on the section 113(0(1) standing
issue may reflect the common understanding among the bench and bar that such an action was
available to any PRP); Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (permitting PRP plaintiff to proceed with section 107(a) action and noting that "the Ninth
Circuit's pre-Aviall precedents assumed a cost recovery suit was not a prerequisite for a § 113(0
contribution action").
74. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 33-35. Sometimes plaintiffs would join state law claims
to fill gaps in the CERCLA statutory framework. For example, state law cleanup cost claims might
be asserted under an alternative state law liability scheme or to provide a vehicle for recovering
petroleum remediation or other cleanup costs that could not be recovered under CERCLA. See, e.g.,
William W. Watts, Common Law Remedies in Alabama for Contamination of Land, 29 CUMB. L.
REv. 37, 39 (1999) (describing use of common law theories for cost claims regarding Alabama sites
as alternative to CERCLA); Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental
Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 31, 37-42, 63-82 (1987) (describing California
common law and statutory theories potentially applicable to landowners). Similarly, claims for
property damage (e.g., diminution in value, stigma, lost use of property) or personal injury could not
be asserted under CERCLA and thus could only be brought under state tort law.
75.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 33-36.
76. See id. at 54 n.248.
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4. The Aviall Decision
Aviall Services, Inc., the buyer of contaminated properties from
Cooper Industries, Inc., brought a section 113(f) contribution claim
against Cooper to recover costs Aviall incurred after it was directed by a
state regulatory agency to clean up contamination to which both companies contributed.77 In December 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
section 113(f) permitted a PRP to bring a contribution action only if (1)

the PRP plaintiff had first been sued by the federal government under
CERCLA section 106 to enforce a CERCLA administrative order, or by

a government or private party under CERCLA section 107(a) for cost
recovery; or (2) the PRP plaintiff had first settled her CERCLA liability
with the government.78 Because Aviall had neither been sued under
CERCLA nor settled with the government, the Court held that Aviall
could not maintain a section 113(f) contribution action.79
The Court, however, did not go so far as to hold that Aviall was
barred from stating any response cost claim under CERCLA. Aviall had

urged the Court in the alternative to find that Aviall could state a direct
cost recovery claim under section 107(a)(4)(B) as "any other person"
80 The Court chose not to decide the issue, 81
incurring response costs.
and instead remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to address whether
Aviall had waived any section 107(a)(4)(B) claim 82 and, if not, whether a
PRP could assert a direct cost recovery claim under section
107(a)(4)(B).8 3
77.
Aviall, 543 U.S. at 163-64. For a detailed discussion of the Aviall litigation, see
Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 35-49.
78.
Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167-68. In 2000, the District Court had granted Cooper's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the first sentence of section 113(0(1) limited contribution claims to
plaintiffs (unlike Aviall) who had been first been sued under sections 106 or 107(a). Aviall Servs.
Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.397CV1926D, 2000 WL 31730, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13,
2000). The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Aviall's state law claims. Id. at
*5. In 2001, a divided three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
Aviall, 263 F.3d at 134. Rehearing the case en banc in 2002, the Fifth Circuit by a 10-3 vote reversed the district court's decision. Aviall, 312 F.3d at 677 (en banc).
79.
A viall, 543 U.S. at 171.
80.
Id. at 168.
81.
Id. at 168-70. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg argued
that the Court should have proceeded to decide whether Aviall as a PRP could state a claim under
section 107(a)(4)(B). Id. at 170, 173-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82.
The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that no such waiver had occurred and remanded
the case to the District Court for further proceedings. See infranote 88.
83.
Aviall, 543 U.S. at 168-70. The Court noted that among the issues that might be considered on remand was whether Aviall "may pursue a section 107 cost recovery action for some form of
liability other than joint and several." Id. at 169-70. The Court also declined to decide whether
Aviall had an implied right to contribution under section 107(a) or federal common law. Id. at 17071. On February 15, 2005, the Fifth Circuit ordered the case remanded to the district court with
instructions to permit Aviall to amend its complaint to assert a section 107(a) claim without prejudice to Cooper's defense that such an amendment would fail to state a claim for which relief may be
granted. Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at *7-8. On August 8, 2006, the district court
granted Cooper's motion for summary judgment, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a
direct section 107(a)(4)(B) claim because the phrase "any other person" in section 107(a)(4)(B)
referred to persons other than section 107(a)(l)-(4) covered persons as well as section 107(a)(4)(B)
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Aviall caused a sea change in contaminated property law. It upset
years of reliance by the regulated community that a PRP could always
obtain cleanup cost contribution under CERCLA. 84 It created widespread uncertainty about the availability of federal cleanup cost recovery
rights by leaving unresolved whether the lower federal courts in their
pre-Aviall decisions had correctly barred PRPs from bringing direct cost
recovery actions.85 Aviall also effectively extended an invitation, which
this article accepts, to evaluate how state law may enter center stage in
private cleanup cost disputes by overcoming the current inconsistencies
and doctrinal limitations of common law tort theory.
D. The Aftermath of Aviall
Was the Aviall decision a reasonable interpretation of a muddled
statute? Perhaps. Should the bench, bar, and regulatory agencies have
assumed for nearly twenty years that it was beyond peradventure that a
PRP who had not first been sued under CERCLA could bring a section
113(0(1) contribution action? Perhaps not. Nevertheless, the Aviall
decision stunned environmental cleanup cost dispute stakeholders-they
simply did not see it coming.86
1. Uncertain Future of PRP Contribution Claims
By declining to decide whether a PRP could maintain a section
107(a)(4)(B) action, the Supreme Court created profound uncertainty
about whether most PRPs could recover from other PRPs their fair share
of cleanup costs under CERCLA. Every court of appeals to have addressed the issue before Aviall had held that a PRP could not maintain a
section 107(a)(4)(B) action-but did so under the express or implied
assumption that the PRP instead could bring a section 113(f) contribution
action. 87
Following Aviall, federal courts across the country began to grapple
with whether appellate decisions barring section 107(a)(4)(B) claims by
PRPs retained their precedential value after Aviall. Some district courts
(including the district court upon remand in Aviall) relied on pre-Aviall
case law to hold that a PRP could not recover costs under section

governmental and Indian tribe plaintiffs, id. at *24, 29, and that there was no implied contribution
right under section 107(a)(4)(B), id. at *36.
84. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 523 (3d Cir. 2006)
(noting the "understanding at the time [before the Aviall decision was that] ... a PRP that voluntarily cleaned up a contaminated site sua sponte could seek contribution from other PRPs without
waiting for an enforcement action, a Government or innocent landowner cost recovery suit, or a
settlement of liability. [I] In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court significantly altered this understanding."); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
85.
See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
86.
See supranote 72; see also Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 33-58.
87.
See Aronovsky, supranote 5, at 50-54.
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107(a)(4)(B). 8 Other district courts after Aviall held that a PRP could
assert a direct 89 or implied9" claim under CERCLA section 107(a), or
permitted amended pleadings adding a section 107(a) claim pending
guidance from its circuit court of appeals. 91 The United States government, which had filed an amicus curiae brief in Aviall arguing that a PRP
who had not first been sued under CERCLA was barred from bringing a
section 113(f)(1) contribution action, 92 contended in CERCLA cases

88.
See, e.g., Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at *24, 29, 36 (granting Cooper's motion
for summary judgment following remand by U.S. Supreme Court based on the "plain meaning" of
the statute and pre-Aviall case law); Amcal Multi-Housing, Inc. v. Pacific Clay Products, No.
EDCV-06-280-SGL, 2006 WL 3016326, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that a PRP "cannot bring a free-standing section 107 implied contribution claim [in light of pre-Aviall Ninth Circuit
precedent], and cannot bring a section 107 cost recovery claim as it has failed to allege sufficient
facts to bring it within one of the statutorily defined defenses to PRP designation status."); ITT
Indus. v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-674, 2006 WL 2460793, at *3-5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 23,
2006) (granting motion to dismiss because Aviall did not undermine prior Sixth Circuit precedent
barring PRPs from bringing section 107(a) actions); Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. Gaffey, No. H06-1125, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss a PRP's section 107(a) claim because "under the prevailing law at this time [plaintiff] as a PRP
does not have a viable claim for cost recovery under § 107(a) of CERCLA"); Spectrum Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Universal Coops., Inc., Civ. No. 04-99 (MJD/AJB), 2006 WL 2033377, at *5 (D. Minn.
July 17, 2006) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment based on pre-Aviall Eighth
Circuit precedent that a PRP is barred from asserting a section 107(a) claim). See also Aronovsky,
supra note 5, at 51 n.244 (identifying pre-May 2006 cases holding that, notwithstanding Aviall,
PRPs could not recover response costs under section 107(a)).
89. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. FV Steel & Wire Co., Nos. 05C1355, 05C1356, 2006 WL
2724049, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2006) (reversing bankruptcy court ruling that PRP claimants
could not assert section 107(a) claims against bankruptcy estate); City of Martinsville v. Masterwear
Corp., No. 1:04-cv-1994-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2710628, at *2, 3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2006) (holding
current landowner could maintain section 107(a) claim under Seventh Circuit's "innocent landowner
exception," discussed in Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 30-33, permitting section 107(a) claims by
landowners who did not contribute to site contamination); City of Bangor v. Citizens Comm'ns Co.,
437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 222-23 (D.Me.2006) (holding that a PRP may bring a section 107(a) action and
noting that "it is hard to imagine many cases in which purely 'innocent parties' would ever be motivated to initiate an action under section 107."); see also Aronovsky, supranote 5, at 52 n.245 (identifying pre-May 2006 cases holding that, after Aviall, PRPs could recover costs under section
107(a)).
90.
See, e.g., Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141-1151 (D.
Kan. 2006) (holding that a PRP who incurred cleanup costs pursuant to an administrative order on
consent should recover those costs under section 113(f)(3)(B), and as to other cleanup costs a PRP
who cannot state a claim under section 113(f) nonetheless has an implied contribution claim under
section 107(a)); Aggio v. Aggio, No. C 04-4357 PJH, 2005 WL 2277037, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2005) (holding that PRP has an implied right of contribution under section 107(a)).
91.
See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 01-CV-2201, 2005 WL 548266,
*4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2005) (dismissing plaintiff PRP's section 113(f)(1) claim in light of Aviall but
granting leave to amend complaint to add section 107(a) claim because defendant would suffer no
prejudice until Third Circuit decided whether to revisit holding in New Castle County v. Haliburton
NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir. 1997), that a PRP may not bring a section 107(a) cost
recovery action).
92.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 43-45. The United States is itself a PRP facing claims by
PRPs at sites across the country for billions of dollars in cleanup costs. Id. at 44. Aviall had argued
to the Supreme Court that the federal government in its capacity as a multi-site PRP could avoid
paying its fair share of cleanup costs at sites nationwide if PRPs could not sue the United States or
other PRPs for cost recovery under section 107(a) or contribution under section 113(f). Id. at 44
n.212. See also infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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across the country (both as a defendant and as amicus
curiae) that PRPs
93
could not recover cleanup costs under section 107(a).
The issue remained muddled as courts of appeals began to weigh in
on the debate and conflicts arose among the circuits. The Second Circuit, the first court of appeals after Aviall to address the issue, chose to
evaluate PRP section 107(a) claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on
94
whether the PRP plaintiff "voluntarily" incurred claimed cleanup costs.
In ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. UGI Utilities,95 the Second Circuit held
that a PRP who incurred cleanup costs before entering into a voluntary
cleanup agreement with a state agency-without first having been sued,
allocated response costs by a court, or made to participate in an administrative proceeding-could bring a section 107(a)(4)(B) action. 96 Shortly
thereafter, in Schaefer v. Town of Victor,9 7 the Second Circuit held that a
contaminated landfill owner could assert a CERCLA section 107(a)
claim 98 against defendants who disposed of waste at the landfill even
93.
See, e.g., Brief of Appellee United States of America, At. Research Corp. v. United
States, No. 05-3152, 2005 WL 3568541 (8th Cir. Dec. 5, 2005) (argument by appellee United States
that district court properly dismissed CERCLA claims of PRP plaintiff under sections 107(a) and
113(0); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater
Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing and Coatings, Inc., No. 05-3299, 2006 WL 1354188 (7th Cir. May
1, 2006) (brief of Department of Justice and Environmental Protection Agency arguing, in light of a
"reexamination" of government's position after Aviall, a PRP cannot bring a section 107(a)(4)(B)
claim because (1) the phrase "any other person" in section 107(a)(4)(B) refers to persons other than
section 107(a) "covered persons" as well as state, federal and tribal governments referenced in
section 107(a)(4)(A); (2) section 113(0 provides the exclusive authorization for CERCLA contribution claims; and (3) there should be no exception permitting current landowners who did not contribute to site contamination to assert section 107(a)(4)(B) claims); Brief for the Federal Appellees,
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, No. 04-2096 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2005) (PRP could
not assert a cleanup cost contribution claim against the government pursuant to section 107(a) because (1) a cleanup cost claim by a PRP is necessarily a contribution claim, id. at 24-26; (2) section
107(a)(4)(B) standing alone does not provide an express right to contribution, id. at 27-28, 48-50;
(3) there is no implied right to a contribution under section 107(a)(4)(B), id. at 28-47; and (4) the
federal government's sovereign immunity bars any federal common law cleanup cost contribution
claim against it, id. at 51-52); see also Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 836-37 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that PRP may assert section 107(a) claim against the United States, noting that a contrary ruling
would result "in an absurd and unjust outcome" because "the government could insulate itself from
responsibility for its own pollution by simply declining to bring a CERCLA cleanup action or refusing a liable party's offer to settle"). But see E. 1. DuPont de Nemours and Company v. United
States, 460 F.3d 515, 541 n. 31 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that PRP DuPont may not bring section
107(a) action against the United States despite argument that such a ruling could allow the federal
government to avoid contribution liability at sites where it is a PRP, observing that "DuPont does
not, however, provide evidence that the EPA actually uses its enforcement discretion to avoid subjecting other federal agencies to potential liability in a later contribution suit").
94. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 100-02 (2d Cir. 2005).
95. 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
96. Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100-02. The court found it inappropriate to impose an "innocence" condition on the "any other person" language of section 107(a)(4)(B). Id. at 99. The court
distinguished its pre-Aviall decision in Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that a CERCLA claim by a PRP who had entered into CERCLA consent decrees was "a
quintessential claim for contribution" which could be brought only under section 113(f)), on the
ground that the Bedford Affiliates plaintiff had incurred response costs only after having entered into
a consent decree). Id. at 100-03.
97.
457 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2006).
98.
Schaefer, 457 F.3d at 201-02. The court went on to hold, however, that Schaefer's
CERCLA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 210.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

though the owner had entered into a series of consent orders regarding
his site. 99 The court reasoned that because the owner had started incurring response costs before entering into the consent orders, his response
solely due to a court or administrative order imcosts were not 1incurred
00
liability.
posing
The Eighth Circuit took a different approach by directly addressing
0'
the section 107(a) issue in Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States.
The district court had granted the United States' motion to dismiss Atlantic's section 107(a) claim based on Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 10 2 a pre-

Aviall Eighth Circuit decision holding that a PRP could not bring an action under section 107(a).10 3 The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding
that Dico's "analytic is undermined by Avialrl°"4 and holding that a PRP
who voluntarily incurred cleanup costs for which it may be05held liable
may bring a direct cost recovery action under section 107(a). 1
The Third Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in E. I. DuPont
de Nemours and Company v. United States.10 6 DuPont voluntarily undertook to clean up a site it owned in New Jersey that formerly had been

99.
Id. at 192.
100.
Id. at 201-02. By drawing such fine distinctions, the Second Circuit created new uncertainty regarding PRP cleanup cost claims. After ConsolidatedEdison and Schaefer, district courts in
the Second Circuit wrestled with whether a PRP incurred response costs in a sufficiently "voluntary"
manner to permit their recovery under a section 107(a) claim. Compare, e.g., Seneca Meadows, Inc.
v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 284-88 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a PRP who
incurred cleanup costs in connection with consent order with state agency could assert a several
liability section 107(a)(4)(B) claim because the PRP had not been sued, admitted liability or fault, or
been threatened with an imminent judicial or administrative liability finding), and City of New York
v. N.Y. Cross Harbor R.R. Terminal Corp., No. 98CV7227ARRRML, 2006 WL 140555, at *4 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006) (holding that although plaintiff if sued, would be held liable under section
107(a), it could maintain a section 107(a) claim because it conducted a voluntary investigation and
cleanup without first having been sued or made to participate in an administrative proceeding), with
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 398 at 402-04 (N.D.N.Y.
2006) (dismissing section 107(a) claim because costs were incurred pursuant to consent orders, and
dismissing section 113(f) claim because consent orders did not constitute settlements triggering
contribution rights under section 113(f)(3)(B)).
101.
459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
102.
340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003); see also supranote 72.
103.
At. Research, 459 F.3d at 830.
104.
Id.
105.
Id. at 836-37. The court concluded that the phrase "any other person" in section
107(a)(4)(B) meant any person other than the statutorily enumerated United States, States, or Indian
tribes referenced in section 107(a)(4)(A), and that pre-Aviall restrictions of section 107(a)(4)(B) to
"innocent" plaintiffs represented nothing more than judicial "traffic directing" light of the pre-Aviall
analysis that "§ 113 was presumed to be available to all liable parties, including those which had not
faced a CERCLA action." Id. at 832. The court noted that section 107(a)(4)(B) does not compel full
recovery of response costs incurred by a PRP plaintiff, observing that "CERCLA, itself, checks
overreaching liable parties: If a plaintiff attempted to use § 107 to recover more than its fair share of
reimbursement, a defendant would be free to counterclaim for contribution under § 113(f)." Id. at
835. The court also held that "a right to contribution may be fairly implied from the text of section
107(a)(4)(B)," id. at 835, stating that "[c]ontribution is crucial to CERCLA's regulatory scheme."
Id. at 836. In light of these holdings, the court did not address Atlantic's argument that it had an
implied right to contribution as a matter of federal common law. Id. at 836 n.9.
106.
460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006); see also supranote 93 and accompanying text.
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owned and allegedly contaminated by the United States. 1°7 DuPont
08
brought a CERCLA response cost action against the United States.'
The Third Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 vote the district court's order granting the United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings on DuPont's
CERCLA claims. 109 The Third Circuit concluded that Aviall did not give
it cause to reconsider its pre-Aviall precedents holding that a PRP could
only seek contribution under section 113(f),110 reasoning further that
CERCLA's settlement scheme was inconsistent with an interpretation of
section 107(a)(4)(B) that would permit direct cost recovery actions by
PRPs.111 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that DuPont, as a PRP,
could not bring a section 107(a) cost recovery action and that, because
DuPont had neither settled its CERCLA liabilities with the government
nor been sued under CERCLA, DuPont also
could not bring a section
2
113(f) contribution claim in light of Aviall. 1
Similarly, both the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits indicated in postAviall decisions that they would not permit a PRP to bring a section
107(a) claim. The Fifth Circuit in Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal
States Petroleum Co. 3 baldly stated in dicta that a PRP could not bring
a section 107(a) claim.1 14 In Elementis, the court held that a district
court erred by imposing joint and several contribution liability on thirdparty defendants in a CERCLA contribution action. 115 In reaching this
decision, the court cited a pre-Aviall Eleventh Circuit decision' 16 for the
proposition that "when one liable party sues another liable party under
CERCLA, the action is not a cost recovery action under '§ 107(a), and the
imposition of joint and several liability is inappropriate." 17
107.
DuPont,460 F.3d at 525.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 543-44.
110. In dissent, Judge Sloviter contended that Aviall "clearly undermined" the Third Circuit's
pre-Aviall precendents barring section 107(a) claims by PRPs because those decisions assumed that
all PRPs could assert a section 113(f) contribution action. Id. at 546-47. Noting that "[tihere is
nothing in the relevant language of § 107 that compels the result the majority reaches," id. at 546,
the dissent concluded that "permitting parties who voluntarily incur cleanup costs to bring suit under
§ 107 comports with the fundamental purposes of CERCLA," id at 548, because "[v]oluntary cleanups are vital to fulfilling CERCLA's purpose." Id. at 549.
111.
Id. at 541.
112.
Id. at 543-44.
113.
450 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2006).
114.
Elementis, 450 F.3d at 612-13.
115.
Id. at 613.
116.
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1996).
117.
Elementis, 450 F.3d at 613 quoting Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1513). Elementis did
not decide whether a PRP could sue for cost recovery under section 107(a), nor did it even reference
Aviall. See Ad. Research, 459 F.3d at 834 n.7 (dismissing Elementis language as an "isolated quotation" regarding an issue that the Fifth Circuit was not asked to decide); Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55040, at *14 (granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment following remand from U.S.
Supreme Court, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a section 107(a)(4)(B) claim, but
observing that Elementis "did not squarely decide whether a private PRP can bring a cost recovery
action against another PRP under § 107(a)"). Nevertheless, this passing sentence in the Elementis
opinion underscored post-Aviall uncertainty about PRP cleanup cost rights. For example, the Third
Circuit in DuPont,460 F.3d at 542 n.32, in the course of holding that a PRP may not bring a section
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In Young v. United States," 8 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the
plaintiffs' section 107(a) claim. The district court reasoned that the

plaintiffs could not maintain a section 107(a) claim because they were
PRPs. 119 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' claimed

response costs were unnecessary and not consistent with the NCP.120 As
a result, the court observed that it did not need to "determine whether
Plaintiffs are PRPs under section 107(a) and thus unable to assert a costrecovery claim under the rule in this Circuit that a Plaintiff-PRP must
proceed under the contribution provisions of CERCLA section 113(f)
when the Plaintiff-PRP sues another PRP for response costs.' l2 1
In
short, after Aviall the availability of PRP cleanup cost rights under
CERCLA likely will remain uncertain until the Supreme Court or Congress resolves the issue.
2. Impact on Voluntary Cleanups
The uncertainty Aviall created presented a series of stark choices to
owners of contaminated property (as well as other PRPs) faced with
agency remediation directives. 22 The landowner could cooperate by

voluntarily (i.e., short of judicial enforcement action) complying with a
regulatory cleanup directive. A landowner conducting a voluntary
cleanup, however, risks incurring cleanup costs without a well-settled

107(a) action, cited Elementis for the proposition that "at least one other Circuit Court has agreed
with our interpretation of § 107(a)... " The district court in Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. Gaffey,
No. H-06-1125, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), granted defendant's motion to
dismiss a PRP's section 107(a) claim, relying in part on the "May 2006 statement of the Fifth Circuit
in Elementis" to conclude that "under the prevailing law at this time [plaintiff] as a PRP does not
have a viable claim for cost recovery under § 107(a) of CERCLA." Defendants in other cases also
pointed to Elementis as evidence of a circuit split regarding the availability of a section 107(a) claim
for a PRP plaintiff. For example, Elementis was cited by the United States in Atl. Research, 459
F.3d at 834 n.7 as support for the proposition that a PRP may not maintain a section 107(a) action,
and by UGI Industries, Inc. (the defendant in ConsolidatedEdison) in connection with its petition to
the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as evidence of a circuit split requiring the Court to
decide whether a PRP could assert a section 107(a) claim. Reply Brief of Petitioner UGI Utilities,
Inc. on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at
4, UTI Utilities, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 05-1323, 2006 WL 1621796, at
*4 (U.S. June 12, 2006) ("The Fifth Circuit now also has ruled that, contrary to the decision below,
PRPs have no §107(a) cost recovery claim, but PRPs continue to litigate that issue across the Nation."); see also David Ledbetter, Kathy Robb, Andrew Skroback, Cooper Industries v. Aviall: The
Aftermath, 26 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP. 5 n.9 (July 14, 2006) ("Elementis Chromium cannot be
reasonably read as foreshadowing of how the 5th Circuit will rule if it revisits the Section 107 issue.
Frenzied parsing and speculation concerning this language say much, however, about the huge
stakes in play concerning the Section 107 issue.").
118.
394 F.3d 858 (10th Cir. 2005).
119.
Young, 394 F.3d at 860.
120. Id. at 863.
121.
Id. at 862. See Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp.2d 1136, 1145 (D.
Kan. 2006) (quoting the statement from Young that "a PRP is unable to assert a cost recovery claim
"); Columbus McKinnon, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4 (citing Young for the proposition that the Tenth
Circuit after Aviall "implicitly recognized that the law in that circuit remained that a PRP could not
maintain a § 107 claim").
122. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 50-57.

2006]

BACK FROM THE MARGINS

CERCLA right to recover from other PRPs their fair share of cleanup
costs. 123 In the alternative, the landowner could refuse to comply with
agency directives and instead require the agency to initiate a judicial
enforcement action. 124 Such a strategy could result in a CERCLA lawsuit that would trigger section 113(f)(1) contribution rights. On the other
hand, this strategy could also reduce the landowner's negotiation power
with the agency, generate substantial litigation costs, expose the landowner to potentially severe penalties for non-compliance with agency
directives, 25 and delay site remediation. A landowner could attempt to
settle with the EPA or a state agency, giving rise to CERCLA section
113(0(3) contribution rights; 126 however, neither the EPA nor state regulatory agencies with the power to order cleanups have the resources to
negotiate settlements
at tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of contami127
nated sites.
3. Aviall and the Role of State Law Cleanup Cost Claims
After Aviall, most owners of contaminated property could no longer
count on a federal cleanup cost remedy under CERCLA. Because current owners are liable parties under CERCLA, they may not, after Aviall,
obtain cleanup cost contribution under section 113(0 unless they first
have been sued under CERCLA or settled their CERCLA liabilities with
the government, and may not have a right to cost recovery under section
107(a). 128 Aviall, of course, addressed only federal law claims. In the123.
Commentators expressed concern that Aviall would have a significant chilling effect on
PRPs cooperating with regulatory agencies in the absence of a CERCLA contribution remedy. See,
e.g., Charles F. Helsten et al., The Effect of Aviall on the Vitality of Brownfields Programs,A.B.A.
ENVTL. TRANSACTIONS & BROWNFIELDS COMM. NEWSL., Mar. 2005, at 4 (Aviall decision "has
raised many questions that may make developers leery of brownfields projects" in light of uncertain
cleanup cost contribution rights); Richard G. Leland & Toni L. Finger, The Supreme Court's Limitation on PrivateCost Recovery Actions Under Superfund: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished- Part11,
METRO. CORP. COUNS., May 2005, at 8 (parties may choose not to enter into voluntary cleanup
agreements, particularly in states without state Superfund statute contribution rights); see also NAT'L
GOVERNORS ASS'N, POLICY POSITION STATEMENT NR-04: SUPERFUND POLICY § 4.4 (2000) (re-

vised Winter Meeting 2005) ("[A] recent U.S. Supreme Court decision [Aviall] has the potential to
diminish a significant incentive under CERCLA for responsible parties to properly perform voluntary cleanups under state oversight.").
124.
See, e.g., Daniel M. Steinway, The Ramifications of the A viall Decision: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 20 TOxICS L. REP. (BNA) 190, 194-95 (2005) (potential techniques for a PRP to
obtain CERCLA contribution rights include inviting a "friendly" lawsuit from a regulatory agency).
125.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(b)(1) (West 2006) (imposing $25,000 per day fines for noncompliance absent "sufficient cause"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing EPA to seek punitive
damages of up to three times the response costs incurred as a result of failure to take proper action);
see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
127. See Schnapf, supra note 65, at 612 ("[Piarties may have to offer some sort of 'carrots' to
state agencies to justify diverting limited resources by performing a more comprehensive cleanup
than normally would be required or perhaps implementing a supplemental environmental project.");
Albert M. Cohen, Certainty and Uncertainty in the Post Cooper v. Aviall Superfund World, 20
TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 73, 77 n. 15 (2005) ("EPA could be cooperative and enter into such agreements. On the other hand, it may see the lack of a right to contribution as a means to put additional
pressure on parties which refuse to settle.").
128. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
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ory, landowners could always look to state law as an alternative to a
CERCLA claim. Indeed, PRPs often had joined state law claims to
CERCLA cleanup cost claims, for a variety of reasons. First, CERCLA
does not provide a petroleum cleanup cost recovery remedy; 129 state law
is not so limited. Second, CERCLA does not provide damages for property or personal injury caused by contamination;1 30 state law could.
Third, CERCLA limits private cleanup cost recovery to "necessary" re' 31
sponse costs that are "consistent with the national contingency plan;"'
state common law theories are free of the complicated, time-consuming
and often expensive requirements of the NCP.
So why does Aviall matter? It matters because state law often provides no remedy at all, especially for current landowners faced with contamination left by their predecessors or contamination that occurred
years ago. The hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites across the
country represent a significant national problem requiring a comprehensive solution. Voluntary cleanups are essential to solving this problem,
and contribution rights greatly facilitate voluntary cleanups. A federal
cleanup cost contribution remedy under CERCLA would ensure the
availability of contribution claims for sites in every state. But a federal
cleanup cost remedy is not necessarily preferable to a state law remedy.
To the contrary, state law remedies, in many ways, could be superior to
CERCLA. A federal "safety net" remedy is necessary, however, because
current state law fails32 to provide a coherent nationwide response to a
nationwide problem. 1
II. AN INCOHERENT PATCHWORK QUILT: THE CURRENT STATE OF
PRIVATE NUISANCE LAW AS APPLIED TO PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES

This section analyzes the unrealized potential of private nuisance as
a meaningful rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes. It first
looks at the efficiencies and remedial flexibility that could be realized
through application of private nuisance law to contaminated property
disputes. This section then analyzes the doctrinal and policy limitations
of current private nuisance law that dramatically limit opportunities for it
to provide these benefits. Part 1111 of the article proposes an environmental nuisance paradigm for soil and groundwater contamination disputes that would eliminate shortcomings in current law and make reliance on state law a meaningful alternative to a uniform private federal
remedy.
129.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2006).
130.
See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp. 1269, 1285 (D.
Del. 1987) ("Congress in enacting CERCLA clearly manifested an intent not to provide compensation for economic losses or for personal injury resulting from the release of hazardous substances.").
131.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B); see also supranote 54 and accompanying text.
132.
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 68-79 (arguing that a federal "safety net" remedy is
necessary in light of the inter-state inconsistencies and doctrinal limitations of current state law).
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A. Flexibility and Efficiency: The PotentialBenefits of State Law as the
PrimaryRule of Decision in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes
1. Efficiency
State law could provide a more attractive source for the rules of decision governing private cleanup cost disputes than federal law. 133 Use
of state law to resolve all contamination dispute issues would promote
litigation efficiency. First, state law contamination disputes would be
heard in state courts 134 before state court judges more likely to be familiar with applicable state law than federal court judges. 135 Second, using
state law as the primary rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes
would permit the application of a common body of state law to all contaminated property dispute questions, including claims for petroleum
cleanup costs, 13 6 property damages (beyond cleanup costs), and personal
injury damages that are not recoverable under CERCLA. Third, applying a common body of state law to all cleanup cost disputes would avoid
conflicts between federal and state law regarding alternative cleanup cost
allocations among PRPs, and differing measurements of recoverable
damages between costs that were and were not consistent with the
NCP. 137 Fourth, a common body of law in multi-party contamination
disputes would promote settlements by avoiding potential complications
that could arise from inconsistent rules governing settlements not involving all disputants. 138 Fifth, in light of the fact that state or local govern133.
See id. at 60-68 (discussing potential flexibility and efficiency benefits of state law as
primary rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes).
134.
By contrast, CERCLA section 113(b) provides that federal courts have exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over claims "arising under" CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b). State law claims
can be joined to CERCLA claims pursuant to a federal court's original (i.e., diversity) or supplemental subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F. Supp.
1238, 1247-49 (D. Conn. 1992) (analyzing under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) retention of supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims joined with CERCLA claims).
A private cleanup cost or other contamination-related dispute based solely on state law
135.
always could, of course, be filed in or removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332, 1441 (West 2006).
CERCLA excludes petroleum from the definition of the "hazardous substances" governed
136.
by CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2006).
See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 89 n.369.
137.
138.
Partial settlements (i.e., settlements involving fewer than all defendants) in multidefendant cleanup cost litigation typically are conditioned on issuance by the court of a "contribution
bar order" providing contribution protection for a settling defendant. A contribution bar order prohibits contribution claims against the settling defendant by reducing any judgment against the nonsettling defendant in an amount corresponding to the settling defendant's fair share of liability. This
reduction in judgment can either be pro tanto (reducing the non-settling defendant's liability by the
amount paid in settlement), ordered by the court after a "fairness" hearing on the settlement, or pro
rata, reducing the non-settling defendant's liability by the settling defendant's equitable share of
liability as determined at trial. Federal courts are split as to whether to give pro tanto or pro rata
contribution protection in private cleanup cost cases. See, e.g., Eric DeGroff, Raiders of the Lost
ARCO: Resolving the PartialSettlement Credit Issue in Private Cost Recovery and Contribution
Claims Under CERCLA, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 332, 397 (2000) (arguing for pro rata protection in
CERCLA contribution claims and pro tanto protection in cost recovery claims). Complications can
arise when the applicable federal claim contribution protection rule differs from the state law rule.
Using a common body of state law in private cleanup cost disputes would eliminate this problem.
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ment agencies take the regulatory lead at most sites, the availability of
state law claims would facilitate coordination of cost claim elements and
regulatory agency remediation requirements. Finally, tort-based state
law cleanup cost claims could be asserted against government entity
PRPs because federal and state tort claims statutes authorize private tortbased cleanup cost claims. 139
2. Flexibility
Using state law as the primary rule of decision in private cleanup
cost disputes would also promote flexibility in addressing the nation's
many contaminated sites. For example, CERCLA limits private cleanup
140
cost recovery to only those response costs consistent with the NCP.
Compliance with NCP requirements' 4 1 for conducting an appropriate
investigation into the extent of the pollution and evaluating the feasibility
of remedial alternatives, 142 as well as affording a meaningful opportunity

139.
The federal government has been identified as a PRP at thousands of sites across the
country, potentially involving billions of dollars in cleanup costs. Several amicus curiae briefs filed
with the U.S. Supreme Court in Aviall argued that a PRP right of contribution under CERCLA was
necessary to promote cost recovery from the federal government at sites where the United States was
a PRP. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 44 n.212. State tort law claims may be asserted against the
federal government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680
(West 2006); see Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding landowner
timely filed FTCA claim for continuing trespass and nuisance under Colorado tort law arising from
groundwater contamination); see also Elizabeth Ann Coleman, In Re Hoery v. United States: Compensating Homeowners For Loss of Property Value Due to Toxic Pollution Under the Continuing
Tort Doctrine, 16 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 35, 44-47 (2005) (discussing application of FTCA to continuing
tort claim relating to groundwater contamination). Similarly, state law claims may be asserted
against state governments pursuant to comparable state tort claim act statutes or other state statutes
waiving sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 291-92 (N.J. 1987)
(affirming in part nuisance personal injury damage award in action brought by local residents against
municipality regarding contaminants leaching from town landfill into aquifer). By contrast, the
Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity protect state government entities from CERCLA
claims which can only be brought in federal court because CERCLA section 113(b) provides exclusive federal court jurisdiction for claims "arising under" CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (West
2006); see, e.g., Bumette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding private CERCLA
action against state barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
140.
A private party response action is consistent with the NCP if it is in "substantial" compliance with applicable requirements of the NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (2005).
141.
Private cleanup actions that result in a "CERCLA-quality cleanup" are considered consistent with the NCP. See Regional Airport Authority of Louisville v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697, 707
(6th Cir. 2006) (holding cleanup is consistent with NCP if, taken as a whole, it is in substantial
compliance with NCP and results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup). For a private response action to
constitute a "CERCLA-quality cleanup," the selected remedy must: (1) protect human health and the
environment; (2) employ permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maximum extent practicable; (3) be cost effective; (4) identify and attain applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs, i.e., cleanup standards) for the site; and (5) provide for meaningful
public participation in the remedy selection process. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666-01, 8793 (Mar. 8, 1990); Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2001) (identifying "CERCLA-quality cleanup" NCP factors).
142.
The NCP requires preparation of a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS),
which involves, inter alia, a thorough analysis of contamination conditions and remedial alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9) (2005). See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
433 F.3d 1260, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding feasibility study fully analyzing only one remedial
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for public participation in the remedial process, 143 can be time consuming and expensive. 144 The additional costs and delays required for NCP
consistency (and for CERCLA cost recovery from polluters) can disand developing browncourage prospective purchasers from acquiring 45
1
others.
by
contaminated
properties
other
or
field
State common law theories, while imposing culpability and causation proof requirements inapplicable to CERCLA claims, do not condition cleanup cost recovery on consistency with the NCP.146 State law,
therefore, could provide an attractive cost claim alternative for current
landowners hoping to conduct a technically sound cleanup without the
delay and expense often resulting from NCP requirements.147 Similarly,
alternative did not substantially comply with NCP). The final remedy selected by the lead regulatory
agency is documented in a Record of Decision (ROD). 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(1).
143.
Public participation requirements include creation of a public information and community
relations plan and providing sufficient opportunity for public comment on the RI/FS and a proposed
remedy. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6). Failure to comply with NCP public participation requirements
may bar cost recovery. See, e.g., Regional Airport Authority, 460 F.3d at 703-08 (affirming summary judgment for prior owner because plaintiff current landowner's claimed costs were not "necessary" within the meaning of section 107(a)(4)(B) and were not consistent with the NCP because,
inter alia, plaintiff failed to permit public comment on the selected remedy); Carson Harbor Viii.,
433 F.3d at 1266-67 (holding plaintiff failed to show compliance with public participation requirement; "minor and ministerial" involvement of public agency did not provide effective substitute for
public participation); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., 215 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation and comment in the selection of a
remedial action at a particular cleanup site is inconsistent with the NCP.").
See, e.g., Richard G. Opper, The Brownfield Manifesto, 37 URB. LAW. 163, 182-83 (2005)
144.
(noting that NCP requirements apply on their face to all sites regardless of their complexity, and
arguing for amending the NCP to streamline brownfield and other low-risk site regulation); see also
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 4 RODGERS' ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8:9 (2006 Update) ("It deserves

emphasis that the remedial implementation process for NPL sites can be slow (10 to 12 years from
initiation of the RI to site cleanup), ponderous (an average of 8 years of study before cleanup begins), expensive (RI/FS cost $750,000 on average with a high of $7 million; remedies average $25
million, several have exceeded $100 million, and a few are approaching $ 1 billion), legally profuse
(139 RODs and 4 ROD amendments were signed during Fiscal Year 1989), labor consumptive
(some sites will go through 4 or 5 Remedial Project Managers in the years of implementation), and
unfailingly complex (single sites can generate multiple RI/FSs and multiple RODs (as many as
twenty) for each piece of the cleanup pie." (footnotes omitted)).
See Opper, supra note 144, at 183 ("The NCP needs to be updated to fit the new brown145.
fields paradigm, or else it should adopt language to allow a finding of 'consistency' after little or no
elaborate process for certain types of common urban projects."); Schwenke, supra note 24, at 297
("The potential liability for environmental contamination continues to stand as a major impediment
to acquisition, financing, and development of these vacant or abandoned sites.").
In PMC,Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh
146.
Circuit held that a plaintiff unable to recover response costs under CERCLA section 113(0(1) because of inconsistency with the NCP could not recover those costs derivatively under the Illinois
Contribution Act, reasoning that plaintiff PMC's attempted "invocation of Illinois' contribution
statute is an attempt to nullify the sanction that Congress imposed for the kind of CERCLA violation
that PMC committed." See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 93-99 (discussing PMC decision and arguing that the NCP should not provide basis for CERCLA to preempt state statutory or common law
direct cleanup cost remedies).
See, e.g., Richard G. Opper, Managing Risks at Brownfield Sites, 20 NAT. RESOURCES &
147.
ENv'T 32, 36 (2006). Mr. Opper observed that:
There is sometimes less risk, and a greater chance of success, for private cost-recovery
plaintiffs in a common law nuisance case than there is in using CERCLA. The use of a
continuing nuisance theory, incepting after mitigation measures are complete, can be efficient and effective in state court. It can be a cheaper and faster path through the litiga-
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without the specter of NCP consistency hovering over current landowners looking to recover the costs of voluntary cleanup from other PRPs,
states could have greater flexibility with which to experiment and promote effective alternative site cleanup policies. 148
B. Theory Meets Reality. CurrentDoctrinalLimitations PreventState
Law from Solving the NationalProblem of Encouraging Voluntary
Cleanups
In theory, state law remedies could encourage the voluntary cleanup
of contaminated sites as well as or better than a PRP cleanup cost remedy
under CERCLA. In fact, current state law is not up to the task. 149 The
doctrinal limitations of current state statutory and common law theories,
and the significant variations among state law tort regimes, make meaningful state law cleanup cost remedies unavailable at many multi-PRP
sites across the country.
Nuisance casts the widest liability and remedial net among state law
claims potentially applicable to private cleanup cost disputes 150 because
it is not subject to limitations that constrict other state law theories. For
example, a trespass claim requires proof of intentional conduct and can
be defeated by a possessor consent defense. 5 ' Moreover, because the
tort of trespass is based on the unauthorized invasion of the possessory
interest of another in real property, trespass cannot be asserted by a curtion than federal court, and it does not require compliance with the National Contingency
Plan, providing for cost savings during the cleanup.
Id
148.
See Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste
Contamination,15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 221 (1996) ("[s]tate and local laws are better than federal
laws at reflecting local preferences for environmental quality and at encouraging valuable environmental policy experimentation" (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J.
1196, 1210 (1977) ("[s]tate and local governments can better reflect geographical variations in
preferences for collective goals like environmental quality."))).
149.
See Aronovsky, supranote 5, at 68-79.
150. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text; infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text;
see also WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILrrY 121 (1992) ("[N]uisance is a more

reliable theory of liability than trespass or negligence for the hazardous waste disposal situation.");
Klein, supra note 12, at 353-54 (noting that "[i]n light of CERCLA's failures, legal commentators
have increasingly suggested that courts supplement or replace the legislative regime through an
expanded use of common law tort actions-in particular, nuisance law," and citing the observation
of RODGERS, supra note 144, at 112-13, that "[t]here is no common law doctrine that approaches
nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and of technological abuse.");
Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 926 (1999) ("The nuisance cause of action provides the backbone of
common law environmental (pollution) litigation."). More than one common law theory, of course,
may apply to a private cleanup cost dispute. See, e.g., Joseph F. Falcone III & Daniel Utain, You
Can Teach an Old Dog New Tricks: The Application of Common Law In Present-Day Environmental Disputes, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 88 (2000) (noting that "cases have recognized that invasions of property that amount to a trespass may also constitute a nuisance").
151.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. e (1965) (intentional conduct is
required for trespass, but intrusion with consent of a possessor is privileged); Edgcomb v. Lower
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 859 (Wyo. 1996) (consent of possessor is an absolute
defense to a trespass action under Wyoming law).
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423

rent landowner seeking to recover cleanup costs from a prior owner or
tenant who disposed of contaminants while possessing the property.' 52
Negligence claims require proof that the defendant's conduct did not
conform to an applicable standard of care 53 and may not fall within the
continuing tort doctrine in order to avoid a statute of limitations defense. 154 Strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity can be unpredictable because of the multi-factored balancing analysis required to
show that an activity is abnormally dangerous, 155 and in some states this
doctrine is inapplicable to contaminated property disputes. 156 None of
these limitations generally apply to a nuisance claim.

152.
See, e.g., Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp. 747 F. Supp. 93, 99 (D. Mass.
1990) ("Mobil owned and was in possession of the property when it allegedly released the oil causing the contamination. Thus, Mobil's releases of oil were not unprivileged, and Mobil clearly was
not intruding on land in the possession of another. Mobil's releases of oil on its own land, therefore,
cannot constitute a trespass."); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 668, 674 (Cal. Ct.
Ap. 1993) ("Manifestly one cannot commit an actionable interference with one's own possessory
right."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D cmt. d (1965) ("A trespass is an invasion of the
interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it."); see also Falcone & Utain, supra
note 150, at 100 ("While a small minority ofjurisdictions are willing to permit current landowners to
sue previous owners for contamination under claims of nuisance and strict liability, there are an even
smaller number of jurisdictions willing to allow them to sue under a claim for trespass under similar
conditions.").
153.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) ("[N]egligence is conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm."). Contamination caused by waste disposal practices that at the time reflected state of
the art technology may not be actionable years late under a negligence theory. See Aronovsky,
supra note 5, at 70 n.304.
154.
See, e.g., Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 391, 417 (M.D. Pa.
1998) (finding current landowner's negligence claim against former owner and operator of site timebarred; continuing tort doctrine applies only to trespass and nuisance, not negligence); Church v.
General Elec. Co. 138 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174 (D. Mass. 2001) (under Massachusetts law, continuing
tort doctrine is limited to nuisance and trespass claims and does not apply to negligence or strict
liability claims). But see Nat'l. Tel. Co-op. Ass'n. v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.
1998) (holding under District of Columbia law that continuing tort theory applied to toll five year
limitations period on commercial property owner's negligence and strict liability for ultra-hazardous
activity claims alleging that gasoline leaking from a neighbor's underground storage tanks). Application of the discovery rule, coupled by a tolling of the statute of limitations following discovery of
contamination during site evaluation could reduce the risk that a negligence-based cleanup cost
claim could become time barred. See Melanie R. Kay, EnvironmentalNegligence: A Proposalfor a
New Cause of Action for the Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contaminated Land, 94 CAL. L. REV.
149, 172 (2006) (proposing environmental negligence cause of action that would toll statute of
limitations during pendency of site investigation).
155.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977); supra note 37 (identifying the six
factors to consider in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous); see, e.g., Nnadili v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 93, 103 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying District of Columbia law
and section 520 balancing factors to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that storage of gasoline in defendant's underground storage tanks did not constitute an abnormally
dangerous activity); cf Klass, supra note 34, at 963 (noting the continued problem of unpredictability in applying section 520 multi-factor analysis).
156.
See, e.g., Nat'l Tel. Coop. Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1998) (observing that strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity had not yet been explicitly adopted in
the District of Columbia); Jones v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1037, 1050 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (noting
Texas courts have rejected doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities as a basis for strict liability in
the context of hazardous wastes); Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1251 (D. Conn. 1992) (concluding Connecticut law would not recognize storage and use of hazardous materials as abnormally dangerous).
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Nuisance law similarly avoids many of the limitations of "state
Superfund" statutes. For example, some of these statutes limit private
cost recovery to costs consistent with the NCP. 157 Some state Superfund
58
statutes apply only to releases occurring after the statute was enacted. 1
Like CERCLA, 159 some state Superfund statutes do not apply to petro-

leum. 160 Finally, like CERCLA section 113(f), some State Superfund
statutes only permit contribution claims during or after judicial or administrative proceedings against a PRP. 161
As discussed below, nuisance law has great promise as a rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes because its flexibility corresponds
well to the complexity of soil and groundwater contamination problems. 162 Moreover, nuisance law avoids doctrinal limitations presented
157.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1023.11t3 (West 2006). Some state Superfund statutes do not require NCP consistency for cost recovery. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-285(B) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9105
(West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 403.727 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-96.1 (West 2006); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126 (West 2006). Because state Superfund statutes often largely mirror
the structure and liability scheme of CERCLA, see infra notes 159-61, state Superfund statutes
permitting contribution for cleanup costs that are not consistent with the NCP could be subject
(properly or otherwise) to a preemption challenge on the ground that using a "state version of
CERCLA" to permit recovery of non-NCP costs would undermine the goals of CERCLA. Such an
overbroad preemption analysis would be ill-considered. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 90-98.
158.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25366(a) (Deering 2005) (no liability for
actions before January 1, 1982 if the actions were not in violation of then-existing state or federal
law); lAW. REV. STAT. § 128D-6 (2005) (no private recovery of costs arising from a release occurring before July 1, 1990).
159.
State Superfund statutes often adopt or incorporate provisions from CERCLA. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25323.5 (Deering 2005) (incorporating CERCLA definitions of
"responsible party" and "liable person"); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-4-8 (West 2006) (incorporating
CERCLA definition of liable parties); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-302(20) (West 2006) ("remedial
investigation" means a remedial investigation and feasibility study as defined in the NCP).
160.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.09.900 (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25317
(Deering 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400(l)(a) (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.11400 (West 2006).
161.
See, e.g., Wacker Chem. Corp. v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., No. 05-72207, 2006 WL
2404502, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2006) (relying on Aviall to interpret Mich. Comp. Laws §
324.20129(3) to permit contribution actions only during or after civil actions brought under Michigan state Superfund statute); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6020.705(a) (West 2006). Amending state Superfund statutes to ensure cleanup cost contribution rights for all PRPs, including current landowners,
could serve the same "safety net" function as confirming a similar right under CERCLA. Attempting to amend a state Superfund statute, however, could be frustrated by the same risk of "opening
Pandora's box" and confronting the often competing demands of contaminated property dispute
stakeholders that have frustrated efforts to amend core provisions of CERCLA for the past twenty
years. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 81. In any event, state Superfund statute cleanup cost contribution rights (like CERCLA contribution rights) would not provide the litigation efficiency and
remedial flexibility benefits available under the proposed private nuisance paradigm, such as the
application of a common body of tort law to both cleanup cost and other claims raised in private
contaminated property disputes and the absence of the NCP consistency and petroleum exclusion
limitations sometimes found in state Superfund statutory schemes.
162.
See infra note 175 and accompanying text; see also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing
Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradoxof the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 771 (2001)
("Although amorphous in definition, all nuisance actions have in common three important doctrinal
aspects that provide unique scope to their application by the courts: substantiality of interference,
unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and equitable flexibility."); Kuhnle, supra note 148, at
221-23 (arguing that nuisance liability is more contextual, less predictable than CERCLA, not limited by legislative line-drawing).
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by other state law theories. 163 Nevertheless, the current state of nuisance
law fails as a meaningful alternative to a uniform federal rule of decision
in private cleanup cost disputes for the promotion of voluntary cleanups.
Simply put, nuisance law has not evolved to meet the realities of modern
contaminated property problems. 164
C.

The InadequateState of CurrentNuisance Law
1. Nuisance-A Brief Overview

Nuisance law dates back to the twelfth century; 65 its welldocumented history 166 does not require repetition here. William Prosser
famously observed that "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.',' 167 As
one court observed, "in order to alleviate some of the confusion [surrounding the use of the term "nuisance"], it is important to distinguish
'private' and 'public' nuisance, which 'bear little relationship to each
other. Although some rules apply to both, other rules apply to one but
not the other." 168

163.
See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text; cf Kay, supra note 154, at 162-68 (arguing for an "environmental negligence" cause of action because, among other things, doctrinal limitations make current nuisance law unavailable or inadequate to meet common contamination problems); Klein, supra note 12, at 339 (arguing that "shifting costs through nuisance law is no more
efficient than shifting costs through CERCLA-created liability" and proposing instead a broad-based
system of revenue collection to fund cleanups).
164.
See, e.g., G. Nelson Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (1995). Mr.
Smith argued that:
The use of common law nuisance and trespass claims to address environmental problems
is an outdated method since much of the case law relied upon precedes the enactment of
many of the environmental statutes. Consequently, the cases do not direct the courts on
how to confront the complicated problems that are associated with pollution.
Id. at 70.
165.
See, e.g., id.at 41 (describing twelfth century origins of nuisance); Falcone & Utain,
supra note 150, at 65 ("The legal theory of nuisance dates back to the twelfth century.").
166.
See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 162, at 767-68; Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and
Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S.CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1139-41 (1986);
H. Marlow Green, Common Law, PropertyRights and the Environment: A ComparativeAnalysis of
HistoricalDevelopments in the UnitedStates and England anda Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 541, 545-46 (1997); Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Presentand Future,54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 192-96 (1990); William A. McRae, Jr., The Development
of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27 (1948); William H. Wilson, Comment,
Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REv. 47, 54-55 (1970).
167.

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAWOFTORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).

168.
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 964 (W.D.N.Y.
1989) (quoting State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d Cir.1985)).
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Public and private nuisance differ in significant respects. 169 A public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."'' 70 Government entities may bring an action to enjoin
and compel the abatement of a public nuisance. 171 Private parties affected by a public nuisance (e.g., the owner of property impacted by a
contaminated groundwater plume) must show an injury different than
that suffered by other affected property owners to state a prima facie
public nuisance claim. 1 72 Major contaminated groundwater problems
affecting an entire neighborhood or public water supply would cause or
threaten to cause harm to a common interest of the general public and
thus qualify as a public nuisance. Most contaminated property disputes,
however, do not involve a public nuisance. For example, contaminated
soil problems (usually limited to a single parcel of polluted property) and
discrete contaminated groundwater problems (i.e., those involving at
most only a handful of properties down-gradient from the source property and not threatening a public water supply) likely would not be considered a public nuisance. The environmental nuisance paradigm proposed by this article focuses on private
nuisance contaminated property
73
1
nuisance.
public
than
rather
disputes,

169.
See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 162, at 774-75. Professor Antolini observed that:
Public nuisance offers plaintiffs several important strategic advantages. Its primary advantage is a more direct focus on the merits-the existence of the nuisance, the injury,
and the appropriate remedy-than is available in many statutory cases, where the focus is
often on procedure or violations of permits or standards. Moreover, public nuisance gives
plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain damages and injunctive relief, lacks laches and other
common tort defenses, is immune to administrative law defenses such as exhaustion,
avoids the private nuisance requirement that the plaintiff be a landowner/occupier of affected land, eliminates a fault requirement, and circumvents any pre-suit notice requirement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
170.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
171.
Id. § 821C(2)(b).
172.
See id. § 821C(l) ("In order to recover damages in an individual action for a public nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the
public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference.").
Distinctions between public and private nuisance vary among the states, including the requirement
that a private plaintiff suffer a "special injury" providing standing to bring a public nuisance claim,
may further restrict the availability of private cleanup cost remedies at contaminated groundwater
sites. See Antolini, supra note 162, at 761 (discussing the development and various applications of
the special injury requirement for private standing to bring a public nuisance claim). For example,
some courts have found that cleanup costs incurred by a current landowner constitute such a "special
injury," see, e.g., Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 128182 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law to hold that incurring NCP-consistent response costs
constituted special injury providing standing to maintain public nuisance action), while others do
not, see, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying
Pennsylvania law and holding that a current landowner lacked standing to maintain a public nuisance
claim because cleanup costs incurred to remediate contamination for which plaintiff is liable as
current property owner did not constitute injury suffered exercising right common to general public);
Hamlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me. 1990) (applying
Maine law and holding that response costs incurred by current landowner to cleanup own property
did not constitute special injury suffered exercising right common to general public).
173.
Public and private nuisance address different interests (rights common to the general
public as compared to the use and enjoyment of private property) and employ a variety of different
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Section 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the
scope of private nuisance:
[o]ne is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless
174
conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
Courts have considerable flexibility in fashioning private nuisance remedies, including money damages or injunctive relief tailored to the nature
and scope of the underlying invasion.175
Soil or groundwater contamination often results in a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property and thus falls squarely
within the definition of private nuisance. 176 For example, the current
rules (e.g., private actions to enjoin a public nuisance generally are not barred by statutes of limitations and can be brought by a current owner against the former owner of the same property). A
detailed analysis of public nuisance is beyond the scope of this article. A large proportion of contaminated property disputes would fall within the scope of private nuisance law; the environmental
nuisance paradigm proposed by this article addresses the application of private nuisance to contaminated property disputes.
174.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). Private nuisance requires proof of
culpability, i.e., intentional and unreasonable, negligent, reckless, or "abnormally dangerous" conduct by the defendant. Cf RODGERS, supra note 144, § 2.4 ("Nuisance law is continuing on the road
to becoming a strict liability tort although there is more than a little meander in the chosen path.").
In some jurisdictions, culpable conduct by the plaintiff may present an obstacle to recovery. See,
e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 362 N.E.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. 1977)
("[A]lthough contributory negligence may be a defense where the basis of the nuisance is merely
negligent conduct, it would not be where the wrongdoing is founded on the intentional, deliberate
misconduct of defendant."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840E cmt. d (explaining
that where plaintiff contributes to pollution and, if the harm is capable of apportionment, the apportionment will be made and the defendant will be held liable to the extent of his own contribution, but
where apportionment cannot be made the plaintiff's own responsibility for the entire harm will bar
recovery). Under the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm, plaintiff's culpability would be
relevant to fashioning an appropriate remedy under comparative responsibility principles. See infra
notes 440-41 and accompanying text.
175. See, RODGERS supra note 144, § 2.13 (describing available private nuisance remedies and
observing that "[t]he balancing associated so prominently with nuisance law comes to the fore in the
fashioning of remedies" (footnote omitted)); see also James B. Brown & Michael V. Sucaet, Environmental Cleanup Efficiency: PrivateRecovery Actions for EnvironmentalResponse Costs, 7 T.M.
COOLEY L. REv. 363, 381 (1990) ("The common-law action of nuisance encompasses a wide variety
of injuries. This type of action is particularly significant in the environmental context due to the
availability of both equitable relief and damages."). When available, the flexibility of private nuisance remedies can tailor the allocation of cleanup cost responsibilities to specific remediation
dispute circumstances. The severe doctrinal limitations of current private nuisance law, however,
bar its application to many common contaminated property dispute problems. See infra notes 177360 and accompanying text.
176.
See, e.g., Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1330 (S.D. Iowa
1997) (stating that under Iowa law, "[c]hemical contamination of land, such as underground gasoline, can qualify as a nuisance."); MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp, 934 So. 2d 708, 721 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant and holding that
potential contamination and health advisories arising from defendant's waste disposal support private nuisance claim); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I. 1982) (maintaining hazardous
waste dump site constituted public and private nuisance where "defendants' dumping operations
have already caused substantial injury to defendants' neighbors and threaten to cause incalculable
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owner of a contaminated site may need to incur cleanup costs to comply
with regulatory requirements, restore the value and utility of the property, or pursue property development opportunities. Private nuisance,
therefore, would appear well-suited to provide a basis for a current landowner to recover from other PRPs who caused or contributed to site contamination their fair share of cleanup costs. An analysis of private nuisance law across the United States, however, reveals four significant
doctrinal limitations that severely limit the effectiveness of nuisance as a
rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes: (1) most states limit
private nuisance claims to disputes involving neighboring property uses;
(2) in many states the doctrine of caveat emptor bars private nuisance
claims against predecessor owners; (3) many states employ an anachronistic interpretation of the continuing nuisance doctrine to render timebarred private nuisance claims at older contamination sites; and (4) the
misplacement of the burden of proof regarding whether a nuisance is
permanent or continuing can extinguish claims for unabated contamination and create a series of perverse incentives against proactive site investigation and informal cleanup cost dispute resolution. The following
subsections will analyze each of these doctrinal limitations. Part III describes an environmental nuisance paradigm that solves each problem.
2. Geographic Limitations: Same Property Pollution Disputes
Many private cleanup cost disputes concern contamination caused
or contributed to by former occupants of the contaminated property, as
opposed to contamination that originated on neighboring property.
"Same property" pollution arises in many settings, such as former landfills and properties that once housed manufacturing facilities or retail
establishments (such as dry cleaners or service stations) that handled
hazardous substances. Current landowners at these sites are left with
"predecessor pollution" that impairs the value of the property and requires compliance with regulatory cleanup requirements. Most states,
however, bar same property private nuisance claims by a current landowner seeking damages
or equitable relief for contamination originating
177
property.
her
on
damage to the general public. The Picillos' neighbors have displayed physical symptoms of exposure to toxic chemicals and have been restricted in the reasonable use of their property. Moreover,
expert testimony showed that the chemical presence on defendants' property threatens both aquatic
wildlife and human beings with possible death, cancer, and liver disease.").
177.
See, e.g., Evans v. Lochmere Recreation Club, Inc., 627 S.E.2d 340, 342 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) ("[A] private nuisance exists in a legal sense when one makes an improper use of his own
property and in that way injures the land or some incorporeal right of one's neighbor."); Pestey v.
Cushman, 788 A.2d 496, 502 (Conn. 2002) (quoting Nailor v. C.w. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 167 A.
548 (Conn. 1933)) ("The law of private nuisance springs from the general principle that '[i]t is the
duty of every person to make a reasonable use of his own property so as to occasion no unnecessary
damage or annoyance to his neighbor."'); Demont v. Abbas, 32 N.W.2d 737, 738 (Neb. 1948)
("Generally, an owner of property has a right to make any use of it he sees fit. It is only where his
use prevents his neighbors from the enjoyment of their property to their damage that an owner's use
may be restricted."); Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957 (R.I. 1994) ("Under
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a. Majority View: No Same Property Private Nuisance
Claims

The vast majority of states restrict private nuisance claims to disputes between neighboring landowners. 178 The seminal case barring
Rhode Island law it is well settled that a cause of action for a private nuisance 'arises from the unreasonable use of one's property that materially interferes with a neighbor's physical comfort or the
neighbor's use of his real estate.' The offensive condition therefore must originate outside the
plaintiff's land." (quoting Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824, 826 (R.I. 1985))); Sans v. Ramsey Golf &
Country Club, Inc., 149 A.2d 599, 605 (N.J. 1959) ("The question is not simply whether a person is
annoyed or disturbed, but whether the annoyance or disturbance arises from an unreasonable use of
the neighbor's land or operation of his business."); Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla.
1956) (quoting Antonik v. Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) for the proposition that "Nuisance, in law, for the most part consists in so using one's property as to injure the land
or some incorporeal right of one's neighbor ....');Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 197 F. Supp.
2d 1160, 1171-72 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (granting summary judgment for defendant on same property
private nuisance claim, citing Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Ark.
1993) for the proposition that "the Arkansas Supreme Court defines nuisance to contemplate separate parcels of property"); State v. Jacob Decker & Sons, 196 N.W. 600, 601 (Iowa 1924) ("The
essential element in nuisance is the injury to one's neighbors, and involves an invasion of the legal
rights of persons sustaining peculiar relations to the property or thing in question, or threatening or
impending danger to the public."). Some states that bar "same property" private nuisance claims
will nevertheless permit a private plaintiff who has suffered the "special injury" required for standing to seek recovery for "same property" contamination constituting a public nuisance. See, e.g.,
Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1282 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
(applying New York law); see also infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text. In Moore v. Texaco,
Inc., 244 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment under Oklahoma law in favor of defendant former landowner against public and private nuisance claims
brought by a current landowner in connection with soil contamination caused by petroleum. The
court noted that while a public nuisance claim could be asserted against Texaco, the former landowner, plaintiff Moore had adduced no evidence that Texaco had either caused the pollution on the
property or failed to abate prior pollution about which it had knowledge prior to selling the property
to Moore. Moore, 244 F.3d at 1231-32. The Tenth Circuit further held that Moore could not maintain a private nuisance claim based on the petroleum pollution and the construction of berms on the
property, finding it "likely that Oklahoma would reach the same conclusion reached by nearly every
other court to consider the issue: that an action for private nuisance is designed to protect neighboring landowners from conflicting uses of property, not successor landowners from conditions on the
land they purchased." Id. at 1232. Similarly, some courts have recognized an exception to the
private nuisance neighboring property limitation for private nuisance claims by a landlord against a
tenant. Compare, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 885 F. Supp. 716, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (denying motion to dismiss private nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law brought by landlord against
tenant who operated gas station that allegedly caused contamination on leased property), with, e.g.,
Patton v. TPI Petroleum, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931-32 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (dismissing landlord's
private nuisance claim against commercial tenant because under Arkansas law nuisance claims
limited to neighboring property disputes).
178. See, e.g., Falcone & Utain, supra note 150, at 78-84 (describing restriction of nuisance
claims disputes between neighboring landowners as the "majority approach"); see also 9 RICHARD
R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.02[3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) ("Unreasonableness has a role to play in private nuisance law in that plaintiffs are not expected to tolerate unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment of their real property ....The conclusion of 'unreasonableness' depends then upon liability-inviting conduct of the defendant plus a finding that this
conduct violates a protected interest of the neighbor-plaintiff."); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law:
Rethinking FundamentalAssumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1319 (1977) ("An interference is not a
nuisance unless, among other things, it substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of
neighboring land."); Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors:Using Nuisance Law to
Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 406 (1997) ("Nuisance actions to abate interferences with an owner's interest in land have existed for over eight hundred years. The preRevolutionary body of American nuisance law accepted the oft-repeated maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedes ('one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another')." (footnotes omitted)). By contrast, CERCLA makes the owner or operator of contaminated
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private nuisance claims for same property hazardous substance contamination is the Third Circuit's 1985 decision in PhiladelphiaElec. Co. v.
Hercules, Inc.' 79 Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) acquired property in Chester, Pennsylvania, that had once been used as a hydrocarbon
resin manufacturing plant and at which a former owner had disposed of
resins and by-products.' 8 0 Following discovery of the contamination, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources directed PECO to
remediate the site. 181 PECO sued Hercules (as successor to the former
owner of the PECO property), asserting public and private nuisance
claims under Pennsylvania law. 182 PECO sought to recover cleanup
costs and lost property rentals caused by the contamination, and obtain
an injunction directing Hercules to abate any remaining contamination. 8 3 A jury awarded cleanup cost and delay damages to PECO and
the district court issued the requested injunction against Hercules.' 8 4 On
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Pennsylvania
law did not
85
permit a same property private or public nuisance claim. 1
The Third Circuit started its private nuisance analysis by turning to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court assumed that the prior
owner had created a nuisance within the meaning of section 821 D of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which "defines a 'private nuisance' as 'a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."",186 The court found that "[t]he crucial and difficult
question for us is to whom Hercules may be liable."'' 8 7 The court concluded that while Hercules might be liable in nuisance for a claim
brought by a neighboring property owner, Hercules owed no duty under
nuisance law to a successor owner of the Chester site, such as PECO. 88
'
The court reasoned that barring same property nuisance claims "is consonant with the historical role of private nuisance law as a means of efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land
uses. '189 The court noted that:

property at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance liable for response costs without limiting
direct or derivative private response cost recovery rights to neighboring property owners. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2), (4) (West 2006).
179.
Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).
180.

Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 306.

181. Id. at 307.
182.
Id. at 307-08.
183.
Id. at 308.
184.
Id.; see also Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
185.
The Third Circuit affirmed that Hercules was the successor to the prior owners of the
PECO property under a defacto merger theory, but held that PECO could not state a same property
nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law. Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 312-14.
186.
Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F. 2d at 313.
187. Id.
188.
Id. at 314. The court noted that while "PECO also owned an adjoining piece of land, and
thus was a neighbor of Hercules ....[PECO did] not, however, allege that pollution of the Chester
site interfered with its use and enjoyment of this adjoining site." Id. at 314 n.8.
189. Id. at 314.
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[A]ll of the very useful and sophisticated economic analyses of private nuisance remedies published in recent years proceed on the basis
that the goal of nuisance law is to achieve efficient and equitable solutions to problems created by discordant land uses. In this light nuisance law can be seen as a complement to zoning regulations,... and
not as an additional type of consumer protection for the purchasers of
realty. Neighbors, unlike the purchasers of land upon which a nuisance exists, have no opportunity to protect themselves through inspection and negotiation. The record shows that PECO acted as a
sophisticated and responsible purchaser-inquiring into the past use
of the Chester site, and inspecting it carefully. We find it inconceivable that the price it offered Gould did not reflect the possibility of
environmental risks,190
even if the exact condition giving rise to this suit
was not discovered.
The court concluded that to "extend private nuisance beyond its historical role would render it little more than an epithet, 'and an epithet does
not make out a cause of action."' 91 Finally, the court underscored its
discomfort with extending private nuisance to same property disputes by
referencing the nascent state of federal and state environmental statutes,
observing that "[s]uch an extension of common law doctrine is particularly hazardous in an area, such as environmental pollution, where Congress and the state legislatures are actively seeking
to achieve a socially
92
acceptable definition of rights and liabilities."'
The court also found PECO's public nuisance claim unavailing. On
the one hand, the court rejected Hercules' contention that the neighboring property dispute limitation on private nuisance claims applied
equally to public nuisance claims, 93 noting that the "doctrine of public
nuisance protects interests quite different from those implicated in actions for private nuisance, . . . [and that] an action for public nuisance

may lie even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the
exercise of private property rights."' 94 The court nevertheless concluded
that under Pennsylvania law spending money to remediate predecessor
pollution did not constitute the "special injury" or "particular damage"

190.
Id. (citation omitted). The court further held that the doctrine of caveat emptor barred
PECO's claim. Id. at 312-13. See infra notes 221-43 and accompanying text. The court also found
analogous a series of Pennsylvania cases (later overruled) that did not permit "tenants to circumvent
traditional limitations on the liability of lessors by the expedient of casting their cause of action for
defective conditions existing on premises (over which they have assumed control) as one for private
nuisance." Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 313. The court noted that although these tenant-landlord
cases had been overruled by the time of the PhiladelphiaElectric decision, they nevertheless reflected "sound tort theory." Id. at 314 n.8.
191.
Id. at 315 (citation omitted).
192.
Id. at 315 n. 13; see also infra notes 379-82 and accompanying text.
193.
Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315 n.13.
194. Id. at 315.
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different in kind from that suffered by195the general public required for
PECO to assert a public nuisance claim.
Over the next two decades, courts around the country embraced the
reasoning of PhiladelphiaElectric to reject same property pollution private nuisance claims under the laws of other states.'1 96 These decisions
tended to rely on the traditional role of private nuisance as a vehicle for
resolving disputes between neighboring land uses; they typically neither
identified nor rested on positive law that barred same property private
nuisance claims.

195.
Id. at 316.
196.
See, e.g., Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 706-08 (S.D. Ind.
1993) (applying Indiana law); Truck Components, Inc. v. K&H Corporation, No. 94 C 50250, 1995
WL 692541, at *12 (N.D. II1., Nov. 22, 1995) (applying Illinois law); Metro. Water Reclamation
Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918-19 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (stating
that under Illinois law the purpose of private nuisance action is to resolve disputes between
neighboring, contemporaneous landowners); Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F.
Supp. 784, 808 (D.N.J. 1989) ("Because New Jersey courts have read private nuisance to encompass
only instances of danger to the public or interference with the use of adjoining land, Amland's claim
here must fall."); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (D. Mass
1990) ("Because the law of private nuisance requires that the interference be to persons outside the
land upon which the condition is maintained, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals has held that a
vendee of land does not have a private nuisance action against a vendor for its contamination prior to
the sale."); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me.
1990) (applying Maine law); Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 780 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (applying Mississippi law to grant summary judgment on private nuisance claim, stating that
"[the common law of nuisance does not protect a landowner from interference or harm resulting
from a previous use of his property by a prior landowner."); Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 642
A.2d 180, 190 (Md. 1994) (affirming summary judgment on ground that Maryland law was consistent with holding in PhiladelphiaElectric and other courts that "a cause of action for private nuisance requires an interference with a neighbor's use and enjoyment of the land."); Hydro-Mfg., Inc.
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957 (D.R.I. 1994) (applying Rhode Island law); Dartron Corp.
v. Uniroyal Chem. Comp., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 730, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (applying Ohio law); Cross
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 944 F. Supp. 787, 792-93 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "[t]he law
of nuisance evolved as a means of resolving conflicts between neighboring contemporaneous land
users" and holding that under Missouri law a current property owner may not recover against a prior
owner under a private nuisance theory for a condition created on the property by the prior owner);
Reg'l Airport Auth. of Louisville & Jefferson County v. LFG, LLC, 255 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 (W.D.
Ky. 2003) ("We believe that were a Kentucky court to consider this issue, it would follow the lead of
the majority of the courts, which have consistently rejected allowing a subsequent landowner to
recover in private nuisance from a prior land owner [sic]."); Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp.
355, 368 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (noting that under North Carolina law, "a nuisance is the improper use of
one's own property in a way which injures the land or other right of one's neighbor"); Middlebury
Office Park Ltd. P'ship. v. Timex Corp., No. 3:95-CV-2160 (EBB), 1998 WL 351583, at *4 & n. 2
(D. Conn. June 16, 1998) (dismissing private nuisance claim because "[i]n
Connecticut, the tort of
nuisance is only applicable where a person is 'making use of his own property so as to occasion
unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor' and because "claims asserted by a landowner
against a former owner of property are barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor unless they fall
within two limited exceptions: first, the defects existing in the property were not discoverable upon
reasonable inspection by the purchaser, and, second, the seller was chargeable with knowledge of the
defects").
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b. Minority View: Same Property Nuisance Claims Permitted
A small minority of states recognize same property private nuisance
pollution remediation claims. 197 Indeed, reported decisions applying the
law of just two states--California and Minnesota-have recognized such
claims. 198 In 1991, the California Court of Appeal in Mangini v. AerojetGeneral Corp. (Mangini 1)199 held that a current owner could sue a prior
lessee for contamination originating on the current owner's property.20 0
In Mangini I, the owners of 2,400 acres of land near Sacramento, California sued Aerojet-General, which had leased the property years before
from the prior owner, for allegedly contaminating the property with
waste rocket fuel materials. 20 1 Plaintiffs asserted claims under nine legal
theories, including private nuisance.20 2 The trial court sustained defendant's general demurrer without leave to amend.20 3 The California Court
of Appeal reversed. 2°
Aerojet-General, relying on general tort law principles, tort law
treatises, and PhiladelphiaElectric,20 5 argued that private nuisance law
did not permit a claim by a current owner for injuries resulting from acts
by a defendant committed on the same property.20 6 The Court of Appeal
rejected these arguments as not reflective of California law, noting that

197.
See Falcone & Utain, supra note 150, at 84-91 (describing as the minority view that a
property owner may sue predecessors-in-interest of the same property for private nuisance).
198.
Indiana law regarding same property private nuisance claims is unclear. In Gray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), plaintiffs lived next to a former landfill
site at which they alleged that defendant Westinghouse disposed of PCBs. Plaintiffs sued Westinghouse, asserting, among other things, a claim for private nuisance. Id. at 51-52. Westinghouse
argued that it could not be liable to abate the nuisance because it did not own the landfill. Id. at 5253. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss,
holding that "the creator of a nuisance of land which it does not own can be required to abate the
nuisance." Id. at 53. The court also stated that "[w]e hold that the party which causes a nuisance
can be held liable, regardless of whether the party owns or possesses the property on which the
nuisance originates." Id. Subsequently, the federal district court in Lilly Industries, Inc. v. HealthChem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ind. 1993) held that Indiana law did not recognize same property private nuisance claims, citing to and relying on the reasoning in PhiladelphiaElectric. Id. at
706-08. The court found Gray distinguishable because it did not involve a same property nuisance
claim. Id. at 706. See also Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 1:05-CV-645-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL
3254544, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006) (citing Lilly Industries and granting summary judgment for
defendant on a same property private nuisance claim and observing that "[r]ecently, heretofore
undiscovered environmental pollution on real property seems to have fostered imaginative attempts
to construct or expand on a common law tort theory of recovery. But these efforts have not found
support under Indiana law since the state courts have declined to utilize trespass or nuisance doctrines to resolve environmental clean-up disputes.").
199.
Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini1), 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
200. Mangini1, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1133-37.
201.
Id. at 1131-32.
202.
Id. at 1132-33.
203.
Id.at 1133.
204. Id. at 1156.
205. Id. at 1133-34.
206. Id.
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"California nuisance law is a creature of statute." 20 7 California Civil
Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as:
[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or
basin, or any public
20 8
park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.
The court traced the origins of section 3479 to nineteenth century statutes
enacted during California's Gold Rush, which "recognized that a property owner could sue for nuisance where miners entered the owner's
property without consent and dug ditches that interfered with the free use
of the property. ' 20 9 The court acknowledged that California's statutory
definition of nuisance might be broader than the traditional scope of
common law nuisance, noting that "[t]he statutory definition of nuisance
appears to be broad enough to encompass almost every conceivable type
or interference with the enjoyment or use of land or property. ' 2 10 The
court concluded that "[t]he California nuisance statutes have been construed, according to their broad terms, to allow an owner of property to
sue for damages caused by a nuisance created on the owner's property.
Under California law it is not necessary that a nuisance have its origin in
neighboring property., 211
Subsequent California cases extended
Mangini I to private nuisance claims against former property owners as
well as former tenants.212
Minnesota law similarly has been interpreted to permit same property private nuisance claims. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reilly
Industries, Inc.,213 Union Pacific, the owner of real property in Minnesota, sued Reilly Industries, the successor of Republic Creosoting Company, to recover the past and future costs of cleaning up contamination
214
caused by Republic's former creosoting operations on the property.
Union Pacific included a private nuisance claim in its complaint. Reilly
moved for summary judgment on that claim, arguing that private nui207.
Id. at 1134.
208.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2006). California Civil Code section 3480 provides that
"[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal." Id. § 3480. Civil Code section 3481 provides that "[e]very nuisance
not included in the definition of the last section is private." Id. § 3481.
209.
ManginiI, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1135.
210.
Id. at 1136 (citations omitted).
211. Id.at1134.
212.
See, e.g., Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 668, 672-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (allowing private nuisance claim by current owner against former owner and tenant); Newhall
Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 334, 340-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing
private nuisance claim by current owner against former owner).
213.
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998).
214.
Id. at 862-63.
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sance applies only to neighboring
property use disputes. 215 The court
2 16
denied Reilly's motion.
The court acknowledged that, "as a general matter," a claim for
"private nuisance resolves conflicts between neighboring or adjacent
landowners," but observed that Minnesota law imposed no such limitation. 217 The court noted that under Minnesota's nuisance statute:
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance. An
action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously
affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance,
and by the judgment the
nuisance may be enjoined or abated, as well
21 8
as damages recovered.
Based on the broadly-worded Minnesota statute, the court concluded that
"Union Pacific may maintain a nuisance claim even though the claim
does not involve adjacent property of neighboring property holders. 2 19
No other state has recognized a same property private nuisance
claim brought by the current owner of property against a former owner or
tenant. 220 Accordingly, in the vast majority of states, the owner of contaminated property cannot use nuisance law to recover a PRP's fair share
of cleanup costs regarding contamination that originated on the property
rather than on a neighboring property. Under this rule, the current owner
of most brownfield sites, former industrial facilities, and former landfills
would be barred from recovering cleanup costs under a private nuisance
theory and, after Aviall, could have no right to cleanup cost contribution
at all.
3. Market-Based Limitations: The Doctrine of CaveatEmptor
The neighboring property requirement bars landowners in most
states from recovering cleanup costs from predecessor PRPs under a private nuisance theory. A closely related barrier to recovery also faced by
landowners is the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor.221 The commentary

215.
Id. at 863, 867.
216. Id. at 867.
217. Id.
218.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (West 2006).
219.
Union Pac.R.R., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
220.
Some courts have permitted a landlord to recover cleanup costs from a tenant under a
private nuisance theory. See, e.g., Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1250 (D. Conn. 1992) (applying Connecticut law). Other relationship-based theories may also be
available to a landlord for recovery of cleanup costs from a tenant, including waste (failure to restore
property to pre-leasehold condition) or breach of contract (e.g., breach of warranty regarding property usage or breach of lease provision requiring restoration of property to pre-leasehold condition).
221.
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 12, at 356 (observing that historically "private nuisance has
had virtually no application in cases where current waste site owners and operators seek contribution

436

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 352, summarizes the application of caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware") to the vendor of land:
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was
that, in the absence of express agreement, the vendor of the land was
not liable to his vendee, or a fortiori to any other person, for the condition of the land existing at the time of transfer. As to sales of land
this rule has retained much of its original force, and the implied warranties which have grown up around the sale of chattels never have
developed. This is perhaps because great importance always has been
attached to the deed of conveyance, which is taken to represent the
full agreement of the parties, and to exclude all other terms and liabilities. The vendee is required to make his own inspection of the
premises, and the vendor is not responsible
to him for their defective
222
condition, existing at the time of transfer.
Caveat emptor proponents embrace economic arguments to support its
application to cleanup cost claims by a vendee against a vendor of real
property. They argue that the doctrine encourages: (a) thorough inspection of the property by the vendee; (b) full disclosure of property defects
by the vendor to avoid misrepresentation liability; and (c) the clear, efficient shifting of risk regarding
property conditions without wasteful liti2 23
gation transaction costs.
Indeed, many states recognize caveat emptor as a defense to claims
by the purchaser of real property against the seller with regard to property conditions existing on the transferred land, including private nuisance claims relating to hazardous substance contamination.22 4 For exfrom previous landowners for the costs of cleaning waste. The reason behind this lack of application
is the adherence of the courts to the doctrine of caveat emptor.").
222.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 352, cmt. a (1965).

223.
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 12, at 365-67 (arguing in favor of applying caveat emptor to
private party nuisance claims); Michael Andrew O'Hara, The Utilization of Caveat Emptor in
CERCLA Private Party Cleanups, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 160 (1993) ("As a defense,
caveat emptor completely disallows any recovery to a plaintiff who has had ample opportunity to
examine the item under consideration. Allowing the defense of caveat emptor creates an incentive
for the purchaser to inspect closely the good being purchased. This incentive is desirable from an
equity standpoint because it promotes a true 'meeting of the minds' in transactions, placing the
purchaser and seller on equal terms."); see also Truck Components, Inc. v. K-H Corp., No. 94-C
50250, 1995 WL 692541, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1995) (rejecting same property private nuisance
claim and observing without expressly referencing caveat emptor that "[a] suit for private nuisance
between successive owners of the same property would effectively displace the market's allocation
of risks and subject sellers to unbargained for future liability to remote buyers.").
224.
See Klein, supra note 12, at 356 ("Historically, however, private nuisance has had virtually no application in cases where current waste site owners and operators seek contribution from
previous landowners for the costs of cleaning waste. The reason behind this lack of application is the
adherence of the courts to the doctrine of caveat emptor."); cf, e.g., James B. Brown & Glen C.
Hansen, Nuisance Law and Petroleum UndergroundStorage Tank Contamination: Plugging the
Hole in the Statutes, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 643, 683-94 (1994) (arguing in favor of predecessor owner
liability for leaking underground storage tank contamination). See also, e.g., Gordon v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., No. CIV. A. 10753, 1997 WL 298320, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997) (stating that
under Delaware law, caveat emptor applied to private nuisance claim by vendee of contaminated
property against vendor); Wilson Auto Enters., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101, 107
(D.R.I. 1991) (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings, because "[wlhen Wilson purchased
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ample, the Third Circuit embraced caveat emptor as an alternative
ground to bar PECO's private nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law in
PhiladelphiaElectric Co. v. Hercules, Inc. 225 In PhiladelphiaElectric,
the court recognized that Pennsylvania law had abolished the rule of caveat emptor as to the sale of new homes by a builder-vendor.2 26 The
court nevertheless concluded that where "corporations of roughly equal
resources contract for the sale of an industrial property, and especially
where the dispute is over a condition on the land rather than a structure,
caveat emptor remains the rule. 227 Similarly, in Amland Properties
Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America,228 a federal district court in New
Jersey held that caveat emptor barred a property owner from asserting a
private nuisance claim against the vendor / prior owner for the cost of
remediating polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination. 29 Likewise, a New York federal district court in Westwood Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. National Fuel Gas DistributionCorp.,230 granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that New York courts would apply the doctrine of
caveat emptor to preclude a private nuisance claim by a current property
owner against a former owner for the costs of remediating soil and
groundwater contamination. 231 The Westwood court, however, would
not apply caveat emptor to dismiss the current owner's damages claim
on a public nuisance theory. The court attempted to distinguish private
nuisance caveat emptor cases by concluding that

the property from LRRC in an arms-length transaction, he lost any possible standing to sue the
previous owners and lessees in negligence, nuisance, trespass, or strict liability"); Rosenblatt v.
Exxon Co., U.S.A., 642 A.2d 180, 188 n.7 (Md. 1994) (rejecting same property private nuisance
claim, and noting that "the common law rule of caveat emptor, although legislatively abrogated in
the context of residential property, is still applicable in Maryland with regard to the sale of commercial property"); Middlebury Office Park Ltd. P'ship. v. Timex Corp., No. 3:95-CV-2160 (EBB),
1998 WL 351583, at *4 n.2 (D. Conn. 1998) (dismissing private nuisance claim because "[i]n Connecticut, the tort of nuisance is only applicable where a person is 'making use of his own property so
as to occasion unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor"' and because "claims asserted by
a landowner against a former owner of property are barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor unless
they fall within two limited exceptions: first, the defects existing in the property were not discoverable upon reasonable inspection by the purchaser, and, second, the seller was chargeable with
knowledge of the defects").
225. Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that
caveat emptor barred current landowner's claim against successor to former owner).
226. Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F. 2d at 312.
227. Id. at 313.
228. Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1989).
229. AmlandProps.Corp., 711 F. Supp. at 808.
230. Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y.
1990).
231.
WestwoodPharmn. Inc., 737 F. Supp. at 1282-84. The Westwood court stated:
While the New York Court of Appeals has abolished the defense of caveat emptor in
cases involving contracts for the construction and sale of homes.... Westwood has provided no convincing reason for this court to assume that the Court of Appeals would
likewise refuse to apply the doctrine where, as in the present case, the vendor and the
vendee of the property at issue are both sophisticated commercial enterprises who agreed
to a purchase price based, apparently in large part, on the condition of the property at the
time of conveyance.
Id.(citation omitted).
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[i]n light of the different interests and public-policy concerns involved in public-nuisance actions, the court has not been convinced
that New York courts would dismiss Westwood's claim. This conclusion is bolstered by the nature of the alleged public nuisance involved here, contamination of the environment by hazardous substances. Knowledge about the hazards to public health and to the environment posed by hazardous wastes is increasing constantly, and
this court is not willing to assume that the New York law of public
nuisance is too inflexible to meet the growing public need for avenues to address these hazards, including lawsuits where public interests are being
protected through a cause of action brought by a pri23 2
party.
vate

Some states have refused to apply caveat emptor to private nuisance
claims relating to hazardous substance contamination.2 33
For example, in Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp.,234 the purchaser of a chemical manufacturing plant sued
the seller in a Maine federal court to recover cleanup costs under a varie moved
oe to
ods
ety of theories, including private nuisance. 235 The seller
dis
miss the buyer's tort claims, arguing that sections 352236 and 353237 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts barred vendor liability to the
232.
Id. at 1282; ef Klein, supra note 12, at 361-62 (noting that, while courts that apply caveat
emptor to private nuisance claims will not do so to private claims for public nuisance, application of
the special injury rule may have same limiting effect on actions against prior owner as caveat emptor
does in private nuisance cases). Although public and private nuisance address different interests, a
private party bringing a public nuisance claim nevertheless seeks a remedy (damages or injunctive
relief) relating to a private injury (e.g., the "special injury" that gave the plaintiff standing to bring
the claim). Id.
233.
See, e.g., Sealy Conn., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. Conn. 1997)
(holding that caveat emptor did not bar nuisance claim by lessor against lessee, but did bar nuisance
claim by vendee against vendor); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp.
925, 932-33 (D. Me. 1990) (applying Maine law).
234.
759 F. Supp. 925 (D. Me. 1990).
235.
Hanlin Group,Inc., 759 F. Supp at 927.
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 (1965) (providing that: "[eixcept as stated in §
353, a vendor of land is not subject to liability for physical harm caused to his vendee or others while
upon the land after the vendee has taken possession by any dangerous condition, whether natural or
artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee took possession").
237.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965) provides:

(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition,
whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is
subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee
or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after the vendee has taken
possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and
(h) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.
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vendee.238 The court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis of caveat
emptor.239 The court noted that the Maine Law Court previously had
declined to apply caveat emptor to the sale of new houses by a builder
vendor and had not yet addressed a private nuisance claim for chemical
contamination of land caused by a vendor.240 The court concluded that it
could not assume that Maine state courts would apply caveat emptor to
contaminated property tort disputes.24 1
Buyers and sellers of real property should be able to expressly and
knowingly allocate responsibility between them for addressing contamination found on transferred property.242 Applying caveat emptor to same
property contamination private nuisance cases accepts the primacy of the
economic theory underlying the doctrine by automatically effecting a
default allocation of cleanup cost risks to the buyer as a matter of law.
There remains, however, an underlying tension between, on the one
hand, economic theory assuming that a real property transfer resulting
from arm's length, misrepresentation-free bargaining reflects an efficient
allocation of risk that the law should respect, and on the other hand, environmental policy encouraging proactive remediation through the equitable allocation of cleanup cost responsibilities. The issue is not whether
transactional circumstances and market forces are relevant to private
cleanup cost disputes. They are. Instead, the question with which courts
must wrestle is how these factors should affect the allocation of cleanup
cost responsibilities, i.e., should caveat emptor (or related issues such as
purchaser knowledge of site conditions reflected, perhaps, in a discounted purchase price) provide a complete defense to vendor liability or
instead affect the nature and scope of any remedy.243
238. Hanlin Group, Inc., 759 F. Supp. at 932.
239. Id. at 933. The court nevertheless granted the seller's motion to dismiss on the ground
that Maine law only permitted private nuisance claims in disputes involving neighboring properties.
Id. at 935.
240.
Id. at 932-33.
241.
Id. at 933.
242.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (West 2006) (nothing in subsection barring agreements to
transfer liability under CERCLA "shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a
party to such agreement for any liability under this section"); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1996) (business purchase agreement indemnification agreement
enforceable against seller as "responsible parties can lawfully allocate CERCLA response costs
among themselves while remaining jointly and severally liable to the government for the entire
clean-up"); see also infra notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
243.
See, e.g., Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 360, 364
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss private and public nuisance and trespass claims for
property damage regarding contamination that migrated from neighboring property, rejecting defendant's argument that pre-purchase knowledge of contamination barred liability but noting that proof
of such knowledge may be considered by the jury in determining damages); W. Props. Serv. Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 691 (9th Cir. 2004) (buyer aware of environmental hazards as evidenced by reduced purchase price precluded from recovering entire cost of cleanup); see also Joseph
Y. Ybarra, Refining California 's "Consent" Defense in Environmental Nuisance Cases: Determining the ProperScope ofLiability for Responsible FormerOwners, 74 S.CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1215-21
(2001) (analyzing role of "consent" defense to private nuisance claims in context of cases involving
(a) release agreements in recent transfers of property, (b) older transfers of property; (c) "as is"
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4. Temporal Limitations: The Doctrine of Continuing Nuisance
Many polluted sites were contaminated decades ago. Under
CERCLA, the fact that a PRP contaminated a site long ago would not
present a statute of limitations problem because (1) CERCLA imposes
retroactive liability and (2) the limitations periods for recovering costs
under CERCLA sections 107(a) and 113(f) are measured from the completion of remedial activity244 or the date of a CERCLA settlement or
judgment creating rights to contribution, 245 respectively. After Aviall,
however, a federal law cleanup cost remedy may no longer be available
to most PRPs.
Under state law, the statute of limitations can present insurmountable problems at older contamination sites. The limitations period for246a
nuisance claim generally begins to run when the nuisance is created
or, under the discovery rule, when the potential plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the claim.247
Because tortious injury to property is considered an injury to the
property itself rather than to the property owner, the limitations period
does not begin to run anew every time ownership of the property changes
hands. 248 As a result, a current landowner who only recently discovered
agreements; and (d) purchaser awareness of contamination at the time of sale); cf, e.g., N.Y. Tel.
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 473 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (under New York law, prior
owner nuisance liability was terminated if there was reasonable opportunity for the new owner to
discover harmful conditions on the property).
Section 113(g)(2) provides that a section 107(a) claim to recover the cost of a removal
244.
action must be brought within three years of the completion of a removal action and a section 107(a)
claim to recover the costs of a remedial action must be brought within six years "after initiation of
physical on-site construction of remedial action." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(2) (West 2006); see also
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(23) (defining "removal"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(24) (defining "remedial").
Section 113(g)(3) provides that no action for response cost contribution may be com245.
menced more than three years after the date of: (a) entry of judgment under CERCLA for recovery
of response costs; (b) a de minimis settlement under CERCLA section 122(g); (c) a cost recovery
settlement under CERCLA section 122(h); or (d) entry of a judicially approved response cost settlement. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(3).
See, e.g., Mangini 1,281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]here a private
246.
citizen sues for damage from a permanent nuisance, the statute of limitations begins to run upon
creation of the nuisance.").
See, e.g., McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App.
247.
1999) (under California law, "the period of limitations will begin to run without regard to whether
the plaintiff is aware of the specific facts necessary to establish his claim, provided that he has...
'notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry."' (citations omitted)).
CERCLA section 309(a)(1) applies a "federally required commencement date" to state statutes of
limitation when the state law commencement date would provide a shorter limitations period. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9658(a)(1) (West 2006). The "federally required commencement date" is defined in
CERCLA section 309(b)(4) as "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that
the personal injury or property damages [allegedly caused by a CERCLA hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant] were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant concerned." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658(b)(4); see also Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
303 F.3d 176, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2002) (federally required commencement date preempts state statute
of limitations if state law otherwise would provide for earlier commencement date).
See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co. v. S.Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 556 (Cal. Ct. App.
248.
1996) ("In an action involving tortious injury to property, the injury is considered to be to the property itself rather than to the property owner, and thus the running of the statute of limitations against
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contamination or learned of its significance may find a nuisance claim
time-barred if a prior landowner had discovered the problem years before.
Otherwise time-barred nuisance claims for older contamination
problems may survive depending on whether the nuisance is characterized as "continuing" rather than "permanent., 249 Broadly speaking, if an
interference with the use or enjoyment of property "will not terminate or
be abated, the nuisance is said to be permanent., 250 If a nuisance is characterized as permanent, the plaintiff must recover all past, present, and
future damages from the activity in a single action. 251 Once the limitations period has expired, however, all claims for permanent nuisance
damages are time-barred.

a claim bars the owner and all subsequent owners of the property."); see also Bauer v. Weeks, 600
S.E.2d 700, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant on a property
damage tort claim regarding defective synthetic stucco exterior cladding even though limitations
period expired before the plaintiff purchased property because, under Georgia law, "if a homeowner
sells a house after the statute of limitations has run, the conveyance does not revive the cause of
action" for defects in the house); cf Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.
283, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (applying California law to dismiss private nuisance claim as time
barred where the plaintiff, who acquired property beyond the three year California limitations period
and four years after the release of pollutants ceased, failed to allege lack of knowledge about the
state of property or justifiable delay in discovering contamination). For same property private nuisance claims, the statute of limitations presumably could not begin to run until the owner responsible
for contaminating the site sold the property. The limitations period then would begin to run when
the successor owner discovered or should have discovered the contamination under the applicable
state or federal discovery rule. See supra note 247. Statutes of limitations applicable to nuisance
claims traditionally look to historic conduct (when the last act constituting the cause of action occurred) or the consequence of historic conduct (when the contamination caused by defendant was
abated). Alternatively, states could take a prospective approach to environmental nuisance statutes
of repose, with the trigger for the limitations period based not on historic acts but on remedial conduct, e.g., a designated period of time after plaintiff first incurs cleanup costs. Cf, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A.
§9613(g) (West 2006) (CERCLA section 107(a) cost recovery statutes of limitations triggered by
dates of removal or remedial expenditures); see also Kay, supra note 154, at 172 (proposing environmental negligence cause of action that would toll statute of limitations during pendency of site
investigation). Under such an approach, subsequent property owners would still be able to assert a
nuisance-based claim for cleanup costs if the statute of limitations began to run afresh for each
landowner who incurred cleanup costs. On the other hand, this variation on the discovery rule would
conflict with policies of finality underlying statutes of limitations and present complications arising
from different statutes of limitations applying to nuisance claims depending on the nature of the
damages sought.
249. See infra notes 272-349 and accompanying text. Some jurisdictions refer to a "continuing" nuisance as a "temporary" nuisance.
250. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 468 (2000). The distinction between permanent and continuing nuisance can vary dramatically by state. See supra notes 259-334 and accompanying text.
251.

JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 84(b)(ii) (permanent nuisance damages

include diminution in property value and lost opportunity to sell the property); see, e.g., Baker v.
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 218 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294 (Cal. 1985) (all past, present and
future permanent nuisance damages to be recovered in single action); Mitchell Energy Corp. v.
Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (submitting claim for future damages to jury
constituted election to proceed on permanent nuisance theory); City of Clanton v. Johnson, 17 So. 2d
669, 672 (Ala. 1944) (all permanent nuisance damages, including diminution in property value, must
be sought in single suit).
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In contrast, a "continuing nuisance" broadly speaking is an interference with the use and enjoyment of property that can be terminated.252 A
plaintiff may bring successive continuing nuisance actions so long as the
harmful inference continues; new causes of action effectively continue to
accrue until the inference comes to an end.253 Because a continuing nuisance can stop or be abated at some point in the future, continuing nuisance remedies typically are limited to injunctive relief to abate the nuisance, an action for damages that accrued during the nuisance limitations
period, or both.2 54 As discussed below, characterization of a nuisance as
252.
See, e.g., Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (under
California law, a nuisance is continuing if offensive condition can be discontinued or reasonably
abated at any time); N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Minn. 1963) (under
Minnesota law, "[w]here a structure is erected or junk is stored and the harmful effect is 'one that
may be abated or discontinued at any time,' there is 'a continuing wrong so long as the offending
object remains,' and the courts regard such as a continuing trespass." (footnote omitted)).
253.
See, e.g., Wilshire Westwood Ass'n v. At. Richfield Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 569 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]here the nuisance involves a use which may be discontinued at any time, it is
characterized as a continuing nuisance, and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for
damages until the nuisance is abated."); Tri-County Inv. Group, Ltd. v. So. States, Inc., 500 S.E.2d
22, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 28 S.E. 994, 998 (Ga.
1897), to show that under Georgia law, "where a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is
one which can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it, every continuance of
the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action will lie").
254.
See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 251, § 84(b)(i) ("For a temporary nuisance, i.e., a nuisance
that a plaintiff may seek to abate or, at its election, seek damages, when the plaintiff elects damages,
the award will cover losses only up to the date of the commencement of the action or the date of
trial."). Continuing nuisance damages typically are limited to damages consistent with the nonpermanent nature of the nuisance (e.g., abatement costs, lost rental, lost use) suffered during the
limitations period. For example, in a state with a three year statute of limitations for nuisance, a
continuing nuisance plaintiff could only recover damages suffered during the three years before the
suit was filed. See, e.g., Lyons v. Twp. of Wayne, 888 A.2d 426, 434 (N.J. 2005) ("One who suffers
a continuing nuisance, therefore, is able to collect damages for each injury suffered within the limitations period." (citation omitted)); Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 543 S.E.2d 563, 567
(S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (continuing nuisance damages limited to previously unrecovered damages
suffered during limitations period). These courts typically hold that prospective damages (e.g.,
diminution in property value, stigma to property value) are unavailable to a continuing nuisance
plaintiff. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1952) (directing trial court to
determine whether landslide onto plaintiff's property constituted a permanent nuisance; if so, the
court should award diminution in property damages and if not, the court should award injunctive
relief to abate the nuisance); Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 869
(Cal. 1985) ("[I]f a nuisance is a use which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages until the
nuisance is abated. Recovery is limited, however, to actual injury suffered prior to commencement
of each action. Prospective damages are unavailable." (citation omitted)). Some courts, however,
have treated a nuisance as continuing only for statute of limitations purposes, choosing to award a
"permanent" (i.e., prospective) nuisance damage remedy. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (D. Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium released
from nearby nuclear weapons plant constituted continuing nuisance and trespass for statute of limitations purposes, and could provide basis for prospective, diminution in value damages effectively
purchasing an easement for invasion to continue); Beatty v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 860
F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[N]uisances may be classified for two distinct purposes, one for
the assessment of damages, and the other for the application of the statute of limitations."); cf
Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini111), 912 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Cal. 1996) (holding that plaintiff
failed to prove nuisance was continuing and, because permanent nuisance claim was time-barred,
declining to decide whether the same characterization of a nuisance as permanent or continuing
should apply for both limitations and damages purposes). See infra note 439 and accompanying
text.
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permanent or continuing thus has three distinct consequences: (a) when
the claim accrues (i.e., is claim barred by the applicable statute of limitations); (b) whether a series of successive nuisance suits is permitted (i.e.,
whether the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent nuisance suit for
later accruing damages caused by an unabated nuisance); and (c) whether
damages are available for future or only past injuries."'
At first blush, the "continuing nuisance" doctrine would seem to
eliminate statute of limitations problems for private nuisance claims arising from the remediation of older contamination. Closer examination,
however, demonstrates dramatic variation regarding how courts define a
continuing nuisance 256 and, indeed, whether the continuing nuisance
doctrine is available at all. 257 These variations, in turn, can determine
whether any state common law private cleanup cost remedy exists for
older contamination conditions.258
A review of continuing nuisance law across the country reveals a
range of different approaches to distinguishing between a "continuing"
and a "permanent" nuisance. These standards vary depending on
whether the focus of the inquiry is on: (a) the failure of the defendant to
abate the offensive condition; (b) the nature of the conduct creating the
255.

See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §

5.11(l) (2d ed. 1993).
256.
See, e.g., Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 272-73 (Tex. 2004) ("in
other jurisdictions there is no consensus as to where the line between permanent and temporary
nuisances should be... or how it should be applied .. "); Kay, supra note 154, at 166-67 (discussing different definitions of continuing nuisance); see also Robert E. King, Chemical Contamination
in California: A Continuing Nuisance, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 483, 489-90 (1997) (arguing that
failure of California legislature or courts to define standards distinguishing between permanent and
continuing nuisance in contaminated property cases has led to conflicting judicial outcomes); G.
Nelson Smith, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in EnvironmentalLitigation:Legislative Inaction and
Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 39, 48-49 (1995) (noting that plaintiffs turn to
common law nuisance and trespass actions to address petroleum contamination because of CERCLA
and California state Superfund statute petroleum exclusion but that "what constitutes a nuisance or
trespass is not defined in the California Code, particularly as applied to environmental matters. As a
result, courts are compelled to hypothesize as to the true meaning of an environmental nuisance or
trespass, and as to when a cause of action under such theories accrues. Such lack of statutory guidance has led to inconsistent interpretations, many times within the same jurisdiction, causing both
plaintiffs and defendants in environmental nuisance and trespass litigation to question the actual
availability of such remedies.").
257.
See infra notes 330-34 and accompanying text.
258.
Most states recognize both "continuing nuisance" and "continuing trespass" theories and
apply a common distinction between "permanent" and "continuing" torts to each cause of action.
See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 1), 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841-42 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (applying common standard for distinguishing between permanent and continuing trespass
and nuisance). Some states do not extend the "continuing tort" doctrine to negligence or strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity claims, thereby limiting the availability of these theories for disputes
involving older contamination sites. Compare, e.g., Church v. Gen. Elec. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 169,
174 (D. Mass. 2001) (under Massachusetts law, continuing tort doctrine is limited to nuisance and
trespass claims and does not apply to negligence or strict liability claims), with Nat'l Tel. Co-op.
Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1998) (under District of Columbia law, continuing tort theory applied to toll five year limitations period on commercial property owner's negligence and strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity claims alleging that gasoline leaking from a
neighbor's underground storage tanks).
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offensive condition; (c) any social benefit derived from the condition, or
(d) the prospective impact or form of the condition.
a. Continued Abatable Harm
In some states, the "continuing" nature of a nuisance turns on
whether the offensive condition is "abatable.,, 259 In these jurisdictions, a
new cause of action accrues every day, in effect, because of the defendant's continued failure to abate a nuisance for which the defendant is
liable, resulting in the continued presence of an offensive condition. The
Mangini decisions illustrate the abatability standard.
As described above, in 1991, the California Court of Appeal in
Mangini I held that California's broad statutory definition of private nuisance allows a current landowner to maintain a private nuisance action
against the former tenant of a prior landowner. 260 That holding, however, did not clear the way for the plaintiffs nuisance claim to proceed
because the defendant also argued that the plaintiffs claim should be
dismissed as a time-barred permanent nuisance action. 26 1 The court
agreed that a permanent nuisance claim was time-barred but allowed
plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging continuing nuisance.262
The court stressed that under California law "the crucial distinction between a permanent and continuing nuisance is whether the nuisance may
be discontinued or abated, 263 and observed that:
[P]laintiffs land may be subject to a continuing nuisance even
though defendant's offensive conduct ended years ago. That is be259.
See, e.g., Valdez v. Mtn. Bell Tel. Co., 755 P.2d 80, 84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (presence of
utility pole that could be "easily removed at a reasonable expense" constitutes a temporary nuisance); Fletcher v. City of Indep., 708 S.W.2d 158, 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (nuisance should be
characterized as "temporary" if it is "scientifically possible and reasonably practicable" to abate);
Knight v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Mont. 1992) ("We have held that a nuisance is a
continuing nuisance when: ... at all times, the [defendant] could have abated the nuisance by taking
curative action. Since the nuisance was so terminable, it cannot be deemed to be a permanent nuisance as of the creation date .... "); N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Minn.
1963) ("[T]he harmful effect is 'one that may be abated or discontinued at any time."'); Russo
Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 675 A.2d 1077, 1086 (N.J. 1996) ("[N]uisance is continuing
when it is the result of a condition that can be physically removed or legally abated. In such a case, it
is realistic to impute a continuing duty to the defendant to remove the nuisance, and to conclude that
each new injury includes all elements of a nuisance, including a new breach of duty."); Caron v.
Margolin, 147 A. 419, 420 (Me. 1929) (describing continuing nuisance as a nuisance that "is not of
such a permanent nature that it can not readily be removed and thus abated"); City of Phoenix v.
Johnson, 75 P.2d 30, 34-35 (Ariz. 1938) ("If it is within the power of the person by the exercise of
skill and labor to abate the nuisance, he must do so. If he fails in his duty, but allows the same to
continue, he is responsible for maintaining a continuing nuisance .... If one responsible for maintaining a nuisance is unable by the exercise of skill and labor to abate it, then it is to be regarded as
permanent, because it will continue indefinitely without change .
.
260.
See supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
261.
Mangini1, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
262.
Id. at 841. The court also held that the continuing/permanent distinction applies equally to
private nuisance claims and to private suits for damages based on public nuisances. Id. at 839, 842
n.15.
263.
Id. at 840.
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cause the "continuing" nature of the nuisance refers to the continuing
damage caused by the offensive condition, not to the acts causing the
offensive condition to occur.264
Mangini I held that a nuisance was continuing if it was "abat-

able., 26 5 The court, however, did not define what it meant for a nuisance
to be "abatable." This issue was not clarified until after the remanded
case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded plaintiffs $13.2 million in
damages.266 The California Court of Appeal overturned the jury's verdict in Mangini II, ruling that the trial court should have granted defen-

dant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the contamination was a continuing
nuisance, i.e., that it was "abatable. 2 67 In 1996, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal (Mangini 111).268 The court concluded that evidence of "mere technological feasibility" alone could not
prove abatability.269 Instead, the court held that a nuisance was "abatable"-and thus continuing-if it could be "remedied at a reasonable
cost by reasonable means. 270 No such evidence was offered at trial;
indeed, there was no evidence of how the site actually would be remediated. 271 The court concluded that defendant was entitled to judgment

notwithstanding the verdict because:
[W]e do not know how much land or water has to be decontaminated.
We do not know how deep the decontamination would have to go.
We have no idea how much it would cost but know only that it would
cost unascertainable millions of dollars. [T] On this27 record,
there is
2
no substantial evidence that the nuisance is abatable.

264. Id. at 841. The court applied the same "abatability" standard to conclude that plaintiff
could file an amended complaint alleging a continuing trespass claim. Id.; see also supra note 258.
265. Id. at 840.
266.
Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (ManginiIl), 912 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Cal. 1996).
267. Id. at 1224; see also Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini I), 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696,
708 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Pursuant to California Rule of Court 976(d)(1), the Court of Appeal
decision in ManginiH could not be considered published once the California Supreme Court granted
Mangini's petition for review. See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 976(d)(1).
268.
Mangini111, 912 P.2d at 1221.
269. Id. at 1227.
270. Id. at 1229.
271.
The Plaintiffs' own experts testified that there was not enough known yet to assess what
remedial measures would be necessary or effective, and the plaintiffs' counsel in closing argument
acknowledged a lack of evidence about the extent of site contamination or what it would take to
decontaminate plaintiff's property. Id. at 1225, 1227. The court also noted that there was no evidence that a government regulatory agency had set cleanup levels for the site. Id. at 1227. Some
courts have looked to site cleanup levels set by a regulatory agency as evidence that site contamination presumptively was abatable and as evidence of the degree of cleanup required to effect reasonable abatement. See, e.g., Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562,
569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (agency letter advising that cleanup satisfied agency concerns demonstrated that nuisance was abatable and thus continuing); Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
796, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("We are satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsible public agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be done to abate contamination in particular cases.").
272.
Mangini111, 912 P.2d at 1230.
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Absent evidence that the contamination could be abated at a reasonable
cost and by reasonable means, the court deemed the plaintiffs' claim to
be a claim for permanent nuisance and thus barred by the statute of limitations.2 73
b. Continued Presence of Harmful Condition
Some courts have held that contamination constitutes a continuing
nuisance as long as it remains on the plaintiffs property, without regard
to whether the contamination is reasonably abatable. For example, in
Hoery v. United States,274 the plaintiff sued the United States in a Colorado federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that toxic
chemicals negligently released into the ground at an Air Force base had
migrated onto the plaintiff's residential property. 275 The government
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs nuisance and trespass claims as timebarred under Colorado's two year statute of limitations, arguing that all
government operations causing the release of the chemicals had stopped
by 1994 and that while the plaintiff knew or should have known about

Id. at 1221. Other states have similarly embraced reasonable abatability as the standard
273.
for continuing nuisance. See, e.g., Traver Lakes Cmty. Maint. Ass'n v. Douglas Co., 568 N.W.2d
847, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (continuing nuisance is "abatable by reasonable curative or remedial
action"); Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 179 (Or. 1977) ("Temporary injury, or injury
which is reasonably susceptible of repair, justifies damages measured by the loss of use or rental
value during the period of the injury, or the cost of restoration, or both, depending on the circumstances."); City of Sioux Falls v. Miller, 492 N.W.2d 116, 118 (S.D. 1992) ("[I]f a structure, even
though permanent, can be changed, repaired, or remedied at a reasonable expense to abate a nuisance, the condition is temporary." (quoting 58 AM. JUR. 2D § 30)); Pate v. City of Martin, 614
S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981) ("A nuisance which can be corrected by the expenditure of labor or
money is a temporary nuisance. Where the nuisance is temporary, damages to property affected by
the nuisance are recurrent and may be recovered from time to time until the nuisance is abated."
(citation omitted)); Hedgepath v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 559 S.E.2d 327, 337 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("A
continuing nuisance is defined as a nuisance that is intermittent or periodical. It is described as one
which occurs so often that it is said to be continuing although it is not necessarily constant or unceasing. A nuisance is continuing if abatement is reasonably and practically possible."); Valdez v. Mtn.
Bell Tel. Co., 755 P.2d 80, 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) ("Courts have also distinguished between a
permanent or temporary structure or nuisance. A permanent structure or nuisance is one that may not
be readily remedied, removed or abated at a reasonable expense, or one of a durable character evidently intended to last indefinitely, costing as much to alter as to build."); Taylor v. Culloden Pub.
Serv. Dist., 591 S.E.2d 197, 203 (W. Va. 2003) ("A nuisance is temporary or continuing where it is
remediable, removable, or abatable, or if abatement is reasonably and practicably possible, or, according to some cases, where it is abatable at a reasonable cost, or by the expenditure of labor or
money, by the defendant, or by legal process at the instance of the injured party, against the will of
the person creating it."); Campbell v. Anderson, 866 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("When
a nuisance can be reasonably and practicably abated, it is a temporary nuisance."); Idaho Gold
Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 22 P.2d 147, 150-51 (Idaho 1933) (discharge of oil
and grease into waterway constituted permanent nuisance where jury could conclude that abatement
would be impractical); cf Isnard v. City of Coffeeyville, 917 P.2d 882, 889 (Kan. 1996) (nuisance
was not abatable and thus permanent); accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.530 (West 2006) (defining permanent nuisance as "any private nuisance that: (a) cannot be corrected or abated at reasonable
expense to the owner; and (b) is relatively enduring and not likely to be abated voluntarily or by
court order"); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.540 (West 2006) ("Any private nuisance that is not a
permanent nuisance shall be a temporary nuisance.").
64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2004).
274.
Hoery, 64 P.3d at 215-16.
275.
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the release by 1995, the suit was not filed until 1998.276 The court
granted the government's motion, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that
the continued presence and migration of chemicals constituted a continuing nuisance.277 The plaintiff appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court
accepted a request by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to answer two
questions pertaining to Colorado state law: "(1) Does the continued migration from defendant's property to plaintiffs property, allegedly
caused by chemical releases by the defendant, constitute continuing trespass and/or nuisance under Colorado law? (2) Does the ongoing presence of those toxic chemicals on plaintiffs property constitute continuing trespass and/or nuisance under Colorado law?, 278 The court answered both questions in the affirmative.27 9
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that:
[i]f the defendant causes the creation of a physical condition that is of
itself harmful, even after the activity that created it has ceased, a person who carried on the activity that created the condition is subject to
continuing liability for the physical condition. [T] For continuing intrusions - either by way of trespass or nuisance - each repetition or

continuance amounts to another wrong, giving rise to a new cause of
action. The practical significance of the continuing tort concept is
that for statue of limitation purposes, the claim
does not begin to ac280
crue until the tortuous conduct has ceased.
In contrast, the court distinguished cases characterizing irrigation ditches
and the location of railway lines as permanent nuisances 28 1 because those
structures were designed to promote the state's economic develop-

276. ld.at 216-17.
277. Jd. at 217.
278. Id. at 215.
279. Id. at 218.
280. Id. (citations omitted). The court relied on comment (e) to section 834 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
Activities that create a physical condition differ from other activities in that they may
cause an invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land after the activity
itself ceases. When the invasion continues only so long as the activity is carried on, a person who ceases to have any part in the activity is not liable for the continuance of the invasion by others. But if the activity has resulted in the creation of a physical condition
that is of itself harmful after the activity that created it has ceased, a person who carried
on the activity that created the condition or who participated to a substantial extent in the
activity is subject to the liability for a nuisance, for the continuing harm. His active conduct has been a substantial factor in creating the harmful condition and so long as his
condition continues the harm is traceable to him. This is true even though he is no longer
in a position to abate the condition and to stop the harm. If he creates the condition upon
land in his possession and thereafter sells or leases it to another, he is subject to liability
for invasions caused by the condition after the sale or lease as well as for those occurring
before. When the vendor or lessor has created the condition his liability continues until
the vendee or lessee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. e (1965).

281.

Hoery, 64 P.3d at 219-20.
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ment.282 Accordingly, the court concluded that the only exception under
Colorado law to a continuing nuisance where a defendant fails to eliminate an ongoing harmful physical condition wrongfully placed on plaintiff's land is where the invasion serves a "socially beneficial" purpose
intended to be permanent.283 The court found the exception inapplicable
in Hoery. The court reasoned that:
public policy favors the discontinuance of both the continuing migration and the ongoing presence of toxic chemicals into Hoery's property and irrigation well. Under Colorado law, a tortfeasor's liability
for continuing trespass and nuisance creates a new cause of action
each day the property invasion continues. Hence, the alleged tortfeasor has an incentive
to stop the property invasion and rem6ve the
284
cause of damage.

Unlike the Mangini III decision, the Hoery analysis did not further require a showing that contamination could be abated by reasonable means
at a reasonable cost as a condition to characterizing it as a continuing
nuisance. 281
282.
Id. at 220.
283.
Id.; accord Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (D. Colo. 2004)
(applying Hoery and Colorado law and holding that a tort based on property invasion that continues
in fact is a continuing tort unless the invasion will continue indefinitely and the invasion "is integral
to an enterprise vital to the development of the state."); see also infra note 354. The Hoery court
also recognized as a separate basis for finding a continuing nuisance the fact that the toxic pollution
continued to migrate unabated onto plaintiff's land. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222. See infra notes 315-24
and accompanying text. Other courts have focused on the continued presence of a harmful condition
to characterize a nuisance as continuing. See, e.g., Bradley v. Am. Smelting and Ref. Co., 709 P.2d
782, 791-92 (Wash. 1985) (applying Washington law); Kulpa v. Stewart's Ice Cream, 534 N.Y.S.2d
518, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (continuing nuisance claim stated where contamination that migrated from underground storage tanks removed from neighboring property remained in plaintiff's
well). Applying Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit in Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997),
also employed a continued presence approach in the context of a continuing trespass case. The court
reversed a district court order granting a motion to dismiss a continuing trespass claim based on
continued presence of contaminants on plaintiff's property because "under Ohio law, a claim for
continuing trespass may be supported by proof of continuing damages and need not be based on
allegations of continuing conduct" and noted that defendants "may be ordered to remove the uranium waste if the trespass is determined to be continuing and abatable." Nieman, 108 F. 3d at 1559.
In dissent, Judge Krupansky argued that under Ohio law the dumping of waste constitutes a permanent trespass and nuisance, contending that the majority opinion "unjustifiably licenses the plaintiff
to assert a stale permanent tort claim which could and should have been litigated within four years of
Nieman's constructive discovery of the alleged radiation emissions caused by the defendants." Id. at
1568 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
284.
Hoery, 64 P.3d at 223. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kourlis argued that a continuing
tort "theory that concentrates on the nature of the conduct of the tortfeasor is the one that comports
best with general tort law and the concepts of predictability and deterrence." Id. at 224.
285.
The court did observe that "the record at this stage of the litigation indicates that the
contamination is not permanent - that is, it is remediable or abatable. Although the United States did
not address the factual issue, Hoery's expert opined under oath that Hoery's property could be remediated." Id. at 222-23 (footnote omitted). See Coleman, supra note 139, at 53-54 ("In summary, the
[Hoery] court noted five reasons for reaching its conclusion. First, the TCE pollution is an ongoing
presence and migrates continuously onto Hoery's property. Second, the daily migration and presence of TCE on Hoery's property constitute the continuing tort. Third, the undisputed record shows
that the contamination is not permanent because it is abatable and remediable. Fourth, the pollution
is neither socially nor economically beneficial. Finally, public policy favors termination of the
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c. Continued Harmful Conduct
Other courts find that a continuing nuisance standard based on the
continued presence of contamination "would clearly undermine the purposes behind statutes of limitations., 286 Instead, these courts focus on
the defendant's continued polluting conduct or instrumentalities (e.g., a
currently leaking underground storage tank) as the basis for characterizing a nuisance as continuing rather than permanent. 287 For example, in
Union Pacific RailroadCompany v. Reilly,288 the current owner of Minnesota property brought a nuisance action in a Minnesota federal court
against the successor to the former property owner, alleging creosote that
had leached from storage tanks previously located on the property constituted a nuisance. 289 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the nuisance claim was time-barred. 290 The court found a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff discovered
the contamination within the limitations period, 29' but ruled that the continued presence of the creosote contamination did not constitute a continuing nuisance. 292 The court concluded that under Minnesota law:

continued migration and ongoing presence of TCE in Hoery's property." (footnote omitted)); Dana
L. Eismeier, Continuing Trespass and Nuisance for Toxic Chemicals, 32 COLO. LAW. 107, 110
(2003) (observing that the Colorado Supreme Court left unanswered in Hoery whether it "will adopt
a 'reasonableness' legal standard regarding what nuisances or trespasses can be abated"); cf Tatum
v. Basin Res., Inc., 141 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (stating, without supporting citation or
elaboration, that Hoery identified reasonable abatability as a permanent injury claim factor).
286. Breiggar Props. L.C. v. H. E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Utah 2002) (granting summary judgment for defendant contractor on ground that continued presence of debris dumped
on plaintiff landowner's property beyond the limitations period constituted a permanent rather than
continuing trespass). See infra notes 287-300 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Hicks Family Ltd. Partnership v. 1st Nat. Bank of Howell, No 268400, 2006 WL
2818514, at *9 (Mich. App. Oct 3, 2006) (stating that under Michigan law a plaintiff alleging continuing nuisance or trespass must show "continuing tortious acts, not merely continual harmful
effects from a completed act"); Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586, 594-95 (N.C. 1990)
(under North Carolina law, continued harm from migration of gasoline from present or former USTs
is a "renewing" nuisance rather than a "continuing," i.e., permanent, nuisance.); Soo Line R.R. Co.
v. Tang Indus., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 889, 896-97 (N.D. I11.1998) (private nuisance claim against a
tenant for contamination arising from tenant waste disposal time barred because under Illinois law
continuing tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts or conduct, not continued harm, so nuisance became permanent when lease expired and tenant vacated site); Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d
631, 639-40 (Alaska 1985) overruled on other grounds by Bibo v. Jeffrey's Rest., 770 P.2d 290, 292
n.9 (Alaska 1989) (continuing nuisance (or trespass) only where "repeated and continued tortious
acts are committed."); Anderson v. State, 965 P.2d 783, 789 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] continuing
tort is defined as one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated
until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a
statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an
original violation, and for there to be a continuing tort there must be a continuing duty."); Carpenter
v. Texaco, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 398, 399 (Mass. 1995) ("[A] continuing trespass or nuisance must be
based on recurring tortious or unlawful conduct and is not established by the continuation of harm
caused by previous but terminated tortious or unlawful conduct.").
288. 4 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998).
289.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 4. F. Supp. 2d. at 862-63.
290.
Id. at 863.
291.
Id. at 865.
292.
Id. at 867.
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[t]he continuous presence of the contaminants is insufficient to constitute a recurring damage. The disposal of creosote was in the nature of a permanent tort, rather than a continuing tort. To the extent
that leakage from storage tanks or basins could constitute a continuing wrong, such wrong ceased when the storage tanks and settling
basins no longer existed. There is no evidence of contamination or
damage as a consequence of conduct or events which recurred on or
after December 22, 1988. Thus, the court agrees with defendant that
the "continuing wrong" doctrine is inapplicable to plaintiff's
claims. 293
Similarly, in Carpenter v. Texaco, Inc.,294 the Supreme Judicial
Council of Massachusetts held that the continued presence of gasoline
contamination on the plaintiffs' property did not constitute a continuing
nuisance. In Carpenter, the plaintiffs' property was contaminated by
gasoline that had leaked from an underground storage tank formerly located on a nearby property. 295 Defendant Texaco had owned a gas station on that property but sold the station in 1980; the tank was removed
in 1981 and no continuing release of gasoline from the gas station property had occurred after 1984.296 The plaintiffs discovered the contamination in 1982 but did not bring their consolidated actions until 1991 and
1992.297 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Massachusetts' threeyear statute of limitations for permanent nuisance; plaintiffs contended
that the ongoing presence of the gasoline on their property constituted a
continuing nuisance. 298 The trial court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Council, which held that "a continuing trespass or nuisance must be based on recurring tortious or unlawful conduct and is not
established by the continuation of harm caused by previous but terminated tortious or unlawful conduct. 29 9 The court viewed the gasoline
seepage as a single encroachment that had stopped by 1985 and thus became a permanent nuisance.3 °°

Id.
293.
294.
646 N.E.2d 398 (Mass. 1995).
Carpenter,646 N.E.2d at 399.
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
Id. at 400 & n.4. The Carpentercourt distinguished Sixty-Eight Devonshire, Inc. v.
300.
Shapiro, 202 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Mass. 1964) (gutter repeatedly poured water onto the plaintiff's
property); and Asiala v. Fitchburg,505 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (continuing damage
from ongoing encroachment by defective retaining wall) as cases where "rights were being invaded
from time to time, and thus there were continuing trespasses or continuing nuisances" Carpenter, 646
N.E.2d at 400 n.4. The Carpenter court also distinguished Wishnewsky v. Saugus, 89 N.E.2d 783,
786 (Mass. 1950) (recurrent drainage system flooding harmed plaintiff's land); Wells v. New Haven
& Northampton Co., 23 N.E. 724 (Mass. 1890) (culvert repeatedly channeled water onto plaintiff's
property); and Prentiss v. Wood, 132 Mass. 486, 487 (1882) (dam repeatedly set water back on
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d. Predictability of Future Damage
Texas takes a "fairly unique" 30' approach to distinguishing between
permanent and "temporary" nuisances by looking at the predictability of
future harm arising from the nuisance rather than abatability or continued
harmful conduct. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Texas discussed this
standard at length in Schneider National Carriers,Inc. v. Bates.302 In
Schneider National Carriers,nearby residents sued industrial plant operators, alleging that air contaminants, odors, lights, and noise emitted
from the plants for many years interfered with the use and enjoyment of
the plaintiffs' property.30 3 The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs' nuisance
claims were time-barred because these long-standing conditions constituted a permanent nuisance. 30 4 The court of appeals reversed, finding
issues of fact regarding the frequency of nuisance conditions and the
feasibility of injunctive relief.305 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals after granting a petition for review in order "to try to
clarify the distinction [between permanent and30temporary
nuisance], one
6
of the oldest and most complex in Texas law.,
The court found that the distinction between a temporary and a
permanent nuisance "must take into account the [three] reasons for which
that distinction is drawn, ' , 30 7 i.e., when a nuisance claim accrues, whether
a series of nuisance suits should be permitted, and whether damages for
future as well as past harm should be allowed.30 8 The court held that:
[I]f a nuisance occurs several times in the years leading up to a trial
and is likely to continue, jurors will generally have enough evidence
of frequency and duration to reasonably evaluate its impact on
neighboring property values. In such cases, the nuisance should be
treated as permanent, even if the exact dates, frequency, or extent of
future damage remain unknown. Conversely, a nuisance as to which
any future impact remains
speculative at the time of trial must be
30 9
deemed "temporary."
Based on this distinction, the court found that a nuisance should be
deemed permanent "if it is sufficiently constant or regular (no matter
how long between occurrences) that future impact can be reasonably

plaintiff's property) as cases involving "continuing nuisances that were not barred by the statute of
limitations because of the recurring nature of the harm." Id. at 400 n.4.
301.
Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. 2004).
302.
147 S.W.3d at 264.
303.
Schneider Nat'! Carriers,Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 268.
304.
Id.at 269.
305.
Id.

306.
307.

Id. at 268.
Id.

308.

Id. at 275.

309.

Id. at 280 (footnote omitted).
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evaluated., 310 Under this standard, there would be no need for a series of
successive suits if future damages could be reasonably ascertained in one
action. 31 1 The court also held that "the characterization of a nuisance as
temporary or permanent should not depend on whether it can be
abated. 31 2 The court reasoned that a nuisance should be enjoined only if
the plaintiff did not have an adequate legal remedy (i.e., damages); to
award both future damages and enjoin the nuisance would amount to a
double recovery by the plaintiff. 313 It further reasoned that abating an
otherwise permanent nuisance would not necessarily render its effects
temporary, observing that harm such as stigma arising from the nuisance
might impact the value of plaintiff's property for the foreseeable future.3 14
e. Impact of Harmful Condition Varies Over Time
Some courts have based the distinction between a continuing and
permanent tort on whether the form or effect of the offensive condition
changes over time so that, in effect, a new cause of action accrues with
every change in condition. 31 5 For example, the California Court of Appeal in Field-Escandonv. DeMann 316 observed that "[t]he salient feature
of a continuing trespass or nuisance is that its impact may vary over
time., 31 7 In Field-Escandon, the plaintiff argued that because a sewer
pipe buried on the plaintiffs property years before plaintiff acquired the
land could be removed at any time, it constituted a continuing trespass. 318 The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on
the ground that the trespass was permanent and the plaintiffs claim was
310.
Id. at 281.
311.
Id. at 283.
312.
Id. at 284.
313.
Id.
314.
Id. at 285-86.
315.
See, e.g., Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("The
salient feature of a continuing trespass or nuisance is that its impact may vary over time."); see also
Kuhnle, supra note 148, at 197 n.61 (changing over time standard "appears to be controlling in
hazardous waste cases"); f Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 29 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1378 (D. Ga. 1998) (granting summary judgment for counterclaim defendant on ground that
presence of 300 barrels of chemical waste on property no longer owned by counterclaimant and
without evidence of continued leaching from barrels did not support claim for continued nuisance,
observing that "[a] cause of action for continuing nuisance is limited to situations where the contamination has continued to spread: the fact that Briggs & Stratton's barrels remained on the PMI
property is insufficient to constitute a continuing nuisance."); City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 75 P.2d
30, 35 (Ariz. 1938) ("Permanent nuisance expresses the idea that a nuisance may continue in the
same state, unless the person obligated to abate it performs his duty and changes its form so as to
destroy its character as a nuisance.").
316.
251 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
317.
Field-Escandon, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 53. The Supreme Court of California in Mangini III
quoted this language from Field-Escandon but did not question or overrule its continuing nuisance
standard in the course of affirming entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant on
the ground that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of offering substantial evidence that the nuisance
was reasonably abatable. See Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 111), 912 P.2d 1220, 1223
(Cal. 1996); see also supra notes 337-45 and accompanying text.
318.
Field-Escandon,251 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
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time-barred because the pipe's impact on the property did not vary or
increase over time. 319 In Spar v. Pacific Bell,320 the court took the rea-

soning of Field-Escandon one step further to hold that utility lines that
the defendant already had voluntarily removed from plaintiffs property
nevertheless constituted a permanent nuisance and trespass.12 1 The court
noted that "because defendant is a public utility, it might have been able
on plaintiffs property by paying just compensation
to keep the 3facilities
22
to plaintiff.
Under the "varying impact over time" standard, whether a private
nuisance (or trespass) claim for older contamination is timely as a continuing tort or time-barred as a permanent tort could depend on the media
contaminated by the defendant. Groundwater contamination conditions
vary over time, as a plume of contaminated groundwater migrates and
spreads through plaintiffs property and, perhaps, beyond.3 23 Unlike
groundwater contamination, soil contamination from a now-terminated
source may not change materially over time. For example, some hazardous substances, such as DDT or PCBs, are relatively insoluble in water,
readily sorb to soil and, absent the introduction of a chemical solvent or
other catalyst, rarely will leach or migrate in the subsurface.324 Even
though abatement of soil contamination typically is much faster and less
expensive than groundwater remediation, under a "varying over time"
standard an older groundwater contamination nuisance claim could survive a statute of limitations challenge as a continuing tort while an older
soil contamination claim would likely be dismissed as time-barred.
319. Id. at 53.
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
320.
321.
Spar, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
322. Id. at 483.
323.
In Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2004), the Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the continued migration of contaminated groundwater onto plaintiff's property constituted a
continuing nuisance. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222. The court also found that the continued presence of
wrongfully placed contaminants on plaintiff's property provided an alternative basis for characterizing the nuisance as continuing for statute of limitations purposes. Id.; see also supra notes 272-85
and accompanying text. Similarly, in Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.
1991), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court order granting a motion to dismiss as time barred a
private nuisance claim based on California law brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging
that contamination of a water district well from the operations of a former military laundry constituted a nuisance. Arcade Water Dist., 940 F.2d at 1267. The court held that continuing damage
rather than continuing wrongful activity was required to establish a continuing nuisance but, without
expressly stating that changing nuisance conditions were relevant to determining whether a nuisance
was permanent or continuing, stressed that "the most salient allegation is that contamination continues to leach into Arcade's Well 31." Id. at 1268; see also Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp.,
781 F. Supp. 659, 665-67 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (denying defendant's statute of limitations summary
judgment motion on plaintiff's groundwater contamination continuing nuisance claim based on
disposals that occurred years before, observing "[t]he fact that the area of contamination is getting
bigger as the years go by does not convert the nuisance into a permanent nuisance. As noted above,
'the salient feature of a continuing trespass or nuisance is that its impact may vary over time."'
(quoting Field-Escandon,251 Cal. Rptr. at 53)).
324.

See, e.g., ROBERT D. MORRISON,

ENVIRONMENTAL FORENSICS:

PRINCIPLES AND

APPLICATIONS § 1.5 (2000) (describing immobility of hydrophobic compounds like DDT and PCBs
and their remobilization through cosolvency by the introduction of a solvent such as gasoline or oil).
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f. Multi-Factor Balancing
Given the wide range of tests applied by courts across the country, it
is not surprising that some courts have concluded that no one factor
should be determinative of whether a nuisance is continuing or permanent. Instead, a number of courts have employed a multi-factored balancing test to arrive at a case-by-case determination of whether a nuisance is continuing or permanent. 325 The California Court of Appeal's
decision in Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Co., 326 illustrates such a multi-factored approach. In Beck, the owner of
contaminated property sued the former owner to recover cleanup costs
and obtain an injunction compelling remediation of oil contamination
placed on the property decades before.32 7 In determining that the nuisance was permanent rather than continuing, the California Court of Appeal considered a variety of different factors: (a) whether the defendant's
offending activities had been discontinued (it had); (b) whether the nuisance would vary or change over time (tar-like petroleum contamination
in the soil would not); (c) whether the contaminants would continue to
migrate and cause new damage (it would not); (d) whether the nuisance
could be abated at any time (it could) and, if so; (e) whether abatement
was the best alternative in light of its cost (more than the value of the
property), technical feasibility (excavation was feasible), legitimate
competing interests (local agencies opposed excavation in light of minimal risk to groundwater or human receptors), benefits of abatement
(remediated property), and risk of abatement (transporting contaminants
to another location for disposal). 328 After balancing each of these factors,
the court concluded that the contamination constituted a permanent nuisance and that Beck's claim was time-barred. 329 Multi-factored balancing on a case-by-case basis permits the court substantial flexibility in
determining whether a claim should be time-barred as a permanent nuisance; it also is an unpredictable standard that does not promote consistent adjudication.

See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
325.
(multi-factor balancing test under California law); City of Sioux Falls v. Miller, 492 N.W.2d 116,
118 (S.D. 1992) (applying South Dakota law and defining continuing nuisance by whether nuisance
can be discontinued at any time, is intermittent or periodical in character, or involves a solid structure or a structure that can be modified); L'Enfant Plaza E., Inc. v. John McShain, Inc., 359 A.2d 5,
6 (D.C. 1976). ("Three factors for determining permanency are articulated in D. Dobbs, Remedies §
5.4 (1973): '(1) is the source of the invasion physically permanent, i.e., is it likely, in the nature of
things, to remain indefinitely? (2) is the source of the invasion the kind of thing an equity court
would refuse to abate by injunction because of its value to the community or because of relations
between the parties? (3) which party seeks the permanent or prospective measure of damages?').
326.
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
327.
328. Id. at 557-60.
329. Id. at 560.
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g. Continuing Nuisance Unavailable
Finally, in some states the continuing tort doctrine is simply unavailable to address property contamination problems. For example, in
Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,330 the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in an
action alleging that gasoline leaking from defendants' underground storage tanks had contaminated plaintiffs commercial property, ruling that
the continuing tort doctrine only applied to cases involving personal injury and was inapplicable to cases involving only property damage. 3 3' In
New York, the state legislature in Civil Practice and Rules section 214-c
effectively abolished the doctrine of continuing torts for any "action to
recover damages for ... injury to property caused by the latent effects of
exposure to any substance or combination of substances" by imposing an
absolute discovery rule-based three-year statute of limitations for such
claims. 332 In Jensen v. General Electric Co., 3 3 3 the New York Court of
Appeals interpreted section 214-c to bar a continuing nuisance money
damages claim brought by property owners against an electric utility that
allegedly released hazardous substances that contaminated the plaintiffs'
but not to bar a continuing nuisance claim for injunctive reproperty,
4
33

lief.

The absence of a continuing tort doctrine dramatically limits the
availability of a tort-based cleanup cost claim for sites at which the contamination was created years ago. The discovery rule could preserve a
nuisance-based cleanup cost claim for landowners at sites recently sold
by parties who caused the contamination years before. Otherwise, without a continuing tort doctrine, a current property owner who is voluntarily cleaning up an older contamination site could not turn to state tort law
to obtain from other PRPs their fair share of cleanup costs.
5. Procedural Limitations: Burden of Proving Continuing Nuisance
The continuing nuisance doctrine theoretically can preserve private
cleanup cost claims for older contamination otherwise barred by the stat330.
331.
332.

385 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
Citizens & S. Trust Co., 385 S.E.2d at 427-28.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (McKinney 2006). Section 214-c states, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or
within the body or upon or within property must be commenced shall be computed from
the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff,

whichever is earlier.
Id.
623 N.E.2d 547 (N.Y. 1993).
333.
Jensen, 623 N.E.2d at 548-49; see also Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir.
334.
2005) (under Jensen and section 214-c, continuing tort doctrine is unavailable for Federal Tort
Claims Act nuisance claim for cleanup cost and diminution in value damages).
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ute of limitations. In application, however, the ability of a current landowner to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs may turn on which party
has the burden of proof (i.e., the burden of production and burden of persuasion) about whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing. The significance of the burden of proof, in turn, depends on the continuing nuisance standard employed by the court.
Few reported cases address the burden of proving whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing. Perhaps this is because the burden of
proof on the issue of continuing nuisance is less likely to present a challenge to a plaintiff in jurisdictions that employ a continued harmful activity standard. Absent a dispute regarding the source of contamination, in
these jurisdictions once defendant's conduct or structure causing the contamination on plaintiff's property has stopped or been removed, the continuing nuisance doctrine would no longer apply. Similarly, in courts
that focus on whether the nuisance has changed over time, evidence of
the basic characteristics of the contamination (e.g., immobile soil contamination as compared to ongoing leaching or contaminated groundwater migration) should resolve whether the nuisance is continuing.
The burden of proof, however, can be determinative in continuing
nuisance cases in courts that employ an abatability of harm standard (or
include abatability as part of a multi-factored balancing analysis), particularly those that require proof that a nuisance can be abated by reasonable cost and by reasonable means. To address the abatability of soil or
groundwater contamination, a court may well require at least three types
of evidence.
First, the court may expect evidence of what a cleanup that is minimally acceptable to relevant government regulatory agencies would look
like. This would require evidence of an adequate site characterization,
i.e., identifying the extent and nature of the contamination. It would also
require evidence of applicable cleanup standards, i.e., at what point
would regulatory agencies consider the site remediated.335 In the absence of applicable government cleanup standards, the court may turn to
the testimony of expert witnesses regarding appropriate cleanup levels.
Second, the court may expect evidence of whether it is technologically feasible to remediate the site to the court's satisfaction. This would
require evidence of a detailed plan for accomplishing the cleanup and the

335.
In theory, abatement of a chemical contamination nuisance could mean complete removal
of all detectable contaminants. It is unlikely that a regulatory agency would require such a cleanup
in most instances; moreover, complete removal of all contaminants at sites with groundwater or
extensive soil contamination could prove technically impossible as well as unnecessary to protect
public health and the environment. See Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 805 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]e are satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsible public
agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be done to abate contamination in
particular cases.").
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likelihood that the contemplated technique would effect the desired
remediation.
Third, the court may expect evidence of the cost of remediation. To
the extent that the court will be evaluating the "reasonableness" of the
proposed abatement, the court may also require evidence about the current value of the contaminated property as compared to the property's
value after remediation.
A party cannot satisfy this burden of production unless (a) environmental professionals have adequately characterized the site; and (b) a
regulatory agency has participated in developing a cleanup plan. At a
small site with discrete soil contamination that will require only excavation and proper disposal, this burden of production could easily be met.
At a larger site with complicated contamination problems, however, the
burden of production could present a significant challenge. For example,
development of cleanup standards could be delayed because of regulatory agency inattention or understaffing. At sites involving contaminated
groundwater, fully characterizing the nature, extent, and source(s) of
groundwater contamination and developing a remediation plan could
take years.336 The party who must produce evidence that the contamination constitutes a continuing nuisance runs the risk of not having necessary evidence to present at trial or to defeat summary judgment, or to
persuade the court for a trial date continuance (or perhaps multiple continuances) in order to gather the necessary abatability evidence.
Courts have commonly placed the burden of proving a continuing
nuisance on plaintiffs.3 37 Two California appellate decisions illustrate
the consequences of plaintiffs' failure to meet this burden. In Mangini v.
Aerojet-GeneralCorp. (Mangini JJ),338 the Supreme Court of California
affirmed a Court of Appeal decision overturning a $13.2 million jury
verdict 339 for the plaintiffs-owners of contaminated property on the
ground that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of producing evidence
that the contamination constituted a continuing nuisance, i.e., that it was
reasonably abatable.340
336.

See, e.g., EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES, supra note 21, at 49-57 (de-

scribing remediation techniques used at NPL sites); id. at 269-83 (describing source location and
remediation problems at contaminated groundwater sites where dense non-aqueous phase liquid
contamination is present).
337.
See Coleman, supra note 139, at 46 ("To establish a continuing tort, the plaintiff must
show a 'substantial nexus' between the violations outside and within the limitations period. If the
violations are 'sufficiently related' they are treated as one continuous violation and the statute of
limitations will not be tolled because the tortious act has not ceased." (footnote omitted)).
338.
339.

912 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1996); see also supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
Mangini111, 912 P.2d at 1230; Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (ManginiII), 31 Cal. Rptr.

2d 696, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (damage award was not for cleanup costs but for "a reduction in
the value of the use of the property within the limitations period").
340.
Plaintiffs had won the right to proceed with a same property continuing nuisance claim in
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (Mangini 1), 281 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See supra
notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
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The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they had met their
burden by offering evidence that the property was contaminated and that
the technology existed to decontaminate the property.3 4' Instead, the
court required the plaintiffs to have offered evidence that the property
could be remediated by reasonable means and without unreasonable expense.342 The court agreed that something less than total decontamination could suffice to show abatability but found that plaintiffs had failed
to submit evidence of cleanup levels acceptable to or ordered by agencies
for the property,343 or expert evidence about the means and cost of site
remediation. 344 Because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the nuisance
was reasonably abatable, it was deemed permanent and their nuisance
claim was time-barred.3 45
Less than one month after the Supreme Court of California decided
Mangini III, the California Court of Appeal in Beck Development Co. v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 346 held that the plaintiff had failed
to carry its burden of proving that a nuisance was continuing.34 7 Beck
had attempted to develop a large tract of land in Tracy, California, on
which Southern Pacific, a prior owner, had built a reservoir to store up to
3,000,000 barrels of oil. 348 Beck sued Southern Pacific for an injunction
and damages relating to oil contamination on the property. The trial
court found that the oil contamination constituted a continuing nuisance,
issued an injunction requiring Southern Pacific to determine the extent of
contamination and remediate the contamination identified to standards
provided by regulatory agencies, and ordered Southern Pacific to pay
Beck $1,205,613.18 in damages. 349 The California Court of Appeal reversed Beck's continuing nuisance judgment against Southern Pacific.350
341.
Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1227.
342.
Id.
343.
Id. at 1226-27. Indeed, no such evidence was available. Although the EPA and state
agencies had entered into a consent decree with Aerojet-General in 1988 to complete a remedial
investigation and feasibility study to identify and evaluate remedial alternatives for the site, the study
had not been prepared by the time of trial, and apparently was not expected to be ready until 1998.
Id. at 1231 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
344.
Id. at 1224. To the contrary, plaintiffs' expert testified that the site had not been sufficiently characterized to know what remedial measures would be necessary or whether they could be
effectively accomplished, describing the potential range of cleanup costs as over $20 million and
perhaps as high as $75 million. Id. The court also noted that plaintiffs' counsel had acknowledged
to the jury during closing argument that "'[N]obody really knows how much is there, where it is,
So I guess the
what the chemicals are, or how much it's going to cost to abate the chemicals ....
bottom line, if you ask yourself the question, how bad really is this site, the answer's got to be you
just don't know."' Id. at 1224-25.
345.
Mangini Il, 912 P.2d at 1230. Plaintiffs apparently did not object to bearing the burden
that the nuisance was continuing as an element of their cause of action, but did object to proving that
the contamination could be remediated by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost. Id. at 1226.
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
346.
347.
Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.
Id. at 526-27.
348.
349.
Id. at 533.
350.
Id. at 560. Beck also sued both the California Department of Toxic Substances Control
(DTSC), seeking a writ of mandate compelling the DTSC to make a determination regarding
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The court employed a multi-factor balancing analysis to determine
whether the oil contamination constituted a continuing nuisance. 35 ' Relying on Mangini III, the court included in that analysis whether the con' 352
tamination could be abated at "reasonable cost by reasonable means.
The court emphasized the testimony of Beck's experts that the site had
been insufficiently characterized to draw firm conclusions about either
the extent of contamination or the cost of remediation, and that the range
of remediation costs (between $6,500,000 and $16,200,000) estimated by
Beck's consultant exceeded the value of the land after remediation.3 53
The court also noted that a regulatory agency had concluded that nothing
further needed to be done with the contamination and instead had cautioned that excavating, treating, and disposing of the contaminated soil at
an off-site location "would be significantly burdensome and from a public and regulatory point of view may not be the most advisable option., 354 The court found that "the result of the uncertainty in the record
is that there is no substantial evidence of abatability," 3 " and that because
Beck had the burden to prove reasonable abatability the oil contamination was deemed to constitute a permanent nuisance and Beck's private
nuisance claim was time-barred.356
Few authorities place the burden of proving whether a nuisance is
permanent or continuing on the defendant.357 An Iowa Supreme Court
whether the property constituted a hazardous waste site or a site presenting no known environmental
hazard, and the City of Tracy (the "City"), seeking an order that the City accept and process Beck's
proposed development plan. Id. at 526. For several years, Beck had submitted technical reports to
the DTSC at its request only to have the DTSC respond with requests for still more reports, while the
City refused to process Beck's development plan until the DTSC had made a determination about
the environmental condition of the property. Id. at 528-32. The trial court issued the requested writ
to the DTSC but refused to order the City to process Beck's development plan. Id. at 526-27. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against the DTSC and reversed the judgment in
favor of the City. Id. at 540, 547.
351.
Id. at 560; see also supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
352. Id. at 559 (quoting Mangini111, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 281).
353. Id. at 560. The court noted that the record lacked an estimate of the actual detriment that
Beck would suffer if the property was not remediated. Id. For example, the court's opinion does not
address the potential profitability that Beck would have derived from development of remediated
property.
354. Id. at 559-60. In Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 220 (Colo. 2004), the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the presence of contaminants on plaintiff's property constituted a continuing nuisance unless the contamination could and should be removed. In the abstract, the presence of
contaminants in soil or groundwater does not serve any socially beneficial purpose. On the other
hand, the court's concerns in Beck might reflect an instance where, under the Hoery standard, leaving the soil contamination in place would serve such a purpose, i.e., when removing the contamination would create a greater risk of harm than leaving it alone.
Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.
355.
356. Id. at 560. The court also concluded that the oil contamination was not a nuisance per se
at 551, and that Beck failed to prove that the contamination posed a risk
under California statutes, id.
to drinking water supplies or other pathways to the public in order to constitute a public nuisance.
Id. at 554.
357. See Brown & Hansen, supra note 224, at 698-99 (arguing that defendants should bear
burden of proving that underground storage tank contamination constitutes a permanent nuisance
rather than plaintiffs bearing the burden that the site constitutes a continuing nuisance, likening the
issue to the defendant's burden of proving an affirmative defense that a claim is barred by the statute
of limitations); see also Smith, supra note 164, at 60 (noting that, while plaintiffs typically bear
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decision in 1903 regarding whether an improperly placed building constituted a permanent or continuing nuisance turned on which party bore
the burden of proof. In Pettit v. IncorporatedTown of GrandJunction,
Greene County,358 the court held that a private landowner could maintain
a public continuing nuisance action for an injunction ordering the removal of public buildings improperly located in a street:
As the statute did not authorize the construction of the buildings in
the streets, the intention to permanently locate them there is not, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be inferred; that is, the
burden is upon the party asserting that an obstruction in the highway
is a permanent nuisance, instead of a continuing one, to establish the
fact by proof. This was not done. These buildings were frame, and
such as could readily have been removed by the use of modem machinery, practically without injury. The character of the foundation
was not shown, and no evidence concerning the feasibility of removal was introduced. Moreover, as already observed, they were
placed in a situation where the municipality had no right to locate
them; and in this respect the case is distinguishable from most of
those cited, where the nuisance consisted in negligently makinjan
9
improvement where the party at fault had the right to construct it.
Pettit, however, appears to be the exception. Plaintiffs typically bear the
burden of production that a nuisance is continuing-a burden that can be
determinative in cases involving a current landowner who voluntarily
cleans up older contamination
and wants to obtain from other PRPs their
3 60
fair share of cleanup costs.

burden of proving damages within continuing tort limitations period, statute of limitations usually is
an affirmative defense).
358.
93 N.W. 381 (Iowa 1903).
359.
Pettit,93 N.W. at 383.
360.
See e.g., Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Kansas law to hold that the plaintiff failed to carry burden of proof that harm to leasehold was
remediable, removable, or abatable and thus constituted temporary rather than time-barred permanent nuisance damages). Some courts will presume in the face of ambiguous pleading that an alleged nuisance is continuing (or temporary). For example, in King v. City of Independence, 64
S.W.3d 335, 339-40, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds, George Ward Builders,
Inc. v. City of Lee's Summit, 157 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), the court directed a temporary nuisance judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to specify in the complaint
whether the nuisance was permanent or temporary. The court concluded that:
If allegations are doubtful as to whether the pleaded cause of action is for a permanent
nuisance or a temporary nuisance, courts should treat the nuisance as temporary. This is
so "because adjudication of a permanent nuisance amounts to a grant of an easement to
the wrongdoer to continue to interfere with the plaintiffs land.
King, 64 S.W.3d at 339-40 (quoting Scantlin v. City of Pevely, 741 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987)).
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D. Uncertainty and Opportunityafter Aviall: The UnrealizedPotential
ofPrivate Nuisance Law in Cleanup Cost Allocation Disputes
Private nuisance has the potential to provide a flexible legal framework well-suited to resolving cleanup cost allocation disputes between
the current owners of contaminated property and others who contributed
to site contamination. Providing current landowners with the means to
require other PRPs to pay or contribute to cleanup costs is essential to
helping solve the national problem of encouraging voluntary cleanups at
the nation's hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites. The current
state of private nuisance law, however, is not up to the task. The dramatic variations in nuisance law among the states and significant doctrinal limitations affecting the application of nuisance law to many common contamination problems make current nuisance law an unsatisfactory response to this national problem. Moreover, the incoherent patchwork quilt of private nuisance law across the country undermines the
ability of state law to restore the reliance interest equilibrium among
contaminated property dispute stakeholders upended by Aviall, and, of
perhaps greater importance, the capacity for state law to offer flexible,
efficient rules of decision in contaminated property disputes that federal
law cannot provide.
States can respond in one of two ways to the current deficiencies in
private nuisance law. The first is to do nothing. State courts and legislatures can simply stand by and let the uncertainties created by Aviall about
the role of federal law in private cleanup cost disputes sort themselves
out. Perhaps Congress will amend CERCLA to ensure cleanup cost contribution rights for all PRPs, not just PRPs who have already been sued
under CERCLA sections 106 or 107(a) or settled with the government.
Or perhaps the United States Supreme Court will definitively resolve
whether a PRP may recover from other PRPs their fair shares of cleanup
costs under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).
If all PRPs ultimately are found to lack a federal right to recover
cleanup costs from other PRPs, then private cleanup cost disputes will
descend into a Balkanized state of confusion, with the cleanup cost recovery rights of a PRP who voluntarily cleans up property dependant on
which of 50 differing rules of decision happens to apply to a particular
dispute by happenstance of geography. In the vast majority of states, no
private nuisance action will be available for same property cleanup cost
disputes, either because of traditional interpretations of ancient nuisance
law or because of the operation of the similarly ancient doctrine of caveat emptor. In many states, the availability of cleanup cost claims relating to older contamination sites will turn on which of the many competing "continuing nuisance" tests a state may happen to employ. Current
landowners in states with nuisance doctrine inhospitable to cleanup cost
claims will be discouraged from voluntarily taking the lead in site
cleanup. Instead, cleanup cost allocation disputes will increasingly shift
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from direct to derivative claims, as current property owners wait for---or
seek out-litigation against them as a trigger for cleanup cost contribution rights under federal or state law.
On the other hand, the chilling effect on voluntary cleanups created
by Aviall will largely disappear if federal legislation or court decisions
provide all PRPs with CERCLA cleanup cost contribution rights. Confirmation of CERCLA cleanup cost rights, however, would do nothing to
effect the efficiency and flexibility benefits that potentially could be
available under nuisance law, including: (a) application of a common
body of state law to the cleanup cost and other issues raised in contaminated property disputes; (b) encouragement of technically sound, efficient cleanups; and (c) avoidance of the remediation and litigation transaction costs
associated with NCP consistency requirements under
36
CERCLA. 1
The second option is for states to seize the initiative and re-examine
the current state of nuisance law in their jurisdictions. Limiting private
nuisance claims to disputes between contemporaneous neighboring property owners, employing overly-restrictive continuing nuisance standards,
and applying outmoded interpretations of nuisance that undermine
prompt site remediation ignore the realities of environmental contamination problems and private cleanup cost disputes. States should adopt a
new environmental nuisance paradigm that applies to all private cleanup
cost disputes faced by the current owners of contaminated property. The
next section of this article proposes such a paradigm.
III. AN ENVIRONMENTAL NUISANCE PARADIGM FOR PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES

Before Aviall, states allowed federal law to serve as the primary rule
of decision in private cleanup cost disputes in large part by clinging to
narrow, anachronistic interpretations of private nuisance law. The uncertain status of current landowner federal law cleanup cost contribution
rights after Aviall has provided an opportunity for states to make private
nuisance law relevant to a wide range of contaminated property disputes.
State courts and legislatures can revitalize private nuisance law by revisiting unnecessary doctrinal limitations barring its application to same
property and older contamination problems through adoption of the environmental nuisance paradigm described below. Combining such a modernized liability framework with its traditional remedial flexibility would
transform private nuisance into a valuable tool for allocating remediation
responsibilities at sites across the country. Moreover, it can assure
cleanup cost contribution rights to CERCLA-liable but non-culpable

361.

See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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current owners of contaminated property. 362 This section identifies and
analyzes the environmental nuisance paradigm components required to
bring the efficiency and flexibility of private nuisance law to virtually all
cleanup cost disputes faced by the current owners of contaminated property.
A. The Proposal
Every state, whether by statute or case law, should modernize its
law of private nuisance as applied to contaminated property disputes in
accordance with the following environmental nuisance paradigm:
(1) A claim for private nuisance should be available in same property
as well as neighboring property contamination disputes.
(2) The doctrine of caveat emptor should be abolished
private nuisance liability in environmental nuisance
underlying circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's
contaminated property should be relevant to awarding
a private nuisance remedy.

as a defense to
cases, but the
acquisition of
and fashioning

(3) Soil and groundwater contamination should presumptively constitute a continuing nuisance capable of abatement.
(4) The burden of proof as to both liability and damages regarding
whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing should be on the party
(plaintiff or defendant) contending that a nuisance is permanent.
(5) A party seeking to meet this burden of proving that an environmental nuisance is permanent would be required to show that the
contamination cannot be abated by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost as measured against the highest and best potential use of the
property as remediated.
This environmental nuisance paradigm serves several goals. First, it
creates a template that allows every state to adopt a nuisance-based
cleanup cost remedy, providing current landowners with an incentive to
initiate prompt characterization and remediation efforts.363 Second, it
362.
Because the current owner of contaminated property is a liable party under CERCLA
section 107(a)(1) regardless of whether she contributed to site contamination, she may not after
Aviall obtain cleanup cost contribution from other PRPs under section 113(f) unless she first has
been sued under CERCLA or settled with the government, and may not have a right to cost recovery
at all under section 107(a). See supra notes 72-121 and accompanying text. Current private nuisance law would bar this non-culpable but CERCLA-liable current owner from recovering cleanup
costs in same property or many older contamination disputes. The paradigm proposed by this article
would provide cleanup cost recovery rights for this non-culpable current owner.
363.
A nuisance-based paradigm requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover cleanup costs must
have a property interest in the contaminated site. It thus would provide a remedy for current property owners at multi-PRP sites but would not benefit PRPs who incur cleanup costs but who are not
current landowners, e.g., former owners, arrangers, transporters, neighbors. This paradigm nevertheless should address most private cleanup cost disputes. Regulatory agencies often look to the current
owner of property to take the lead in site cleanup. Agencies would look to PRPs other than the
current site owner to take the lead in cleaning up a site in a limited set of circumstances, e.g., the
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encompasses same property contamination problems, not just neighboring property disputes. Third, it encourages site cleanup rather than payment of prospective damage awards that effectively constitute the purchase of permanent contamination easements. Fourth, it encourages informal resolution of cleanup cost disputes by allowing equitable cost
allocation and presumptively making available successive continuing
nuisance actions if abatable contamination is not remediated. Finally, it
is consistent with the basic structure and tradition of nuisance law. Although it could most efficiently be implemented by statute, courts in
many states could adopt the paradigm by interpreting the existing common law of private nuisance law to reflect the realities of soil and
groundwater contamination. 364 The following discussion looks in more
detail at each component of the proposed paradigm.
B. Same PropertyEnvironmental Nuisance Disputes
A private right of action for environmental nuisance should include
same property contamination disputes. Properties often have been contaminated in whole or in part as a result of hazardous substance handling
practices by prior site occupants, such as at former landfills, industrial
facilities, gas stations, and abandoned brownfield sites. The contamination caused by these former occupants may significantly impair the current landowner's ability to develop or otherwise use the property and

current landowner is insolvent or otherwise incapable of proceeding with the cleanup, or the current
owner meets the requirements for a defense to remediation liability, such as the third party defense
found in CERCLA section 107(b)(3). Non-current landowner PRPs who incur cleanup costs because they are named on a cleanup order or otherwise take the lead in site cleanup would need to
rely on legal theories other than a direct private nuisance action (e.g., contract rights, state or federal
cleanup cost statutes, derivative claims) to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs.
364.
Some state appellate courts may not encounter significant stare decisis problems in order
to embrace the paradigm because they have not specifically applied the common law of private
nuisance to contaminated property disputes. Many decisions applying state nuisance law to private
contaminated property disputes are from federal courts estimating how a state court of last resort
would apply nuisance law to environmental contamination problems. See, e.g., Phila. Elec. Co. v.
Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law); Lilly Indus., Inc. v.
Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying Indiana law); Wellesley Hills
Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Massachusetts
law); Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 808 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying
New Jersey law); Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1280
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law). State appellate courts which have not specifically
addressed the application of private nuisance law to contaminated property disputes are not bound by
federal court interpretations of state law. See, e.g., Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald
Constr. Co., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Flederal decisional authority is
neither binding nor controlling in matters involving state law"); SI Sec. v. Bank of Edwardsville, 841
N.E.2d 995, 1001 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Illinois courts not bound by federal court interpretation of
Illinois statutes not involving federal questions). Moreover, rather than assume that a state court will
apply an anachronistic interpretation of nuisance law to a contaminated property dispute, federal
courts may wish to follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit in Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220,
1222-23 (10th Cir. 2003), and certify nuisance law questions applicable to soil or groundwater
contamination cases to state courts of last resort for resolution.

2006]

BACK FROM THE MARGINS

subject her to costly environmental regulatory obligations. 365 Nevertheless, the vast majority of states continue to ignore the realities of environmental contamination problems by restricting private nuisance claims
to disputes involving neighboring property uses. 366 This majority rule
should be abandoned for several reasons.
First, the neighboring use dispute limitation is not mandated by the
fundamental structure of private nuisance law. On the contrary, private
nuisance provides a remedy for significant interference with the use and
enjoyment of another's property. It is well-recognized that "[p]rivate
nuisance is traditionally a claim based upon activities outside the land by
a stranger to the title, for instance, based upon a neighbor's noise or pollution." 367 Courts have bootstrapped this traditional role of private nuisance law into a doctrinal requirement barring same property claims. For
example, in Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules, Inc.,3 6 8 the
Third Circuit in 1985 focused on "the historical role of private nuisance
law as a means of efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring
contemporaneous land uses" to hold that the current owner of contaminated property could not assert a same property private nuisance
claim.369 Courts throughout the country, over the following two decades,
have cited PhiladelphiaElectric and embraced the "traditional role" of
private nuisance law-often without further analysis-to bar same property private nuisance claims involving hazardous substance contamination.37 °
The fact that private nuisance claims historically served as a common law zoning tool does not exclude other purposes that could be
served well by private nuisance law. The hallmark of nuisance is its
flexibility; the doctrine can and should adapt as a solution to modem
environmental problems. 371 The current owner of property required to
365.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821D & cmt. e (1975) (private nuisance is an
invasion of another's use and enjoyment of property, including interference with possessory interest); id. § 821F (claim for private nuisance requires significant harm).
366.
See supra notes 178-96 and accompanying text.
367.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 463 (2000) (noting also that a few recent cases had
imposed same property liability for serious contamination or ultra-hazardous conduct).
368.
762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
369.
Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 307, 314.
370.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 548 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Wis. 1996) (hold371.
ing that Wisconsin private nuisance law supported damages judgment for dairy farmers against
electric cooperative for damage to their dairy herd allegedly caused by stray electrical voltage,
noting that "[The Wisconsin Supreme Court] has previously characterized the common law doctrine
of private nuisance as being both 'broad' to meet the wide variety of possible invasions, and 'flexible' to adapt to changing social values and conditions." (citation omitted)); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l.
Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012-14 (D. Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium
released from nearby nuclear weapons plant constituted a continuing nuisance and trespass for
statute of limitations purposes, and could provide basis for prospective diminution in value damages,
effectively purchasing an easement for invasion to continue given Colorado's "adoption of a flexible
approach to determining the appropriate measure of damages for injury to real property"); Carter v.
Monsanto Co., 575 S.E.2d 342, 348 (W. Va. 2002) (Starcher, J., concurring) ("The cause of action
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remediate the contamination caused by others experiences the same interference with the use and enjoyment of the property whether the contamination came from a prior owner or a predecessor. Indeed,
[a]s Oliver Wendell Holmes commented on the development of the
common law: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long372since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past."
Simply put, the historic pedigree of private nuisance law in neighboring
property owner disputes should not pose an insurmountable barrier to its
adoption as a tool for resolving same property contamination disputes.
Second, current common law or statutory definitions of nuisance do
not compel courts to bar same property private nuisance claims. Section
821 D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a private nuisance as
an "invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land. '3 73 The Philadelphia Electric court, among many others, cited
section 821D to define a private nuisance for purposes of conducting its
Pennsylvania law analysis.374 The section 821D definition is broad
enough to encompass same property disputes where the continued presence of contamination caused by the prior owner invades and substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by another, i.e., the
current owner.
Some courts adopting the PhiladelphiaElectric analysis have distinguished California cases 375 recognizing same property private nuisance claims on the ground that (a) the law of nuisance is codified in
California and (b) California's broad statutory definition of nuisance has
for private nuisance has been for centuries a highly flexible one, giving courts substantial latitude to
fashion appropriate and reasonable remedies, depending on the harm to be avoided or remedied.");
Antolini, supra note 162, at 771 ("Although amorphous in definition, all nuisance actions have in
common three important doctrinal aspects that provide unique scope to their application by the
courts: substantiality of interference, unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and equitable
flexibility.").
372.
Antolini, supra note 162, at 790 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
373.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1975); see also id., cmt. e ("If the interference with the use and enjoyment of the land is a significant one, sufficient in itself to amount to a
private nuisance, the fact that it arises out of or is accompanied by a trespass will not prevent recovery for the nuisance, and the action may be maintained upon either basis as the plaintiff elects or
both.").
374. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 1985).
375. The California state courts are the only state courts as of this writing to have recognized in
a published opinion private nuisance same property claims. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text. A Minnesota federal district court in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reilly Industries,
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860, 867 (D. Minn. 1998) interpreted Minnesota's nuisance statute to permit
private nuisance same property claims. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. Research
conducted for this article revealed no reported Minnesota state court decision or state court decision
from any jurisdiction other than California recognizing private nuisance same property claims.
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been expansively interpreted by the California courts.37 6 The breadth of
California's statutory definition of nuisance, however, is immaterial because the definition of nuisance in most states (including those that adopt
the section 821D definition from the Restatement (Second) of Torts is
sufficiently
broad to encompass same property private nuisance claims as
77
well. 1
Third, some courts that bar same property private nuisance claims
nevertheless permit same property public nuisance claims brought by
private parties with standing to sue because in exercising a common public right they have suffered a "special injury" different in kind or significant degree from that suffered by the general public. 378 However, "it is
difficult to see any material difference between a public and a private
nuisance in the context of a subsequent private landowner seeking to sue
the previous owner for contamination of the property. 3 79 Permitting a
current property owner to sue a predecessor for damages (e.g., cleanup
costs) under a public nuisance theory while barring such a claim under a
private nuisance theory cannot meaningfully be explained by the different interests protected by public and private nuisance and further demonstrates the need for courts to think afresh about the role of nuisance in
contaminated property disputes.
Fourth, the PhiladelphiaElectric court was reluctant in its 1985 decision to "extend private nuisance beyond its historical role ' 380 because
"[s]uch an extension is particularly hazardous in an area, such as environmental pollution, where Congress and state legislatures are actively
seeking to achieve a socially acceptable definition of rights and liabilities." 38' Two decades later, such concerns should no longer inhibit a
court from recognizing same property private nuisance claims. Statutory
376. See, e.g., Truck Components, Inc. v. K&H Corp, No. 94 C 50250, 1995 WL 692541, at
*12 n.9 (N.D. 111.Nov. 22, 1995) (California same property nuisance case law based on unique
California statutory scheme).
377.

See Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D. Ind. 1997)

(noting that the breadth of California's statutory definition of private nuisance is not unique to California).
378.

See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l

Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-84 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law to
bar private nuisance claim under doctrine of caveat emptor but permitting public nuisance same

property claim because of unspecified "different interests and public-policy concerns involved in
public nuisance actions"); cf., e.g., Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957-58

(R.I. 1994) (citing PhiladelphiaElectric to bar same property private nuisance claim while recognizing same property public nuisance claim, but granting summary judgment for defendant because

plaintiff failed to suffer "special damage").
379.

Truck Components, Inc. v. K&H Corp., No. 94 C 50250, 1995 WL 692541, at *12 (N.D.

Ill.
Nov. 22, 1995) (applying Illinois law to bar both private nuisance and public nuisance same
property claims and also observing that "[w]hile a public nuisance might be actionable against the

prior owner if brought on behalf of the public, the present property owner cannot avoid the limitation
against bringing a private nuisance action merely by converting his claim to one of public nuisance.").

380.

Phila.Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315.

381.

Id.
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environmental law has matured from its nascent stages in the mid-1980s.
Legislatures have had an opportunity to develop statutory liability
schemes addressing environmental regulatory liability and in the course
of doing so have largely chosen not to preempt state common law tort
theories of liability. 382 Moreover, same property private nuisance claims
are consistent in structure with provisions of CERCLA and state Superfund laws that impose strict liability on prior property occupants responsible for site contamination.383 Recognizing same property private nuisance claims in the early twenty-first century will not interfere with legislative environmental policy making; on the contrary, it would promote
legislative goals of encouraging prompt, voluntary cleanups and promoting informal resolution of cleanup cost allocation disputes.
Fifth, courts should re-examine the propriety of same property private nuisance claims in light of the fact that the development of state
nuisance law governing private cleanup cost disputes has disproportionately occurred in federal court.3 84 Under the Erie385 doctrine, "a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the state substantive law as pronounced by the state's highest court or, if there has been no such decision, must predict how the state's highest court would decide were it
confronted with the problem., 38 6 A federal court presented with a question of first impression regarding whether to permit a same property private nuisance claim involving hazardous substance contamination damages might be reluctant to re-examine the "historical role" of private nuisance as a tool to resolve neighboring property use disputes. For examSee, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9614(a), 9652(d), 9659(h) (West 2006) (CERCLA "savings
382.
clauses" regarding liability under state law theories); Edwards v. First Nat. Bank of Ne., 712 A.2d 33
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (trial court erred by granting motion to dismiss groundwater contamination common law claims against lender on ground that Maryland environmental code lender liability
exemption preempted nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability claims); City of Lodi v.
Randtron, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 107, 119-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that local ordinance modeled
after CERCLA preempted as conflicting with and unauthorized by California Hazardous Substance
Account Act (HSAA) but noting that HSAA preserved common law liabilities for parties responsible
for hazardous substance contamination). But see City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Dow
Chem. Co., No. 999345, 999643, 2005 WL 1171998, at *18-19 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 11, 2005)
(barring common law damage claims that conflicted with HSAA); see also Aronovsky, supranote 5,
at 85-86.
383.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (definition of "covered persons" includes persons who
owned or operated a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25323.5 (West 2005) (incorporating CERCLA definitions of "responsible party"
and "liable person"); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-4-8 (West 2006) (incorporating CERCLA definition
of liable parties).
Federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims "arising under"
384.
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b). CERCLA plaintiffs have often joined state law cleanup cost and
other contamination damage claims, such as private nuisance claims, to CERCLA claims pursuant to
a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction to hear state law claims for which the court otherwise
would lack subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West 2006). Private nuisance claims
also could be brought in federal court (either joined to a CERCLA claim or as an independent claim)
pursuant to diversity of citizenship federal court subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 13311332.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
385.
Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omit386.
ted).
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469

pie, in Westwood Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 3 7 the plaintiff argued to a New York federal district court
that the doctrine of caveat emptor did not bar a same property private
nuisance claim brought under New York law, pointing to a series of New
York state court decisions recognizing various exceptions to the doctrine.388 The court declined to accept plaintiff's argument, stating that:
[w]ithout a more definitive indication from New York's courts that
the state's common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to
cases such as the one at bar, well-established principles of federalism
dictate that this court refrain from extending 389
the scope of private nuisance liability beyond its traditional bounds.
These federal court decisions 39 0-particularly Philadelphia Electriccame to form many of the building blocks for the majority rule that private nuisance contaminated property claims must involve a neighboring
property dispute. State (as well as federal) courts need to re-examine the
majority rule rather than further enable the development of a body of
same property contamination private nuisance jurisprudence created
largely by happenstance because of the Erie doctrine.
Finally, as a matter of policy, "expanding" private nuisance law beyond its traditional role in neighboring property use disputes also is consistent with the traditional flexibility of nuisance law to address and
adapt to changing societal and economic conditions. 39' The "traditional"
role of private nuisance law-as a vehicle for resolving neighboring
property disputes-was established long before the development of modem environmental law, the creation of contaminated property regulatory
obligations, and growth of scientific knowledge and invention of technical tools necessary to discover (or begin to discover) the presence of
health risks and environmental problems presented by hazardous substance contamination. Private nuisance law is broad and flexible enough
to meet today's modem contamination problems and can apply with
equal force to interference with the use and enjoyment of property
caused by same property as well as neighboring property contamination.
387.
Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y.
1990); see also supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
388.
Westwood, 737 F. Supp. at 1283-84.
389.
Id. at 1284. The court also cited to the Third Circuit's decision in PhiladelphiaElectric,
barring a same property private nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 1284 n.12.
390.
See supra note 195.
391.
For example, economic disruption occasioned by the issuance of injunctive relief in private nuisance cases has evolved from an irrelevant consideration to a component in a balancing
analysis (comparing the social utility of the actor's conduct and the total amount of economic and
other harm that would result from enjoining an offending use) employed to determine whether an
injunction should issue at all and, if so, under what conditions. See, e.g., Jeff L. Levin, Compensated
Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REv. 775, 793-803 (1986) (describing
development of modem nuisance law and economic theory). There is a wide range of scholarship
discussing in detail the evolution of nuisance law from its twelfth century origins to the present. See,
e.g., supra note 166.
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C. Abolish the Caveat Emptor Defense to EnvironmentalNuisance Liability
Along with adherence to the "traditional role" of private nuisance as
a rule of decision only for neighboring property use disputes, the doctrine
of caveat emptor has presented a second barrier to same property private
nuisance cleanup cost dispute claims. 392 Caveat emptor should not provide a defense to private environmental nuisance liability; instead, the
circumstances surrounding the current landowner's acquisition of the
property should remain relevant to the nature and scope of any remedy
ordered by the court.
Several arguments could be advanced in support of caveat emptor
as a defense in contaminated property disputes: (a) it provides a bright
line for risk allocation in real property transactions; 393 (b) it encourages
full disclosure by sellers and diligent property investigations by buyers,
promoting a true "meeting of the minds" regarding risk allocation in real
property transactions; 394 and (c) it prevents wasteful transaction costs
associated with vendor/vendee litigation about property conditions that
are better addressed by the allocation of risk by market forces. 395 These
arguments, however, fail to justify allocating exclusively to current landowners all of the costs of remediating contamination to which they may
have made little or no contribution.
risk

First, any benefits of a caveat emptor bright line for allocating
are outweighed by the inequity of allowing sellers of contami-

396

392.
See supra notes 221-43 and accompanying text. See also Kay, supra note 154, at 170-71
(proposing that caveat emptor should not provide a defense to a same property contamination damages claim brought under a proposed theory of environmental negligence, arguing that Restatement
(Second) of Torts sections 352 (caveat emptor exception when seller knows of harmful condition but
conceals or fails to disclose it to seller) and 840A (seller remains liable as if still in position for
physical harm caused by nuisance condition) provide a "strong foundation on which to rest liability
for land sellers who polluted the property before sale.").
393.
See Albert G. Besser, Caveat Emptor - Where Have You Gone?, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J.
203, 226-27 (1992) (noting the unfairness of allowing a buyer of contaminated property to sue a
seller notwithstanding "as is" clause but barring a seller from shifting risk to a buyer or enforcing an
indemnity clause if contamination is unknown at time of purchase).
394.
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 12, at 366 (by encouraging seller disclosure and buyer investigative diligence, "[t]he rule of caveat emptor, therefore, encourages parties to reach a true meeting of
the minds in real estate transactions."); Besser, supra note 393, at 210-11 (purchaser of contaminated
property not a "mere bystander" injured by circumstances outside his control; rather, "[t]he purchaser can and, in this environmentally conscious era, should inspect the property or subject it to
environmental investigations.").
395.
See, e.g., Besser, supra note 393, at 215-16 (changing common law allocation of risk
between successive owners is better left to legislatures); Klein, supra note 12, at 365 ("using nuisance law to shift cleanup costs to intermediate landowners will cause such entities to expend resources in unproductive litigation-related activities.").
396.
The caveat emptor risk allocation line is not always as bright as its proponents might
suggest. For example, in some states risks associated with undisclosed site conditions do not shift
until the buyer has had a "reasonable opportunity" to discover undisclosed conditions. See, e.g.,
New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (under New
York law, the owner of land ceases to be liable in tort after the conveyance at such time as the new
owner has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition by making prompt inspection and
necessary repairs).
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nated property to avoid common law remediation liability as a matter of
law. The doctrine's underlying economic theory-that the market should
allocate risks associated with real property conditions-assumes that the
buyer (and, for that matter, the seller) has the technical and financial capacity to discover site contamination and understand its regulatory, economic and health significance during the narrow window of opportunity
available for inspection of commercial or residential real estate. This
assumption is unrealistic. Until relatively recently, few buyers fully understood the consequences of soil or groundwater contamination. A
properly conducted invasive (e.g., Phase II) site inspection can be expensive and, without information about past waste disposal practices to
guide investigators, potentially fruitless. Moreover, discovery of contamination does not necessarily mean that all potential environmental
problems at the site have been identified much less understood. A site
assumed to present one set of risks based on data collected years ago
may prove to present additional concerns in light of newly developed
contaminant detection techniques.39 7 It is not realistic to assume that the
market can efficiently or fairly allocate responsibility for such unknown
and unknowable risks.
Second, applying the doctrine is likely to have little or no material
impact on expanding the scope of seller disclosures. In many jurisdictions, the scope and content of real estate disclosure obligations, particularly those involving the use or disposal of hazardous substance on the
property, are now often mandated by statute or regulation.3 98 In addition,
under the proposed paradigm a seller would not be tempted by a prospective caveat emptor liability defense to minimize disclosures about past
property use and avoid scaring away potential buyers. Similarly, caveat
emptor is likely to have little effect on whether a buyer diligently investigates the property in question. To the contrary, the scope of a potential
buyer's site investigation likely would be determined by the buyer's interest in identifying any potential risk of assuming the environmental
liabilities and regulatory requirements that arise from owning contaminated property.

397.
See, e.g., RANDALL L. ERICKSON & ROBERT D. MORRISON, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTS
AND REMEDIATION PLANS: FORENSIC AND LEGAL REVIEW § 8.3 (1995) (discussing risks of misidentification of compounds as a result of analytical testing method selected and how high detection
limits can mask the presence of a compound in a soil or groundwater sample).
398.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(e)(2)(vii) (West 2006) (mandatory
disclosure form shall include a list of defects in relation to hazardous or regulated materials); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7 (West 2006) (mandatory disclosure by owners to buyers, lessees
or renters of real property in writing of release of any hazardous substance that has "come to be
located on or beneath that real property"); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2, 120(4)(g) (West 2006)
(mandatory disclosure of "[a]ny hazardous conditions, including substances, materials, and products
on the real property which may be an environmental hazard"); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:1 K-9
(West 2006) (absent alternative contractual arrangements between buyer and seller of industrial
property, seller must provide buyer with a no further action letter from state environmental regulatory agency or an approved remediation plan to be funded by seller).
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Third, litigation expenses are not "wasteful transaction costs" when
they serve to equitably reallocate the costs of cleaning up contamination
to the party creating it. The potential for same property private nuisance
litigation could further encourage pre-dispute agreements expressly allocating cleanup cost risks. Indeed, the threat or prosecution of litigation
also can encourage post-dispute resolution that efficiently allocates
remediation and cleanup cost responsibilities between vendor and
vendee.
Finally, market forces can still efficiently allocate risk through contract. A seller can (and should) be able to avoid liability to a buyer for
site contamination cleanup costs if the buyer contractually agrees to accept such responsibility.39 9 A contractual allocation of responsibility by
the buyer, however, must reflect a clear assumption of a known or knowable risk, in contrast (particularly in connection with agreements that predate CERCLA) to a generic "as is" clause unaccompanied by disclosures
about site hazardous substance use or waste disposal history. 400 Accordingly, without caveat emptor, a seller seeking to avoid site contamination
liability would have the additional incentive to fully disclose the site's
hazardous substance history in order to obtain an enforceable contractual
release of liability from the buyer.40 '
Just as many courts have now rejected "coming to the nuisance" as
a defense to adjoining property dispute nuisance liability, 40 2 they should
399.
See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) (buyer
barred from asserting CERCLA claims against seller pursuant to prior agreement resolving and
releasing claims relating to sale of property and business).
400.
See, e.g., Ybarra, supra note 243, at 1216-19 (arguing for a "standard of clear awareness
of the specific contamination by the purchaser before rights against the responsible party (seller) are
relinquished" and distinguishing among cases involving release agreements in recent transfers of
property, older transfers of property, "as is" agreements, and purchaser knowledge of site contamination).
401.
Similarly, because a seller's agreement to indemnify a buyer regarding hazardous substance liabilities can be enforceable, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(e)(3) (West 2006) ("[n]othing in
this subsection [of CERCLA] shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party
to such agreement for any liability under this section"), buyers have additional incentive to conduct
thorough pre-acquisition site investigations to determine whether contamination issues may be
present that warrant negotiation of an indemnification agreement.
402.
See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENViRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2:9 (1986 &
Supp. 2006) ("The priority in time of conflicting uses is pertinent to the question of whether a nuisance is proven. The issue arises typically as a defense to a nuisance claim on the theory that plaintiff has 'come to the nuisance."'); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D, cmt. b (1979) ("The
rule generally accepted by the courts is that in itself and without other factors, the "coming to the
nuisance" will not bar the plaintiffs recovery. Otherwise the defendant by setting up an activity or a
condition that results in the nuisance could condemn all the land in his vicinity to a servitude without
paying any compensation, and so could arrogate to himself a good deal of the value of the adjoining
land. The defendant is required to contemplate and expect the possibility that the adjoining land
may be settled, sold or otherwise transferred and that a condition originally harmless may result in
an actionable nuisance when there is later development."); cf, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (granting private nuisance injunction requested by
developer who purchased property located near cattle feeding operation on condition that developer
indemnify cattle feeder for the reasonable cost of moving or shutting down); Jerry Harmon Motors,
Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 337 N.W.2d 427, 432 (N.D. 1983) (plaintiff that comes
to an alleged nuisance has heavy burden to establish liability); Green, supra note 166, at 583-84
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also turn away from caveat emptor as a liability defense to private nuisance claims.4 °3 Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff/current landowner's acquisition of contaminated property should
remain relevant to the nature and scope of any nuisance remedy. A wide
range of transactional factors could impact the shaping of private nuisance relief, including: (a) a current landowner's knowledge about past
on-site waste disposal practices before acquiring the property; (b) contractual language relating to but not directly addressing remediation cost
risk allocation; (c) purchase price reduction or other consideration adjustment related to site contamination; and (d) post-transactional behavior by the current owner (e.g., contributing to site contamination, failing
to promptly and effectively address discovered contamination).
These factors should not bar liability for a defendant who created
contamination conditions constituting a nuisance. They should, however, be taken into account at the remedy stage of private nuisance litigation. For example, a court may consider such factors in deciding whether
to grant an injunction, 4° fashioning the terms under which injunctive
relief should be granted,4 °5 calculating damages to avoid any "double
recovery" by a current owner who received a purchase price discount
because of known or suspected contamination problems,4 °6 or evaluating
the extent to which cleanup cost or other contamination damages should
be borne by plaintiff rather than defendant under a "comparative respon-

(arguing that coming to the nuisance should be an affirmative defense if pollution costs have become
capitalized into surrounding land values).
403.
See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1258 (N.J. 1991) (rejecting
application of caveat emptor to same property ultra-hazardous activity contamination claim, observing that "the rule of caveat emptor has not retained its original vitality. With time, and in differing
contexts, we have on many occasions questioned the justification for the rule."). Courts have turned
away from caveat emptor as a matter of public policy in a variety of contexts, such as claims by the
buyer of a new home against the developer-seller. See, e.g., Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 932-33 (D. Me. 1990) (applying Maine law and holding that caveat
emptor did not bar private nuisance claim and noting that Maine courts previously had declined to
apply the defense in cases involving the sale of new homes); 17 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:26, at 352-53 (4th ed. 2000) ("Over the years, however, the
number of cases which have strictly applied the rule of caveat emptor appears to be diminishing, and
there is a distinct tendency to depart from the rule, either by way of interpretation, or exception, or
by simply refusing to adhere to the rule where it would work injustice."). Sound public policy
similarly requires that courts reject caveat emptor as a liability defense in same property private
nuisance cases involving soil or groundwater contamination.
404.
Cf Kellogg v. Village of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1975) ("While coming to the
nuisance may properly be considered while weighing the equities in an abatement action, it is irrelevant in a damage suit.").
405. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev., Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706, 708 (Ariz. 1972)
(granting private nuisance injunction requested by developer who purchased property located near
cattle feeding operation on condition that developer indemnify cattle feeder for the reasonable cost
of moving or shutting down).
406. See, e.g., W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 691 (9th Cir. 2004) (buyer
aware of environmental hazards as evidenced by reduced purchase price precluded from recovering
entire cost of cleanup).
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sibility" approach to environmental nuisance damages. 4°7 Economics
and market forces thus should continue play a role in private nuisance
disputes. That role, however, should be at the remedy rather than the
liability phase of the case.
D. A Different Approach to ContinuingEnvironmentalNuisance
Whether a nuisance is characterized as continuing or permanent implicates several critical issues in private environmental nuisance cases:
(a) identifying when a cause of action accrues and the applicable statute
of limitations begins to run; (b) determining the appropriate nature and
scope of available legal and equitable relief; and (c) resolving whether a
plaintiff may bring successive actions to address future harm and conduct.40 8 The current status of private nuisance law is a hopeless jumble
largely because of the widespread inconsistency among (and sometimes
within) states regarding the definition of a continuing nuisance and its
application to soil and groundwater contamination cases. This inconsistency must be eliminated so that private nuisance law can become a
meaningful alternative to a federal rule of decision in private cleanup
cost disputes across the country.
To begin with, under the proposed paradigm every state should recognize a tort of continuing environmental nuisance. The concept of continuing tort may seem inconsistent with the policies of finality, predictability and encouraging prompt prosecution of claims that underlie statutes of repose. Closer examination, however, reveals that a continuing
nuisance is not an open-ended exception to the statute of limitations; it
should be viewed as a tort of wrongful inaction-a defendant's failure to
abate a condition that continues to harm plaintiff and the environment.
Viewed this way, defendant's ongoing refusal to abate continues to accrue a new cause of action based on defendant's ongoing inaction.
Moreover, soil and groundwater contamination presents statute of limitations challenges significantly different in degree (if not in kind) from
those presented by other torts. For example, a property owner may have
noticed discolored soil decades ago but not understood its health, environmental or regulatory significance. Similarly, recent changes in technology (e.g., development of laboratory equipment capable of identifying
increasingly smaller concentrations of contaminants) 40 9 may provide a
far more complete understanding of the harm and regulatory obligations
triggered by contamination caused by the defendant. Without a continu407.
For a thorough discussion of "comparative nuisance" and the equitable allocation of
cleanup costs based on the comparative responsibility of the parties under a nuisance cause of action,
see generally Jeff L. Lewin, ComparativeNuisance, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1009 (1989).

408.
See, e.g., Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 275-76 (Tex. 2004)
(discussing issues implicated by nuisance characterization).
409. ERICKSON & MORRISON, supra note 397, at 161 (discussing risks of misidentification or
non-identification of compounds because of analytical testing methods and laboratory equipment
detection limitations).
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ing tort doctrine, a current owner who only recently learned the significance of older contamination may find a state law cleanup cost claim
(and with it the incentive voluntarily to remediate contamination caused
by others) time-barred by applicable statutes of limitations, even under a
discovery rule.4 1°
1. Defining Continuing Nuisance-Reasonable Abatability
The definition of "continuing nuisance" in contaminated property
cases should reflect the circumstances of the underlying environmental
problem. The definition of a "continuing nuisance" should arise from the
defendant's failure to remediate the soil and groundwater contamination
she caused or to which she contributed. Viewed this way, the defendant
is responsible for the continued contamination even after the cessation of
her conduct that contaminated the environment (e.g., disposal activity,
installation and maintenance of a leaking underground storage tank). It
is the unabated contamination, not the acts creating it, that constitutes the
continuing interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of property. 41' The defendant thus should have an ongoing duty to abate the
contamination; the repeated failure to perform this duty constitutes a
separate cause of action that continues to accrue until the defendant performs its duty or the contamination is otherwise abated.
An ongoing duty to abate through remediation assumes that remediation is practicable. Under the proposed paradigm, the definition of a
continuing nuisance requires that the contamination reasonably be capable of remediation. "Reasonable abatability" contemplates that (a) the
contamination could be abated to an appropriate level; (b) abatement to
such a level is technically possible;
and (c) the abatement could be ac41 2
complished at a reasonable cost.
a. Abatement to an Appropriate Level
An appropriate abatement level could be determined in one of two
ways. First, site-specific regulatory agency cleanup levels could set a
presumptive level of abatement. 413 The California Court of Appeal accepted such a role for agency approved cleanup levels in Capogeannis v.

410. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
411.
See Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 1), 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 838 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (continuing unabated harm is basis for continuing nuisance claim under California law);
Capogearmis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he continuing nature
of nuisance refers to the continuing but abatable damage caused by the offensive condition, not the
acts causing the offensive condition to occur." (citation omitted)).
412.
In Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini II1), 912 P.2d 1220, 1229 (Cal. 1996), the
Supreme Court of California embraced a "reasonableness" limitation on an abatability standard for
continuing nuisance, concluding that a nuisance was continuing for limitations purposes if it "can be
remedied at a reasonable cost by reasonable means." See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying
text.
413. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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Superior Court.4 14

The court rejected the defendants' "essentially semantic argument that because it does not appear that the contamination
[leakage from a removed underground storage tank] can ever be wholly
removed the nuisance must be deemed permanent. 4 5 Instead, the court
was "satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsible public agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be
done to abate contamination in particular cases. As judges we will not
presume to insist on absolutes these agencies do not require."' 6 Similarly, the court noted that because "as a practical matter the only impact
of the contamination on the Capogeannises is by way of the regulatory
agencies demands, 4 17 once those "demands have been met,
so far as the
4 8
abated.
be
will
nuisance
the
concerned
are
Capogeannises
Second, expert testimony could be used to address site cleanup standards. The characterization of a nuisance as permanent or continuing
may come before the court at trial or by summary judgment motion before a regulatory agency has set cleanup standards for the site. 4, 9 If so,
the court will require expert evidence regarding site conditions to evaluate the abatability of site contamination. Similarly, a party may turn to
expert testimony to rebut any presumption that agency cleanup standards
demonstrate that site contamination is abatable.42 °
b. Reasonable Means of Abatement
The concept of "reasonable abatability" should include a two-fold
technical component. First, means must exist to accomplish the contemplated remediation. Merely because an agency (or an expert witness) has
proposed a cleanup standard does not mean that the standard can be met
with current technology. For example, a proposed standard may contemplate reduction of groundwater contamination pollution levels to a
specified level of X parts per billion (ppb) for a particular compound. It
may be impossible, however, to meet the X ppb standard: the subsurface source of groundwater contamination may not have been lo-

414.
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
415.
Capogeannis, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805.
416.
Id.
417.
Id.
418.
Id.
419.
There may be many reasons why a contamination dispute could reach such advanced
stages of litigation without establishment of agency cleanup levels. For example, it may take years
to fully characterize large or technically complicated sites, and substantial time after completion of
site characterization activities to determine site cleanup levels. Moreover, limited resources can
substantially delay an environmental regulatory agency's determination of cleanup standards for
sites of any size or complexity.
420. In Mangini III, the California Supreme Court held that the contamination of plaintiff's
property constituted a permanent nuisance in part because there was no evidence of agency cleanup
standards or expert testimony proposing appropriate cleanup levels for the site. Mangini 111, 912
P.2d at 1221.
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cated; 42 1 the technology may not yet exist to clean up the contaminated
groundwater to the desired level; or laboratory equipment or available
analytical methods may not be capable of determining whether the
cleanup standards has been met.422
Second, even if the means exist to remediate the site contamination,
other environmental regulatory factors may argue against remediation.
For example, in Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 423 the court concluded that excavating oil-contaminated soil,
while technically possible, might not be reasonable in light of a regulatory agency's concern that the contamination presented no risk if left in
place but would raise other environmental concerns if it was excavated
and transported away from plaintiffs property for off-site disposal.42 4
c. Reasonable Cost of Abatement
For contamination to be deemed "abatable," the remediation must
be possible at a reasonable cost. The essence of private nuisance is interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of property. 425 Whether
the cost of abatement is reasonable, therefore, should be viewed from the
plaintiffs perspective. In other words, abatement costs should be balanced not against the value of the property as contaminated or, for that
matter, the value of the property after cleanup. Instead, it should be balanced against the value of the remediated property to the plaintiff after
the cleanup, including the present value of profits that could be generated
from the remediated property. As a result, if a parcel of contaminated
property has no net value as contaminated, a fair market value of
$5,000,000 as remediated, and the capacity to generate an additional
$5,000,000 in profit if remediated (e.g., the present value of profits generated from developing the site for single family residences), the baseline
for measuring the reasonableness of remediation should be $10,000,000,
the overall value of the highest and best use of the property as uncon-

421.
For example, at some sites the presence of dense non-aqueous phase liquids (DNAPLs)-in effect, a volumetrically small but high-concentration collection of the contaminant in a subsurface water-bearing soil zone-can serve as a continuing source of groundwater contamination.
See ERICKSON & MORRISON, supra note 397, §7.4 (describing how, as groundwater flows past the
DNAPL, a portion of the DNAPL "will dissolve into the groundwater" at a rate dependent on
groundwater velocity and DNAPL solubility). Unless the DNAPL can be located and its effect
eliminated or significantly reduced, near-source concentrations of groundwater contamination may
not be capable of remediation to proposed cleanup levels.
422. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
423.
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
424. Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-60; see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(ii)(E) (2006)
(NCP requires that selection of remedial action include consideration of "the preference for treatment as a principal element and the bias against off-site land disposal of untreated waste.");
JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: REAL ESTATE AND

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 4-103 (2004) (noting NCP preference in connection with preparation of
RI/FS for on-site treatment and cost-effectiveness).
425. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979) (defining private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land").
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taminated. Viewed this way, a $7,000,000 cleanup would represent
abatement at a reasonable cost and thus a continuing nuisance.42 6
Why should cost matter at all? Why should a defendant be "rewarded" with a statute of limitations defense when she causes technically
abatable harm that is so extensive that the cost of abating it exceeds the
value of cleanup to plaintiff? Cost should matter because at some point
the harm is so great that the law should no longer permit a private plaintiff to demand that the defendant abate the nuisance in a direct action
premised on interference with the use and enjoyment of property. As
comment f to section 839 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides,
"[t]he law does not require the unreasonable or the fantastic, and therefore even though it might conceivably be possible to abate a particular
condition, it is not 'abatable' within the meaning of this Section unless
its abatement can be accomplished without unreasonable hardship or
expense.,,427 Moreover, factoring costs to determine whether a nuisance
is continuing or permanent reflects a policy choice that preserves a role
for statutes of limitations. Without cost as a factor, almost any technically abatable contamination would support a claim for continuing nuisance, all but eliminating the statute of limitations as a defense in environmental nuisance cases. An analysis into the means and cost of
abatement would involve a case-by-case analysis regarding site conditions requiring the expenditure of additional party and judicial resources.
These resources likely would be expended anyway, however, in fashioning a nuisance remedy,4 28 examining the reasonableness of abatement
426. The highest and best use of the property, viewed objectively, would take into account both
plaintiff's planned use and any other, more profitable use that could be employed by plaintiff or a
future purchaser (who presumably would pay plaintiff for the potential development opportunity). A
court may also consider the reason why plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant abatement costs
exceeding the value of the property to plaintiff. On the one hand, plaintiff may be required by a
regulatory agency to conduct such a cleanup. On the other hand, the plaintiff may choose to remediate for purely business reasons. See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559 (evaluating plaintiff's private nuisance claim for remediation of a development site in light of regional water board
conclusion that contaminated soil could have remained in place). In the former situation, a court
may take into account whether the plaintiff has any choice in remediating defendant's pollution as
part of a "reasonableness" analysis; in the latter situation, the economics of remediation may assume
determinative significance regarding whether the nuisance is permanent or continuing.
427. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 839 (1979) (addressing liability of possessor of
land who fails to abate an artificial condition constituting a nuisance). In addition to evidence of
technical abatability, courts may also consider the selection of site-specific cleanup levels as relevant
to whether abatement can be achieved at a reasonable cost, at least in those instances where the
agency is required to take cost-effectiveness into account in setting cleanup levels. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(ii)(D) (requiring lead agency under NCP to take cost-effectiveness into account
inselecting remedial action); see also supra note 271 and accompanying text.
428.
It is possible that a plaintiff at an older contamination site will be required by a regulatory
agency to cleanup contamination of her property to which she made little or no contribution at a cost
that exceeds the value of the remediated property to plaintiff. A court may take into account any
regulatory directives imposed on plaintiff in deciding whether the cost is reasonable and thus
whether the nuisance is continuing. Moreover, in contrast to a direct private nuisance claim based
on plaintiff's interest in freedom from a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of her
property, derivative claims (e.g., if state law permits actions for contribution or equitable indemnity
upon issuance of a cleanup order or in the event of enforcement action) may be available against the
defendant with regard to cleanup costs arising from such a duty imposed on the current owner.
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costs sought as damages by the plaintiff,429 allocating cleanup costs
based on a comparative responsibility analysis, and the crafting of
abatement injunctive relief.
d. Comparison with Other Continuing Nuisance Standards
The "reasonable abatability" standard rests on a defendant's inaction in the face of a reasonably abatable harm that continues to interfere
with a plaintiffs use and enjoyment of property. It also would preserve
cleanup cost claims at many older contamination sites at which the statute of limitations would bar claims for permanent nuisance. The reasonable abatability standard is superior to other continuing nuisance standards currently used by courts around the country, which fail to adequately serve the policy considerations that support preservation of
cleanup cost claims at older contamination sites.
The continuing harmful conduct standard 430 does nothing to address
the problem of a defendant's inaction in the face of the reasonably abatable harmful condition that remains on a plaintiffs property. Moreover,
although the discontinuance of a defendant's conduct creates something
of a bright line to determine when the permanent nuisance statute of limitations begins to run, it provides no relief at older contamination sites
where a defendant's polluting conduct may have ceased years ago but the
offensive condition it created remains unabated.
The predictability of future harm standard employed by the Texas
courts 43 1 looks away from both a defendant's conduct and the abatability

of pollution, focusing instead on the predictability of future damages. In
effect, the predictability of harm standard constitutes a presumption that
a nuisance is permanent by limiting "temporary" nuisance actions to
those where future damages cannot reasonably be determined and thus a
single action would be unable to fully compensate the plaintiff. It creates
no incentives for abatement; indeed, the Texas standard creates a perverse incentive for a plaintiff to argue that the nature of a contamination
problem cannot yet be characterized and for a defendant to argue that
because the problem can be abated by reasonable means and at a cost
capable of a current reliable estimate the contamination must constitute a
permanent nuisance and plaintiffs claim should be time-barred.

Other types of property damages, e.g., lost rental or other use of the property, would presumably not
be available under a derivative theory of liability.
429. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1) (1979) (stating that "[i]f one is
entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total
destruction of value, the damages include compensation for (a) the difference between the value of
the land before the harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the
cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred, (b) the loss of use of the land, and
(c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant.")
430.
See supra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
431.
See supra notes 301-14 and accompanying text.
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The courts that use a "changing over time" standard effectively
equate a "continuing nuisance" with a "different-looking nuisance. 43 2
In other words, if the harmful condition changes over time, it is a different nuisance and therefore a new cause of action should accrue. This
approach ignores both the defendant's failure to abate harm and ongoing
active causation of harm as the basis for a continuing nuisance analysis.
It also draws arbitrary remedial lines, permitting a continuing nuisance
claim for groundwater contamination (which changes form over time as
groundwater continues to migrate) while relegating to permanent nuisance status discrete, easily removed soil contamination (which generally
remains immobile and does not change form or environmental impact
over time).
The continued presence standard 433 comes closest to serving the
goals achieved by the proposed reasonable abatability standard. On its
face, however, the continued presence standard does not address either
the technical means of abatement or its cost, transforming all soil and
groundwater contamination that does not serve a socially beneficial purpose by remaining in place into a continuing nuisance. Such a broad
standard would support a nuisance-based cleanup cost claim in almost all
contaminated property cases but would virtually eliminate the statute of
limitations as a defense at these sites and in theory permit perpetual successive continuing nuisance actions concerning contamination that cannot practicably be abated.434 If soil or groundwater contamination is not
practicably abatable, it properly should be viewed as a permanent problem for which the rules of permanent nuisance should apply.
Finally, the multi-factored balancing approach 435 has the benefit of
flexibility. It also has the significant disadvantages of unpredictability
and unreliability regarding whether a given contamination problem constitutes a continuing nuisance. Moreover, it shifts the focus of continuing nuisance law from abating contamination to a case-by-case bundling
of issues to be weighed in a potentially inconsistent manner from court to
court.
In sum, states should re-examine the law of continuing nuisance as
applied to soil and groundwater contamination problems by viewing the
definition of continuing nuisance through the lens of the public policy
that this tort should serve. The proposed paradigm promotes prompt,
efficient cleanups by preserving cleanup cost claims based on a defen-

432.
See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
433.
See supra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
434.
Even if a state court found the continued presence test more attractive than a reasonable
abatability approach, a court might decline to embrace a standard that would all but eliminate the
statute of limitations (even with a "social utility" exception) as a liability defense and instead defer
such a policy choice to the state legislature.
435.
See supra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
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dant's continued failure to reasonably abate the soil or groundwater contamination she caused or to which she contributed.
2. Rebuttable Presumption of Continuing Nuisance
The proposed paradigm is designed to encourage (a) abatement of
soil and groundwater contamination, (b) voluntarily cleanup by current
property owners of contamination caused in whole or in part by others,
and (c) informal resolution of private cleanup cost allocation disputes
among PRPs. The default characterization of a nuisance in the event of
evidentiary equipoise can play a substantial role in serving these goals.
Accordingly, the proposed paradigm would create a rebuttable presumption 436 that soil or groundwater contamination constitutes a continuing
rather than permanent nuisance.43 7
An environmental nuisance framework that presumes soil and
groundwater contamination constitute a continuing nuisance would provide a number of benefits. First, abatement-related private nuisance
claims (e.g., claims for cleanup cost damages or injunctive relief ordering defendant to abate a nuisance) presumptively would not be timebarred.
Second, equitable relief directed to abating the nuisance presumptively would be available. Under a reasonable abatability standard for
436.
Some courts have articulated a preference for finding a continuing nuisance to protect
plaintiffs from the statute of limitations, unforeseen future injuries, and to encourage the abatement
of nuisances. See Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804-05 (1993) (holding that
issues of material fact whether contaminants from former owner and tenant underground storage
tank constituted a continuing or permanent nuisance barred summary judgment for defendants on
statute of limitations). This preference, however, often manifests itself by allowing plaintiffs in
close or doubtful cases to elect which nuisance theory to pursue. Id. at 801. This election, of course,
is illusory in connection with older contamination problems where a permanent nuisance claim
would be time-barred.
437.
Not all soil or groundwater contamination, of course, constitutes a nuisance. De minimus
concentrations of contaminants on a plaintiff's property, for example, might not constitute a nuisance. A plaintiff thus would still be required to prove that the contamination substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of her property and that the defendant's negligent, intentional and
unreasonable or ultra-hazardous activity conduct proximately caused the contamination. See supra
note 174 and accompanying text; see also Jezowski v. City of Reno, 286 P.2d 257, 260-61 (Nev.
1955) (private nuisance claim requires proof of "material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or
hurt"); Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (N.H. 1972) (interference with use and enjoyment of
property must be substantial); Energy Corp. v. O'Quinn, 286 S.E.2d 181, 182 (Va. 1982) (condition
"substantially impairing the occupant's comfort, convenience, and enjoyment of the property" may
constitute private nuisance); Brown & Hansen, supra note 224, at 664-65 (noting that "many California courts have utilized the common law balancing approach to determine whether a condition or
activity constitutes a nuisance under the provisions of [California Civil Code] section 3479. Under
this approach, the plaintiff must establish that the harm of a nuisance outweighs the benefits of the
defendant's conduct. In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is substantial and not
nominal. Whether a particular use of land constitutes a nuisance must be determined on a case-bycase basis in light of all the circumstances. The relevant balancing factors include the priority of the
use, the locality and surroundings of the property, the nature and extent of the nuisance and the
injury caused thereby, whether the nuisance is continual or occasional, and the number of people
affected."). Assuming, however, that the presence of contaminants does constitute a nuisance, under
the proposed paradigm it would presumptively constitute a continuing rather than permanent nuisance.
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continuing nuisance, soil and groundwater contamination presumptively
would be capable of abatement by reasonable means and at reasonable
cost.438 A plaintiff also would be entitled to recover damages consistent
with the continuing (i.e., non-permanent) nature of the nuisance sustained during the limitations period (e.g., abatement costs, damages arising from the lost use of the property). 439 A defendant would typically
Sites that already are the subject of a regulatory agency cleanup order may present pri438.
mary jurisdiction concerns. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court has the discretion to
refer certain matters to a specialized administrative agency. It is "a prudential doctrine under which
courts may, under appropriate circumstances, determine that the initial decision-making responsibility should be performed by the relevant agency rather than the courts." Syntek Semiconductor Co.
v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts may consider a variety of factors in deciding whether to exercise the doctrine, including whether (a) the court is being called on to
decide factual issues which are not within the conventional experience of judges or are instead issues
of a sort that a court routinely considers; (b) the defendant could be subjected to conflicting orders of
both the court and the agency; (c) relevant agency proceedings have been initiated; (d) the agency
has proceeded diligently or allowed the proceedings to languish; and (e) the plaintiff is seeking
injunctive relief requiring technical or scientific expertise for the courts to craft. Schwartzman, Inc.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 857 F. Supp. 838, 841-43 (D.N.M. 1994) (applying primary jurisdiction doctrine to stay landowner's claim for injunctive relief where EPA had already
begun process of initiating remedial investigation and feasibility study). Some courts have deferred
consideration of injunctive relief under the primary jurisdiction doctrine where an environmental
regulatory agency actively was involved in site characterization or remediation, see id.; Liss v.
Milford Partners, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 216 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (unpublished) (denying motion to
dismiss claim seeking injunction under Connecticut law that defendants remediate soil and groundwater contamination but postponing further judicial proceedings pending completion of administrative action by state Department of Environmental Protection); White Lake Improvement Ass'n. v.
City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473, 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (affirming dismissal of complaint
seeking injunction to abate nuisance caused by discharge of waste into lake on ground that plaintiff
should pursue administrative remedies through state water agency before court should further entertain action to abate nuisance), while others have rejected the primary jurisdiction argument and
permitted claims to abate a nuisance, see, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Mich. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 380
N.W.2d 53, 67-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not require court to
defer jurisdiction over contaminated site to EPA in light of limited agency resources, lack of emergency situation, and absence of agency objection); Meinders v. Johnson, 134 P.3d 858, 867 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2005) (affirming injunction that defendants remedy surface and subsurface pollution from
mineral exploration and production on plaintiffs property where Corporation Commission had not
yet exercised jurisdiction over matter).
439.
See supra note 252 and accompanying text. Some courts have treated a nuisance as
continuing for statute of limitations purposes only but nevertheless awarded "permanent" nuisance
(i.e., prospective) damages. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (D.
Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium released from nearby nuclear weapons
plant constituted a continuing nuisance and trespass for statute of limitations purposes but could
provide basis for prospective, diminution in value damages effectively purchasing an easement for
invasion to continue); Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) ("[N]uisances may be classified for two distinct purposes, one for the assessment of
damages, and the other for the application of the statute of limitations."); cf Briscoe v. Harper Oil
Co., 702 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Okla. 1985) (affirming temporary nuisance damage award for cost of
repairing well and permanent nuisance damage award for unabatable diminution in farmland property value caused by oil and gas lessee). Such an inconsistent approach to continuing nuisance
would all but eliminate the statute of limitations as a defense in environmental nuisance cases and
fail to serve any unifying policy except maximizing plaintiffs financial recovery. Under the proposed paradigm, a presumption against prospective damages would keep the policy focus of continuing nuisance actions on remediation and cooperation. Whether stigma damages are more consistent
with a permanent or continuing nuisance theory presents a challenging conceptual problem.

(A

detailed discussion of stigma damages is beyond the scope of this article.). On the one hand, diminution of property value caused by stigma of prior contamination that has been abated arguably is
consistent with a continuing nuisance theory and thus could be recoverable. On the other hand,
diminution in property value caused by contamination stigma could be viewed as prospective harm

2006]

BACK FROM THE MARGINS

483

bear sole responsibility for these damages at sites where the defendant
was the sole cause of the contamination. At sites where the plaintiff had
partial responsibility for the contamination, 440 damages (including the
cost of complying with any injunction issued by the court) could be allocated proportionately. 44 1 By contrast, contamination that cannot reasonably be abated443should not be enjoined 44 2 and would constitute a permanent nuisance.
Third, plaintiffs presumptively would have a right to bring successive actions until the nuisance was abated. In each action, a plaintiff
would be able to seek injunctive relief and damages sustained during the
preceding limitations period. The right to bring successive actions protects a plaintiff against unforeseen future remediation costs and temporary harm occasioned by a defendant's continued failure to remediate the
contamination (e.g., lost property use damages, abatement costs). It also
provides powerful incentives for the parties to cooperate in promptly
remediating the property. A plaintiff would want to get the site cleaned
and thus reserved only for permanent nuisance actions. For example, in Santa Fe Partnershipv.
Arco Products Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), a California Court of Appeal felt
constrained by California Supreme Court precedent holding that prospective damages are unavailable for a continuing nuisance action to hold that stigma damages were unavailable in a continuing
nuisance case.
440.
Even if a plaintiff did not contribute to site contamination, a court may consider as part of
a comparative responsibility analysis whether the plaintiff acted diligently to mitigate harm upon
discovery of the contamination or its significance, or instead allowed site conditions to worsen and
abatement costs to increase through inattention or indifference.
441.
See generally Lewin, supra note 407, at 1053-69 (advocating nuisance remedial scheme
contemplating proportional allocation of nuisance damages and cost of performing abatement injunction based on the comparative responsibility of plaintiff and defendant for creating or maintaining the nuisance). Courts also could freely experiment with alternative remedial schemes consistent
with the fundamental nature of the continuing nuisance analytical framework. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 & n.8 (4th ed. Aspen 1992) (citing William F. Baxter &
Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects ofAirport Noise, 15 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1972), as basis for proposal, in
context of noise pollution, of "time-limited easements," limiting successive continuing tort actions to
periodic suits (e.g., every 10 years) in order to limit administrative costs and provide extended platform for bargaining in exchange for payment by defendant of prospective damages covering the
temporary pollution easement period). For an extensive discussion regarding the evolution of nuisance remedies, see generally Lewin, supra note 166.
442. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1952) (directing the trial court to
determine whether a landslide onto the plaintiffs property constituted a permanent nuisance; if so,
the court should award diminution in property damages and if not, the court should award injunctive
relief to abate the nuisance).
443. By filing a timely claim for permanent nuisance, a plaintiff could recover all past, present,
and future damages caused by the contamination, in effect representing the price of a permanent
easement for the pollution on plaintiff's property. Cf Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d
1003, 1012 (D. Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium released from nearby
nuclear weapons plant constituted a continuing nuisance and trespass for statute of limitations purposes, and could provide basis for prospective, diminution in value damages effectively purchasing
an easement for invasion to continue). If the permanent nuisance claim is not timely filed, plaintiff
could not recover damages because of the statute of limitations and "because the nuisance is deemed
permanent, the plaintiff may not abate the nuisance by an injunction; rather she is limited to her
time-barred claim for damages. In effect, defendant has acquired a right to damage, and continue to
damage, plaintiff's land at no cost to defendant!" FISCHER, supra note 251, §84(d). The presumption of continuing nuisance created by the proposed paradigm would reduce the risk of the latter
result.
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up promptly to restore the value of her asset and satisfy regulatory obligations. A defendant (who likely would be precluded from re-litigating
her liability in a subsequent action) would want to mitigate delay or lost
use damages arising from the continued presence of contaminants on
plaintiff's property. A defendant thus would be encouraged to actively
participate in site remediation to promote a cost-effective cleanup (which
the defendant is paying for, in whole or in part) and to avoid an argument
in a subsequent action that the defendant should pay punitive damages
for intentionally failing to abate a nuisance for which it has been previously found liable. 444
In the alternative, a defendant who is found liable for continuing
nuisance and subject to successive suits until the nuisance is abated has
an incentive to negotiate an informal resolution of remediation and
cleanup cost allocation issues. 44' For example, the defendant could enter
into a settlement agreement establishing a contract-based set of duties to
directly conduct or financially participate in the cleanup and avoid future
litigation transaction costs. Similarly, the defendant may attempt to negotiate a settlement by paying the plaintiff to liquidate the defendant's
continued obligation to remediate the contamination.
The presumption that soil or groundwater contamination constitutes
a continuing nuisance would be rebuttable. Accordingly, whether a nuisance ultimately was found to be continuing or permanent would turn on
the intersection of three components of the paradigm: (a) the standard
(reasonable abatability) by which a court would determine whether the
objecting party satisfied its burden; (b) the default presumption that the
nuisance is continuing; and (c) the placement of the burden of proof on
any party objecting to characterization of the nuisance as continuing, i.e.,
any party contending that the nuisance is permanent. It is to this shifted
burden of proof that we now turn.
E. Burden of Proofon the PartyAdvocating for PermanentNuisance
The presumption that soil or groundwater contamination constitutes
a continuing nuisance is effected by the allocation of the burden of proof.
If the evidence regarding the reasonable abatability of contamination
conditions is in equipoise, under the proposed presumption the nuisance
would be deemed continuing. This presumption could only be overcome
if a party-whether defendant orplaintiff-who argues that a nuisance is

444.
See, e.g., Sumitomo Corp. of Am. v. Deal, 569 S.E.2d 608, 615-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(affirming as consistent with due process $250,000 continuing nuisance and trespass punitive damage award against upstream developer who knew of damage caused by water leaving its detention
ponds but did nothing to abate the flow of water).
445.

See Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding of

continuing nuisance "will tend to encourage private abatement, and perhaps monetary cooperation in
abatement efforts, if only to limit successive lawsuits").
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permanent can demonstrate that the contamination44 6 likely cannot be
abated by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost.
Courts that have addressed the issue generally place the burden of
proof on a plaintiff to show that a nuisance is continuing." 7 Because the
question commonly arises only when a permanent nuisance claim would
be time-barred, the burden of proof issue traditionally is framed as
whether continuing nuisance characterization is an element of a plaintiff's cause of action 44 8 or part of a defendant's statute of limitations affirmative defense. 449 Nuisance characterization, however, affects not
only the statute of limitations but the right to bring successive nuisance
actions and the nature of available relief. The burden of proof, thus,
should turn on the policy considerations and consequences arising from
nuisance characterization. 45 °
Characterizing contamination as a continuing nuisance would promote the paradigm's policy objectives to (a) expand the availability of
current landowner common law rights to recover from other PRPs their
fair share of cleanup costs, (b) encourage prompt characterization and
remediation of contamination, and (c) promote settlement of private
cleanup cost disputes. On the other hand, if a nuisance is deemed permanent, landowners would be unable to recover cleanup costs at many
older contamination sites and defendants would have no obligation or
incentive under common law to help remediate contamination that ocThe party advocating for a permanent nuisance would bear both the burden of production
446.
(i.e., the obligation to produce sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment or entry ofjudgment
as a matter of law) and the burden of persuasion at trial.
447.
See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 111), 912 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Cal. 1996);
see also supra notes 337-60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1226 (noting that the parties did not dispute that the
448.
characterization of nuisance was an element of plaintiff's cause of action); Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 556 (finding a private nuisance claim time-barred because the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden to prove continuing nuisance).
449. See Brown & Hansen, supra note 224, at 698-99 (arguing that defendants should bear
burden of proving that contamination from an underground storage tank constitutes a permanent
nuisance, rather than plaintiffs bearing the burden that the site constitutes a continuing nuisance,
likening the issue to the defendant's burden of proving an affirmative defense that a claim is barred
by the statute of limitations); see also Smith, supra note 164, at 60-61 (noting that, while plaintiffs
typically bear burden of proving damages within continuing tort limitations period, the statute of
limitations usually is an affirmative defense).
450. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions shifted to school authorities the burden of showing
that their actions as to other segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by segregative intent, observing that "[t]here are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the
burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of policy and fairness
based on experience in the different situations."' (citation omitted)); David S. Cohen, The Evidentiary PredicateForAffirmative Action After Croson: A Proposalfor Shifting the Burdens of Proof 7
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 489, 499 (1989) ("Courts, however, are not hesitant to reallocate both burdens in order to achieve the purposes of the underlying substantive law and to fulfill notions of good
public policy."); Martin J. LaLonde, Allocating the Burden of Proofto Effectuate The Preservation
and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 438, 449 (1993)
("Courts often do not hesitate to allocate the burden to realize the purposes of the substantive law
and to promote public policy goals.").
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curred long ago. Moreover, at sites where a permanent nuisance claim
would not be time-barred, an award of prospective permanent nuisance
damages would effectively purchase a pollution easement for defendant
and undermine the current landowner's incentive to use a damage award
to fully remediate her property, leaving the environment polluted
and
451
use.
productive
fully
for
unavailable
property
useful
potentially
Placing the burden of proof on the party advocating that contamination constitutes a permanent nuisance would eliminate a series of perverse incentives under current practice. First, defendants arguing that a
nuisance claim should be time-barred because the contamination constitutes a permanent nuisance currently need only point to the absence of
data regarding contamination abatability. 4 2 Under the proposed paradigm, defendants would need to proffer site characterization data if they
wished to show that a nuisance cannot be abated by reasonable means
and at reasonable cost. 4 53 Second, defendants would have an incentive to
become actively involved in the site investigation and remediation process, either to control abatement costs for which they may be liable or to
demonstrate that they were prepared to participate in nuisance abatement
454
but were deterred from doing so by unreasonable plaintiff demands.
Third, plaintiffs seeking to pocket a one-time potential "windfall" of
past, present, and future money damages for permanent nuisance rather
than use their recovery to remediate their property would have to prove
that their property is not subject to reasonable abatement. Plaintiffs
would be deterred taking this position by the risks of harming prospects
for future site development (e.g., the risk of creating by their own argu451.
Where the statute of limitations defense is unavailable, the risk of a substantial damages
award for permanent nuisance could lead a defendant to argue that a nuisance is continuing. The
risk of such an award also could encourage greater care in hazardous substance handling and disposal practice.
452.
See supra notes 338-56 and accompanying text.
453.
The burden of proof regarding nuisance characterization also has a significant impact on
litigation timing. A plaintiff bearing the burden of proving that a nuisance is continuing cannot
proceed to trial until sufficient site condition data has been generated to meet its burden of production. As a result, a plaintiff may be forced to try to delay trial until the information becomes available. A defendant, on the other hand, currently has the incentive to accelerate trial in the hope that
the plaintiff cannot meet his or her burden of proving that contamination is reasonably abatable.
Under the proposed paradigm and re-allocated burden of proof, until a site has been adequately
characterized the defendant would need to obtain a delayed trial date or else risk a failure of proof
that the contamination cannot be reasonably abated. Similarly, a defendant also would have an
incentive to become involved in the regulatory process and urge agencies to proceed promptly with
approval of site investigation and remediation plans and issuance of cleanup standards. The proposal further would eliminate the risk that a plaintiff would be unable to recover cleanup costs for
contamination created by another because an agency failed to generate the site cleanup standards
necessary for plaintiff to prove that the contamination was reasonably abatable.
454.
Defendants thus could argue that delays or unreasonable demands imposed on them by
plaintiffs in abatement activities (e.g., demanding that defendants pay without meaningful input
about how the money would be spent, preventing defendants from communicating with regulatory
agencies) would support equitable liability defenses of waiver, laches, or estoppel, see, e.g., Jamail
v. Stoneledge Condo. Owners Ass'n, 970 S.W.2d 673, 676-77 (Tex. App. 1978) (laches may bar or
qualify relief in private continuing nuisance claim), or reduce defendant's share of abatement cost
responsibility.
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ment a future stigma on property value), compromising potentially available insurance coverage for site remediation, and undermining arguments
to regulatory agencies about site-specific, cost-effective remediation
strategies.
The proposed re-allocated burden of proof, by increasing the chance
that the contamination will be considered a continuing nuisance and thus
subject to reasonable abatement, also would encourage a cooperative
approach to site characterization and settlement of cleanup cost responsibilities. A defendant may wish to avoid litigation transaction costs associated with the threat of a series of continuing nuisance lawsuits, the risk
of an injunction ordering participation in a cleanup, the specter of prospective damages for plaintiffs lost use of the property until the contamination is abated, and the possibility that a plaintiff would demand
punitive damages for defendant's alleged willful failure to abate a continuing nuisance. Similarly, a plaintiff would have an incentive to negotiate settlement because of the reduced chance of a large prospective
damage award, the risk of regulatory compliance obligations, and the
desire to avoid litigation transaction costs.
Finally, the proposed re-allocation of the burden of proof should be
accompanied by a presumption that the only remedies available to455a
plaintiff are those consistent with the abatability of the nuisance.
These remedies would include (a) injunctive relief for abatement of contamination and its source (if still actively polluting) and (b) damages
consistent with an abatable nuisance suffered by plaintiff during the limitations period,45 6 such as abatement costs and damages arising from lost
opportunity costs associated with unabated contamination (e.g., lost
rents, delayed development profits).45 7 Damages that assume permanent
455.
This presumption would be consistent with the perspective of most courts that permanent
nuisance claims permit a plaintiff to recover in one action all past, present, and future damages
caused by the nuisance, and that continuing nuisance claims permit injunctive relief directed toward
nuisance abatement as well as past damages suffered within the limitation but not future damages
based on a nuisance that could be discontinued or abated at any time. See generally FISCHER, supra
note 251, §84[b]-[e].
456.
See, e.g., Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 219 n.7 (Colo. 2004) (damages available
for continuing torts up to time of suit); Anderson v. State, 965 P.2d 783, 792 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998)
("[A] continuous tortious act should not be subject to a limitations period until the act ceases. The
doctrine also recognizes that though the statute of limitations is tolled by a continuing tortious act,
'in such a case[,] a recovery may be had for all damages accruing within the statutory period before
the action, although not for damages accrued before that period.' (quoting Wong Nin v. City &
County of Honolulu, 33 Haw. 379 (1935))); Lyons v. Township of Wayne, 888 A.2d 426, 430 (N.J.
2005) ("One who suffers a continuing nuisance, therefore, is 'able to collect damages for each injury
suffered within the limitations period."' (citation omitted)). To promote efficiency, continuing
nuisance damages incurred to the time of trial (rather than to the time the continuing nuisance action
was commenced) also could be recoverable. See, e.g., Renz v. 33rd Dist. Agric. Ass'n., 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (permitting recovery of continuing nuisance damages between
commencement and conclusion of action notwithstanding California Supreme Court dicta that damages available during limitations period preceding commencement of action).
457. See, e.g., Kathan v. Bellows Falls Village Corp., 223 A.2d 470, 472 (Vt. 1966) (cost of
repair rather than diminution in property value is appropriate measure of damages in this continuing
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property impairment, such as diminution in property value, would be
presumptively unavailable under the proposed paradigm. 458 Such a remedial presumption would further promote the policies of site remediation and voluntary cleanup on which the proposed paradigm is based by
keeping the focus of continuing nuisance litigation on cleanup rather than
on calculating the price of a permanent nuisance pollution easement.
CONCLUSION: NUISANCE LAW AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES

The uncertainty regarding the future role of federal law in private
cleanup cost disputes caused by Aviall has created an opportunity for
private nuisance to play a significant role in private cleanup cost disputes. Private nuisance law can fill significant gaps in the CERCLA
private enforcement scheme by providing a private cleanup cost remedy
at petroleum contamination sites 459 and encourage voluntary remediation
by owners of contaminated property by allowing them to obtain from
those who caused most or all of the pollution their fair share of cleanup
costs. 460 Moreover, private nuisance law can promote litigation and remedial efficiency and flexibility by providing a common body of state
law for resolution of all contamination-related claims 461 and encouraging

technically sound, prompt, and cost-efficient remediation whether or not
in compliance with the often time-consuming and expensive procedural
requirements of the NCP.46 2
In its current state, however, private nuisance law remains a theory
of unrealized potential inapplicable to many common types of private
cleanup cost disputes. In most states, a landowner cannot bring a private
nuisance claim to address same property contamination problems. The
responsible parties' failure to remediate long-standing contamination
continues to substantially interfere with current owner's use and enjoyment of her property, yet in many jurisdictions nuisance claims to obtain
cleanup costs from or an abatement injunction against the polluter would
trespass case); see also FISCHER, supra note 251, §84(b)(i) (temporary nuisance damages include
diminished rental value and lost use damages).
458.
See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
459.
CERCLA does not provide a cleanup cost remedy for petroleum contamination because
petroleum is expressly excluded from the definition of "hazardous substances" covered by the statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2006). See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
460.
The current owner of contaminated property is a "covered person" liable under CERCLA
section 107(a)(1). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1). Under Aviall, the landowner would be unable to bring
a section 113(f) contribution action unless it first had been sued under CERCLA or settled with the
government, while under pre-Aviall case law the current owner as a PRP also would be barred from
asserting a section 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery claim. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
461.
Private remedies under CERCLA only address recovery of "necessary costs of response"
to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f).
CERCLA does not authorize private claim injunctive relief, nor does it provide for personal injury
damages, lost profit or other economic damages, lost use or diminution in value property damages.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Some or all of these contamination-related damages may
be available to a current owner under a continuing or permanent nuisance theory.
462.
See supra notes 140-45, 429 and accompanying text.
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be time-barred. Finally, the doctrinal limitations of current nuisance law
are underscored by the dramatic state-by-state variations in the scope of
nuisance law, reflecting a patchwork quilt of random environmental protection rather than a coherent body of law responding to the nationwide
problem of remediating contaminated properties.
The environmental nuisance paradigm proposed by this article
would solve these problems by (a) expanding the scope of nuisance liability to include same property private nuisance disputes, (b) eliminating caveat emptor and other common law market-based risk allocation
tools as defenses to liability, 463 (c) adopting a reasonable abatability of
harm standard for continuing nuisance, (d) creating a rebuttable presumption that a soil or groundwater contamination nuisance was continuing (i.e., the contamination was reasonably abatable), and (e) placing the
burden of proof on the party contending that a nuisance was permanent
to show that the contamination was not reasonably abatable. This proposed paradigm would allocate cleanup cost obligations on the basis of
comparative responsibility for site conditions, encouraging voluntary
cleanups by current landowners and the informal resolution of cleanup
cost allocation disputes.
This paradigm could be adopted by the states in several ways. First,
state appellate courts could embrace the principles underlying the paradigm through the case-by-case evolution of common law. The definition
of nuisance under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and most state law
is broad enough to encompass same property cleanup cost disputes, and
many state appellate courts have not yet directly addressed whether soil
or groundwater contamination constitutes a continuing or permanent
nuisance.
Second, state legislatures may find that legislation represents a
faster and more efficient solution. Some state appellate courts may be
unable to implement the paradigm because of stare decisis concerns or
limitations imposed by existing state statutes. Moreover, the evolution of
state private nuisance case law could take years. To avoid these potential
obstacles, state legislatures could enact an environmental nuisance statute codifying the elements of this paradigm. Whether accomplished by
statute or case law, however, the goal of meaningfully addressing the
nation's soil and groundwater pollution problem will be served by each
state that chooses to embrace the paradigm.

463.
An express contractual release constituting a knowing waiver of nuisance-based rights
would remain enforceable under the proposed paradigm. Caveat emptor and other common law
market-based risk allocation tools would remain relevant to fashioning a remedy against a liable
defendant. See supra notes 399-407 and accompanying text.
464.
See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
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Other bodies of law, of course, remain applicable to private cleanup
cost disputes.46 5 To the extent that after Aviall a landowner can still recover cleanup costs from other PRPs under CERCLA, she may choose to
proceed with a cleanup consistent with the NCP in order to take advantage of CERCLA's retroactive, status-based strict liability scheme 466 as
well as comparable private claims possibly available under state Superfund laws. Buyers of contaminated property may have contract or fraudbased claims against sellers, newly-discovered contamination may give
rise to a negligence claim, and contamination from a neighboring property could provide the basis for a trespass or traditional private nuisance
action. None of these legal theories, however, provide the breadth and
flexibility that
would be available under the proposed private nuisance
46 7
paradigm.

A modernized law of private nuisance would assure the availability
of a cleanup cost remedy to the owner of property contaminated in whole
or in part by others. The sea change in contaminated property law occasioned by Aviall has shined a spotlight on the need to modernize the law
of private nuisance. State courts and legislatures should seize the opportunity to bring a revitalized law of private nuisance law back from the
margins as a significant rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes.

465.
See supranote 363.
466.
CERCLA should not broadly preempt direct actions under nuisance or other state law
theories for cleanup cost damages or abatement injunctive relief (at least in the absence of an EPA or
court order issued under RCRA or CERCLA). For a discussion of CERCLA preemption of state law
direct and derivative claims, see Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 90-104.
467.
See supranotes 150-61 and accompanying text.
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INTRODUCTION

For many years equity interest owners in closely held entities have
engaged in buy-sell agreements. Buy-sell agreements provide for,
among other things, restrictions on the transfer of equity interests upon
the occurrence of certain triggering events such as the death, disability,
or retirement of an equity holder. Parties to buy-sell agreements experience varying income and estate tax consequences depending on the type
of agreement, form of business entity associated with the agreement, the
manner in which an equity holder's interest is transferred, and the source
of the funds that are used to purchase the interest. In many cases, an
insurance policy on the life of an equity holder serves as a source for the
funds that will be used to acquire a decedent equity holder's interest
upon his or her death. Though complex, the federal tax consequences to
business entities and equity holders that engage in such buy-sell arrangements have largely been settled.
However, with the advent of the limited liability company (the
"LLC") and with two federal circuit courts of appeal issuing opinions
that impact how estates of deceased corporate shareholders are taxed, the
manner in which estate tax is imposed on transfers subject to certain
common buy-sell arrangements has been called into question.' Further,
an analysis of the policy underlying the applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code 2 (the "Code") governing such transactions reveals
very little consistency between the relevant Code sections and applicable
Treasury Regulations. 3 Not surprisingly, there is also little consistency
in the manner in which such sections are applied by the courts and ad-

1. See Estate of Blount v. Comm'r, 428 F.3d 1338, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2005); Estate of
Cartwright, 183 F.3d 1034, 1035 (9th Cir. 1999).
2.
All section references to the Code are references to Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as
amended from time to time.
3. See infra Part ll.B. .a.
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ministered by the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS" or the "Service").
Current provisions of the Code and regulations have historically
been interpreted to require the value of insurance proceeds received on a
life insurance policy owned by a corporation to be ratably included in the
estate of the insured decedent shareholder via an increase in value stock
of the entity.5 Under this interpretation, a deceased shareholder's gross
estate would reflect a proportionate increase in the value of the stock due
to the company's receipt of the insurance proceeds.
However, the Ninth and recently the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have issued opinions which impact the manner in which stock of a
closely held corporation subject to a buy-sell agreement is valued for
estate tax purposes. 6 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal
have held, among other things, that in determining the value of a corporation for purposes of determining the value of a deceased shareholder's
interest, the value of insurance proceeds received by the corporation
must be offset against the corporation's obligation to redeem the shareholder's stock under the buy-sell arrangement. 7 The holdings remove
the value of insurance proceeds from the value of the corporation which,
in turn, reduces the value of each shareholder's equity interest. While
this interpretation may be logical, it is misplaced in calculating the value
of a shareholder's stock in a redemption transaction for estate tax purposes.
In contravention to the apparent intent of the Code and historical
application of current regulations, the two opinions appear under certain
circumstances to allow the value of insurance proceeds received by a
closely held corporation to completely escape estate taxation. 8 This outcome thwarts the Code's overall goal of including either all or a portion
of the value of such insurance proceeds in the insured decedent's estate. 9
The opinions are also inconsistent with the IRS's interpretation of its
own regulations that govern the manner in which insurance proceeds
received by a corporation are included in the value of a deceased shareholder's stock. ' 0
Directly related to the above problem and due to the increased
popularity of limited partnerships and limited liability companies, taxpayers have increasingly sought to implement buy-sell agreements within
partnership or LLC structures. Although the regulations provide guid4.
See infra Part I.B. 1.a.iii.
5.
See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2042; Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(f) (as amended in 2006), 20.2042l(c)(6) (as amended in 1979); see also infra Part lI.B.I.a; Part II.B.1 .b.
6. Estate ofBlount, 428 F.3d at 1339-40; Estate ofCartwright, 183 F.3d at 1035.
7. 428 F.3d at 1346; 183 F.3d at 1038.
8.

See infra Part Il.B. 1.a.iii.(b).

9.
10.

See I.R.C. § 2042(a)(2).
See infra Part Il.B. 1.a.iii.(c).
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ance on the tax consequences of insurance proceeds received by a corporation, no regulatory guidance is available in relation to receipt of insurance proceeds in a partnership structure."l Taxpayers and commentators
are now inquiring as to the tax consequences of the receipt of insurance
proceeds by a limited partnership or limited liability company. Without
guidance from the Treasury on the use of an insurance funded buy-sell
arrangement in an LLC or limited partnership structure, taxpayers and
their advisors are left to interpret a small number of old cases and rulings
to determine the tax consequences of various proposed structures. Further, existing rulings by the IRS in the partnership area are inconsistent
with the manner in which the regulations treat corporations and shareholders under similar circumstances.' 2 Given the increasing number of
closely held companies that are being formed in the United States and the
important business and estate planning goals that are served by such buysell agreements, the tax consequences of such arrangements should be
clarified. 13
In an effort to address these problems, this article first provides an
overview of the manner in which buy-sell arrangements are structured
with a specific focus on using insurance proceeds to fund the arrangement. 14 The article reviews the historical manner in which corporations
and shareholders who are parties to buy-sell agreements are taxed where
the agreement is funded by life insurance proceeds. 15 An argument is
made that the recent holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeal inappropriately allow taxpayers to exclude all of the value of
insurance proceeds payable to a closely held corporation from the gross
estate of a deceased shareholder. 16
The article then analyzes the application of the Code, regulations,
and rulings applicable to the receipt by partnerships and LLCs of insurance proceeds of a policy on the life of a member of partner where a buy11.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
12.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39034 (Sept. 21, 1983), available at 1983 GCM
LEXIS 83,*1-2; Rev. Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
13.
For data and statistics on the increasing number of LLC formations over the last several
years see TaxProf Blog, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/govtreports/index.htm which
shows the following statistical graphic that compares the cumulative increase in LLC formations to

formations of corporations in several large states:
Cumulative +/State
CA
FL
NY
OH
PA
TX

LLC
87.1%
237.9%
72.1%
60.3%
109.6%
81.3%

Corp
20.1%
23.7%
(11.4%)
(18.5%)
4.6%
(27.3 %)

2005
LLC
70,024
130,558
58,847
42,594
27,885
59,076

2004
Corp
107,923
175,698
82,300
14,921
23,107
40,945

LLC
58,097
100,070
47,967
38,765
23,752
49,677

2003
Corp
103,325
177,490
84,434
16,386
23,156
42,302

LLC
45,274
62,406
40,768
31,147
16,472
35,285

Corp
93,696
168,080
83,273
16,601
20,943
55,107

2002
LLC
37,429
38,639
34,193
26,575
13,302
32.593

Corp
89,880
142,036
92,929
18,299
22,096
56.319

The above graphic was synthesized by Larry Ribstein from data obtained from the International
Association of Commercial Administrators, Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/
05/the data is out.html.
14.
See infra Part 1.
15.
See infra Part 1I.
16.
See infra Part ll.B. 1.
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sell agreement is in place. 17 The article focuses on areas in which the
cases, rulings, statutes, and regulations either inaccurately or inadequately provide guidance to taxpayers. A conclusion is reached that the
guidance in relation to corporations is inconsistent with treatment accorded to partners of partnerships and members of LLCs. In this regard,
the article proposes that the regulations applicable to corporations, with
suggested amendments, should apply to limited liability companies and
limited partnerships in the same manner as they apply to corporations.' 8
Finally, the article questions whether the case precedents and regulations now in force protect the overall goals of the Code as originally
enacted by Congress.19 The author concludes that the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeal's recent decision is arguably inaccurate. At the same
time, the author acknowledges the ambiguities in the current regulations
as interpreted by the Courts of Appeal and proposes amendments that
will assist courts and taxpayers in interpreting them. The amendments, if
adopted, seek to clarify the regulations to make them consistent with the
intent of the Code and apply equally to corporations and entities that are
treated as partnerships for tax purposes.

I. OVERVIEW OF BUY-SELL ARRANGEMENTS
A buy-sell agreement is a contract pursuant to which a corporate
shareholder, partner, or member of an LLC may (or must) offer his or her
equity interest for sale to the company or the other equity holders upon
the occurrence of certain triggering events. 20 Triggering events may
include, among others, the equity holder's death, disability, retirement, or
termination.
A buy-sell arrangement generally restricts the sale or transfer of an
ownership interest in the entity to certain related parties or unrelated parties in general. For example, the equity holders of a closely held entity
may wish to limit future ownership to individual family members who
are perceived as capable of participating in management and operations
of the entity. The terms of a buy-sell agreement also may include a
method for determining a price for a unit of interest in an entity. By limiting ownership and setting a method of valuation, a buy-sell agreement
can provide a method that is acceptable to all the equity holders of transferring control and continuing the existence of an entity upon the death,
disability, or termination of employment of a single equity holder.
A buy-sell arrangement can create a market for a closely held equity
interest. Without such an arrangement, little, if any, market may exist for
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Part lI.B. .b.
See infra Part 111.
See infra Part III.
See Jonathan E. Strouse, Redemption and Cross-PurchaseAgreements: A Comparison,

THE PRACTICAL ACCOUNTANT, Oct. 1991, at 44.
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an interest in a closely held entity. With a buy-sell arrangement in place,
a minority interest in a closely held company may be transferred to other
equity holders, family members or redeemed by the company. A buysell agreement will often set the price for the purchase.
A buy-sell agreement can also provide a source of funds upon a
purchase or redemption of a deceased shareholder's ownership interest.
For example, where a corporation, partnership, or LLC becomes a party
to a buy-sell agreement and is required under certain circumstances to
purchase the interest of an equity holder, the company may be authorized
under the arrangement to purchase life insurance on each of the equity
holders in order to fund the purchase of a deceased equity holder's interest. In the event the equity holder passes away, the entity will receive the
insurance proceeds and use such proceeds to purchase the decedent's
equity interest from his or her estate.
Of course, buy-sell arrangements differ in structure and form. The
two most common forms of buy-sell agreements are cross-purchase
agreements and redemption agreements. 2' The two structures result in
different federal income and estate tax consequences to the entity and its
equity holders. Depending on the facts and circumstances, the equity
holders of an entity will select the structure that is most efficient from an
economic, management, income, and estate tax perspective. This section
initially focuses on the form of typical structures that use insurance proceeds to fund buy-sell agreements and then analyzes federal tax consequences of each of the basic structures.
A. Cross-PurchaseAgreements
A cross-purchase agreement is a contract among the equity holders
of a company. Under the terms of a cross-purchase agreement, each equity holder agrees or has an option to purchase some or all of the stock
offered by the other equity holders.22 The corporation, partnership, or
LLC is typically not a party to a cross-purchase agreement. In a crosspurchase arrangement, the remaining equity holders must purchase, for
example, another equity holder's interest upon a triggering event (e.g.,
death).
In a cross-purchase arrangement, each equity holder is authorized to
acquire an insurance policy on the lives of each of the other equity holders. 23 Each shareholder pays the premiums on the policies that he or she
has acquired on the lives of the other equity holders. Upon the death of
21.
There are also variants on these two basic forms of the agreements that may include,
among others, agreements between companies and their equity holders under which the equity
holder may offer his or her interest initially to the company and thereafter to the other equity holders.
Alternatively, the equity holder may first offer his or her interest to the other equity holders and
thereafter to the company.
22.
Strouse, supra note 20, at 44.
23.
See, e.g., id. at 44-45.
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an insured equity holder, the surviving equity holder will receive the life
insurance proceeds as beneficiary on the policy ensuring the life of the
decedent equity holder. 24 The surviving equity holders will then use the
insurance proceeds to satisfy their obligation under the cross-purchase
agreement to acquire the deceased equity holder's interest.
1. Tax Consequences to the Selling Equity Holder
There are a number of income and estate tax consequences to the
equity holders in a cross-purchase agreement which differ depending
upon whether the company is a C corporation, S corporation, or an entity
treated as a partnership for tax purposes (e.g., a general partnership, limited partnership or LLC). Generally, there are no material tax consequences to the company when a cross-purchase agreement is executed
and equity interests are exchanged among the equity holders under the
terms of the agreement.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the estate will receive a basis step
up to fair market value in relation to the deceased shareholder's stock.25
Where insurance proceeds are used to fund a cross purchase obligation,
the remaining shareholders use the policy proceeds to purchase a deceased shareholder's equity interest from the decedent's estate. Corporate stock generally fits into the definition of a capital asset.26 Thus, any
gain recognized on the sale of the corporate stock is generally subject to
the lower tax rates applicable to capital gains. 27 Under these circumstances, when the remaining shareholders purchase the decedent's equity
interest at fair market value from decedent's estate, the estate receives
the stock with a basis equal to its fair market value and the estate will not
realize any gain upon the death of the decedent. 28
The receipt of the insurance proceeds by the remaining shareholders
will not be included in deceased shareholder's estate unless the estate
held incidents of ownership in the policy. 29 Where the remaining shareholders own the policies, the remaining shareholders should have all
incidents of ownership in the policy insuring decedent's life. Neither the
decedent nor the decedent's estate should hold incidents of ownership as
contemplated under Code section 2042.

24. Id. at 45.
25.
I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1). There is an exception to the above in relation to a shareholder of an S
corporation. The estate of a deceased S corporation shareholder will not receive a step up in the
basis to fair market value upon the shareholder's death to the extent of the shareholder's interest in
unrealized receivables of the corporation.
26. I.R.C. § 1221. An exception exists where the shareholder is a "dealer" in stock.
27. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 1222, 1223.
28. This conclusion assumes that there was not a meaningful change in the value of the stock
between the time that the decedent shareholder died and the time that the estate sells the stock to the
remaining shareholders. In the event that the value of the stock changes in the interim period, gain
or loss may be realized and recognized by the estate.
29. See I.R.C. § 2042.
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The tax consequences to a selling partner or member of an LLC
upon the sale of units subject to a cross-purchase agreement are similar
to the tax consequences to a corporate shareholder. Similar to a corporate shareholder, any gain or loss realized by a partner upon a sale or
exchange of an interest in a partnership or LLC is generally characterized
as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset.
Under these circumstances, the selling deceased partner or member's estate should experience a step up in the basis of the ownership interest and realize capital
gain, if any, on the exchange. 3 '
2. Tax Impact on the Cross-Purchase Buyer
A purchasing shareholder or purchasing partner's initial basis in an
interest acquired from another shareholder or partner is equal to its
cost. 3 2
Generally, the cost is equal to fair market value of the equity
interest purchased from decedent's estate. A transfer of a partnership
interest ordinarily will not terminate the partnership unless fifty percent
or more of the total interest in capital and profits is sold or exchanged in
a twelve-month period. 3
3. Drawbacks of the Cross-Purchase Agreement
One drawback of the cross-purchase agreement exists when there
are a large number of equity holders that are parties to the buy-sell arrangement. If, for instance, there are just two equity holders, two life
insurance policies are sufficient; one policy is beneficially owned by A
insuring the life of B and one policy is beneficially owned by B insuring
the life of A. However, when there are a large number of equity holders,
the number of policies required may become impractical. The number of
policies required is equal to i (the number of equity holders) multiplied
by (i - 1).34 For example, if a company has 6 equity holders, the number of required insurance policies would be 30 [calculated as follows: 6 x
(6-1)]. Under these circumstances, the cost and administrative burden of
managing the policies may become problematic. For this and various
other reasons, equity holders may instead structure their buy-sell arrangement as a redemption agreement.

30.
I.R.C. § 741.
31.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1960). Exceptions exist in relation to the above general rules
where the partnership holds specific types of assets. Similar to the rule applicable to the estate of an
S corporation shareholder, the estate of a deceased partner will not receive a step up in the basis to
fair market value upon the partner's death to the extent the value of the interest is decreased by items
of income in respect of a decedent (items of "IRD"). See I.R.C. § 691; see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE
23.04[1] (2006). Items of IRD
ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
include, among other things, certain partnership receivables and the deceased partner's distributive
share of partnership income for the period ending with his death. Id. (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9102-018 (Oct. 12, 1990)).
32.
I.R.C. § 1012.
33.
I.R.C. §708(b); see also MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31, 15.02[2](d).
34.
Strouse, supra note 20, at 45.
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Another practical problem with cross-purchase agreements can arise
when a new shareholder or partner enters into the agreement. The new
shareholder or partner must obtain an insurance policy on the life of each
of the other equity holders.3 5 Obtaining an insurance policy on an older
shareholder or partner who is in poor health or of advanced age can be
expensive or hard.36
Finally, where insurance proceeds are received under a policy by
remaining shareholders or partners, there is no guaranty that such proceeds will be used to purchase the decedent shareholder or partner's equity interest. 37 The proceeds may instead be expended in an unrelated
shareholders or the proceeds may be subject to
fashion by the remaining
38
creditors' claims.
B. Redemption Agreements
A redemption agreement is a contract between the equity holders of
the company and the company itself. Under a typical redemption agreement, a corporation, partnership, or LLC agrees to purchase or redeem
stock or units offered by the shareholders, partners, or members. 39 If,
pursuant to the agreement, the company funds the purchase of the equity
interests with proceeds from life insurance, the company generally purchases only one policy on the life of each equity holder. 40 Thus, for example, if six equity holders exist, the company need only purchase six
policies.41

One benefit of a redemption agreement is that the premiums will be
paid by the company which may oversee and confirm that the policy is
maintained .42 Since the company pays the premiums on the life insurance policies, the cost of insurance is borne by the shareholders in proportion to their equity interests.
Redemption agreements have specific federal income and estate tax
consequences to the entities and equity holders that engage in such
agreements. The federal income tax consequences to the parties involved
in a corporate redemption agreement depend on whether the entity that is
a party to the agreement is a C corporation, partnership, or LLC treated

35.
McKEE ET AL., supra note 31, 23.07[1].
Id.
36.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Strouse, supra note 20, at 45.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 46. If, in the alternative, a cross-purchase structure had been implemented here, the
company would have been required to purchase 30 policies under the formula. See supra note 34
and accompanying text.
Id. at 45.
42.
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as a partnership for tax purposes. The analysis below is intended to
cover the basic federal tax consequences of a redemption agreement.43
1. Tax Impact on Corporation & Shareholders
Implementation of a redemption agreement between a C corporation
and its shareholders requires analysis of whether the distribution of the
insurance proceeds will be treated as a dividend distribution under Code
section 301 or a taxable exchange between the corporation and the
shareholder under section 302. 44 The complexity of sections 301 and
302 generally causes redemption agreements to be viewed as more complex than a cross-purchase buy-sell arrangement which is among only the
shareholders. It can be time consuming and costly to determine the tax
consequences of a corporate distribution.
Upon the death of a shareholder who is a party to a corporate redemption agreement, the remaining shareholders may be faced with the
difficult task of determining whether the distribution in redemption is a
dividend or consideration received in sale or exchange. In the event that
the distribution is characterized as a dividend, the remaining equity holders will receive no step up in the basis of their equity interests upon the
redemption.4 5
a. Tax Considerations: Sale or Exchange Treatment
A redemption qualifies as a sale or exchange of a shareholder's
stock under four different circumstances: (1) if it is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend, 46 (2) if the distribution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder,4 7 (3) if redemption completely
terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation, 4 8 or (4) the redemption is from an unincorporated shareholder and is in partial liquida-

43.
For a more exhaustive analysis, see also HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, STRUCTURING BUYSELL AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS WITH FORMS ch. 8 (2005).
44.
I.R.C. §§ 301, 302.
45.
1.R.C. § 301.
46.
I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). In general, in order to qualify under § 302(b)(1) as a redemption that
is essentially equivalent to a dividend, the redemption must result in a meaningful reduction of the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313
(1970); see also Rev. Rul. 85-106, 1985-2 C.B. 116. For this purpose, the attribution rules of § 318
of the Code apply. Davis, 397 U.S. at 307. In determining whether a reduction in interest is "meaningful," the most significant rights are:

(1) the right to vote and thereby exercise control; (2) the

right to participate in current earnings and accumulated surplus; and (3) the right to share in net
assets upon liquidation. See Rev. Rul. 85-106, 1985-2 C.B. 116 (citing Rev. Rul. 81-289, 1981-2
C.B. 82).
47.
I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). In general, a redemption is substantially disproportionate within the
meaning of § 302(b)(2) if the shareholder's interest in outstanding common voting and nonvoting
common stock after the redemption is less than 80% of the shareholder's interest before the redemption, and if, after the redemption, the shareholder owns less than 50% of the combined voting power
of all shares. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C).
48.
I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). In general, a redemption qualifies as a complete termination under §
302(b)(3) if a shareholder's interest terminates all interests in the corporation as a result of the redemption. For this purpose, the attribution rules of § 318 of the Code apply. See I.R.C. § 302(c)(2).
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tion of the distributing corporation. 49 To the extent that the distribution
in redemption meets any one of these specific circumstances, the distribution will qualify for capital gains rather than ordinary income treatment. 50 Again, the determination of whether a redemption is a sale or
exchange under Code section 302(b) is complex. A complete discussion
of each of the four circumstances is beyond the scope of this article.'
Nevertheless, classification of a distribution in redemption as a sale or
exchange, as opposed to a dividend, is important primarily because of the
ability of the shareholder to benefit from his or her basis in the shares.
For example, assume A and B are shareholders of C Corp. (which
has substantial earnings and profits). A, B and C Corp engage in a redemption agreement pursuant to which A's stock is to be redeemed for
$100,000 ($1.00 per share as of the date of death; 100,000 shares) upon
A's death. If the redemption is taxed as a sale or exchange of the stock,
the shareholder decedent's estate should recognize no gain due to the
step up in basis to fair market value on the date of the decedent's death.52
Thus, the main reason for avoiding dividend treatment is to take advantage of the tax-free return of basis. Prior to the imposition of a lower
tax rate upon dividends, historically, the disparity between the ordinary
an even
tax rate imposed on dividend income and capital gains provided
53
greater benefit to sale or exchange treatment upon redemption.
b. Tax Considerations: Dividend Treatment
If a distribution in redemption of stock by a corporation does not
meet the requirements of section 302(b), the distribution generally will
be classified as a distribution of a dividend to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits. 54 If a distribution exceeds earnings and profits, it will represent a return of capital to the extent of the shareholder's
basis in its stock.55 Finally, to the extent the distribution exceeds the
shareholder's basis in its stock, the distribution will be treated as gain
from the sale or exchange of property.56 Due to the fact that an estate
will generally receive a step up in the basis of the decedent's assets to
fair market value on the date of the decedent's death, characterization of
the distribution as a dividend can be very costly from a tax perspective as
compared to sale or exchange treatment which results in little or no tax49.
I.R.C. § 302(b)(4).
50.
See Davis, 397 U.S. at 305.
51.
For a thorough analysis of the application of these rules, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S.
EuSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 9 (2005) (covering redemptions of corporate stock).
52.
See I.R.C. § 302(a).
If the redemption is taxed as a "dividend" pursuant to § 301(a) and § 302(d), the estate
53.
will be taxed at net capital gain rates pursuant to §I(h)(I 1). See I.R.C. § l(h)(l 1) (generally providing that qualified dividend income is subject to tax at the net capital gain rates).
54.
I.R.C. §§ 301, 302(c)(1).
55.
I.R.C. § 301(c)(2).
56.
I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(A).
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able gain. This is because, where there are substantial earnings and profits, the full amount of the distribution in redemption will be treated as a
dividend subject to tax. Whereas, in a redemption treated as a sale or
the distribution will be reduced by the
exchange, gain subject to tax on 57
recovered.
is
that
basis
of
amount
2. Tax Impact on Partnerships, LLCs, Partners, and Members
Generally, the payment by a partnership to a partner in complete
liquidation of a partner's interest does not result in a tax consequence to
the partnership. 58 Further, assets may generally be distributed in kind
tax-free. 59 However, liquidation payments to partners are governed by
section 736.
Like the rules that apply to corporate shareholder distributions, the
tax consequences to a partner (or member of an LLC which is treated as
a partnership for tax purposes) can be quite complex from a tax perspective. Initially, section 736 divides liquidation payments into two categories meeting the definitions of section 736(a) and section 736(b). Payments classified as section 736(a) payments are further subdivided into
two categories which include payments of a distributive share of partner60
ship income and payments more in the nature of guaranteed payments.
The section 736(b) category generally includes payments to the partner
for his or her share of the partnership property. 6 ' Payments to a partner
in relation to partnership property are further subject to either ordinary or
capital characterization depending upon the nature of the property.
For example, payments for substantially appreciated property and
62
unrealized receivables generally will attract ordinary income treatment.
Cash payments for other types of property such as goodwill, for example,
will attract capital gain treatment. 63 Further, tax treatment may differ
depending upon whether the partner was a partner in a partnership in
which capital was an income-producing factor versus a partnership in
which capital was not an income-producing factor. 64
II. FEDERAL TAx CONSIDERATIONS OF USING INSURANCE TO FUND
BUY-SELL ARRANGEMENTS

In addition to general business and tax considerations, there are specific income and estate tax rules that may affect the decision to use insurance proceeds to fund either a cross-purchase agreement or redemp57.

See I.R.C. § 1001(a).

58.

I.R.C.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

33A AM. JuR. 2d Federal Taxation 10376 (2006).
See I.R.C. § 736(a).
See I.R.C. § 736(b).
See I.R.C. § 751.
See I.R.C. §§ 731, 741.
See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31, ch. 22.

§ 736.
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tion agreement. The Code accords special income tax treatment to insurance proceeds that are payable upon the death of the insured. 65 Additionally, the estate tax sections of the Code also provide specific rules
that define when a decedent's gross estate must include insurance proceeds.
A. Income Taxation of Life InsuranceProceeds
Code section 101(a) generally provides that gross income does not
include amounts received under a life insurance contract if such amounts
are paid by reason of death of the insured. 66 Under this rule, a beneficiary of a life insurance policy that receives insurance proceeds upon the
death of the insured may exclude the insurance proceeds from gross income.
For example, assume A and B are the only shareholders of C Corp.
Inc. They have engaged in a cross-purchase agreement (the "Agreement") under which, upon the death of either A or B, the other will buy
the decedent's share for $100,000. Pursuant to the Agreement, A and B
each purchase a life insurance policy on the life of the other and each of
them intends to use the proceeds to purchase the other's interest upon the
death of the other party. When A dies, B will receive the $100,000 from
the insurer
and may exclude the full amount of the proceeds from in67
come.

Exceptions to the section 101(a) general exclusionary rule apply
under certain circumstances. If a life insurance contract or any interest
therein is transferred for valuable consideration, the exclusion from gross
income is limited to an amount equal to the sum of the actual value of the
consideration plus any premiums paid by the transferee. 68 The phrase
"transfer for valuable consideration" is defined as any absolute transferfor-value of a right to receive all or part of the proceeds of a life insurance policy. 69 Thus, the creation, for value, of an enforceable contractual right to receive all or a part of the proceeds of a policy may constitute a transfer for valuable consideration of the policy or an interest
therein. 70

65.
See I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).
66. id. The tax-free receipt of proceeds can be likened to a free step up in basis. In effect,
I.R.C. §101(a)(l) operates the same as a step up in basis. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(l). I.R.C. § 1022,
which would replace I.R.C. § 1014 at the time of estate tax repeal under current law, provides for
carryover basis. See I.R.C. § 1022(b)(2)(C). As such, life insurance could be viewed as even more
tax beneficial than other properties.
67. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(l); see also ZARITSKY, supra note 43, 8.02[l][a].
68.
I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). Also included with the amount paid and any future premiums are
"other amounts" which phrase includes interest paid or accrued by the transferee on indebtedness
with respect to such contract or any interest therein if such interest is not allowable as a deduction
under § 264(a)(4). Id.
69.
Treas. Reg. § 1.101 -1(b)(4) (as amended in 1982).
70. See id.
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For example, A pays a premium of $500 for an insurance policy in
the face amount of $1,000 upon the life of B, and A subsequently transfers the policy to C for $600. Thereafter, C does not make any additional
payments in relation to the policy and receives the proceeds upon the
death of B. The amount which C can exclude from his income is limited
to $600. The $400 of the proceeds which exceed the $600 purchase price
must be included by C as income.
B. Estate and Transfer Taxation of Life Insurance
In addition to income tax consequences, the impact of using life insurance proceeds to fund a buy-sell agreement requires analysis of the
estate tax consequences. Section 2031 operates in conjunction with section 2033 and generally defines "gross estate" as including the value of
all of a decedent's property (tangible or intangible and wherever situated)
at the time of death. 71 Broadly, section 2033 requires the value of all of
a decedent's property be included in his or her gross estate at the time of
death. 72 Although sections 2031 and 2033 each relate to value and inclusion, section 2033 identifies includible interests whereas section 2031
generally addresses valuation.73
Identification of specific interests includible in a decedent's gross
estate is addressed in sections 2033 through 2046. 74 Included within that
range of sections is section 2042 which provides rules in regard to inclusion of the value of insurance proceeds in a decedent's gross estate.75
1. Section 2042: Incidents of Ownership
Section 2042 operates under certain circumstances to require inclusion in a gross estate of the value of insurance proceeds payable upon a
decedent's death.76 Taxpayers generally attempt to structure their estates
in a fashion that escapes application of section 2042 thereby excluding
life insurance proceeds from their gross estates. Fundamentally, section
2042 is a specific inclusion section that requires insurance proceeds receivable by an executor on the life of a decedent to be included in his or
her gross estate.77 There is no question that insurance proceeds from a
policy on the life of the decedent that are actually received by an executor must be included in a decedent's estate.
Less intuitive is section 2042's requirement under certain circumstances that amounts payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent's
71.
I.R.C. § 203 l(a); see also I.R.C. § 2033 ("The value of gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
72.
See I.R.C. § 2033.
73.

See RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION

available at 1999 WL 1031606.
74.
Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 2033-2046.
75.
See I.R.C. § 2042.
76.
See id.
77.
I.R.C. § 2042(1).

4.01 (2006),
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estate under policies on the life of the decedent must also be included in
the decedent's gross estate. Where the decedent possesses "incidents of
ownership" in relation to the insurance policy, proceeds payable to a
third party must be included in the decedent's gross estate.78 The term
"incidents of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the
policy in a technical legal sense. 79 Incidents of ownership
include any
80
economic interest or benefit from an insurance policy.
The regulations specifically provide that "incidents of ownership"
include the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the
policy, to assign the policy or revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy
8
for a loan, or to borrow against the cash surrender value of the policy. '
This list, though illustrative, is not exhaustive.82 Incidents of ownership
broadly encompass most every right that is retained in a policy. 83 In the
obvious example, if an insured transfers a policy to another but retains
the right to change the beneficiary on the policy, retention of such right
will result in the proceeds being included in the insured's estate.84
A number of cases and rulings address less obvious examples and
add to the definition of the phrase "incidents of ownership" for purposes
of applying the Code and regulations. In Revenue Ruling 61-123,85 the
IRS ruled on a fact pattern in which an airline passenger purchased an
accident insurance policy on his life prior to his death in an airplane
crash.8 6 After filling in the beneficiary designation, he mailed the policy
insuring his life to the beneficiary and boarded the plane.87 The proceeds
were not payable to the decedent's estate. However, under these circumstances, the IRS ruled that the proceeds of the policy were includible in
the decedent's gross estate even though as a practical matter it was impossible for him to exercise any incidents of ownership while the plane
was in flight. 88
Similarly, in Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 89 the decedent's
spouse purchased an accidental death insurance policy on his life several
hours prior to a plane crash, which killed the insured husband. 90 Not78.
I.R.C. § 2042(2).
79. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1979).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 335
(1929); see also ZARITSKY, supra note 43, 8.02[4].
81.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c); see also ZARITSKY, supranote 43, 8.02[4].
82. H.R. REP. No. 2333-77, § 404 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 491; see also
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 73, 4.14[4][a].
83.
See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 73, 4.14[4][a], available at 1999 WL 1031619.
84. See I.R.C. § 2042(2). This analysis is similar to the analysis applied in sections 2036
through 2038 relating to transfers of property where an interest is retained by the grantor of the
property. See I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038.
85.
Rev. Rul. 61-123, 1961-2 C.B. 151.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88.
id.
89.
380 U.S. 678 (1965).
90. Estate ofNoel, 380 U.S. at 679-80.
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withstanding that the decedent was in transit and could not actually have
exercised any incidents of ownership, the Supreme Court held that the
proceeds must be included in the decedent's estate. 91 The holding in
Noel and the outcome in Rev. Rul. 61-123 indicate a tendency on the part
of the Court and the IRS to find and apply incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy where an individual has the right to change the beneficiary even though the individual had no real control over the beneficiary
designation.
The right to change a beneficiary designation is not the only attribute that may result in incidents of ownership. Use of an insurance policy
as collateral will also constitute "incidents of ownership." In Estate of
Krischer v. Commissioner,92 the decedent obtained loans, renewals of
loans, or additions to existing loans from a financial institution. 93 At
inception, each loan was secured by either one or both of two life insurance policies.94 Renewals or additions to such loans were expressly
made subject to an assignment of those policies as collateral. 95 The
Commissioner determined that the decedent possessed incidents of ownership in the policies by virtue of his power to pledge them as collateral
for past and future loans. 96 Attribution of incidents of ownership to the
decedent caused the proceeds to be includible in decedent's gross estate
pursuant to section 2042(2). 97 The Court in Estate of Krischer agreed. 98
Thus, notwithstanding that the policy owner irrevocably transfers a policy, if the owner retains the right to use the policy as collateral, the owner
will continue to have incidents of ownership under section 2042(2).
In each of the above cases or rulings, the proceeds of the life insurance policy were payable to a third party and not the decedent insured's
estate. Under these circumstances, section 2042 nevertheless operated to
include the proceeds in the decedent's gross estate. The courts and the
IRS have been very liberal in attributing incidents of ownership to a decedent where the decedent has retained even the slightest rights to exercise control over the policy.
However, the power to substitute one life insurance policy for another of equal value appears not to be an incident of ownership. In Estate of Jordahl v. Commissioner,99 the decedent created a trust and
named himself as one of three trustees. 10 0 The corpus of the trust included insurance policies on the decedent's life and other income91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 683-84.
32 T.C.M. (CCH) 821, 1973 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117 (1973).
Id. at *3.
Krischer, 1973 Tax Ct. Memo Lexis 117, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *13.
65 T.C. 92 (1975).
Jordahl,65 T.C. at 92.
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producing assets. 01' The trustees were instructed to pay the premiums
out of the assets of the trust and to pay over any remaining income to the
03
decedent. 102 At no time was income insufficient to pay the premiums. 1
On his death, his daughter was to receive the income until she reached
age 50 at which time she was to receive the principal. 104 The decedent
retained the power to substitute securities, property, and policies "of
equal value" for those transferred to the trust. 105 The court held that the
insurance proceeds were not includible because the right to substitute
other policies "of equal value" did not give him a right to the "economic
benefits"06of the policies and because his powers as trustee were strictly
limited. 1
a. Incidents of Ownership Held by Corporations
i. Current Treasury Regulations
Incidents of ownership on a policy held by a corporation can also be
attributed to an individual shareholder of the corporation. Insurance proceeds payable to a third party other than the corporation must be included
in an insured shareholder's estate if the insured shareholder can actually
exercise any incident of ownership in the policy. 10 7 Thus, an insured
shareholder will be attributed incidents of ownership held by the corporation where the insured owns a controlling interest in the corporation and
08
the proceeds are payable to a beneficiary other than the corporation.1
However, a shareholder may avoid being attributed incidents of ownership in an insurance policy possessed by the corporation under certain
circumstances. Regulations under section 2042 provide an exception to
this general rule of inclusion where a corporation's incidents of ownership will not be attributed to a decedent through stock ownership to the
extent that the proceeds are payable directly to the corporation. 109
The above analysis under the regulations first hinges on whether the
corporation or a third party receives the insurance proceeds. More specifically, where a corporation is the beneficiary and recipient of proceeds
of a life insurance policy on the life of a decedent shareholder, the corpo101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 101 (citing I.R.C. § 2042(2)).
107. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1979). An example is given in the regulations providing that if the decedent is the controlling stockholder in a corporation and the corporation owns a life insurance policy on his or her life, the proceeds of which are payable to the decedent's spouse, the incidents of ownership held by the corporation will be attributed to the decedent
through his or her stock ownership and the proceeds will be included in his or her estate under section 2042. Id.
108.
Id.; see also KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING & WEALTH PRESERVATION:
STRATEGIES & SOLUTIONS

109.

12.02[][b][i] (2005).

Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
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ration's incidents of ownership will never be attributed to the decedent
shareholder through his or her stock. "0 This rule operates notwithstanding the fact that a majority shareholder would have actual control over
any insurance policy held by the corporation. Applying this rule in isolation appears to allow the insurance proceeds to escape inclusion in a majority shareholder's estate and escape the direct requirements of section
2042 of the Code. However, as discussed extensively below, estates of
majority shareholders have historically reported the value of the proceeds
indirectly via an increase in the value of the decedent shareholder's stock
under the general inclusion rule of section 2031.
On the other hand, where the insurance proceeds are not payable to
or for the benefit of the corporation, the question arises as to whether
incidents of ownership held by the corporation will be attributed to an
insured shareholder. Where a decedent shareholder owns a controlling
interest and the proceeds are payable to a third party (e.g., not the corporation), incidents of ownership held by the corporation are attributed to
the decedent shareholder's estate under section 2042.111 The attribution
of incidents under these circumstances is based upon the fact that a majority shareholder has authority to actually exercise control over the policy. This, in turn, causes the insurance proceeds to be included in the
majority shareholder's estate notwithstanding that the proceeds are payable to a third party. However, if a decedent shareholder owns only a
minority interest, no incidents are attributable and no proceeds are directly included in the decedent shareholder's estate. 112
Operation of these rules is demonstrated in the following example
provided in the regulations under section 2042. Assume the decedent
was the controlling stockholder in a corporation. Further, assume that
the corporation owned a life insurance policy on the decedent shareholder's life and the proceeds were payable to the decedent's spouse, a
third party. The incidents of ownership held by the corporation are attributed to the decedent through his stock ownership and all of the proceeds are includible in the decedent's gross estate under section 2042.113
However, if in this example the policy proceeds had been payable forty
percent (40%) to the decedent's spouse and sixty percent (60%) to the
corporation, only forty percent of the proceeds would be included in decedent's estate under section 2042.114 While the example in the Regulation does not specifically address the remaining sixty percent of the insurance proceeds that went to the corporation, it can be inferred that the
value of the corporate stock in the decedent's estate will increase due to
the corporation's receipt of the additional sixty percent. Further, it can
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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also be inferred that the increased value of the decedent's stock must be
included in the decedent's gross estate under section 2031.115
In sum, the regulations appear to require inclusion of at least a ratable portion of the value of the insurance proceeds in a shareholder's
estate where the proceeds are payable to the corporation under section
2031. Where the corporation receives the insurance proceeds, the Regulations operate on the presumption that the value of the corporate stock
included in a decedent's estate under section 2031 will increase proportionately upon the corporation's receipt of the insurance proceeds. Conversely, where policy proceeds are payable to a party other than the corporation (or the insured shareholder's estate) and corporate incidents are
attributable to the decedent shareholder, the decedent shareholder's estate is required to include all of the proceeds in his or her gross estate
under section 2042. These rules reflect the close relationship that exists
between section 2042 and section 2031.
ii. Current Case Law
The above analysis under the regulations is not, however, consistent
with recent holdings of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of
Cartwright v. Commissioner'1 6 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of Blount v. Commissioner.117 In Cartwright, the decedent, Mr. Cartwright, was a majority shareholder in the CSB law firm
("CSB"), a California professional corporation."18 Mr. Cartwright died
in 1988 owning a majority 71.43% of the shares of CSB. 1 9 CSB held
two insurance policies on the life of Mr. Cartwright which, upon his
death, paid a total of $5,062,029 in proceeds.120 Pursuant to a redemption agreement in place at the time of Mr. Cartwright's death between
CSB and its shareholders, CSB paid the insurance proceeds that it received to Mr. Cartwright's estate in redemption of Mr. Cartwright's
shares. '21 CSB treated $4,080,256 of the total payment as non-employee
compensation and the remaining approximately one million dollars as a
payment in redemption of Mr. Cartwright's stock. 122 However, the estate treated the full amount received as paid in redemption of Mr. Cart115. See T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 1974 IRB LEXIS 835, at *3 (1974) (providing that
where a corporation is the beneficiary of any portion of the proceeds of a life insurance policy, there
is no need for that portion to be included in the gross estate under section 2042 because it directly
affects the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's gross estate). See infra Part
ll.B. 1.a.iii.
116.
183 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1998).
117.
428 F.3d 1338 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
118.
Cartwright,183 F.3d at 1035; see also Estate of Cartwright v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH)
3200, 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 299, at *3 (1996) (indicating that they incorporated the firm of
Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin & Sucherman, Inc. (CSB), as a professional corporation under California law).
119.
Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1036.
120. Id.
121.
Id.
122. Id.
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wright's stock and none of the payment as non-employee compensation.12 ' The IRS disagreed with the estate and determined that the
$4,080,256 was compensation and that the estate owed $1,142,472 for its
tax deficiency. 24 Consistent with CSB's treatment, the IRS treated the
additional approximately one million dollars as the redemption amount.
The first issue the court addressed was whether the payment to Mr.
Cartwright's estate was made solely for redemption of the stock or
whether it was in part for Mr. Cartwright's stock and in part for his claim
for compensation due. 125 Mr. Cartwright's estate contended that the full
$5 million should be treated as paid in exchange for the redemption of
the decedent's stock. 126 In affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that approximately one million dollars of the insurance proceeds constituted payment for Cartwright's stock and approximately four
million dollars constituted compensation for services. 127 Under the
Ninth Circuit's holding, approximately four-fifths of the payment constituted a liability of the company that related to compensation for services
rendered before the decedent shareholder's death.
The court next addressed whether the five million dollars of insurance proceeds should have been included as an asset of CSB for purposes
of valuing CSB stock held by Mr. Cartwright's estate under section
2031.128 Affirming the Tax Court again and quoting the regulations under section 2031, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the Tax Court appropriately excluded all of the life insurance proceeds in valuing stock. 129 The
court indicated that consideration must be given to non-operating assets
including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit
of the company, to the extent such non-operating assets have not been
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 1036-38.
128.
Id. at 1037-38.
129.
Id. at 1038. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0(2) provides that the fair market value of shares of
stock should be determined by considering the company's net worth, prospective earning power and
dividend-paying capacity, and other relative factors. The regulation states that:
Some of the "other relevant factors".., are: The goodwill of the business; the economic
outlook in the particular industry; the company's position in the industry and its management; the degree of control of the business represented by the block of stock to be
valued; and the values of securities of corporations engaged in the same or similar lines
of business which are listed on a stock exchange. However, the weight to be accorded
such comparisons or any other evidentiary factors considered in the determination of a
value depends upon the facts of each case. In addition to the relevantfactors described
above, considerationshall also be given to non-operating assets, including proceeds of
life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the extent such
non-operatingassets have not been taken into account in the determination of net worth,
prospective earningpower and dividend-earningcapacity. Complete financial and other
data upon which the valuation is based should be submitted with the return, including
copies of reports of any examinations of the company made by accountants, engineers, or
any technical experts as of or near the applicable valuation date.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0(2) (emphasis added).
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taken into account in determining net worth. 130 The court reasoned that
the proceeds received by CSB from the insurance policy would not necessarily affect what a willing buyer would pay for CSB's stock because
the insurance proceeds were offset dollar-for-dollar by CSB's obligation
to pay out the entirety of policy benefits to Cartwright's estate.' 31 Thus,
the Court classified the insurance proceeds as being the kind of ordinary
non-operating asset that should not be included in the value of CSB under the Treasury Regulations. Neither the Tax Court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made any distinction between the approximately
four million dollar payment related to compensation and the approximately one million dollars remitted to the estate in redemption of the
decedent's shares. By excluding all of the insurance proceeds from the
value of CSB, no distinction was made between the four million dollar
obligation for services provided by the decedent prior to death and the
one million dollar obligation to redeem the decedent's shares. Further,
by failing to make any distinction between the two obligations, the holding in Cartwright allowed the estate to value its shares of CSB without
proportionately increasing the value of the decedent's shares by a ratable
portion of the one million dollars of insurance proceeds paid to the estate
in the redemption.
On October 31, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar issue
in Estate of Blount v. Commissioner.132 In Estate of Blount, the decedent, Mr. Blount, was one of two shareholders of Blount Construction
Company ("BCC"), a corporation formed in the state of Georgia.' 33 The
two shareholders, Mr. Blount and Mr. Jennings entered into a stock redemption agreement that required BCC to purchase the stock on the
death of the holder at a price agreed upon by the parties. 134 In the early
1990s, BCC purchased insurance policies providing roughly three million dollars in order to fulfill its commitments
to purchase the sharehold35
1
agreement.
redemption
the
under
ers' stock
In 1996, Mr. Blount was diagnosed with cancer, and his doctor predicted that he had only a few months to live. 36 When Blount died in
1997, he owned roughly 83% of BCC, a clear majority interest. 137 In
accordance with the redemption agreement, BCC paid Mr. Blount's estate four million dollars. 38 Mr. Blount's estate reported the value of the
shares at four million dollars. 39 However, the IRS determined that the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Cartwright,183 F.3d at 1038 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f)(2)).
Id. at 1038.
428 F.3d at 1339.
Id.at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1341.
Id.
Id.
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value of the stock was $7,921,975 and that the taxpayer
had undervalued
40
the stock by approximately four million dollars. 1
Based upon expert testimony, the Tax Court concluded that the
value of the company was approximately $6.75 million. 14' The Tax
Court then added the insurance proceeds of $3.1 million to the value of
the company to arrive at $9.85 million as the fair market value of the
stock. 142 On review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the $6.75 million valuation for BCC was not erroneous. 143 However, the court of Appeals found that the inclusion by the Tax Court of the additional $3.1
million in insurance proceeds was in error. 44
In declining to include the insurance proceeds in the value of BCC,
the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the reasoning in Cartwright finding it to
be "persuasive and consistent with common business sense." 14 5 Like the
Cartwrightcourt, the Blount court quoted regulations under section 2031
stating that in valuing the corporate stock, "consideration shall also be
given to non-operating assets, including insurance proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the extent
that such non-operating assets have not been taken into account in the
determination of net worth."' 146 Focusing on the last clause of the quoted
section of the regulation, the court concluded that the language limiting
inclusion to the extent that such assets have not been taken into account
in determining net worth precludes inclusion of the value of the insurance proceeds received by BCC.147 The court reasoned that insurance
proceeds are not the kind of ordinary non-operating asset that should be
included in the value of the corporation. 148 Further, to the extent the
insurance proceeds are required to be used to redeem the decedent shareholder's interest in the corporation, the proceeds are offset dollar-forobligation to purchase decedent's stock under
dollar by the corporation's 149
the redemption agreement.
In a footnote, the court indicated that the Commissioner argued that
this interpretation frustrates the clear intent of Congress to include corporate owned life insurance in the estate of its sole shareholder. 150 However, in the same footnote, the court stated that "the legislative history
relied upon by the Commissioner indicate[s] only that Congress believed
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
(1976)).
148.
149.
150.

Id.

Id.at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1345.
Id.
Id.(citing Estate of Cartwright, 183 F.3d at1038; Huntsman v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 861, 875
Id.at 1346.
Id.
Id.at 1345 n.6.
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that a sole shareholder was deemed to have the incidents of ownership
possessed by his corporation on insurance policies on his life."''
The
footnote goes on to briefly interpret Congressional intent:
[T]he [R]egulations now provide that the incidents of ownership held
by a corporation are not to be attributed to its shareholder, and no indication is included in the committee reports that Congress intended
property owned by a decedent to
be includable in his gross estate at
52
other than its fair market value. 1
The court further supported this questionable conclusion by indicating
that "[t]o suggest that a reasonably competent business person, interested
in acquiring a company, would ignore a $3 million liability strains
credu53
lity and defies any sensible construct of fair market value."1
iii. Applying the Case Doctrine Produces a Different
Outcome than Application of the Code and Regulations
(a)

Under the Cases

The opinions of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in Cartwrightand
Blount each addressed valuation of corporate stock within a decedent
shareholder's estate in connection with a corporate redemption agreement. In both cases, the corporation in question owned a life insurance
policy insuring the life of the majority shareholder, and the corporation
received the insurance proceeds upon the majority shareholder's death.
Both opinions focused upon determining stock value for purposes of
including such value in the decedent shareholder's gross estate for purposes of section 2031. Each opinion concluded that the insurance proceeds received by the company should not affect the value of the stock in
the decedent's estate. Each court reasoned that the insurance proceeds
were to be offset dollar-for-dollar against an existing obligation of each
corporation.
However, there is at least one factual distinction between the two
cases. In Blount, all of the amounts received by the decedent shareholder's estate were in return for the stock redeemed by the corporation. 15 4 In Cartwright, however, only approximately one-fifth of the
amounts received by the decedent shareholder's estate were received in
return for the decedent shareholder's stock. 155 The remaining four-fifths
of the amounts received were for services provided by the decedent
shareholder prior to his death. The large majority of the amounts re-

151.

Id.

152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 1346.
See id. at 1339-41.

155.

Estate ofCartwright, 183 F.3d at 1036, 1038.
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ceived by the decedent shareholder's estate represented an accrued compensation liability of the corporation not associated in any way with the
obligation of the corporation to redeem the decedent shareholder's stock.
Due to the perceived dollar-for-dollar offset of these liabilities, each
of the opinions results in the exclusion of insurance proceeds in valuing
the corporate stock. Without an increase in the value of the stock related
to the corporation's receipt of insurance proceeds, the estates of the two
decedent majority shareholders effectively were allowed to exclude the
value of any portion of the insurance proceeds in their respective estates.
This outcome stands regardless of the fact that in each case, the majority
shareholder actually had control over his respective corporation and,
therefore, control over all of the incidents of ownership of the policies
held by the corporations.
(b) Under the Regulations
Application of current regulations under sections 2042 and 2031 to
the facts in each of these cases results in a different outcome than arrived
at by the Blount and Cartwrightcourts. Because CSB and BCC received
the proceeds of the life insurance policies on Cartwright and Blount respectively, the regulations specifically indicate that neither shareholder is
attributed corporate incidents of ownership.156 Therefore, neither of the
decedent shareholders' estates would be attributed incidents of ownership, nor would either estate be required to include the insurance proceeds in gross estate under section 2042.
However, in determining the value of the stock under section 2031,
Regulations section 20.2031-2(f) requires that consideration be given to
non-operating assets, including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company. 157 Contrary to the interpretations of the Circuit Courts of Appeal in Cartwrightand Blount, the intent
of this rule is to reflect the insurance proceeds received by the corporation as an asset that proportionately increases the value of the deceased
shareholder's stock. The decedent shareholder's stock value for purposes of calculating gross estate must increase proportionate to the value
of the insurance proceeds received by the company.
This conclusion is supported by the language in section 2042 and
Regulations section 20.2042-1(c)(6). As previously discussed, section
2042 requires a decedent's estate to include all "amount[s] receivable by
all other beneficiaries," under a policy on the life an insured shareholder
with respect to which the shareholder possessed incidents of ownership. 158 Given that the definition of incidents of ownership is broad and
includes "any" incidents of ownership, Congress must have intended that
156.
157.

Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(0

158.

I.R.C. § 2042(2).
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incidents of ownership be attributed to a majority shareholder of a corporation that owns a life insurance policy in the shareholder's life.' 5 9 It is
unlikely that Congress intended that a decedent majority shareholder be
allowed to escape inclusion in his or her estate of life insurance proceeds
received by his or her controlled corporation.
While the regulations under section 2042 clearly provide an excepto
the inclusion of the proceeds where the corporation receives the
tion
proceeds, the regulations nevertheless attempt to further Congress' clear
intent by requiring inclusion of a ratable portion of the proceeds in a decedent shareholder's gross estate as follows:
In the case of economic benefits of a life insurance policy on the decedent's life that are reserved to a corporation of which the decedent
is the sole or controlling stockholder, the corporation's incidents of
ownership will not be attributed to the decedent through his stock
ownership to the extent the proceeds of the policy are payable to the
corporation .... See § 20.2031-209 for a rule providing that the insuranceproceeds of certain life insurancepolicies shall be consid'
ered in determining the value of decedent's stock. 60
The first sentence is the exception to the general rule of inclusion
that prevents corporate incidents from being attributed to a sole or majority shareholder where the policy proceeds are payable to the corporation.
If the goal of section 2042 is to include the proceeds in a decedent's estate where a decedent has incidents of ownership, why are the incidents
of ownership in the case of a majority shareholder specifically not attributed under the above regulation? The answer lies in the third sentence in
the above quoted portion of the regulation. The third sentence, highlighted in italics and bold, refers to regulations under subsection
20.2031-2(f), which is specifically discussed by both the Cartwrightand
Blount courts. This regulation provides factors and guidelines for valu16
ing stock that is not publicly traded, like the stock of CSB and BCC. 1
Under this regulation, consideration must be given to non-operating assets, including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the
benefit of the company, to the extent such non-operating assets have not
been taken into account in the determination of net worth. 162 Read in
conjunction with the first sentence of the above quoted language, section
20.2042-1 (c)(6) is attempting to require inclusion of a ratable portion of
the proceeds in the decedent majority shareholder's estate via a perceived
increase in the value of the stock upon the corporation's receipt of the
proceeds.

159.
160.
161.
162.

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c)(2).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (emphasis added).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f).
Id.
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The Treasury's statements in 1974 in the preamble to the amendments to regulations under sections 2031 and 2042 support this reading
of the regulation.' 63 In 1974, Treasury Decision 7312 was published
amending the regulations under section 2042 to add, among other things,
the current version of Regulation section 20.2042-1(c)(6) and to specifically amend paragraph (f) of Regulation section 20.2031-2.' 64 The preamble to the 1974 amendments provides the following explanation:
Under section 2042 of the Code, if a decedent died possessed of any
incidents of ownership in a life insurance policy on his life, the entire
proceeds of the policy will be included in his gross estate for estate
tax purposes. The term "incidents of ownership" is described in §
20.2042-1(c)(2) as including "a power to change the beneficiary re65
served to a corporation of which the decedent is sole stockholder."1
A problem was presented in Revenue Ruling 71-463, 1971-2 C.B.
333, which ruling was later withdrawn by Revenue Ruling 72-167,
1972-1 C.B. 307, as to whether a controlling stockholder should be
treated as a "sole stockholder" for purposes of section 2042. The position taken in the proposed rules is that a controlling stockholder
should be so treated. However, where a corporation is the beneficiary of any portion of the proceeds of a life insurancepolicy, there is
no need for that portion to be included in the gross estate under
2042 because it directly affects the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's gross estate.

Accordingly, §20.2042-1(c) is amended by this document to provide
that, with respect to proceeds of corporate-owned life insurance
which are payable to either the corporation or a third party for a valid
business purpose, incidents of ownership held by the corporation will
not be attributed to the decedent through his stock ownership. 166
Thus, where the corporation is the beneficiary of any portion of the
policy proceeds, there is no need for that portion to be included in the
gross estate under section 2042 or the regulations thereunder because it
directly affects the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's
gross estate under the section 2031 Regulations. 167 The intent of the
1974 change in the regulations was to remove the insurance proceeds
from section 2042's inclusion requirement because the proceeds directly
increase the value of the stock that is included in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2031.168 Without the exclusionary provision in the
section 2042 regulations, the insurance proceeds would conceivably be
included in a decedent shareholder's estate twice. The insurance pro163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 1974 LRB LEXIS 835, *1-4 (1974).
Id. at *5-10.
Id. at *2.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at * 1-2.
Id.
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ceeds would be included once via section 2042 due to the fact that the
shareholder actually has incidents of ownership in the policies held by
the corporation. The insurance proceeds would be included a second
time under section 2031 due to the increase in the value of the shares
held by the decedent shareholder's estate when the insurance proceeds
are paid to the corporation. In an effort to prevent double inclusion in
the decedent shareholder's estate of the value of the proceeds received by
the corporation, the insurance proceeds included under section 2042 are
removed by an amendment to the regulations leaving a single proporstock held by the
tionate inclusion under section 2031 when valuing the
169
decedent shareholder at the time of his or her death.
Without discussing the intent of section 2042 and the regulations
thereunder, the opinions of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits seem incomplete. A more complete analysis may have first acknowledged that each
court, in effect, included the insurance proceeds in valuing the stock of
each corporation but then removed the value of the insurance proceeds
by offsetting the proceeds dollar-for-dollar against the perceived obligations to the decedent shareholder's estates. In short, by removing the
value of the insurance proceeds from the value of the stock, the insurance
proceeds have been completely excluded from the decedent majority
shareholder's estate, notwithstanding that the decedent had incidents of
ownership over the policy. Without a discussion of the regulatory exclusion of insurance proceeds and the history behind the exception, the explanation as to why the value of the insurance proceeds was offset dollarfor-dollar by each corporation's obligation to the decedent's shareholder's estate is at best incomplete and in both instances possibly inaccurate.
(c) The Analysis of the Blount and Cartwright
Courts is Incorrect from an Accounting and Financial Perspective
In addition to incorrectly applying the Code and regulations to the
circumstances in Blount and Cartwright,the conclusion reached by each
of the courts that the obligation of BCC and CSB to redeem the shareholder should be offset dollar-for-dollar against the insurance proceeds is
incorrect from an accounting and financial perspective. While a third
party might value a target corporation by treating a redemption obligation as a liability, it is not at all appropriate for a shareholder to reduce
the value of the company by the value of his or her shares.
The Blount court summarized its position when it stated that "[t]o
suggest that a reasonably competent business person, interested in acquiring a company, would ignore a $3 million liability strains credulity
169. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2042-1(c)(6), 20.2031-2(f); see also T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 1974
IRB LEXIS 835, *2-3 (1974).
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and defies any sensible construct of fair market value."'' 70 While it may
be logical from an unrelated third-party purchaser's perspective to include the liability associated with a redemption agreement in its purchase
price analysis, neither the Cartwright court nor the Blount court compared a redeemed shareholder's perspective to a third-party purchaser's
perspective. However, the Tax Court's opinion in Blount (later reversed
by the Eleventh Circuit) did contain specific and persuasive analysis regarding the effect of a redemption obligation on insurance proceeds received by a corporation.'17 In the Tax Court, Mr. Blount's estate argued
that the court should treat BCC's enforceable $4 million dollar redemption obligation as a corporate liability in determining the value of the
decedent shareholder's shares. 72 In making this argument, the estate
recognized the liability would operate to offset the value of the insurance
proceeds received by the corporation. By lowering the value of the company, the proportionate value of the decedent's stock would also be reduced. In declining to allow the offset, the Tax Court reasoned that the
redemption obligation should not be treated as a value depressing corporate liability when the very shares that are the subject of the redemption
obligation are being valued. 173 The Tax Court's holding would have
resulted in a proportionate increase in the value of Mr. Blount's stock
that would have increased Mr. Blount's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
In addressing the estate's argument, the Tax Court noted the distinction between a third-party purchase of the shares and the corporation's
redemption of its shares from a shareholder and provided the following:
A simplified example will illustrate the fallacy behind the estate's
contention that BCC's obligation to redeem decedent's shares should
be treated as a liability offsetting a corresponding amount of corporate assets. Assume corporation X has 100 shares outstanding and
two shareholders, A and B, each holding 50 shares. X's sole asset is $
1 million in cash. X has entered into an agreement obligating it to
purchase B's shares at his death for $ 500,000. If, at B's death, X's $
500,000 redemption obligation is treated as a liability of X for purposes of valuing B's shares, then X's value becomes $ 500,000 ($ 1
million cash less a $ 500,000 redemption obligation). It would follow
that the value of B's shares (and A's shares) is $ 250,000 (i.e., one
half of the corporation's $ 500,000 value) upon B's death. Yet if B's
shares are then redeemed for $ 500,000, A's shares are then worth $

170. Estate of Blount, 428 F.3d at 1346.
171.
Estate of Blount v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 2004 Tax. Ct. Memo LEXIS 117,
*78-86 (2004), aff'd in part andrev 'd in part,428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005).
172.
Id. at *78.
173.
Id. at *80.
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100-percent ownership of
500,000-that is, A's 50 shares constitute
74
a corporation with $ 500,000 in cash. 1
The Tax Court then pointed out that it could not be correct that B's
one half interest in one million dollars in cash was only worth $250,000,
nor could it be correct that A's one half interest in the remainder shifted
from a value of $250,000 pre-redemption to a value of $500,000 postredemption. 175 Further, the error in relation to the valuation of B's
shares in the example was the recognition of the corporation's redemption obligation as a claim on the corporate assets when valuing the same
shares that would be redeemed with those assets. 176 By contrast, a hypothetical third-party buyer of A's shares would pay $500,000 for A's
shares whether the redemption obligation existed or not. 177 This is because a third-party purchaser would take account of both the liability
arising from the redemption obligation and the shift in the proportionate
interest of A's shares as a result of the redemption. 178
Treating the corporation's obligation to redeem a shareholder (or a
shareholder's estate) as a liability in valuing the company for purpose of
redemption would result in valuing the corporation in its post redemption
configuration. 179 There is an important distinction between valuing stock
to be redeemed from a shareholder and valuing stock prior to a purchase
by a third party. With respect to valuing stock to be redeemed, the
shareholder (or shareholder's estate) will always seek to receive his or
her ratable share of the value of the company previous to the redemption. 180 Whereas, a third unrelated party would analyze the purchase of
the stock held by the remaining shareholders based upon the value of the
shares that remain after the redemption takes place.
So, why is it that the Tax Court decided in Cartwrightthat CSB's
obligation to the decedent shareholder should offset the insurance proceeds received by the corporation while the Tax Court's decision in
Blount denied a similar offset? That too was logically explained by the
Id. at *81-82 (footnotes omitted).
174.
Id. at *82.
175.
176.
Id. at *82-83.
Id. at *83 n.36.
177.
178.
Id. at *83.
179.
Id. at *79-80.
See id. at *80-83. In a more extreme example, it would make no sense that a 99% share180.
holder would base the value of his or her redemption on post-redemption value of 1%. On the other
hand, a hypothetical third party willing buyer looking to purchase all of the stock of BCC prior to
redeeming the decedent shareholder's estate would correctly consider the corporation's liability in
determining the value of the shares. This is so because the obligation to redeem the decedent shareholder's estate would continue after the third party purchaser's acquisition of the stock. Such a
hypothetical purchaser's stock value in BCC would decrease proportionately when the redemption
occurred. Using the same example, where a third party seeks to purchase a company that is obliged
to redeem a 99% shareholder. It would make no sense for the third-party acquirer to pay more than
1% of the pre-redemption value of the company. A third-party buyer will seek to value what he or
she will have at the moment after purchase. Whereas, a shareholder that is to be redeemed will seek
to value what he or she has a moment before the purchase.
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Tax Court in its decision in Blount. As previously indicated, four-fifths
of the liability in Cartwrightwas related to personal services provided by
Mr. Cartwright to CSB before his death. This four-fifths portion of the
" ' Rather, it
liability was not a corporate obligation to redeem its stock.18
was a liability for services performed-not meaningfully different from
any other liability of the corporation that would be netted against assets
to ascertain the net value of the company.' 82 Upon finding that approximately four-fifths of the obligation in Cartwrightwas not a redemption,
the Tax Court concluded that the whole liability in Cartwright should be
offset dollar-for-dollar against the insurance proceeds. Whereas, the Tax
Court properly found that the obligation in Blount was a redemption, as
opposed to an ordinary liability, which
should not be an offsetting liabil83
1
proceeds.
insurance
the
against
ity
While this analysis explains why four-fifths of the liability in Cartwright should be a liability that is offset against the assets of the company (including any insurance proceeds received), the Tax Court failed
to completely clear the air in relation to the remaining one-fifth of the
liability related solely to redemption of Mr. Cartwright's shares held by
his estate. The remaining one-fifth of the liability in Cartwrightis indistinguishable from the whole liability in Blount. Recognizing this, the
Tax Court conceded in its decision in Blount that the remaining one-fifth
portion of the liability in Cartwrightconstituted an obligation to redeem
stock. 184 Thus, it might have been appropriate for the Tax Court to have
also conceded that the remaining one-fifth of the liability in Cartwright
should not have been an obligation that was recognized in valuing the
corporation.
iv. Summary: Incidents of Ownership Held by Corporations
Based upon the above analysis, it is clear that the manner in which
the Treasury and the Tax Court value a decedent's ownership equity interest in a corporation are at odds with the manner in which the Cartwright and Blount courts have interpreted the Code and relevant Regulations. The Code generally requires a decedent to include in his or her
gross estate the value of policy proceeds payable upon the decedent's
death to the extent that the decedent held incidents of ownership in the
insurance policy. However, the regulations allow a decedent majority
shareholder's estate to exclude the value of insurance proceeds received
by the decedent's wholly or majority owned corporation notwithstanding
181.
Id. at *84.
182.
Id.
183.
See id. at *85-86; see also Huntsman v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 861, 874 (1976) (indicating that
insurance proceeds are treated like any other nonoperating asset when determining a closely held
corporation's value); Estate of Blount, 2004 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117, at *77.
184.
Estate of Blount, 2004 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117, at *84-85.
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that the decedent could have exercised actual control over the insurance
policy. The exclusionary exception provided by the regulations was designed to prevent double inclusion of the value of the insurance policies
in the decedent's estate, By allowing an exclusion where the corporation
receives the policy proceeds, the regulations contemplate inclusion of a
single ratable share of the insurance proceeds via an increase in the decedent's stock interest. Thus, in order to include the value of the decedent's interest in the corporation, the value of the insurance proceeds
must at least be included in the value of the company one time.
However, the Ninth Circuit's and the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in
Cartwright and Blount thwart the above analysis. The Cartwright and
Blount decisions require a dollar-for-dollar offset of the insurance proceeds received by a corporation against the corporation's obligation to
redeem the decedent shareholder. This dollar-for-dollar offset reduces
the overall value of the corporation when valuing the deceased shareholders shares. The effect of these holdings is to allow decedent sole or
majority shareholders to avoid including a ratable share of the value of
the insurance proceeds received by the corporation notwithstanding that
such a shareholder may exercise actual control over the insurance policy
held by the corporation. This outcome is contrary to the Code's overall
requirement that such proceeds must be included in gross estate where
the decedent has incidents of ownership in the policy. The outcome is
also contrary to the goal of the regulations to include at least a ratable
share of the proceeds in a deceased shareholder's estate.
b. Incidents of Ownership Held by Partnerships and LLCs
The above described inconsistency between the Blount and Cartwright opinions and the regulations under sections 2031 and 2042 also
affects the valuation of a deceased partner or member's equity interest in
a partnership or LLC where a redemption agreement is in place. In general, partnerships may be treated both as an "entity" for federal income
tax purposes and, under other circumstances, partnerships may be considered as an "aggregate" of individuals each treated as directly owning
an interest in the partnership assets and operations. 185
If a partnership or LLC is considered as an entity separate from its
partners or members under the entity theory of partnership taxation, the
partnership itself, instead of the partners individually, would have all the
incidents of ownership. 86 For purposes of the following discussion, it
will be assumed that an LLC is treated as a "partnership" for federal income tax purposes and that the members of an LLC are "partners" for
purposes of analysis. In relation to valuation for purposes of estate taxation of a deceased partner's interest in a partnership, the entity theory of
185.
186.

See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31, 1.02[1].
Id; see also I.R.C. § 701; MCKEE ET AL., supra note 31,1 1.02[2].
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partnership taxation would appear to be analogous to the manner in
which the shareholders of a corporation would be taxed, as previously
discussed. Except in certain rare circumstances, subchapter K of the
imposes tax on the individual partners rather than the
Code generally
87
partnership. 1
A different outcome might be obtained under the aggregate theory
of ownership. If a general partnership owns an insurance policy, incidents of ownership appear to be attributed to an aggregate of the general
partners and, therefore, to each one individually. 188 This rule would attribute to each general partner without regard to the percentage of ownership in the partnership, incidents of ownership in policies of insurance
held by the partnership on a partner's life. Under the aggregate theory,
several minority general partners might each be treated as having incidents of ownership in an insurance policy. Thus, where a minority corporate shareholder is clearly not attributed incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy held by the corporation, it is unclear whether a minority
general partner should be attributed incidents of ownership. Further
questions arise in relation to treatment of limited partners and members
of an LLC.
i. Where Proceeds are Payable to Partnership or LLC
Under the aggregate and entity theories of partnership taxation, the
question arises as to whether partners of a partnership or members of an
LLC should be attributed incidents of ownership in a policy owned by
the entity. Cases and administrative rulings have addressed this issue
without complete agreement on the treatment of incidents of ownership
in the partnership setting. Arguably, at least one similarity exists in the
treatment of incidents of ownership in the corporate and partnership settings. If the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of a deceased
partner are payable to or for the benefit of the partnership, then such proceeds should not be included in the gross estate under section 2042.189
Of course, this similarity immediately calls into question whether the
Blount and Cartwrightopinions impact valuation of a decedent partner's
equity interest where a redemption agreement is in place between the
decedent and the partnership. Beyond this similarity, several inconsistencies arise in the treatment of corporate shareholders as compared to
partners.
In 1955, the Tax Court analyzed and discussed incidents of ownership in an insurance policy held by a general partnership in Estate of

See I.R.C. §§ 701-777.
187.
188.
Rev. Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
189.
See id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034 (Sept. 21, 1983); see also ZARITSKY,
supra note 43, 8.02[4][b] (indicating that the IRS has not indicated formally whether it will apply

this rule when the insured is only a limited partner).
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Knipp v. Commissioner.190 In Knipp, the taxpayer was the estate of a
deceased partner, Mr. Knipp.' 9' At the time of his death on November
21, 1947, Mr. Knipp had eleven insurance policies outstanding on his
192
life, ten of which were assigned to the partnership prior to his death.
The partnership owned the policies and Mr. Knipp had no right to change
the beneficiary designation on the policies. 193 The value of each of the
policies was entered on the books of the partnership as an asset and,
194
thereafter, the partnership pledged the policies as collateral for loans.
"The partnership paid the premiums on the policies .

.

. [and] [t]he in-

of the policies each year was considered
crease of cash surrender value
95
income of the partnership."'
The Commissioner argued that all of the proceeds of the insurance
policy paid to the partnership should be directly included in Mr. Knipp's
gross estate under section 2042 because, as general partner, Mr. Knipp
possessed incidents of ownership in the policies at the time of his
death. 196 The court disagreed, finding that because Mr. Knipp's interest
in the partnership never exceeded fifty percent (50%), the premium payments were made by the partnership, the insurance proceeds were pay97
able to the partnership, and the policies were assets of the partnership. 1
In support of its conclusion, the court found that the partnership had
complete control over the policies and the decedent had no rights in the
policies other than those flowing from his partnership interest.' 98 The
Commissioner conceded that the insurance policy was an asset of the
partnership and that Mr. Knipp had no rights in the policies other than
those flowing from his partnership interest. 199 Based upon its finding
that the partnership controlled the policies, the court also found that the
partnership held all incidents of ownership in the policies. 20 0 The court
held that the partnership's incidents of ownership in the policies insuring
the life of the decedent were not attributed to the decedent, and the insurance proceeds were not includible in the decedent's gross estate. 20 ' The
aggregate and entity theories of partnership taxation were not explicitly
applied for purposes of attributing incidents of ownership in an insurance
policy owned by the partnership to either the entity or the partners as a
group. However, the outcome of Knipp would appear to be more consis25 T.C. 153, 154 (1955), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 6, nonacq., 156-2 C.B. 10, affd on other
190.
grounds,244 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1957).
See Knipp, 25 T.C. at 154.
191.
192. Id. at 157.
193.
See id. at 168-69.
194. Id. at 157.
Id.
195.
196. Id. at 166.
197. See id at 167-68.
198. See id. at 167-69.
d. at 168.
199.
200. Id. at 167.
Id. at 169.
201.
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tent with the application of an entity theory of partnership taxation where
incidents of ownership are concerned. Further, this outcome comports
with the manner in which corporations and their shareholders are taxed
in relation to the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of a shareholder.
Like a majority shareholder in a corporation, the court's holding
that Mr. Knipp was not attributed incidents of ownership for purposes of
section 2042 allowed Mr. Knipp's estate to exclude the proceeds in calculating his gross estate. But the holding in Knipp does not allow the
taxpayer's estate to completely escape estate taxation of the insurance
proceeds. Under the circumstances in Knipp, the value of the decedent's
partnership units would appear to increase proportionately due to the
partnership's receipt of the insurance proceeds.20 2 Thus, the holding in
Knipp accords the same treatment to a 50% general partner as the regulations accord to a majority shareholder in a corporation.
Unfortunately, however, the holding in Knipp did not fully resolve
the question of attribution of partnership incidents of ownership in an
insurance policy owned by a partnership. In General Counsel Memorandum 39034 (the "Memorandum"), the IRS analyzed the facts of proposed
Revenue Ruling 83-147 and provided a detailed comparison of the treatment of incidents of ownership between partnerships and corporations.0 3
The Memorandum addressed the facts of the proposed rules whereby C,
D, and E are equal minority general partners of the XYZ partnership.
The XYZ partnership obtained a life insurance policy on the life of D
and designated D's child A as the beneficiary.20 4 Thereafter, the premium payments were made by the XYZ partnership. 20 5 The issue for
consideration in the proposed ruling was whether a partner possesses
incidents of ownership as an insured in a life insurance policy held by the
partnership, where the proceeds are
payable not to the partnership but,
20 6
rather, to a thirdunrelatedparty.
The IRS first reasoned in the Memorandum that although the facts
involve partnership-owned life insurance, the treatment of corporateowned life insurance is relevant .207
Further, the IRS noted that
"[p]artnership-owned life insurance 'could' be given treatment analogous

202.
See I.R.C. § 2031(a).
203.
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034 (Sept. 21, 1983). By way of a memorandum, dated
December 22, 1981, the Director of the Individual Tax Division of the requested that Chief Counsel
consider two proposed revenue rulings, 83-147 and 83-148, referred to in the G.C.M. as Proposed
Ruling A and Proposed Ruling B, respectively. Id. Ultimately, Proposed Ruling A was published as
Revenue Ruling 83-147. Compare I.R.S. Gen. Courts. Mem. 39, 034 (Sept. 21, 1983), with Rev.
Rul. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158.
204.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034, at *2.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at *1.
207.
Id. at *4.

2006] ESTATE TAXATION OFREDEMPTIONAGREEMENTS

525

to corporate-owned life insurance. ' 0 8 The Memorandum again points
out that a corporation's incidents of ownership are not attributed to a
"controlling" shareholder where the proceeds are payable to the corporation. 20 9 The Service reasoned that this prevents the proceeds from being
considered both as a factor in valuation of the decedent's stock and as a
separate asset in the decedent's gross estate. 2'0 The IRS noted that this
outcome was specifically intended by the drafters of Regulation section
20.2042-1(c)(6). 1 ' Citing Knipp, the IRS indicated that it acquiesced in
and agreed with the holding in Knipp only where the insurance proceeds
were payable to the partnership and where inclusion of the insurance
proceeds would result in double inclusion of a substantial portion of the
proceeds.
Based upon this reasoning, the Service indicated that it agreed with
the conclusion in the proposed ruling that where:
a partnership owns a life insurance policy on a partner's life and the
proceeds are payable other than to or for the benefit of the partner-

ship, [an] insured partner possesses incidents of ownership in the policy in conjunction with the other partners, that require direct inclusion of [all] the proceeds in the insured partner's gross estate under
section 2042(2).212

In this regard, the Service noted that the proposed ruling treats "a partnership as an aggregate of the individual partners... where the insurance
proceeds" are not payable to the partnership. 2 t ' As such, the insurance
proceeds are all directly includible in the decedent shareholder's gross
estate under section 2042(2).
For purposes of section 2042(2), the Memorandum indicates that a
partnership is treated "as an aggregate of individual partners. 21 4 Further, the Memorandum notes that "incidents of ownership will not be
attributed to partners where the insurance proceeds are payable to or for
the benefit of the partnership. 21 5 Under these circumstances, attribution
of the partnership's incidents of ownership to the insured partner "would
result in double taxation of the. . . proceeds. 21 6 The Service then stated
that its position was to avoid such double inclusion by not including proceeds payable to the partnership directly in the decedent's estate under

208. Id. at *6 (citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1974)).
at *5-6.
209. See id.
210. Id. at *7-8.
Id.at *5 (citing Memorandum from Commissioner on Amendment of Estate Tax Regula211.
tions (Feb. 28, 1974), 1974 TM LEXIS 84, *1-3).
at * 1-2 (emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. See id.at *7.
214. Id.
215. Id.
at *7-8.
216. Id.
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section 2042(2).217 Although not specifically stated in the Service's reasoning, this conclusion would appear to indicate that where the proceeds
are payable to the partnership, the partnership will be treated as an entity
for federal tax purposes.
Post Cartwright and Blount, based upon Knipp and the Service's
acquiescence to Knipp in the Memorandum, the same concern arises in
the area of partnerships that exists in the corporate arena only to a much
greater degree. The rulings in Cartwright and Blount allow insurance
proceeds received by a corporation to be offset against a perceived obligation on the part of the corporation to redeem an equity interest from
the decedent corporate equity holder. There would appear to be no logical reason why the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, or any court following
the decisions in Cartwright and Blount, would not apply the same reasoning to a redemption by a partnership or LLC of a decedent partner's
or member's interest.
It is true that the Cartwright and Blount courts each based their
holdings on regulations under sections 20.2031-2 which specifically relate to valuation of stocks of a corporation.2 18 However, regulations under section 20.2031-3 address the valuation of interests in businesses and
require taxpayers to determine the fair market value of a partnership in a
manner consistent with the valuation of a corporation. Indeed, the net
value of a partnership is determined on the basis of all relevant factors
including, among other things, the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of
Regulation section 20.2031-2 relating to the valuation of corporate
stock.2 19
Thus, it would appear that the holding in Blount would equally apply to a partnership redemption causing a dollar-for-dollar offset of insurance proceeds received by a partnership or LLC on a policy insuring
the life of a partner or member against the liability of the partnership or
LLC to redeem a partner or member under a redemption agreement.
ii. Inconsistent Treatment of Minority Partners and Members of LLCs Where Insurance Proceeds Payable Outside the Partnership or LLC
Importantly, however, the Service went on in the Memorandum to
make a distinction between a controlling shareholder and a partner under
the circumstances of the proposed ruling. The Memorandum indicates
that the proposed ruling takes a different approach than the regulations as
they apply to corporations where the proceeds are payable outside the

217.
218.
219.
amended

Id. at *8.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (as amended in 1976).
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3(c) (as amended in 1992); see also id. § 20.2031-2(f) (as
in 1976).
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partnership. 21° As previously discussed, the regulations under section
2042 provide that if a decedent corporate shareholder owns only a minority interest in a corporation, no incidents of ownership held by the corporation are attributable to the decedent shareholder and no proceeds are
directly included in the decedent shareholder's estate. 22' However,
unlike the case of a minority corporate shareholder, the Memorandum
does not apply the same rule allowing the insurance proceeds to escape
estate taxation where decedent is a minority general or limited partner or
a minority member of an LLC.222
In addressing whether incidents of ownership in the policies would
be attributed to the minority general partner, the Service conceded that
partnership-owned life insurance could be given treatment analogous to
corporate-owned life insurance in accordance with the regulations.2 23
However, if treated the same as a shareholder-corporation arrangement, a
partnership's incidents of ownership would only be attributed to a majority partner where the policy proceeds were payable to a third party.
Whereas a minority partner, in theory, would not be attributed incidents
of ownership.
However, the Memorandum indicates that a general partner insured
under a policy held by a general partnership possesses incidents of ownership that are exercisable in conjunction with other general partners.224
This broad statement attributes incidents of ownership in an insurance
policy held by the partnership to any general partner regardless of the
fact that such general partner is a majority or minority interest holder in
the partnership. Such a conclusion would appear to be at odds with the
Tax Court's holding in Knipp. Thus, the IRS appears to have taken a
different approach in the Memorandum based upon the premise that "a
partnership is generally regarded as an aggregate of its individual partners." 225 The Memorandum states that "[a]ny incidents of ownership in
a life insurance policy held by the partnership are [in reality] held by the
partners as individuals. 226 Based upon this reasoning, any policy proceeds payable to a third party are includible in the insured partner's gross
estate under section 20.2042(2) regardless of whether the partner is a
minority or majority owner of the partnership.227 This conclusion appears to ignore the notion that "the term 'incidents of ownership' is not
limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in a technical legal

220. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,034, at *6-7.
221.
Id.
222. See id. at *4-8.
223. Id. at *6.
224.
See id.
at *7 (citing STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 73,
1031619).
225. Id. at *7.
226.
Id. at *23.
227.
Id. at *22-23.
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sense." 228 "Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the
insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. ' 229 Further,
as previously discussed, the conclusion also ignores the provisions under
the regulations that attribute incidents of ownership in a corporate setting
only to a controlling shareholder. 3 ° A minority shareholder of a corporation is not attributed incidents of ownership under any circumstances
whereas a minority partner is attributed incidents of ownership where the
policy proceeds are payable other than to the partnership.
In light of the above distinction, a question remains in relation to
whether a limited partner or a member of an LLC would be attributed
incidents of ownership in a policy held by the entity. In 2001, the IRS
addressed a fact pattern which included a contribution of an insurance
policy to a limited partnership. In Private Letter Ruling 200111038, two
grantors (A and B) of two separate trusts (Trust A and Trust B) formed a
new limited partnership (LP). 23' Trust A was to contribute insurance
policies to LP in exchange for a limited partnership interest. 23 2 Trust B
was to contribute cash in exchange for a general partnership interest in
LP.233 Grantors A and B also contributed cash in exchange for a limited
partnership interest in LP. 234 Under teT
the LP agreement, all taxable income and losses were to be allocated in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership.23 5 Further, the agreement provided that general partners had sole management authority over the partnership and
limited partners had no right to participate in management or investment
decisions including any decisions in relation to the LP's ownership of the
insurance policies. 236 Importantly, however, the proceeds of the acquired
insurance policies were to be paid to the LP.237
The ruling addressed the issue of whether, for purposes of section
2042, a limited partnership interest would be treated as being sufficient
control such that the limited partners would be treated as possessing incidents of ownership by virtue of their interest in such an entity.23 8 The
IRS ruled that where the terms of a partnership agreement preclude the
limited partners from exercising any control over the management and
day-to-day affairs of the limited partnership or take part in the vote in
respect to the limited partnership's management and operations, the limited partners will not possess incidents of ownership under section 2042
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
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239
with respect to insurance policies held by the limited partnership.
Thus, in an initial analysis, it would appear that the question turned upon
whether the limited partners (or presumably a non-managing member of
an LLC) had "control" over the policy for purposes of incidents of ownership.

However, this line of reasoning loses much of its force due to the
fact that the IRS then fell back on its analysis in Revenue Ruling 83-147.
The IRS indicated that its conclusions were due to the fact that the policy
proceeds were payable directly to the limited partnership and not to a
third party. 240 Thus, because the proceeds are payable to the partnership,
the proceeds will increase the value of the decedent limited partner's
interest in the limited partnership and, therefore, no incidents of ownership held by the partnership should be attributed to the decedent limited
partner. 24 1 Even though the reasons given in the ruling address the lack
of the limited partners' control over the policies in relation to section
2042, the fact that the limited partnership received the proceeds makes
the ruling less intriguing and less valuable. Again, the question of how
insurance proceeds on a policy held by a limited partnership or LLC payable to a third party will be treated for purposes of section 2042 specifically remains unaddressed. Further, the question of whether a partner's
status as a limited partner alone will result in a sufficient lack of control
such that the limited partner will not be attributed incidents of ownership
remains unanswered. If the analysis turned solely on "control," a limited partner (majority or minority) would not appear to have any incidents of ownership regardless of whether the proceeds were payable to a
third party.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
There are two basic problems in relation to application of the rules
under section 2042 of the Code. First, the Cartwrightand Blount decisions allow taxpayers to completely avoid inclusion of insurance proceeds payable to a corporation where there is a redemption agreement in
place that requires the corporation to redeem a deceased shareholder's
equity interest in the company. Second, the IRS has created an inconsistency in applying the regulations under section 2042 attributing incidents
of ownership in an entity-owned life insurance policy where the policy
proceeds are payable to a third party. The inconsistency results where a
minority limited partner is attributed incidents of ownership while a minority corporate shareholder is not. Both of these inconsistencies should
be addressed by Congress, the courts, and the Treasury Department.

239.
240.
241.

See id. at * 19-20.
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Of primary importance is the anomaly created by the Cartwright
and Blount opinions which have created precedent that can be relied
upon by estates of deceased shareholders to support a complete exclusion
of the value of insurance proceeds received by the corporation. This
loophole should be closed. The policy behind the exception to inclusion
provided for in the regulations under section 2042 is premised upon ratable inclusion of the proceeds under section 2031. This policy is
thwarted by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Blount and by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Cartwright.
A. Amend Section 2031 Regulations to Require Inclusion of Life Insurance Proceeds in Valuation
One possible solution would be for the IRS to amend the regulations
under section 2031 to clarify that life insurance proceeds payable to or
for the benefit of a company shall, to the extent the proceeds are excluded by the regulations under section 2042, be included for purposes of
determining the value of the company. Specifically, the fourth full sentence of Regulation section 20.2031-2(f) could be amended to include
following additional language:
In addition to the relevant factors described above, consideration
shall also be given to non-operating assets, including proceeds of life
insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the
extent that such non-operating assets have not been taken into account in determining the net worth, prospective earning power and
dividend earning capacity. Such non-operating assets shall include,
among other things, proceeds of a life insurancepolicy payable to or

for the benefit of the company which proceeds have not otherwise
been included in the insured shareholder'sestate under section 2042
or the applicable regulationsthereunder.

The above amended section of the regulations would clarify that insurance proceeds received on the life of an insured shareholder would be
included for purposes of valuing the decedent's stock in the company.
This amendment would require inclusion of the insurance proceeds in an
attempt to prevent an interpretation such as, for example, the interpretations in Cartwright and Blount, that the insurance proceeds are not the
kind of non-operating asset that should be included in the value of the
company under the regulations. 42 However, the holding in Blount could
continue to create ambiguity because the court's holding also requires
that where a redemption agreement is in effect between the company and
the shareholders, the company's obligation under the agreement should
offset the insurance proceeds "dollar-for-dollar., 243 This second requirement, in effect, would undermine the effect of the proposed
242.
243.

See Estate of Blount v. Comr'r., 428 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
See id.at 1346.
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amendment by leaving open the question of whether an estate must take
the company's redemption obligation into consideration when valuing a
decedent shareholder's stock.
The requirement that the company's redemption obligation be taken
into consideration by the redeemed shareholder's estate in valuing the
stock for purposes of determining gross estate is inappropriate for several
reasons. First, such a requirement would result in undervaluing the redeemed shareholder's stock in virtually every instance due to the fact
that a redeemed shareholder would never concede to selling his or her
shares back for less than an arm's length consideration. Further, valuation based upon post-redemption assets is not arm's length for reasons
explained by the Tax Court in its decision in Blount.244 This portion of

the holding by the Eleventh Circuit would not likely be addressed by the
IRS in regulations but, rather, left to the courts to correct in a later case.
B. Amend Regulations Under Section 2042 to Require Attribution of
Incidents of Ownership to Majority Shareholders,Partners,and
Members of LLCs
Because of the inherent ambiguity in interpreting the court's holding in Blount, a larger, more expansive change in the Code and Regulations may be appropriate. Accepting the Blount court's holding that the
insurance proceeds should not be included in the valuation calculation, it
may be appropriate for the Treasury to reconsider the requirements of
section 2042 and promulgate regulations that pertain to shareholders,
partners, and members of LLCs that attribute incidents of ownership to a
"controlling" equity holder.
Under current regulations, it appears that the Treasury envisioned
that estates of deceased shareholders of corporations should be required
to include only a ratable portion of the insurance proceeds received by
the corporation. This policy is implemented via the regulations which
prevent attribution of incidents of ownership to a sole or controlling
shareholder where the economic benefits of a life insurance policy on the
life of the shareholder are reserved to the corporation. 24 In turn, this
allows the shareholder to exclude from the gross estate a portion of the
value of the life insurance proceeds notwithstanding that such shareholder actually had control over the policy.
Historically, inclusion of the insurance proceeds via attribution of
incidents of ownership to a controlling decedent shareholder resulted in a
double inclusion of the proceeds. This outcome resulted because the
value of the corporate shares in the decedent's estate was thought to increase proportionately due to the corporation's receipt of the insurance
244.
245.

See id. at 1343-45.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1974).
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proceeds. However, under the Cartwrightand Blount decisions, the proceeds are no longer subject to double inclusion due to the fact that the
proceeds are offset dollar-for-dollar by the company's obligation to redeem the deceased shareholder's stock.24 6 Thus, it may be appropriate
for the Treasury to consider whether to amend the current regulations
under section 2042 to provide that a sole or controlling shareholder, partner or member of an LLC will be attributed incidents of ownership where
the equity holder has sufficient ownership interest. This outcome would
appear to be consistent with Congress' intent to impose estate tax on
decedents who have the ability to, for example, change the beneficiary
designation on the policy held by the entity.
C. Amend Regulations to Treat Shareholders,PartnersandMembers
Consistently with Respect to AttributionRules
The above problems stem from a set of circumstances wherein the
company receives the proceeds from an insurance policy which insures
the life of an equity holder. A separate and different inequity arises
where the proceeds of a company-owned insurance policy are payable to
a third party. It makes little sense that a minority corporate shareholder
should be treated differently than a minority partner or minority member
of an LLC where the proceeds of an insurance policy are held by the
entity but payable to a third party.
The advent, evolution, and increased popularity of limited liability
companies require that the regulations under section 2042 that apply to
corporations be reassessed in an effort to provide similar treatment to
partners of partnerships and members of LLCs. The general policy behind the section 2042 regulations, directing the proceeds of a corporateowned insurance policy payable to a third unrelated party be excluded
from a minority shareholder's gross estate should apply to minority partners, limited partners, and non-managing members of LLCs.
However, the Treasury rulings and agency memorandums indicate
unwillingness on the part of the IRS to treat minority partners and minority members of LLCs in a similar fashion. Instead, the Treasury views
the partners or LLC members that are treated as partners for tax purposes
as being an aggregate of partners each of whom individually has control
over incidents of ownership of a policy held by the partnership or LLC.
While the general theory of aggregate versus an entity approach to partnerships may be relevant to the analysis, there is a very large unaddressed grey area between the rights of shareholders and the rights of
limited partners and non-managing members of an LLC. More specifically, where a limited partnership or LLC agreement authorizes certain
partners or members to manage the assets, including insurance policies,
held by the company, attribution of incidents of ownership to such part246.

See Estate ofBlount, 428 F.3d at 1346.

2006] ESTATE TAXATION OF REDEMPTIONAGREEMENTS

533

ners or members would be appropriate in that they have actual control.
However, there appear to be many instances in which a limited partner or
non-managing member of an LLC would have little if any control over a
policy owned by the entity. A minority limited partner and a minority
member of an LLC who has no management authority over a companyheld insurance policy would, like a minority shareholder of a corporation, have no control over such a policy and there would be little reason
to attribute incidents of ownership to such partners or members of an
LLC.
As a result, the Treasury's rulings and memorandums that require a
deceased minority limited partner or deceased minority member of an
LLC to include the whole value of an insurance policy in gross estate
notwithstanding that the proceeds are paid to an unrelated third party are
likely unsupportable and outdated. The Treasury should embark on a
regulation project to analyze and propose amendments to or new regulations which focus on the core control requirement of section 2042. Attribution of incidents of ownership should be limited only to those equity
holders of a company that have actual control over the policy or have the
independent ability to control the ownership rights of an insurance policy
held by the company.
IV.

SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

Generally, section 2042 requires a decedent who possesses incidents
of ownership in an insurance policy on his or her life to include in the
decedent's gross estate all insurance proceeds receivable under such policy.247 A decedent possesses incidents of ownership in a policy to the
extent that the decedent can, for example, change the beneficiary desig248
nation or otherwise has rights to the economic benefits of the policy.
A sole or majority shareholder has the power to control the beneficiary
designation of a policy owned by the corporation. Thus, a sole or majority shareholder generally would be attributed incidents of ownership in a
corporate-owned insurance policy. However, current regulations under
2042 provide an exception whereby a decedent sole or majority shareholder will not be attributed incidents of ownership in such a policy
where the proceeds are payable upon death directly to the corporation. 249
The purpose of this exception is to prevent the double inclusion of the
value of the insurance proceeds once through section 2042 by attribution
to the majority shareholder via incidents of ownership and again through
an increase in the value of the shares of stock that are required to be included in gross estate under section 2031.

247.

See I.R.C. § 2042.

248.
249.

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1974).
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
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In relation to partnerships and limited liability companies, the cases
and rulings have resulted in a similar exception with no attribution of
incidents of ownership to partners or members where proceeds of a policy insuring the life of a decedent partner or member are payable to the
entity. The Tax Court and the Treasury's rulings are supported by the
same view that to require inclusion under section 2042 would result in
unnecessary double inclusion of the value of the insurance proceeds in
the decedent partner or member's estate.
Until recently, attribution of incidents of ownership and estate taxation of the receipt of policy proceeds by either an entity or the equity
holder of such entity under the above described circumstances was
largely undisputed under the cases, rulings and regulations. However, in
1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cartwright found that proceeds received by a corporation from a policy insuring the life of the
corporation's majority shareholder should not increase the value of the
decedent's shares for purposes of determining the decedent's gross estate. 250 The court came to this conclusion based largely upon the fact
that the value of the insurance proceeds was offset by an existing liability
to the decedent shareholder's estate for services performed for the corporation prior to the decedent's death.25 ' A small portion of the insurance
proceeds received by the corporation were used to redeem the majority
shareholder's stock pursuant to the terms of a stock redemption agreement that existed between the majority shareholder and the corporation.2 52 The effect of the court's holding was to allow the shareholder's
estate to completely avoid inclusion of the value of the insurance proceeds received by the corporation. Ignoring the small portion of the
payment related to the redemption agreement, the outcome of the Cartwright case was consistent with the policy behind the estate tax provisions of the Code.
However, in October of 2005, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Blount followed the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Cartwright.
While the court's decision in Blount purports to follow the reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cartwright,it appears to misapprehend the reasoning of the Tax Court which was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit in Cartwright. By holding that the liability to redeem the shares
of the decedent shareholder operates to offset dollar-for-dollar the insurance proceeds received by the corporation for purposes arriving at the
redemption value of a deceased shareholder's stock, the Blount court
ignores the requirements of section 2042 and the regulations thereunder.
In doing so, the holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Blount completely removes the insurance proceeds in determining the
250.
251.
252.

See Estate ofCartwright v. Comm'r., 183 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999).
See Estate of Cartwright, 183 F.3d at 1038.
Id. at 1035-37.
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value of the shares of the corporation in the decedent shareholder's estate
under section 2031. By removing the insurance proceeds from the calculation of the value of the decedent shareholder's stock under section
2031, no portion of the insurance proceeds are included in the decedent's
estate.
The exception to inclusion of the proceeds in the regulations under
section 2042 is based upon the premise that the increase in value of the
stock due to the corporation's receipt of the insurance proceeds will result in a proportionate increase in the value of the corporate stock to be
included in the shareholder decedent's gross estate under section 203 1.253
Consequently, the Blount opinion and the Cartwrightopinion to a certain
degree, appear to allow exclusion of the value of the proceeds from the
section 2031 calculation. This, in turn, appears to create an apparent
loophole that allows taxpayers to avoid estate tax payable on proceeds
received from policies where such taxpayers clearly are attributed incidents of ownership. Further, there is no reason why the same anomalous
result would not apply in the redemption of a partner or a member of an
LLC where the entity received the policy proceeds.
In addition to the apparent loophole created by the Cartwrightand
Blount opinions, the IRS has created a distinction in the manner in which
minority corporate shareholders and minority partners are treated when a
third party, as opposed to the entity, receives insurance proceeds on the
life of one of the equity holders. In a corporate setting under these circumstances, a decedent minority shareholder is not attributed incidents of
ownership in the policy held by the corporation. By not attributing the
corporate incidents of ownership to the decedent minority shareholder,
no amount of the insurance proceeds received by the third party is required to be included in his or her estate. This same rule is not applied to
minority partners or LLC members. Under these same circumstances,
the minority member or partner is attributed incidents of ownership. As
such, the draconian opposite outcome occurs requiring the estate of the
decedent minority partner or member to include all of the value of the
insurance proceeds in gross estate.
Given the widespread implementation of redemption agreements by
shareholders and their closely held entities, there is a need to address the
problems created by the holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Blount and the Treasury's disparate treatment of minority corporate
shareholders, minority limited partners and minority members of LLCs.
Several possible solutions exist. First, the Treasury should amend the
regulations to clarify that insurance proceeds received by a company on
the life of a majority equity holder should be included in the equity
holder's estate when valuing the equity interest. Although this outcome
253.

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (as amended in 1974).
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was intended by the Treasury and is explained in various Treasury pronouncements, the regulations are sufficiently ambiguous that two federal
courts of appeal did not interpret the regulation as it was originally intended to operate.
In the alternative, the Treasury may wish to accept the treatment espoused by the courts of appeal and amend the regulations under section
2042 to require attribution of incidents of ownership to majority shareholders, partners, and members of LLCs. This alternative is in many
ways more consistent with Congress' original intent when it enacted section 2042. Whereas, under current regulations, it was the intent of the
Treasury to include only a ratable portion of the proceeds, this alternative
would require majority equity holders in closely held entities to include
in gross estate the whole amount of the insurance. Majority owners of
entities that own insurance policies in fact have control of insurance
policies held by their companies. It is for this reason that this alternative
may be a viable solution.
Finally, the Treasury should equalize the treatment of minority
shareholders with the treatment under the regulations of limited partners
and non-managing members of LLCs. Under current regulations, where
policy proceeds are payable to unrelated third parties outside of the company, minority shareholders are not attributed incidents of ownership
under the rules. The Treasury's theory behind this treatment is premised
upon the fact that a minority shareholder does not have actual control
over the policy benefits. On the other hand, limited partners and nonmanaging members of LLCs are attributed incidents of ownership under
the current rulings. This effectively requires such equity holders to include all of the policy proceeds in their estates upon their deaths. Such
treatment is unwarranted and must be addressed by the Treasury in a
manner that is consistent with the treatment accorded to corporate minority shareholders.

THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION": THE WRONG ANSWER
TO THE CRISIS OF INADEQUATE HEALTH CARE FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN
LINDA C. FENTIMANt

In 1999, Regina McKnight, a homeless, mentally retarded woman
who was pregnant and addicted to cocaine, was charged with murder
when her child was stillborn. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed her murder conviction and upheld the twenty-year sentence imposed 1
In 2002, a severely mentally disabled woman became pregnantafter
being rapedby the owner of the group home where she lived. The wife of
a Floridaprosecutor sought to be appointed "guardianof the fetus" in
order to prevent the woman from taking prescription drugs necessary to
maintain her physical health and mental stability and to prevent the
woman from having an abortion. Ultimately, the Floridacourts rejected
these efforts.2
In 2004, Melissa Rowland, a pregnant woman with a long history of
mental illness, sought assistance at a hospital because she noticed a decrease in fetal movements. Doctors recommended a Caesareandelivery,
but Rowland declined,and the hospital offered no other help. When one
of the twins she was carrying was stillborn, Rowland was charged with
murder, with prosecutors asserting that she had acted with depraved
indifference to the value of human life.3
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In roughly two-thirds of the states, women who write advance directives to guide their medical care should they become incompetent may
4
have their directives renderedunenforceable if they become pregnant.
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INTRODUCTION

The last few years have witnessed an astonishing array of intrusive
and punitive government actions against pregnant women. These government interventions, ranging from criminal prosecutions and fetal
"guardianship" proceedings to statutes safeguarding "the unborn" and
new "regulatory interpretations" of existing law, are touted as necessary
to protect fetuses from harm, particularly harm from their own mothers,
and are framed as a response to a new public health crisis. 5 While these
government actions vary in the extent to which they threaten women's
physical liberty and decision-making autonomy, 6 they share a common
view of pregnant women as vessels for the developing fetus, with both
the potential, and the obligation, to protect that fetus at all costs.

5. See Ziba Kashef, The FetalPosition: Federal and State Dollars Are Subsidizing a Boom
in Antiabortion 'Crisis Pregnancy Centers,' MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2003, available at
http://www.mothejones.com/news/outfront/2003/01/ma 218 01.html. Other government activities
support the position that embryos and fetuses are full human beings, as the Bush Administration has
funded so-called "Snowflake Adoptions" (the directed donation of embryos to infertile couples) and
fetal imaging technology for "pregnancy crisis centers," whose raison d'etre is to discourage women
from choosing abortions. See Elissa K. Zirinsky, Adoption's New Frontier,CBS News, July 28,
2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/28/national/printable712541 .shtml; Anna Mulrine, A
Home for Frozen Embryos, USNEwS.COM, Sept. 27, 2004, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
health/articles/040927/27babies.bl.htm (discussing the $1 million federal grant to two "embryo
adoption" organizations to promote public awareness of these programs). The Department of Health
and Human Services has funded so-called "crisis pregnancy centers" since 1996. See Kashefsupra;
see also The Abortion Access Project, Impeding the Right to Choose: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and
sources cited therein (on file with Author); Informed Choice Act, S.755.1S, 109th Cong. § 2(a)
(providing for additional funding for ultrasound equipment to be used to provide pregnant women
with a visual image of the fetus).
6. One might distinguish, for example, between prosecuting a woman for homicide because
she used drugs while pregnant and a law that requires that pregnant women be told of the possibility
of fetal pain before having an abortion. My point is not that all government "fetal protection" initiatives are equivalent, but that they each diminish the ability of a competent adult to make choices
about her life and her body, and does so based upon the actor's status as a pregnant woman.
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Current "fetal protection ' 7 efforts pack a triple whammy: they undermine women's health, limit women's ability to fully participate in the
economic life of the nation, and disproportionately affect the indigent
and racial minorities. First, the new "fetal protection" threatens to limit
women's ability to participate in the workforce and control their reproductive capability by raising the specter of civil or criminal liability if
they engage in potentially risky activities before or during pregnancy.
Second, many "fetal protection" initiatives seek to redefine the fetus as a
person, with rights fully equal to those of a born human being, in a thinly
disguised effort to limit abortion access.8 Finally, efforts to constrain
women's actions for the benefit of their fetuses frequently reflect racial,
gender, and class stereotypes about how women in general, or certain
groups of women, do or should behave. 9 It does not appear coincidental
that poor women and women of color are the main targets of "fetal protection" efforts.' 0
7.
The term "fetal protection" was apparently first used by legal commentators in the early
1980's, referring to employers' policies that excluded fertile women from the workplace, or at least
better-paying jobs within the workplace. The ostensible purpose of these "fetal protection" policies
was to ensure that children born to their female employees would not be injured by their mothers'
on-the-job exposure to toxic chemicals, but the goal of protecting employers against tort liability was
also important. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, Firingthe Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641
(1981). In the mid-1980s the use of the term was broadened to include state laws prohibiting the
experimentation on, and transfer of, embryos and fetuses, the fore-runner of today's controversy
over stem cell research. See, e.g., Note, Reproductive Technology and the ProcreationRights of the
Unmarried,98 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1985). In the late 1980s, courts and commentators began to use
the term "fetal protection" to encompass tort actions and criminal prosecutions of women based on
their conduct during pregnancy, as well as broader questions about how to consider the interests of
women and their fetuses in the abortion context. See, e.g., George Annas, The Impact of Medical
Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 229 (1987); John
A. Robertson, GestationalBurdens and Fetal Status: Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED.
189, 202 (1987); Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Government Regulation of Pregnant
Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 187-89 (1989). What I call the "new 'fetal
protection"' is the increased range of government actions, beginning in the late 1990s and continuing
through the present, taken against, or about, pregnant women, encompassing health care access and
decisionmaking, civil commitment, and criminal and tort actions.
8.
Julia L. Ernst, Laura Katzive, & Erica Smock, The Global Pattern of US. Initiative Curtailing Women's Reproductive Rights: A Perspective on the Increasingly Anti-Choice Mosaic, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 752, 781 (2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 41-47, (discussing in detail
the debate surrounding Unborn Victims of Violence Act, Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004)).
9.
Indeed, some of the most aggressive criminal prosecutions of pregnant women brought in
the name of fetal protection have been brought in the former slave states of Florida, Missouri, South
Carolina, and Texas; although these states are not the only locus of prosecution. See infra note 66;
see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, A READER 127, 128-31 (Adrien Katherine
Wing ed., New York University Press 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies] (suggesting that the "devaluation of [black women] as mothers.., has its roots in
the unique experience of slavery"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 938, 939 (1997) [hereinafter Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood].
10.
See Ira J. Chasnoff, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drugor Alcohol Use During Pregnancyand
Discrepanciesin Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida,322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202,
1206 (1990) (observing that black women were ten times as likely as white women to be reported by
their physicians for using drugs, despite equal rates of drug use); LAURA E. G6MEZ, MISCONCEIVING
MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 118

(1997). Of course, one could observe that the poor and people of color are disproportionately repre-
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Strikingly, the new "fetal protection" crusades have failed utterly to
deliver more health care to poor children or women or to improve the
health status of at-risk children. Rather, they are potent symbolic gestures, offering a quick fix to complex social, medical, and economic
problems. By blaming individual women for conduct which is often not
freely chosen," government avoids taking responsibility for its continuing failure to meaningfully address the reality that many poor and lowincome Americans lack access to health care or acknowledge the special
problems faced by women who are victims of domestic violence, suffering from mental illness, and/or addicted to drugs and alcohol. 12 Effective health policy requires the provision of adequate heath care services
for all, including reproductive health care across the life span and targeted services addressing our most vulnerable women and children.
This article will expand upon the feminist critique by focusing on
children's health as well as the health and liberty interests of their mothers. In the first part of this article, I examine the legal and cultural underpinnings of "fetal protection" and explore its current manifestations.
In the second part, I place "fetal protection" in a broader context, documenting the ways in which American law currently promotes fetal life,
while simultaneously neglecting the lives and health of born children.
The third part of the article offers concrete recommendations about how
government, both state and federal, can actually achieve the goal of
bringing healthy children into the world and enabling them to live
healthy lives, paying particular attention to the problems of children who
are born into domestic violence and/or poverty and are therefore at high
risk for poor educational and health care outcomes. 13 If we are to truly
sented in the criminal justice system, in both the courts and prisons. See, e.g., William H. Edmonson, Note, A "New" No-Contact Rule: Proposing an Addition to the No-Contact Rule to Address

Questioning of Suspects After Unreasonable Charging Delays, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1773, 1785
(2005). However, this does not explain the extraordinary frequency and ferocity of criminal prosecutions against women of color, particularly when one considers that it is alcohol, not crack cocaine
(stereotypically connected with African-Americans), that is the drug most clearly shown to cause
long-term developmental harm. See infra notes 14-22 and discussion in accompanying text.
11.
The theme of "choice" is frequently raised by proponents of "fetal protection," ignoring
the reality that for many poor women, the systemic lack of health care, education, and employment
denies them the ability to make optimal choices for themselves or their children. See, e.g., Erin
Nelson, Reconceiving Pregnancy: Expressive Choice and Legal Reasoning, 49 MCGILL L.J. 593,
623, 624 (2004).
12.
There is a significant link between a woman's experiencing domestic violence (physical
or sexual abuse) as a child or an adult and her subsequent development of mental illness and/or
substance abuse problems. WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF PREGNANT
AND PARENTING WOMEN WITH SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN PHILADELPHIA 4, 6 (Sept. 2002),

available at http://www.womenslawproject.org/reports/PregnantparentingPVS.pdf, Lynn M.
Paltrow, Pregnancy,Domestic Violence, and the Law: The Interface of Medicine, Public Health,and
the Law: Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461,477 (2005).

13.
Poverty is a major contributor to poor birth outcomes and later childhood health problems.
See Charles Oberg, The Impact of Childhood Poverty on Health and Development, HEALTHY
GENERATIONS, May 2003, at 2-3, available at http://www.epi.umn.edu/mch/resources/
hg/hgchildpoverty.pdf; Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories ofPoverty and Children's MentalHealth, 37 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 207, 207 (1996).
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become a society in which "no child [is] left behind," we must implement a comprehensive public health strategy to promote women's and
children's health across the lifespan, not just during the few months in
which women are pregnant.
What's "New" About the "New FetalProtection?"
At the outset, one might be tempted to ask, "What's all the fuss
about? Are these government actions so different from those taken before?" Women's use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs during pregnancy has long been controversial,1 4 and there has been significant debate over whether criminal prosecutions and involuntary civil commitment are an appropriate or effective way to ensure that children are born
healthy and drug-free. 15
Virtually all observers agree that drug use, broadly defined, during
pregnancy is harmful to the newborn child, although there is disagreement about the extent, and permanence, of the harm.' 6 Research shows
that 5-6% of women use illegal drugs during pregnancy, while 25% used
alcohol, and maternal alcohol use is the leading cause of mental retardation. 17 Some researchers have concluded that maternal cocaine use may
lead to subtle, long-lasting neurological deficits, including "the ability to
habituate or self-regulate" and small but statistically significant deficits

14.
Currently, there is increasing attention paid to methamphetamine, which, like cocaine in
its day, is giving rise to media stories about the grave risks of in utero drug exposure for the longterm development of children. See, e.g., Katie Zernike, A Drug Scourge Creates its Own Form of
Orphan, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at Al; U.S. Warns of 'Global Meth Threat,' BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/4757179.stm. Others have criticized this media coverage
as sensational and poorly informed. See, e.g., Meth andMyth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialist
Warn
Mass
Media
on
"Meth
Baby "
Stories,
July
29,
2005,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtm; see also RYAN S. KING, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, THE NEXT BIG THING? METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (June

2006) (asserting that the media have failed utterly to accurately predict the science and epidemiological data surrounding methamphetamine addiction).
15.
See, e.g., Sarah Childress, Justice: A New Controversy in the Fetal-Rights Wars,
NEWSWEEK, March 29, 2004, at 7; Lynn Paltrow, PregnantDrug Abusers, Fetal Persons, and the
Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1008, 1009 (1999); Brian Maffly, 'FetalAbuse'
Charges Give Rise to Debate; Mothers-to-Be Need Help, Not Fear, Critics Say, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 1997, at DI; Wendy Chavkin, Vicki Breitbart, & Paul H. Wise, Finding Common
Ground: The Necessity ofan IntegratedAgendafor Women's and Children'sHealth, 22 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 262, 263 (1994) (arguing that choosing to reduce infant mortality, HIV transmission, and
drug exposure only by reducing harm to the fetus (and thus intervening through the body of the
pregnant woman) ignores data showing that provision of quality health care across a woman's life is
the best guarantee of ensuring healthy babies).
16.

See, e.g., DAN STEINBERG & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE

LEGISLATURES, STATES RESPONSES TO MATERNAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE: AN UPDATE (Jan.

2000), www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/matemalabuse.htm;

JANET R. HANKN, NATIONAL

INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME PREVENTION

RESEARCH (Aug. 2002), http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh26-1/58-65.htm.
17. Addiction Medicine: Psychopathology of Pregnant Women with Alcohol and Drug Dependencies Examined, WOMEN'S HEALTH WEEKLY, August 23, 2001, at 8 [hereinafter Addiction
Medicine].
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in IQ and language ability, 8 but others have found that most infants exposed in utero to cocaine "catch up to their peers in physical size and
19 In contrast, maternal alcohol use during preghealth status by age 2."
nancy is known to cause serious harm to children with significant in
utero exposure, and infants born to mothers who drank moderately while
pregnant may still experience deficits in IQ, learning, and attention.2 °
Using tobacco during pregnancy poses risks similar in type to those of
cocaine. 21 Most recent research emphasizes the multiple factors leading
to poor birth outcomes, including maternal poverty, homelessness, a history of domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care, undermining the
argument that drug use, whether legal or illegal, is the primary cause of
children being born with deficits.2 2
Recent "fetal protection" efforts have been most aggressive in the
criminal arena. In an unprecedented use of criminal law's heaviest artillery, prosecutors in two instances filed murder charges against women
who delivered stillborn infants, based, respectively, on the woman's drug
use while pregnant 23 or her refusal to have a Caesarean section. 24 The
result was a murder conviction in the first instance and a conviction for
felony child endangerment in the second.25 Women have also been
charged with other types of homicide 26 and with child abuse or reckless
18.
Steven J. Ondersma et al., PrenatalDrug Exposure and Social Policy: The Searchfor an
Appropriate Response, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 95 (2000), available at http://cmx.sagepub.
com/cgi/reprint/5/2/93.
19.

STEINBERG & GEHSHAN, supra note 16.

20. Ondersma et al., supra note 18, at 96.
21.
N. Kistin, A. Handler, F. Davis, & C. Ferre, Cocaine and Cigarettes: a Comparison of
Risks, 10 PEDIATRIC PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 269 (1996) (noting that while children exposed to
cocaine in utero were more likely to have adverse birth outcomes than children whose pregnant
mothers consumed no drugs, children whose mothers used tobacco products while pregnant were at
risk for the same adverse outcomes as children whose mothers used cocaine, although the magnitude
of the risk was lower. "[G]iven the greater number of cigarette smokers than cocaine users in the
population... [there are likely to be more children harmed by their mothers' smoking than by their
mothers' cocaine use during pregnancy]").
22.
See, e.g., Ondersma et al., supra note 18, at 95; Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early ChildhoodFollowingPrenatalCocaine Exposure, 285 JAMA 1613,
1615 (2001). Because some women who use illegal drugs also abuse alcohol, researchers recognize
the need for comprehensive and intensive drug treatment programs that take into account the complex needs of this population, which has high "[r]ates of homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and
prostitution ...[and] histories of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse." See Addiction Medicine,
supra note 17.
23.
McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171.
24.
Mom in CaesareanCase Gets Probation,CHI. TRIB., April 30, 2004, at 18; see also Linda
Thomson, Mother is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNING NEWS, March 12, 2004;
Linda Thomson, RowlandAirs Her Case on Cable TV, DESERET MORNING NEWS, May 13, 2004.
25. See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171; Jacob Santini, Stillborn Twin Case Fades,Issues Stay,
THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, April 16, 2004, at B4. Criminal prosecutions against women who used
alcohol or other drugs while pregnant began in the late 1980's. See infra note 66. However, in only
one state, South Carolina, were these prosecutions and convictions ultimately sustained by the

courts. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-79, 786 (S.C. 1997) (upholding conviction under
child endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy because viable fetus is a "child" under the
statute); McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171.
26.
State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Aiwohi, 123
P.3d 1210, 1210-11 (Haw. 2005).
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endangerment based on their alcohol and drug use while pregnant,2 7
relying on reports from physicians or newborn toxicology testing. Yet
the unanimous judgment of medical and public heath groups is that such
prosecutions will only drive a wedge between pregnant women and their
physicians, and render it less, not more, likely that the women will seek
appropriate pre- and post-natal care, including substance abuse treatment.28
In addition to criminal prosecutions, in the last several years, a
breathtaking array of civil suits and statutory and regulatory initiatives
has sought to treat fetuses as entirely separate from the pregnant women
whose bodies sustain them. In 2002, the federal Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations "clarify[ing] and expand[ing]" the statutory definition of "child" in the State Children's
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a program which provides health
care to low-income children. 29 The regulations redefined "child," from
"an individual under 19 years of age ''3° to "an individual under the age of
19 including the period from conception to birth. 3 1 Critics asserted that
this recasting of fetuses as "children" was both unnecessary and ineffective if, as HHS claimed, its goal was to provide pregnant women with

27. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing recent prosecutions
initiated in Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and Wyoming).
28.
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001) (holding that public hospital's policy of testing pregnant women for drug use, developed in conjunction with local prosecutors
and police, and turning drug results over to authorities for criminal prosecution, did not come within
the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment). The Court observed that "an intrusion on.
. [a patient's expectation of privacy in regard to diagnostic medical tests] may have adverse consequences because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care." Id.at 78 n.14. In a
separate article, I will explore in greater depth the anti-deterrent impact of criminal prosecutions on
women seeking prenatal care and substance abuse treatment.
29.
SCHIP was established in 1997 under Title XXI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1397aa-1397jj (2000), and gives states the opportunity to provide additional health insurance coverage to children whose parents are too "wealthy" to qualify for Medicaid. Medicaid, which was
enacted in 1965 and is authorized by Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396v et
seq., provides health care insurance for the very poorest of American children. BARRY R. FURROW
ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 420-21 (4th ed. 2001).

Both

Medicaid and SCHIP are federal/state partnerships, with the federal and state governments sharing in
both the financing and administration of the two programs. However, there are important differences. Medicaid is an entitlement program, in which all eligible persons must receive the same
benefits. SCHIP gives states much more flexibility in terms of the services that a particular state
may choose to provide. FURROW ET AL., supra, at 418-21, 438-39; see also Sara Rosenbaum, Anne
Markus, & Colleen Sonosky, Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from
Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 1. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 3-12 (2004) (arguing that Medicaid, because it
provides a more comprehensive set of benefits, including Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic,
and Treatment (EPSDT) is a superior program). Children who receive Medicaid "are more likely
than uninsured children and as likely as privately insured children to receive well-child visits and to
visit the doctor in a given year. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID FACTS, EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSTIC, AND TREATMENT SERVICES
(Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MEDICAID FACTS], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Early-

and-Periodic-Screening-Diagnostic-and-Treatment-Services-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
30.
42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(1) (2000).
31.
42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2006).
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prenatal care.32 Instead, it appears that the real purpose of the regulation
was to establish the legal principle that fetuses are children, with all the
rights that accrue to that status.33
Government lawyers have also sought the involuntary civil commitment of pregnant women, in order to impose "treatment" on the
women and their fetuses, 34 as well as court orders mandating Caesarean
sections. While the avowed goal of these actions is to ensure the birth
of healthy children, here too the consensus among medical professionals
is that such interventions are unjustified.3 6 More than thirty states' laws
37
permit civil commitment based on the use of alcohol and other drugs,
32.
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, THE MEDICAID EXPANSIONS FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1995).
33.
For example, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1986 Congress
expanded Medicaid to permit states to enroll all pregnant women with incomes up to 100% of the
Federal Poverty Level and adopted procedural changes that made enrollment easier, thus significantly increasing the number of pregnant women eligible to receive pre- and post-natal care as a
means of ensuring better birth outcomes. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9401(b)(2), 100 Stat. 1874 (1986); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS IN ENROLLING WOMEN MADE ELIGIBLE BY MEDICAID
EXPANSIONS 7 (February 1991), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d2lt9/143346.pdf. While these
changes in the Medicaid program were not totally effective in achieving the birth of healthier children, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 1-2, no one had ever suggested that
the result would be better if the fetuses were enrolled rather than the women in whose bodies they
were developing.
34.
These include the case of State ex rel. Angela MW. v Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 732
(Wis. 1997) and Rebecca Coreau, a pregnant woman who belonged to a religious sect that did not
believe in Western medicine, who was confined in a "secure hospital facility for pregnant prison
inmates" by a Massachusetts juvenile court judge until she agreed to medical examination and treatment. See Marilyn L. Miller, Note, Fetal Neglect and State Intervention:Preventing Another Attleboro Cult Baby Death, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 71, 71 (2001). These cases will be discussed in
more detail in Part I. C., infra.
35. News . .. Husband to Challenge Court Order in Lawsuit over Wife 's Refusal of Caesarean Section, PENN. LAW WEEKLY, Jan. 26, 2004, at 9; Associated Press, New Questions about
ChildbirthRights, May 19, 2004, http://keyetv.com/health/health-story 140110423.html (discussing
the case of Amber Marlowe, who was the subject of an ex parte order to have a Caesarean section
because her fetus weighed 11 pounds, despite her having delivered 6 very large children previously).
36. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-420.969: LEGAL
INTERVENTIONS
DURING
PREGNANCY,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.orglama/noindex/category/l 1760.html, (click "accept," search "420.969") (propounding a
general rule that "[j]udicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an informed
refusal of a medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus" and specifically recognizing the need
for rehabilitative treatment for pregnant substance abusers); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY, Patient Choice in the Maternal-FetalRelationship, in ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS
AND
GYNECOLOGY
(2d
ed.
2004),
available
at
http://www.acog.org/fromhome/publications/ethics/ethics034.pdf (stating that "court-ordered
intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman is rarely if ever acceptable"); American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Fetal Therapy - Ethical Considerations, 103
PEDIATRICS 1061, 1062 (May 1999) (after discussing the range of medical interventions to promote
fetal health and the legal-ethical issues involved, concluding that "Under no circumstances should a
physician physically intervene [to insist on medical treatment] without the explicit consent of the
pregnant woman without judicial review .. ").
37. ALA. CODE. § 22-52-1.2 (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.37.190 (2006); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-64-815 (2006); CAL. WEL & INST CODE § 3050 (Deering 2006); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1-1107 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-685 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2212 (2006);
D.C. CODE ANN. §7-1303.04 (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.675 (LexisNexis 2006);
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-7-41 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334.60.2 (LexisNexis 2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 66-329 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-23-11-1 (LexisNexis 2006); IOWA CODE §
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and several states have recently enacted laws specifically authorizing the
civil commitment of pregnant women based on substance abuse. 38 Further, a majority of states which authorize the use of advance medical
directives to govern the medical care of mentally incompetent individuals suspend the operation of these directives if the patient is pregnant. 39
In June 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor sought to be appointed "guardian" of the fetus of a mentally disabled patient who lived
in a group home in order to prevent the woman from having an abortion. 40 Although the Florida courts ultimately rejected the suit, the case
became a cause cdl~bre in Florida.
In March 2004, Congress enacted the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act (the UVVA or Act),4 ' which made it a crime to injure or cause the
death of a fetus while committing another federal offense. 42 Both supporters and opponents of the Act acknowledged the significant problem
of violence against pregnant women; 43 however, opponents objected to
the Act's solution. Rather than focusing on the injury suffered by the
pregnant woman herself and providing that a person who harms a pregnant woman who in the process injures or kills the fetus should receive

125.75 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29b54 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54 (2006); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 35 (LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-30-27 (2004); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 71-919 (LexisNexis 2006), see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-908 (LexisNexis
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-8 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-22 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.2-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4452-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-311 (2006); TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
574.034 (Vernon 2006); VA. CODE ANN § 37.2-809 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.96A.140
(LexisNexis 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. § 51.15 (2006);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (2006). Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have involuntary
commitment laws specifically for pregnant women who use drugs. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (2006);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-410 (2005); see also OKL. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-546.5 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2006).
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 48.205 (2006) (permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls
38.
and women, dubbed "The Cocaine Mom law"); see also Tom Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom' Law Invoked in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without
Other Crime, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1.
See discussion infra Part I.D.
39.
This attempt was rejected by the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re Guardianshipof
40.
J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which held that under the Florida guardianship statute, a guardian can be appointed only for a "person," and that fetuses were not "persons"
under Florida law. Id. at 538.
41.
Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
42.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2006). The Act enumerated a lengthy list of federal offenses,
including drive-by shootings in connection with drug offenses (18 U.S.C.A. § 36), violence at international airports (18 U.S.C.S. § 37), and assault on a federal officer or employee (18 U.S.C.A. §
111). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(b)(1).
H.R. REP. NO. 108-420, Pt. 1, at 4 n.2 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (citing Victoria Frey, Examin43.
ing Homicide's Contributionto Pregnancy-AssociatedDeaths, 285 JAMA 1510 (200 1) (summarizing the various studies)); Isabelle L. Horon & Diana Cheng, EnhancedSurveillancefor PregnancyAssociated Mortality-Maryland,1993-1998, 285 JAMA 1455 (2001); Linn H. Parsons & Margaret
A. Harper, Violent Maternal Deaths in North Carolina,94 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 990, 991 (1999);
Dannenberg et al., Homicide and Other Injuries as Causes of Maternal Death in New York City,
1987 through 1991, 172 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1557 (1995); Fildes et al., Trauma: The Leading
Cause of MaternalMortality, 32 J. TRAUMA 643-45 (1992).
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an enhanced penalty for that harm, 44 the UVVA makes such an attack or
injury a separate crime. 45 To do so, the UVVA defines "unborn child"
broadly, as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development ....,46 Like the SCHIP regulation, this language raises concern that the statute's real goal is to limit women's ability to obtain an
abortion.4 7
Most recently, laws have been proposed which emphasize fetal
"personhood" in new ways. These include laws requiring women seeking abortion to be told about fetal pain,4 8 to be informed of the need to
prepare a fetal death certificate, or to be given the opportunity to view a
sonogram or listen to the heartbeat of their fetus prior to deciding to have
an abortion. 49 Supporters of these statutes justify them as providing "informed consent," but the statutes are unusual in mandating the substantive details of what patients contemplating a medical procedure must be
told. In contrast, most American informed consent 50 law focuses on the
process of ensuring full communication between patients and their health
care providers rather than on the content of the physician-patient dialogue, 5' relying on the health care professional to determine what information to convey to a particular patient based on her individual needs.
44.
Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate bill to accomplish this,
which was defeated by a vote of 50-49, largely along party lines. A similar amendment offered by
Representative Zoe Lofgren was also defeated in the House of Representatives, by a 229-186 vote.
Edward Epstein, Bill to Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passedby Senate; Assailant of a Pregnant
Woman Could be Chargedwith 2 Separate FederalOffenses, S. F. CHRON., March 26, 2004, at Al;
see also H.R. REP. No. 108-420, Pt. 1, at 86.
45.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West 2006).
46.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(d). Under the law, "the term unborn child means a child in utero, and
the term "child in utero" or "child, who is in utero" means a member of the species homo sapiens, at
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb." See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 919a(d) (West
2006).
47.
Senator Feinstein argued that the UVVA was a deliberate effort to undermine abortion
rights, by "'set[ting] ...the stage for a jurist to rule that a human being an any stage of development
deserves... rights under the law'... Epstein, supra note 46.
48. See S.51, 109th Cong. § 2902 (2005) (proposed by Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas, a
fierce abortion opponent); H.B. 238, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005). Both bills are discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 244-252.
49. See discussion infra in Section I.D. The way for these laws has been paved by federal
funding of fetal imaging machinery, through federal and state grants that are given to organizations
that promote "abstinence only" sex education. The so-called "pregnancy crisis centers" have been a
major beneficiary of such grants. Kashef, supra note 5; The Abortion Access Project, supra note 5.
50. Informed consent doctrine has roots in both the common law tort of battery and in negligence. It protects a patient's interest in choosing when to be touched (a battery is an unconsented
touching and includes medical treatment which the patient did not agree to). See, e.g., Schloendorff
v. The Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). It also ensures that a patient
receives medical treatment from a physician who has explained to the patient those risks and benefits
of treatment that a reasonable patient would wish to know. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2001).
51.
For example, some abortion statutes require that the pregnant woman be told certain
details about the fetus, such as its gestational age and its potential to survive outside the womb, and
be informed of the availability of medical assistance for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care,
as well as options for child support and adoption. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.35.6
(2006); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN §171.012 (Vernon 2003); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). In addition, there are other areas of health care in which state laws
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In sum, the mounting numbers of civil and criminal actions against
pregnant women, along with statutes and regulations equating fetuses
with born children, mean that the new "fetal protection" crusade can no
longer be ignored. These government initiatives are particularly disturbing because their focus on the harm that could be caused by a woman's
behavior during pregnancy ignores the widespread failings of the American health care system, which does not promote women's and children's
health.
The United States falls far short of other developed countries in objective indicators of health status,5 2 and indeed, American infant mortality rates have risen in recent years. 53 Two-thirds of American infants
who die in their first year of life suffer from low birthweight, attributable
in part to their mothers' lack of prenatal care and long-standing health
problems, as well as to multiple births. 5 4 One-eighth of American children are born pre-term, at an estimated cost of $26 billion per year."
There are significant racial disparities in birth outcomes and other measures of children's health, which reflect major problems of health care
access, including the lack of a primary care physician and the lack of
health insurance.56 More than ten million American children have no
mandate that patients (usually women) be told of alternative medical or surgical options. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1690 (West 2006) (sterilization); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.225
(West 2003) (sterilization); S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast
Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18702 (West 2006) (childhood vaccination). Medical procedures that are less politically charged rarely
have such "informed consent" requirements.
52.

See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PROGRAMS, PLANNING FOR

HEALTHY FAMILIES (June 2004), availableat http://amchp.org/aboutamchp/publications/
familyplanning2004.pdf (noting that the United States ranks 29th in the world in infant mortality and
arguing that more attention should be devoted to encouraging family planning as a way of ensuring
good birth outcomes, as data show that when pregnancies are intended children are less likely to be
born premature and with health problems); Margaret A. Harper et al, Pregnancy-RelatedDeath and
Health Care Services, 102 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 273, 273, 275, 276 (Aug. 2003), available
at http://www.greenjoumal.org/cgi/reprint/102/2/273 (noting that "[m]aternal mortality statistics for
the United States have shown little improvement for 2 decades, and 20 countries have lower rates,"
and concluding in a study of North Carolina maternal pregnancy deaths that lacking access to prenatal care made maternal death slightly more likely and having a Caesarean section made maternal
death nearly four times as likely). See also detailed discussion in Part I.B, infra.
53.
T.J. Matthews, Racial/Ethnic Disparitiesin Infant Mortality- United States, 1995-2002,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, June 10, 2005.
54.
Id. See also ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2004 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, 34 (2005),

available at www.kidscount.org [hereinafter CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT]. Low birthweight
is also linked significantly to being born as a twin or other multiple births. Id. at 34; Tarun Jain et
al., Trends in Embryo-TransferPracticeand in Outcomes of the Use ofAssisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350 N. E. J. MED. 1639, 1640 (2004).
55.
Press Release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Births Cost U.S. $26 Billion a Year; Multidisciplinary Research Effort Needed to Prevent Early Births (July 13, 2006), available at
http://www8.nationalacademies.orgonpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordlD=11622
[hereinafter IOM
Report]. The Report defines "preterm" as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a
full-term pregnancy is 38-42 weeks post-conception) and notes that the rate of pre-term births has
risen 30% since 1981. Id.
56.
IOM Report, supra note 55; Matthews, supra note 53 (noting significant racial disparities
in infant mortality rates within and across states); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Jennifer Flome & Peter Joski,
The Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Among Pregnant Women, 1999 (Emory University
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health insurance at all, 57 even though at least 70% live in families where
at least one parent works full time.58
If the goal of government policymakers and prosecutors were actually to ensure that more children are born healthy and have the opportunity to stay that way, the United States would adopt radically different
policies. In addition to the lack of health care access, two notable omissions from the rhetoric of fetal protection are the harms posed to children
by assisted reproductive technology (ART), used largely by the middle
and upper classes, 59 and the risk to all children posed by environmental
April 2001) (identifying disparities in health insurance coverage along racial, employment status,
and income lines) (paper prepared for the March of Dimes, on file with the author).
57.
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID FACTS, ENROLLING
UNINSURED LOW-INCOME CHILDREN IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP (March 2005) (summarizing 2002

data), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2177-04.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, ENROLLING
CHILDREN]. In 2005, more than 12% of children under age 18 lacked health insurance for at least
part of the previous year. ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, CENTERS FOR DISEASE

CONTROL, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW
at
available
2006),
20,
3
(Mar.
2005,
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER
SURVEY,
"[U]ninsured but Medicaidhttp://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur2O603.pdf.
eligible children are twice as likely as those enrolled in Medicaid to have an unmet medical need, to
have not seen a doctor, and to have substantial family out-of-pocket spending on health care."
KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra.

58. Associated Press, Most Uninsured Children Have Parents with Jobs, Sept. 28, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,216338,00.html.
59. What has been absent from the government initiatives described above are any efforts to
regulate the new assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) designed to address problems of infertility, which increase the risk of adverse birth outcomes, but which are used primarily by middle- and
upper- income Americans. See, e.g., Jain,supra note 54, at 1640 (noting the continuing high rate of
multiple births in the United States and their adverse consequences, but observing that the United
States, in contrast to many other countries, has not regulated ART practices, "in part because of the
basic belief that such decisions should be left to couples and their physicians"); Liza Mundy, A
SpecialKind of Poverty: The Poor Get Used to Going Without, but Going Without a Baby is Hard to
Get Used to, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2003, at W08 (describing costs of infertility treatments and how
poor men .and women seek subsidized or alternative access to fertility treatment). People who use
ART are much more likely than the rest of the population to have twins or other multiple births,
which in turn dramatically increases the chances of having a low birthweight infant (one who weighs
less than 2500 grams, or about 5.5. pounds), from 6% to 57%. See CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS
COUNT, supra note 54, at 34. Low birth weight is a major contributor to infant mortality and developmental defects. Id. Yet even singleton births achieved through ART are at risk for harm. Jennifer
L. Rosato, The Children ofART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them
From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 60, 62-66, 69-70, 77-80 (summarizing the data showing that
up to 10% of children born using ART suffer some adverse consequences and criticizing the regulatory hands-off position of states and the federal government); see also John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 9 (2004) (noting that intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which is used in nearly half of American in vitro
fertilization (IVF) treatments, may cause a higher incidence of rare birth defects as well as low birth
weight). But see Anja Pinborg et al., NeurologicalSequelae in Twins Born After Assisted Conception: ControlledNational Cohort Study, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 311 (July 15 2004) (finding no difference
in adverse birth outcomes between infants conceived through ICSI and IVF, but noting that children
born through ART methods have higher rates of stillbirths and neurological problems). See also
PHILIP G. PETERS, JR., How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? OBLIGATIONS TO THE CHILDREN OF

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2004). Similarly, the bioethics issues raised by particular uses of
IVF are generally ignored. Arlene Judith Klotzko, Medical Miracle or Medical Mischief?. The Saga
of the McCaughley Septuplets, Hastings Center Report 5 (May 1998); Susan M. Wolf, Jeffrey P.
Kahn, & John E. Wagner, Using PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosis to Create a Stem Cell Donor:
Issues, Guidelines & Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 331 (2003) (arguing that the combination
of IVF technology with preimplantation genetic diagnosis in order to produce a child who is a poten-
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hazards, including mercury in fish 60 and the forests 61 to pesticides 62 to
lead from older buildings and manufacturing.6 3 The United States has
also failed to promote fetal and children's health and development by
providing paid parenting leaves. 64 When compared to other developed
nations where universal health care and subsidized parenting leave are
the norm, 65 the approach of the United States is both seriously out of step
and actively unhelpful in promoting childhood health.

tial organ donor for a sibling with a rare genetic disorder is so ethically questionable that it should
only take place under human subject research protocols which have been thoroughly reviewed by
institutional review boards). Only recently have suggestions been made that ART should be monitored and regulated. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND
RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-9 (March

2004), available at www.bioethics.gov. Due to the volatile politics evoked by discussions of fetal
and embryonic life, little regulation is likely to occur anytime soon. Rosato, supra, at 74, 75. In
July 2006 the Institute of Medicine issued a report noting the 30% increase in pre-term labor over
the last 25 years, and urging further study of the contribution of ART to this growth. IOM Report,
supra note 55.
60.
Many species of fish pose risks to adults, children, and fetuses, primarily through exposure to mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB). "Children born to women exposed to high
levels of methylmercury [the organic form of mercury found naturally in the environment] during or
before pregnancy may face numerous health problems, including brain damage, mental retardation,
blindness, and seizures. Lower levels of methylmercury exposure in the womb have caused subtle
but irreversible deficits in learning ability." Jennifer Fisher Wilson, Balancing the Risks and Benefits
ofFish Consumption, 141 ANNALS INT. MED. 977, 978 (2004). PCBs are a probable carcinogen. In
addition, "[i]n children, PCB exposure in utero and from breast milk consumption has been linked
with neurodevelopmental delays, impaired cognition, immune problems, and alterations in male
reproductive organs." Id. at 979.
61.
Anthony DePalma, Study of Songbirds Finds High Levels of Mercury, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
25, 2006, at BI.
62.
A number of widely-used pesticides are suspected of being endocrine disrupters, which
affect both male and female reproductive systems and increase the chances of infertility and other
reproductive harms. SHARON L. DROZDOWSKI & STEPHEN G. WHITTAKER, WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES' SAFETY & HEALTH ASSESSMENT & RESEARCH FOR

PREVENTION PROGRAM, WORKPLACE HAZARDS TO REPRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A
RESOURCE FOR WORKERS, EMPLOYERS, HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, AND HEALTH & SAFETY
PERSONNEL 48, 49 (Aug. 1999).
63. Lead poses risks to male and female workers, as well as their children. In men, lead
exposure leads to lowered sperm counts, abnormal sperm shapes, altered sperm transfer, and altered
hormone levels. The results can be sterility and infertility. In women, lead can cause miscarriages,
stillbirths, and infertility, as well as developmental disorders in children exposed in utero. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON
FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 2-3 (Feb. 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99104.html. Lead that workers bring home on their skin, hair, clothes, tool box or car can cause severe
lead poisoning for everyone who comes into contact with it, and can lead to neurobehavioral and
growth effects in a fetus. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, THE
EFFECTS OF WORKPLACE HAZARDS ON MALE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
(1997),
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ malrepro.html.
64. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 329-44, requires employers of more than fifty employees to
permit employees to take an unpaid leave for their own illness or a family member's birth, adoption,
or illness. However, in contrast to almost all developed countries, the United States does not mandate paid leave. KURT H. DECKER, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE INA NUTSHELL 9-14 (2000).
65.
Sakiko Tanaka, ParentalLeave and Child Health Across OECD Countries, 115 THE
ECON. J. F7, F8, F9 (Royal Economic Society 2005).
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A. CriminalProsecutions
Criminal actions against pregnant women have risen sharply in the
last decade. Although women have been prosecuted for drug and alcohol
use during pregnancy in more than half the states since the 1970s, courts
have quashed prosecutions or overturned convictions in all but one state,
South Carolina.6 6 There the courts have upheld women's convictions for
homicide and child abuse based on their conduct during pregnancy.6 7
Virtually all the women who faced these criminal charges were living at
the very margins of society, suffering from poverty, substance abuse, and
often, mental disability. 68 Frequently they were sexually abused as children, and often they are current victims of domestic violence.69
In 1996, Deborah J.Z. was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide70 and first-degree reckless injury, 7' after she went
into labor while at a tavern and said that she would drink herself and her
fetus to death. 72 Her child was born with a high blood alcohol level and
physical features showing fetal alcohol effects. 73 Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court condemned her conduct, it barred criminal prosecution because under Wisconsin's "born alive" rule, a fetus was not a hu66. The first reported effort at prosecution was in 1977, when a California prosecutor indicted
Margaret Reyes on two counts of felony child endangering based on her heroin use while pregnant,
which allegedly caused her twin sons to be born addicted to heroin. The California Court of Appeal
issued a writ or prohibition, enjoining further prosecution of the case. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). A rash of prosecutions began in the late 1980s, beginning with
the 1987 prosecution of Pamela Rae Stewart, who had intercourse with her husband and used amphetamines, both against medical advice. See George Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on
the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM J. L. & MED. 213, 229 (1987). Since then, at least 30
states have prosecuted women for manslaughter, child abuse or endangerment, or drug delivery to a
minor. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN FOR THEIR
BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY: AN APPROACH THAT UNDERMINES WOMEN'S HEALTH AND
CHILDREN'S INTERESTS 2 [hereinafter CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT
WOMEN], available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pubbppunishingwomen.pdf (listing

cases wherein women have been prosecuted for behavior during pregnancy).
67.
See Whitier v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997) (upholding conviction under child
endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy because viable fetus is a "child" under the
statute); see also State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003) (upholding conviction for
homicide by child abuse).
68. See CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN, supra note 66, at
2.
69. See WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 7; see also Paltrow, supra note 12, at 477.
70. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 2005) ("[F]irst-degree intentional homicide" [provides
that:] "(a) ... whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or
another is guilty of a Class A felony.").
71.
§ 940.23 ("[R]eckless injury" [provides that:] "(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily
harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is
guilty of a Class D felony.").
72.
Deborah J.Z. "allegedly told a nurse that 'if you don't keep me here, I'm just going to go
home and keep drinking and drink myself to death and I'm going to kill this thing because I don't
want it anyways."' Deborah J.Z. also expressed fear about the pain of giving birth and the baby's
race. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
73.
Deborah J.Z., 569 N.W.2d at 491. The baby's blood alcohol level at birth was 0.199%.
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man being.7 4 The court cited the ongoing debate over whether substance
abuse should be addressed through treatment or punishment, noting the
concern that threatening criminal prosecution could deter women from
seeking prenatal care. 75 The court held that to permit prosecution of
Deborah Z. would mean that "a woman could risk criminal charges for
any perceived self-destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may
result in injuries to her unborn child. . . [including] smoking or abusing
legal medications . . . [or] 'the failure to secure adequate prenatal medical care
and overzealous behavior, such as excessive exercising or diet76
ing."'

In 1999, Regina McKnight, a homeless African-American woman
with an IQ of 72 and an addiction to crack cocaine, delivered a stillborn
child.77 When she and the child tested positive for cocaine metabolites,
she was charged with homicide by child abuse. 78 McKnight was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 79 The South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld her conviction, rejecting McKnight's arguments
that there was insufficient evidence to show causation or mens rea.8 °
The court also rebuffed her argument that she was denied due process by
being prosecuted for homicide when the South Carolina legislature had
not enacted a statute declaring that a fetus was a child. The court relied
on its prior decisions upholding convictions for felony child abuse based
74.
Id. at 496. Wisconsin law defines a "human being" as "one who has been born alive."
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.22 (16). The court explained its decision as required by the rule of strict
construction of penal laws and by deference to the legislature in a complex public policy area.
Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 494-95.
75.
Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 495. The court's concern is supported by a study of lowincome women who delivered their babies at an inner city hospital in Detroit, who stated their belief
that if Michigan adopted a law mandating that women whose babies tested positive for drugs would
be sent to jail, substance-abusing women would be less likely to seek prenatal care, drug testing, or
drug treatment. When the study's authors attempted to interview women in a state with a law that
threatened incarceration, all known drug users refused to participate in the study out of fear of selfincrimination. See Marilyn L. Poland et al., PunishingPregnantDrug Users: Enhancing the Flight
from Care, 31 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199, 201-02 (1993).
76.
Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d at 494-95 (citing Hillman v. Georgia, 503 S.E.2d 610, 613
(Ga. Ct. App. 1998)).
77.
Robyn E. Blummer, Moralists' New Target: Pregnant Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2003, at 7D; McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173 (S.C. 2003).
78.
McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171, 173. Under title 16, article 3, section 85 of the South Carolina Code, a person may be found guilty of "homicide by child abuse" if he "causes the death of a
child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85
(2005).
79.
See McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 171. The court suspended the sentence upon service of
twelve years in prison.
80.
The court rejected Ms. McKnight's argument that the evidence was insufficient to survive
her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, finding that there was evidence of her "extreme indifference to human life" based on her use of cocaine during pregnancy in light of South Carolina
precedents which upheld felony child abuse convictions based on a woman's drug use while pregnant, holding that both she and women in South Carolina generally were on ample notice that the use
of cocaine while pregnant causes fetal harm. The court also found sufficient evidence to send the
case to the jury on the causation question, despite evidence that in approximately 40% of stillbirths it
is impossible to make a medical judgment about the cause of death. Id. at 172, 73.
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on a woman's drug use while pregnant as providing sufficient notice, 8'
effectively ignoring her argument that her crime could not be homicide,
because a fetus cannot be treated as a child under criminal law unless the
legislature expressly declares it to be so. 82 The court also spurned
McKnight's argument that the homicide prosecution violated her right to
privacy and autonomy. 83 Further, the court rejected her argument that a
twenty-year prison term for the stillbirth of a child was unconstitutional
under the Eight Amendment, insisting that the proper comparison was to
criminal abortion, 84 rather than to other murders. 885
The McKnight decision was condemned around the nation, as unfairly singling out a poor, African-American woman for unprecedented
criminal punishment, while failing to address the underlying problems of
addiction and lack of health care access. Critics charged that threatening
drug-abusing pregnant women with criminal prosecution, rather than
providing them with social and economic support and effective drug rehabilitation, would drive women away from treatment, out of fear that
they would lose their babies or be imprisoned.86
Similar concern was expressed when, in 2003, a Hawaii prosecutor
charged Tayshea Aiwohi with manslaughter based on her use of
methamphetamine while pregnant, which caused the death of her infant
two days after birth.87 Ms. Aiwohi was not charged until two years after
her child's death, when she had successfully completed a drug treatment
program. 88 Both the prosecutor and the trial judge spoke of the need to
hold her accountable and to send a message to prevent other mothers
from using drugs while pregnant. 89 The trial judge also rejected any
suggestion that Aiwohi's addiction might be a mitigating factor, declaring that,

81.
Id. at 176 (citing Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997)).
82.
The maximum sentence for a woman who procures an abortion in South Carolina is two
years and the crime is a misdemeanor. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-41-80(b) (2002).
83.
McKnight, 576 S.E.2d at 176-77.
84. Id. at 174, 177. The court declined to address McKnight's contention that the abortion
statute was applicable, saying that she had not preserved the issue for appellate review. Id. at 174.
85. Id. at 174, 177. The court compared McKnight's sentence to the sentence received by
other convicted murderers in South Carolina, and murderers of children in other states. Id.
86.
See, e.g., Kirsten Schamberg, Prosecutors Targeting Pregnant Drug Users; Some Fear
Women Will Shun Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2003, at Cl; Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests
the Bounds of a Fetus's Rights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 28, 2001, USA Section at 1.

87.

See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-13 (Haw. 2005).

88.

See id.; see also State v. Aiwohi, FCCR03-1-0036 (Haw. Aug. 25, 2004), available at

http://www.courts.state.hi.us (use search function with the name "Aiwohi" and then use the hyperlink for the case file FCCR03-1-0036).
89. See id. The trial judge ruled that "the State, with good reason, has served clear notice that
such conduct can and will result in serious felony charges brought where the child is born alive and
later dies or suffers injury due to knowing, intentional or reckless drug use." The prosecutor "hailed
the judge's remarks" finding the indictment was necessary "to get justice for the baby" and to hold
the mother accountable.

Ken Kobayashi, Mother Gets Probation in Ice Death, HONOLULU

ADVERTISER, Aug. 26, 2004, at lB.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

[D]rug usage, including the use of crystal methamphetamine is a matter of choice and not an illness. Certainly it is a conscious choice to
obtain and use the drug initially and worse yet, while pregnant ....
If drug usage were an illness from the get go, we would today be in
[a] medical
center with a physician present in a diagnosis, treatment
90
mode.

Ms. Aiwohi pleaded no contest in order to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss, and received a twenty-year prison sentence, which was
suspended on condition that she comply with the terms of probation for
the next ten years. 91 The Supreme Court of Hawaii overturned the conviction, holding that one of the elements of manslaughter was the attendant circumstance
that the victim be a person at the time of the defen92
dant's conduct.
Yet even after McKnight and Aiwohi, few observers were prepared
for the 2004 prosecution of Melissa Rowland for capital murder in Utah
after she declined to have a recommended Caesarean section and her son
was stillborn. 93 Like Ms. McKnight, Ms. Rowland was a vulnerable
woman with few resources. Her own mother died shortly after birth, and
Melissa Rowland had a history of serious mental illness dating from
childhood, as well as substance abuse problems. 94 Ms. Rowland moved
to Utah to deliver her children at the request of the adoption agency that
was handling their adoption because Utah's loose adoption laws made
adoption easier. 95 In Utah, she lived on Social Security disability payments and a $100 weekly stipend from the adoption agency; she also
used cocaine and tobacco. 96 Ms. Rowland sought help at three hospitals
because she could not feel fetal movements, but rejected their advice to
have a Caesarean section (C-section). 97 None of the hospitals sought a
court order requiring a C-section or made any other effort to provide Ms.
Rowland with medical treatment. 98 However, after Ms. Rowland delivered a stillborn son and a living daughter, she was arrested and charged
with murder. 99 After spending more than three months in jail, Rowland
90.
See State v. Aiwohi, FCCR03-1-0036 (Haw. Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us (use search function with the name "Aiwohi" and then use the hyperlink for the case file FCCR03-1-0036).
91.
See id.
92.
See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1223 (Haw. 2005).
93.
Linda Thomson & Pat Reavy, Rowland's Out of Jail, Heading to Indiana, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 30, 2004.
94.
See id.
95.
See Katha Pollitt, Pregnantand Dangerous,278 (#16) THE NATION 9, Apr. 26,2004.
96.
See id.; see also Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son's Death..., SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 2004, at Al.
97.
Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96. Prosecutors charged
that she refused to have a Caesarean section because of cosmetic concerns that the operation would
disfigure her. See id But Rowland stated that she never would have said that because she had
already delivered two children by Caesarean. See Pollitt, supranote 95.
98. See, e.g., Thompson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96.
99. See Manson, supra note 96.
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pleaded guilty to two counts of felony child endangerment based on her
drug use during pregnancy pursuant to a plea bargain. 100
The Rowland case aroused a storm of controversy.10 1 Prosecutors
argued that Rowland's failure to undergo a C-section when she was
warned that the fetuses might be harmed by a delay in their birth was a
culpable omission, demonstrating the "depraved indifference to human
life" necessary for a murder charge. 10 2 The indictment was expressly
predicated on a theory of maternal "selfishness," as prosecutors argued
that Ms. Rowland had refused the surgical procedure solely out of vanity. 0 3 The prosecutors suggested, contrary to established tort law princi-

ples of informed consent,'04 that Ms. Rowland did not have a right to
decline medical treatment, but was required to "choose among alternative
05
treatments available," rather than electing the option of no treatment.'
Virtually all other observers condemned the prosecution as unwarranted and legally unsound. 10 6 In part, they argued that it was improper
and dangerous to subject anyone to the risk of criminal prosecution based
on a decision to forego a potentially dangerous surgical procedure, particularly when there had been no effort to seek a court order mandating
medical treatment. 107 Commentators also asserted that criminal prosecution was not the way to handle potentially risky pregnancies, as it would
drive vulnerable women away from medical treatment due to fear that
they would face criminal charges if they admitted to having a drug or
mental health problem. 108 Similarly, vulnerable women may fear criminal charges if they underwent drug testing while receiving prenatal care
or delivering the baby. 109 Further, some writers cautioned that prosecuting pregnant women under these circumstances would lead to a slippery
100.
See Santini, supra note 25; see also Doug Smith & Linda Thomson, Rowland in New
Trouble, DESERET MORNING NEWS May 27, 2004. Ms. Rowland was sentenced to two concurrent
five year prison terms, with sentence suspended while on "good behavior" probation for eighteen
months, requiring her to complete mental health and substance abuse treatment as well as a "parenting skills" course. See id. Ms. Rowland went directly from jail to a rehabilitation facility in Indiana,
but left it after a month. See id
101.
See Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93.
102.
Thomson, Rowland Case Is Called 'Political,' DESERET MORNING NEWS Mar. 13, 2004.
103.
Associated Press, Mother Accused of Murder of Unborn Child Pleads Not Guilty, Mar.
15, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.con/news/nation/20040315-1529-wst-mother
charged.html.
104.
See discussion infra in Part II. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 codifies the common law of
informed consent, although it presumes that "when a person submits to health care rendered by a
health care provider ... that what the health care provider did was [ ]expressly or impliedly authorized" by the patient. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(1) (2006). However, patients may still have a
cause of action for battery without meeting the requirements of § 78-14-5 if they allege that they did
not consent at all to medical treatment. Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
105. Linda Thomson, Mother Is Chargedin Stillbirth of a Twin, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City, Utah), Mar. 12, 2004.
106. See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; Matt Canham, ProposedLaw Targets Pregnant Drug Users..., SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Apr. 10, 2004, at A1.
107. See Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Manson, supra note 96.
108.
See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Canham, supra note 106.
109.
See, e.g., Thomson & Reavy, supra note 93; see also Canharn, supra note 106.
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slope: there was no principled way to distinguish the prosecution in that
case from prosecution of pregnant women who smoke or who do not
follow their physicians' recommendations about healthy eating. 1° Finally, observers again noted the problem of selective prosecution, since
almost all those facing such criminal charges are poor and women of
color. "'
Nonetheless, prosecutors continue to bring criminal charges against
women who have used drugs while pregnant, most recently in Maryland, 112 Missouri, t13 Texas, 1 4 and Wyoming."15 It appears that prosecutors are more interested in scoring points with the public or in pushing
the legislature to expand criminal sanctions against pregnant women who
use drugs than in addressing the underlying causes of substance abuse.
For example, a Wyoming prosecutor who lost his case declared, "We
110.
Associated Press, Arrest in C-Section Case Alarms Women's Groups, THE HOLLAND
SENTINEL, availableat http://hollandsentinel.com (use search function and type in name of article).
111.
See, e.g., Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood,supra note 9, at 938; Chasnoff et al.,
supra note 10, at 1206.
112.
See generally Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006). The Maryland Court of Appeals has recently invalidated the prosecution of two women for reckless endangerment based on
their use of cocaine while pregnant. Id.
113.
A Missouri prosecutor charged Keila Lewis with first degree felony child endangerment,
based on her newborn baby's positive test for marijuana and Lewis' admission that she smoked
marijuana once while pregnant. Brief of Amici Curiae in State v. Lewis, Case 03CR 113048, Chariton County, Missouri Circuit Ct. (on file with author) Ms. Lewis was charged with violating section
568.045, which provides inter alia that "A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a
child in the first degree if... [t]he person knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk
to the life, body, or health of a child less than seventeen years old .. " Mo.ANN. STAT. § 568.045
(West 2006). The case was dismissed in 2005 because the infant's toxicology test was inadmissible
under Missouri law. Personal communications with Jane Aiken, Professor, Washington University
School of Law, March 7, 2005, and Jenean Thompson, Counsel for Keila Lewis, June 21, 2005.
114.
In September 2003, an Amarillo, Texas prosecutor invoked a newly enacted state law
when she asked local physicians to report all women who used illegal drugs while pregnant, so that
they could be prosecuted for child abuse. The new law, redefined the term "individual" in certain
statutes to mean "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at very stage of gestation
from fertilization until birth." S. 319, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). The law also redefined
death to "include... for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to be born alive." Tex.
Atty.
Gen.
Opinion
No.
GA-0291,
January
5,
2005,
available at http://
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/GA/GA0291.pdf. See Letter from Rebecca King, 4 7 'h District
Attorney to all Physicians Practicing in Potter County, Texas (Sept. 22, 2003) (on file with author).
The prosecutor charged at least eighteen women with crimes before the Texas Attorney General
issued an Opinion concluding that the new law neither authorized prosecution for maternal drug use
under the Controlled Substances Act nor required physicians to report such drug use. News from
Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women,
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog. The convictions of two women for delivery of a controlled substance to a fetus were overturned by the Texas Court of Appeals, on the ground that the prosecution
did not show that the fetus possessed the drug as required by Texas law. Ward v. State, 188 S.W.3d
874 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) and Rhonda Tulane Smith v. State, No. 07-04-0490, 2006 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2370 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006) (unpublished opinion).
115.
See Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Meth Baby' Charge, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept.
29, 2005, available at http://www.casperstartribune.com (use search function). In 2004, a Wyoming
prosecutor charged Michelle Foust with causing a child to ingest methamiphetamine based on blood
tests of Foust and her newborn child. See id The case was dismissed on the ground that the law
encompassed conduct taken in regard to a "'child,' ... not a 'fetus' or 'unborn child."' Id.; see also
Associated Press, Woman Chargedwith Using Meth While PregnantArrestedAgain, May 2, 2005,
available at http://www.billingsgazette.com (use search function).
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stuck our toe in the water on this thing .... People need to understand
there's a big hole in the law that needs to be filled." 116 It has been left to
the judiciary to restrain overzealous prosecutors, through the application
of the fundamental principle that legislative intent to criminalize certain
behavior must be clear, and in recognition of the multiple policy considerations that argue against punishing pregnant women rather than offering them treatment. 117
B. New CriminalStatutes.: Changing the Born-Alive Rule
While the prosecutions of pregnant women for murder in McKnight
and Rowland made headlines, the trend toward third party criminal liability for causing the death of a fetus has been underway for more than
thirty years. 118 This change has been accomplished primarily by legislative action, as courts have been reluctant to overturn the common law
"born-alive rule" without explicit legislative authorization. 119 Under the
"born-alive rule," the fetus was not seen as a legal person, separate from
its mother, and a homicide prosecution could not be brought. 120 Criminal

116.
Associated Press, Judge Drops 'Meth Baby' Charge,supra note 115.
117.
See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006). As the Maryland Court of Appeals explained in State v. Kilmon, to accept the prosecutor's argument to construe the reckless endangerment statute to apply to pregnant women who used drugs could mean the criminalization of:
[N]ot just the ingestion of unlawful controlled substances but a whole host of intentional
and conceivably reckless activity... [including] everything from becoming (or remaining) pregnant with knowledge that the child likely will have a genetic disorder that may
cause serious disability or death ... to smoking, to not maintaining a proper and sufficient diet ...to exercising too much or too little ....
Id.at 311-12. The court also noted that the Maryland Legislature had considered but a penal approach to pregnant women's drug use, choosing instead to provide drug treatment for pregnant
women and to consider a woman's drug use while pregnant, if she subsequently refused to enter a
treatment program, as evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights. Id. at 312.
118. See generally Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
119. See, e.g., id.The "born alive" rule is of very long standing. See id.Lord Coke is frequently cited for his articulation of the rule:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe, or
if a man beat her, whereby the child dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead
childe, this is great misprision, and no murder; but if he childe be born alive and dyeth of
the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura,when it is born alive.
State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ohio 1971) (citing 3 Coke, Institutes 58 [1648]). Coke
was followed by other British jurists, including Blackstone, Hale, Hawkins, and Sir James Stephen,
and the rule passed into American common law. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620.
120.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W. 3d 654, 657 (Ky. 2004). In part this was
due to difficulties in proof, because in the case of a stillbirth it could not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the fetus had been alive when injured or that the defendant's conduct was the
proximate cause of death. See id.(citing Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The
Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. L. REv. 563, 575 (1987)). At the same
time, the born alive rule reflected the essential unity of the pregnant woman and her fetus, and the
latter's absolute dependence on her for existence. Cf Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753, 1
95-96 (Can.) (explaining, in the context of deciding not to impose maternal tort liability on the basis
of prenatal harm, that "a pregnant woman cannot have a duty of care to her own foetus, which is at
law but a part of herself .... [T]he physical unity of pregnant woman and foetus means that the
imposition of a duty of care would amount to a profound compromise of her privacy and autonomy.").
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statutes were interpreted in light of that rule, unless the statute specifically included fetuses within the class of victims. 121
In the last few years, there has been an expanded push to characterize the harm caused by battering a pregnant woman solely as harm to the
fetus, effectively erasing the woman herself. 122 New criminal laws directed at fetal harm ignore the psychic injuries imposed on the woman by
such attacks. These include the fear of future domestic violence and
subjugation by an intimate partner, the loss of self-determination, and the
harm to the woman's interest in carrying her pregnancy to term. 123 At
least nineteen states have enacted statutes authorizing a homicide prosecution for causing the death of a fetus, 124 and Congress accomplished
this via the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. 125 Several states have enacted separate feticide statutes or other statutes focusing on fetal harm. 26
Some state courts have achieved the same result through judicial inter127
pretation, rejecting the common law "born alive" rule as outmoded.
However, with the exception of South Carolina, each court has been
121.
See, e.g., Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d at 600-02. The same approach was taken with tort suits
for prenatal injury and wrongful death, and inheritance proceedings. See id (citing Robbins v. State,
8 Ohio St. 131 (1857)); see also Keeler, 470 P.2d at 627 (citing State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa.
1797)); see also Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951) (citing Blackstone's Commentary on the Laws of England and the common law rule that an infant "in the
mother's womb . . . is capable of having a legacy ...

made to it."). See generally Remy v. Mac-

Donald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004) (discussing common law cases permitting a born child to sue
a third party for causing prenatal injuries and the Massachusetts wrongful death statute's applicability to a viable stillborn fetus).
122.
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND.
L. J. 667, 694-97 (2006).
123.
Id. at 669, 677-85.
124.
See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1103(A)(5) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2006);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.071, 782.09 (West 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, 5/9-2.1, 5/93.2 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661-65 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-37 (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 565.024, 565.020 (West 2006); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.210 (West 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§12.1-0104, 17.1-01-04 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.07, 2903.09 (West 2006); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2601-09 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-1, 22-16-15, 22-16-20,
22-16-41 (2006) (including definitions: 22-1-2(31), 22-1-(50A)); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-201,
39-13-202, 39-13-210 (amended 2006), 39-13-211, 39-13-213 to 215 (West 2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-201 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.32.060(l)(b) (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.75, 940.01-.02, 940.05-.06, 940.08-.10
(West 2006).
125.
Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
126.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-80, 40-6-393.1, 52-7-12.3 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-1-6 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (West
2006); H. 108, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-32.8
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1-631:2 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (West 2006);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-18.2 (West 2006). In Virginia, killing a pregnant woman with the intent
to terminate her pregnancy is capital murder. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (West 2006).
127.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004) (holding that born alive
rule should be eliminated through a reinterpretation of the term "human being"); Hughes v. State,
868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding in a vehicular manslaughter case that born alive rule
should be abandoned, but only prospectively); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-27
(Mass. 1984) (holding that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the vehicular homicide
statute, but applying it prospectively only "in order to ensure fairness to the defendant and ...
[others] who did not have the benefit of the warning provided by our construction").
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careful to apply its rule prospectively only, recognizing the due process
"legality" problem that would arise if a court
were to change the com28
mon law and apply it to the case before it. 1
C. Regulatory Redefinition: SCHIP-Turningthe Fetus into a Child
At the same time that criminal initiatives which treat the fetus as a
legally separate person have increased, the Bush Administration has
adopted regulatory policies with the same goal. In 2002, the Department
of Health and Services (HHS) promulgated a regulation purporting to
"clarify and expand" 129 the definition of "child" under the State Child
Health Insurance Program 30 by redefining "child" from "an individual
under 19 years of age"131 to "an individual under the age of 19 including
the period from conception to birth." 132 The Bush Administration offered
two justifications for this change. The first was to promote the birth of
healthy children by expanding government coverage of prenatal care,
fetal surgery, and other medical interventions which it asserted would
provide "continuity of care," benefit children after birth, and ultimately
save the SCHIP program money. 33 The second goal was to maximize
states' "regulatory flexibility,"' 134 permitting them to cover "unborn children," including those of immigrant women, who would otherwise be
excluded from federal health care programs under the provisions of the
128.
See, e.g., Morris, 142 S.W.3d at 654; see also Hughes, 868 P.2d at 730; see also Cass,
467 N.E.2d at 1326-27.
129.
State Children's Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care for Unborn
Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 9936, 9937 (proposed Mar. 5, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 457) [hereinafter SCHIP Proposed Rule].
130.
The State Children's Health Insurance Program, or SCHIP, as it is popularly known, is a
joint federal state program which, for ten years beginning in 1997, provides coverage for many poor
children whose parents earn too much money to qualify for Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-jj.
SCHIP is authorized under Title XXI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1397aa-jj. Many applaud
SCHIP because it gives as an expansion of health care services for poor children and does so by
providing states with 70% of its costs. See HHS News, States May Provide SCHIP Coveragefor
PrenatalCare, New Rule to Expand Health Care Coverage for Babies, Mothers, Sept. 27, 2002,
available at www.hhs.gov/news [hereinafter HHS News]. However, SCHIP is also frequently
criticized as providing a much more meager package of health benefits than Medicaid, particularly
those comprehensive Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSTD) benefits that
are especially important for children with disabilities. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky,
supra note 29, at 1, 3-12. Medicaid and SCHIP are both faulted, for having administrative barriers
that make it difficult for enrollees to maintain eligibility. See id. at 10; Wendy Chavkin & Paul H.
Wise, The Data Are In: Health Matters in Welfare Policy, 92 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 1392, 1393-94
(2002).
131.
Section 2110 of SCHIP; 42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(1) (2006) (defining "child" as "an individual
under 19 years of age").
132.
State Children's Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care and Other Health
Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61956 (Oct. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 457)
(discussing the procedural history of the regulation, which was subsequently codified at 42 C.F.R. §
457.10) [hereinafter SCHIP Final Rule].
133.
SCHIP Proposed Rule, supra note 129, at 9937.
134. This "state choice" mantra was evident throughout the Federal Register notice promulgating the final regulations, with the Department of Health and Services reiterating its view "that States
should have the option to include unborn children as eligible targeted low income children. We are
therefore retaining a revised definition [of child] . . . that permits States maximum flexibility in
extending SCHIP eligibility." SCHIP Final Rule, supranote 132, at 61960.
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA). 35
'
Critics of the proposed regulation responded with several arguments. First, the most fundamental objection to the new SCHIP regulations was that they constituted an ultra vires action by HHS, since nothing in the SCHIP statute or its legislative history suggested that Congress
intended "child" to have anything other than its common, everyday
meaning, as one who had been born. Critics noted that Congress knew
how to use the term "unborn child," as it had in the Medicare and Medicaid statutes, and that all the services covered under SCHIP, such as
"well-baby and well-child care," were manifestly applicable only to born
children. 136 Critics asserted that Congressional silence about "unborn
children" in enacting SCHIP meant that Congress had not intended them
to be covered by the SCHIP program. 137 HHS responded that the silence
meant only that Congress had not "directly spoke[n] to ... whether the
38
term 'child' could include unborn children."1
Second, critics noted that when the regulations were proposed, a bipartisan coalition in Congress was already working to amend SCHIP to
provide prenatal and postpartum care to pregnant women. The critics
asserted that the regulatory change to include "unborn children" was
unnecessary if in truth HHS' goal was simply to provide the needed
care. 139
Third, many objected to the regulation's blatant politicization of
maternal and children's health. 40 By adopting a definition of "child"
which was not in the statute and was inconsistent with long-standing
Supreme Court precedent that a fetus was not a child, ' 4' the HHS regula135.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. Law No.
104-193 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19).
136.
SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61961-62.
137.
See id. at 61962.
138.
Id.
139.
Cynthia Dailard, New SCHIP PrenatalCareRule Advances Fetal Rights At Low-Income
Women 's Expense, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Dec. 2002, at 3. Among the
bills pending were the Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2001, S. 724, 107th Cong.
(2002); the Start Healthy/Stay Healthy Act of 2001, S. 1016, 107th Cong. (2001) and the Start
Healthy/Stay Healthy Act of 2001, H.R. 3729, 107th Cong. (2002); the Immigrant Children's Health
Improvement Act of 2001, S. 582, 107th Cong. (2001) and the Legal Immigrant Children's Health
Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1143, 107th Cong. (2001), all of which proposed to amend Medicaid and SCHIP to permit states to offer health care to more infants and pregnant women, including
immigrant women who were excluded from eligibility under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq.
140.
SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61957; Editorial, A Cynical PoliticalAct, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at B06; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COMMENTS ON STATE CHILDREN'S
HEALTH PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY FOR PRENATAL CARE FOR UNBORN CHILDREN, May 6, 2002,
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/fetalrights/164001eg20020506.html
[hereinafter
ACLU
COMMENTS]; Dailard, supra note 139, at 5.
141.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the fetus was not a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). In Burns v. Alcala, the Court held, in a case
challenging the denial of welfare benefits to pregnant women under the Aid to Families with De-
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tions were part of a strategy to undermine access to abortion. 142 It surely
was not coincidental that HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced
the new regulations at the Conservative Political Action Committee Conference, touting the Bush Administration's "commitment to the unborn." 143
Fourth, critics charged that the regulations violated the First
Amendment in imposing a particular theological viewpoint on the
American public, i.e., that life begins at conception. 144 The critics asserted that poor pregnant women who did not believe that a fetus was a
child would be forced to choose between acting in conformity with their
beliefs and accepting a government benefit enshrining a different religious belief, and that this violated the Supreme Court's Free Exercise of
Religion cases. 145 HHS rejected this concern, stating that "[i]f a woman
has a religious objection, she simply would not accept SCHIP benefits,' 146 ignoring the reality that many poor women need these health
care services.
Fifth, critics contended that the regulation was bad health policy, as
it provided continuity of care for the fetus but not for the woman, who
would not be entitled to post-partun care because it was her "child," and
not she, who was the patient under SCHIP. 147Not only did this devalue
women by treating them as mere "vessels" for the fetus, but the regulapendent Children (AFDC) program, that pregnant women were not entitled to receive AFDC benefits because "dependent child" does not include an unborn child. 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975). The
Burns court stated:
Following the axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning
in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary ... and reading the definition "dependent child" in its statutory context, we conclude that Congress used the word "child"
to refer to an individual already born, with an existence separate from its mother.
Id.at 580-81.
142.
See Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redefining Child Under the State Children'sHealth Insurance
Program: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 137,
143-44 (2003).
143.
Id. at 156-57 (citing Tommy G. Thompson, Sec'y Health & Human Servs., Compassionate Conservatism and Health Care Policy, Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Committee
Conference (Jan. 31, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2002).
144.
SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61963.
145.
Id. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a state could
not deny unemployment insurance benefits to a person fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath
without running afoul of the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Id. at 410.
This ruling has been undercut to some extent by the Court's decision in Employment Div. of Oregon
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 890, which held that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits on
the ground of work-related misconduct, when Smith, a drug counselor, used peyote (a controlled
substance whose use was prohibited by Oregon criminal law) during a Native American Church
ceremony.
146.
SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61963. However, in Sherbert, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the exercise of religious freedom could not be predicated on a right/privilege distinction. 374 U.S. at 404-05 (citing American Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
147.
SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61960, 61967-70. Further, as HHIS conceded,
although covering the "unborn child" meant continuity of coverage after birth, this did not change
the state's normal "redetermination of eligibility" period, which could, depending on state rules, fall
shortly after the child was born. See id.
at 61964.
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tion was also contrary to accepted medical practice and counterproductive for the newly born child, who depended on care from a
healthy mother. 148 These critics noted that a wide range of medical conditions could affect the mother without directly affecting her fetus or
newborn, 149 and that these might not be covered under the HHS regulation. 150 HHS conceded the point, declaring that "care after delivery, such
as postpartum services could not be covered as part of the Title XXI
[SCHIP] State Plan, . . . because they are not services for an eligible
child."' 15 1 Further, HHS informed state SCHIP administrators that states
could cover "at least one postnatal visit" only if they used a "bundled fee
payment" or "global fee method" in paying for pregnancy and delivery
services. 51 2 Since only twenty-eight states use this billing method, there
was concern that many new mothers would have serious gaps in their
health care. 153 There were also fears that some health care providers
would choose not to treat pregnant women under SCHIP at all, to avoid
the ethical and malpractice
issues raised by having the fetus, and not the
54
woman, as their patient.'

The sixth concern was that the SCHIP change would not deliver
more care to pregnant immigrant women. 155 Commentators asserted that
because the new regulation did not exempt the states from their reporting
obligations to the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
many immi156
grant women would still be afraid to request services.
148.
Id.at 61968-70; see also Impact on Infant and Maternal Mortality: Hearings on Uninsured PregnantWomen Before the S. Comm. on Health,Education, Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong.
747 (2002) (statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman) ; see also ACLU COMMENTS, supra note 140.
149.

These included "breast masses, influenza ...

vaccination, . . .peptic ulcer disease,...

postpartum treatment of hemorrhage, infection, episiotomy repair, and postpartum depression."
MARCH OF DIMES COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE TO REDEFINE CHILD UNDER SCHIP, May 6,

2002, http://www.marchofdimes.com (use search function).
150.
See, e.g., id.
151.
SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61969.
152.
Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Dir., Center for Medicaid and State Operations of Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to State Health Officials (Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with author).
153.
Dailard, supra note 139, at 5.
154.

Id.at4.

155.
HHS asserted that "the new regulation makes sure that all low-income immigrants have
access to important prenatal care for their babies." HHS News, supranote 130.
156.
Dailard, supra note 139, at 5; SCHIP Final Rule, supra note 132, at 61965-66. Many
immigrants continue to be deterred from seeking government supported health care for which they
and/or their children are eligible, due to confusion about eligibility requirements and fear that health
care providers or government insurance programs will report illegal immigrants to the federal enforcement authorities. See URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND WORKERS, THE HEALTH
AND WELL-BEING OF YOUNG CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS, Brief No. 5, Feb. 2005, at 3, available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/310584.html;

KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE

UNINSURED, IMMIGRANTS' HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND ACCESS, Aug. 2003, at 2, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2241-index.cfm;
NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION
LAW
CENTER,
IMMIGRATION-FRIENDLY HEALTH COVERAGE OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT, June 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/Issue-Briefs/nmmigrant-Friendly.AppEnrllmnt.
PDF. Indeed, some legal immigrants are denied care; see also Julia Preston, Texas Hospitals' Separate Paths Reflect the Debate on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at Al, A18. When the
SCHIP rule was proposed, and the final rule promulgated, enforcement authority was held in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. On November 25, 2002 President Bush signed the Home-
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Finally, critics argued that justifying the regulation as a means of
expanding health care access 157 was disingenuous and contrary to the
fiscal structure of SCHIP. Because the regulation did not (and could not)
authorize additional funding for SCHIP, it could not lead to any more
health care being delivered.158 Further, because SCHIP is optional both
with regard to states' decision to participate and the range of services
they offer, 159 states had no incentive to add "unborn children" to their
programs. In practice, these predictions have been fulfilled. Only nine
states decided to cover "unborn children" under SCHIP, 160 and one of
these-Rhode Island-had already included pregnant women under an
HHS-approved waiver. 61 Because total SCHIP funds are capped, and
many states are struggling to handle mounting Medicaid and SCHIP
costs in a time of budget shortfalls,1 62 they are unlikely to expand SCHIP
programs. 163 Indeed, many states have been cutting or redesigning
SCHIP to limit costs.
D. Compelled Medical Treatment, Civil Commitment, and FetalGuardianships
In recent years, other efforts to "protect" fetuses from their mothers'
actions during pregnancy have increased,' 64 limiting women's autonomy
to make medical decisions for themselves. Two-thirds of states either
preclude or limit the enforcement of a woman's previously expressed
wishes about foregoing medical treatment from being implemented while
she is pregnant. 165 In addition, many states authorize the civil commit-

land Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, which transfered immigration
enforcement authority to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, within the Department of Homeland Security.
157.
HHS News, supra note 130.
158.
ACLU COMMENTS, supranote 140; see also KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, ASSESSING THE ROLE OF RECENT WAIVERS IN PROVIDING NEW COVERAGE, Dec. 2003,
at iii, availableat http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4158.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, ASSESSING WAIVERS]

(noting that SCHIP funds are capped nationally, and that "[n]ot all states have available funds to
redirect toward coverage").
159.
Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 1, 17-21.
160.
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED:
STATE CHOICES INFLUENCE HEALTH COVERAGE ACCESS FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Oct. 2005,

at 19, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7393.cfm [hereinafter KAISER, IN A TIME OF
GROWING NEED].
161.
HHS News, supra note 130 (noting that Rhode Island, Colorado and New Jersey had
previously obtained waivers to include pregnant women in their SCHIP programs).
162.
KAISER, ASSESSING WAIVERS, supra note 158, at iv (observing that Medicaid and SCHIP
enrollment grew by about 3.2 million people in 2002, largely "because more people became eligible
for Medicaid due to the downturn in the economy").
163.
Many states have cut or redesigned their SCHIP programs to limit costs. JOHN HOLAHAN
ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO 2004 BUDGET CRISES: A LOOK AT TEN STATES, URBAN INSTITUTE,

Feb. 2004, at 1-2, 7-8, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
410946 StateBudgetCrises.pdf; IAN HILL, HOLLY STOCKDALE & BRIGETTE COURTOT, SQUEEZING
SCHIP: STATES USE FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO THE ONGOING BUDGET CRISIS, URBAN

INSTITUTE, June 2004, at 1-2, available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311015.
164.
See generallyJerdee, supra note 4.
165.
See generally id.
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ment of pregnant women for substance abuse treatment, 166 as well as
court orders that compel women to accept medical attendants at labor
and delivery, or mandate particular forms of care such as Caesarean sections.
1. The Pregnancy Exception from Advanced Medical Directives
Women have regularly been denied the right to self-determination
and bodily integrity by state laws that, in the name of "fetal protection,"
automatically invalidate advance health care directives when a woman is
pregnant. Advance directives are widely seen as an important and binding vehicle that enable competent individuals to indicate the kinds of
health care treatment they want should they become terminally ill, suffer
a stroke or other neurological injury, or are in a persistent vegetative
state, and, due to mental incapacity, can no longer make treatment decisions. 167 Advance directives are particularly important for women, because of judicial gender bias in many cases in which men, but not
women, have been deemed strong, self-reliant, and courageous enough to
choose death rather than a lifetime spent in
a persistent vegetative state
68
or other mentally compromised condition. 1
Yet two-thirds of states either limit absolutely or make it more difficult to enforce women's advance directives when they become pregnant.
Seventeen states provide statutory exceptions to their "living will" or
health care proxy statutes which render advance directions automatically
ineffective if the patient is pregnant. 169 Another sixteen states render the
living will or health care proxy inapplicable in a variety of circumstances, ranging from a possibility to a probability that the fetus will
"develop to a live birth." 170 Minnesota gives a slight bow to women's
autonomy by establishing a rebuttable presumption that a pregnant
woman would want health care to be provided if there is a "real possibility [that] . . .the fetus could survive to the point of life birth," even if
"the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized
were she not pregnant."' 17 1 The presumption can be rebutted by an ex166.
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 48.205 (2006) (permitting the civil commitment of pregnant girls
and women, dubbed "The Cocaine Mom law"); see also Tom Kertscher, 'Cocaine Mom' Law Invoked in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without
Other Crime, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1.
167.
See Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and PersonhoodRevisited-Substitute Decisionmakingfor
the Incompetent Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 818-828 (1989) (discussing living
wills and documents designating a medical treatment agent); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 842.
168.
See generally Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender, and "The Right to
Die," 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
169.
Jerdee, supra note 4, at 978 n.35.
170.
Id. at 978-79 nn.36-44. The Alaska statute cited in n.37, ALASKA STAT § 18.12.040, was
repealed in 2004.
171.
The Minnesota law states in pertinent part:
When a patient lacks decision-making capacity and is pregnant, and in reasonable Medical judgment there is a real possibility that if health care to sustain her life and the life of
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plicit statement to the contrary in the advance directive itself, or by clear
and convincing evidence presented at a hearing. 172 While Minnesota's
law endeavors to strike a balance between the woman's interest in autonomy and the provision of a living maternal body in which the fetus can
continue to develop, it still enshrines a normative view of women-that
any "reasonable" woman would choose to continue on life-support if it
meant that her fetus would survive until birth.
The potential impact of these statutes is substantial. In University
Health Services v. Piazzi,173 a Georgia trial court granted a hospital's
petition to continue life support for a brain-dead pregnant woman over
the objections of the woman's husband and other family members, 174 so
that a fetus could be delivered. Although Ms. Piazzi had not executed an
advance directive, the court reached out to decide the case based on the
Georgia Natural Death Act, which rendered a pregnant woman's advance
directive inoperable if the fetus was viable. 75 The court declared that
because Ms. Piazzi was brain dead, she no longer had a constitutionally
protected right to privacy, 176 but implied that even if she did, any interest she had would be rendered irrelevant by the Georgia living will statute. 177
In contrast to the Piazzi court's expansive interpretation, two other
courts have rebuffed constitutional challenges to state advance directive
statutes, dismissing the cases for lack of justiciability. In DiNino v.
Gorton,178 a woman alleged that the Washington Model Health Care
Directive Act was unconstitutional because it made advance directives
ineffective during pregnancy. 179 DiNino drafted an advance directive
contrary to Washington law, and her physician refused to place it in her
medical file, asserting fears of potential liability." 0 DeNino sought a
declaratory judgment that her advance directive was valid and enforcethe fetus is provided the fetus could survive to the point of live birth, the health care provider shall presume that the patient would have wanted such health care to be provided,
even if the withholding or withdrawal of such health care would be authorized were she
not pregnant. This presumption is negated by health care directive provisions described in
section 145C.05, subdivision 2, paragraph (a), clause (10), that are to the contrary, or, in
the absence of such provisions, by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's
wishes, while competent, were to the contrary.
MINN. STAT. § 145C.10 (g) (2006).
172. Id.
173.
This unreported case, No. CV86-RCCV-464, was cited in Daniel Sperling, Maternal
Brain Death, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 453, 494-95 (2004) and Molly C. Dyke, A Matter of Life and
Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REv. 867, 871-72 (1990).
174.
Daniel Sperling, Panel Discussion American Association ofLaw Schools Panel: Panel on
the Use of Patients for Teaching Purposes Without Their Knowledge or Consent: Article: Do Pregnant Women Have (Living) Will?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 331, 336 (2005).
175.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (2006).
176.
Sperling, supra note 173, at 336-37.
177. Id. at 337.
178.
684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
179. DiNino, 684 P.2d at 1299.
180. Id. at 1298-99.
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able, and that her physician would not be held liable if he acted in accordance with its provisions. In the alternative, she argued the statute violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to privacy, which encompassed
her right to seek abortion and to forego medical treatment. 18 1 Her suit
was dismissed as presenting a "purely hypothetical and speculative controversy."' 182 In Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp,183 the plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of two North Dakota statutes which rendered a
woman's advance directive inoperable while she was pregnant, and further mandated that pregnant women receive medical treatment to permit
184
the "continuing development and live birth of the unborn child."'
While the United States District Court for North Dakota acknowledged
the statutes' potential constitutional problems, it ruled that because the
plaintiff was neither pregnant nor in a terminal condition, her case was
non-justiciable. 185 What both DiNino and Gabrynowicz overlook, of
course, is that the entire point of a living will or advance directive statute
is to permit competent adults to announce their wishes for treatment prior
to becoming incapacitated, when they are able to think through their
choices. Denying a woman the opportunity to bring a constitutional
challenge while healthy and non-pregnant will mean, in practical terms,
that she will never be able to challenge the law.
2. Civil Commitment for Substance Abuse and Other Treatment
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia currently permit
pregnant women to be civilly committed for alcohol and other drug
abuse. 186 Most of these state statutes address substance abuse in the
same way that statutes authorize the civil commitment of the mentally ill
when the mental illness poses danger to "self or others."' 87 Three states'
statutes specifically target pregnant women. 188 For example, the Minnesota statute requires physicians to report pregnant patients' use of alcohol
and controlled substances during pregnancy and mandates toxicology
181. Id.at 1299.
182. Id.at 1300.
183. 904 F.Supp. 1061 (N.D.1995).
184. Gabrynowicz, 904 F. Supp. at 1062. One of the statutes being challenged stated:
chapter, medical treatment must be
Notwithstanding a declaration executed under this
provided to a pregnant patient with a terminal condition unless ... such medical treatment will not maintain the patient in such a way as to permit the continuing development
and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to
the patient or will prolong severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication.
N. D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-07(3) (repealed 2005)
185. Gabrynowicz, 904 F. Supp. at 1063-64.
186. See supra note 37 and statutes cited therein.
187. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 125.81 (2005) (authorizing the immediate custody of a chronic
substance abuser, defined in § 125.2 (2005)as a person who "[h]abitually lacks self control as to the
use of chemical substances to the extent that the person is likely to endanger the person's health, or
to physically injure the person's self or others, if allowed to remain at liberty without treatment" and
"[l]acks sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the person's hospitalization or treatment").
188.
MINN. STAT. § 626.5561-63 (2005); OKL.STAT. tit.
63 § 1-546.5 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-20A-70 (2006).
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testing of mothers and newborns shortly after delivery if there is reason
to believe that a mother has used controlled substances. 189 At least one
other state, Wisconsin, has amended its child abuse law to permit the
involuntary commitment of pregnant women who are abusing alcohol or
controlled substances throughout pregnancy to the extent constitutionally
permissible. 190
The Wisconsin law, popularly dubbed the "Cocaine Mom Bill," was
a reaction to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel.
Angela M W. v. Kruicki.1 9' When Angela M.W. was pregnant, her physician reported her to child welfare authorities after she tested positive
for drugs and failed to show up for an appointment.1 92 The court held
that Ms. M.W. could not be compelled to participate in in-patient drug
treatment through a "child custody" proceeding, concluding that the legislature had not intended the term
"child" in the child neglect statute to
93
include children not yet born. 1
The Arkansas Supreme Court relied on Angela M W. in Arkansas
Dep 't of Human Services v. Collier,194 a case which challenged a family
court judge's authority to declare that the fetus of a pregnant woman who
was using methamphetamines was a dependent-neglected child.' 95 Acting sua sponte, the trial judge ordered the "child" to be taken into custody, by holding the woman at a county detention center until she went
into labor.' 96 The Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the judge's actions
97
exceeded her statutory authority.'
In sharp contrast to these two decisions, in 2000 a Massachusetts
family court judge ordered the involuntary medical treatment of Rebecca
Corneau, a pregnant woman who rejected all medical care and was suspected of membership in a religious cult that denied children adequate
nutrition and medical care. 98 The court ordered Ms. Corneau to be
taken to a prison hospital and compelled to submit to a medical examination to determine her health, pregnancy status, and the anticipated birth
date of her "unborn child," so that the court could determine what prena-

189.
MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (2005).
190.
WIS. STAT. § 48.01(1) (2006).
191.
561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997).
192.
State ex rel.Angela M W., 561 N.W.2d at 732-33.
193.
Id. at 737.
194.
95 S.W.3d 772 (2003).
195.
Collier,95 S.W.3d at 773.
196.
Id. at 773; see also Bennett v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 782, 785 (2003) (holding in a related
civil contempt proceeding that the trial judge lacked authority to hold the pregnant woman in contempt of court once the judge terminated her parental rights in a different case).
197.
Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 781 (rejecting arguments that the term "child" in the child neglect
statute should be construed to include a fetus even though other areas of Arkansas law authorized
actions to be brought on behalf of a fetus).
198.
Dave Wedge & Edwin Molina, Experts: Ruling May Just Open Up Floodgates,BOSTON
HERALD, Sept. 1, 2000, at 4.
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tal treatment should be ordered. 199 Ms. Corneau did not appeal the
judge's ruling and she was imprisoned until after her child's birth, when
the child was declared neglected and Corneau's parental rights were terminated.2 °°
3. Compelled Caesarean Sections
Women continue to be forced to have Caesarean sections over their
objections. 20 1 In Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hospital,2

2

the

Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a trial judge's decision to order a
woman who was close to her delivery date to undergo a Caesarean section, based on hospital physicians' concern that because the fetus was in
a breech position, it was likely to die in childbirth.20 3 The court rejected
Ms. Jefferson's religious objections to the procedure, but before the order
could be enforced, she gave birth to a healthy child.2° In the landmark
case of In re A.C., 20 5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals took a
different view, declaring that pregnant women had the right to control

their medical treatment, even when it could affect the health of the fetus. 20 6 The court stated, "[s]urely,

. .

. a fetus cannot have rights20 7in this

respect superior to those of a person who has already been born.

In 1996, a Florida trial court held an ex parte hearing concerning

Laura Pemberton, a pregnant woman who refused medical advice to deliver by Caesarean section because it was feared that her previous cae199.
See Barbara F. v. Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court, 735 N.E. 2d 357 (Mass. 2000) (discussing the juvenile court's order in the course of rejecting a challenge to that court's decision brought
by another pregnant woman, who asserted that the juvenile court's order had a chilling effect on her
own conduct). See also Wedge & Molina, supra note 198, at 4; Dave Wedge, Appeal CitesAbortion
Ruling in Bid to Free Pregnant Cultist, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 6, 2000, at 10; Michael Paulson,
Fetus Dispute Brings Wider Issues to Fore, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 2000, at B5; Miller, supra
note 34, at 71-74.
200.
Miller, supra note 34, at 73-74 nn. 31 & 34.
201.
For illuminating analyses of the issues raised by these cases, see Nancy K. Rhoden, The
Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-OrderedCesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951
(1986); Roberts, PunishingAddicts nho Have Babies, supra note 9, at 964. Women of color have
borne the brunt of these interventions. Id.at 939.
202.
274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
203. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
204.
Id.at 459. See also Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine
Court-OrderedMedicalProceduresDuring Pregnancy,57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 940 (1994).
205.
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
206.
See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
207.
Id. at 1244. The case arose out of tragic circumstances. In 1987, Angela Carder, a twentyseven year old woman who had survived cancer as a teenager, became pregnant. At twenty-five
weeks of pregnancy, she was found to be suffering from cancer again. Id. Her condition deteriorated
rapidly, and at twenty-six weeks, she was hospitalized and expected to die shortly. When the hospital sought a court order to perform a Caesarean section, a trial court held a hearing, and ordered a
Caesarean section to be performed. The baby died within two hours, and Carder died two days later.
Id.at 1238. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeal declared first that the pregnant
woman had the right to self-determination, which included the right to refuse a Caesarean section.
The court further held that in cases such as this one, where it was difficult to ascertain the pregnant
woman's wishes because she was close to death, under the influence of medication, and suffering
extreme emotional distress, the trial court should undertake a substituted judgment analysis, so that it
could decide what the patient would have chosen if she were competent. Id. at 1247-49.
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sarean section put her at higher risk for uterine rupture.2 °8 The court
ordered Ms. Pemberton to be transported to the hospital via ambulance
against her will, and then continued the hearing in her presence, ultimately ordering the Caesarean section to be performed. 20 9 When Ms.
Pemberton subsequently brought a section 1983 civil rights action an
action in federal court, the court held that Ms. Pemberton's constitutional
rights "did not2 10outweigh Florida's interest in preserving the life of the
unborn child.,
In a less dramatic case, in 2004 a Pennsylvania woman, Amber
Marlowe, who had previously given birth to six children, each weighing
more than eleven pounds, went to deliver her seventh child, only to be
21
told that the fetus was so large that it was not safe to deliver vaginally.
When Marlowe declined the hospital's advice to have a Caesarean section, the hospital obtained an ex parte order compelling her to have the
surgery.212 Marlowe and her husband did not learn of the order until
after she had safely delivered her baby at another hospital.2 13
These court-ordered detentions and medical interventions are contrary to the prevailing view of medical professionals that medical treatment against the pregnant woman's wishes is rarely, if ever, appropriate.2 14 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG),
for example, emphasizes that medical judgment is limited and fallible,
that pregnant women do not lose their rights to autonomy merely by becoming pregnant, and, most importantly, that doctors who believe that a
medical intervention will benefit the fetus and/or the mother should exhaust all possible avenues of explanation and persuasion before seeking a
court order, including consultation with an institutional ethics commit15
2

tee.

Significantly, medical groups recognize the need to view pregnant
women's decisionmaking in its full social and economic context. ACOG
alerts physicians to the risk that "clinicians' conclusions reinforce exist208.

Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla.

1999). At the hearing, five physicians testified that the risk of uterine rupture during vaginal deliv-

ery was too high (from "four to six percent"), and that if there was rupture, the fetus was likely to die
during delivery. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. at 1252-53. Neither the state nor federal court addressed
the question of informed consent, that is, who was entitled to make the fetal risk assessment. See
generally id.at 1251-57 (discussing only the issues of substantive due process, procedural due
process, professional negligence, and false imprisonment).
209. Id.at 1250.
210. Id.at 1251.
211.
David Weiss, Court Delivers Controversy, Mom Rejects C-Sections; Gives Birth on Own
Terms, TIMES LEADER Jan. 16, 2004; Associated Press, New Questions about Childbirth Rights,

May 19, 2004, availableat http://keyetv.com/health/health-story_140110423.html.
212. Weiss, supra note 211.
213. Id.
214.
See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 35; American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note
36.
215. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 34-35.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

570

[Vol. 84:2

ing gender, class, or racial inequality., 21 6 The American Medical Association (AMA) agrees that legal interventions during pregnancy are seldom, if ever, proper,21 7 and emphatically rejects "criminal sanctions or
civil liability" for pregnant women based on their conduct "toward [their]
...fetus., 2 18 Instead, the AMA endorses a comprehensive, long-term
approach to substance abuse, to begin in adolescence and continue
through pregnancy and beyond, in recognition of the fact that addiction
to alcohol and other drugs is a disease. 1 9
Many physicians believe that seeking judicial intervention to compel women to accept treatment during pregnancy is counter-productive,
not only leading to a loss of trust in the health care system on the part of
the particular woman who is the object of the intervention, but also deterring other women from seeking care. 220 This problem is compounded
when women are forcibly restrained while an unwanted medical procedure is performed,22' or when pregnant women are confined in prison
hospitals, which often meet only the most minimal standards of health
care and,22at2 the same time, make it possible for a woman to have access
to drugs.

4. Fetal Guardians
Another way that courts have separated pregnant women from their
fetuses, undermining women's right to self-determination, is through the
appointment of fetal guardians. Sometimes such appointments are the
means used to compel women to accept medical treatment to benefit the

216.
Id. at 35.
217.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 36 (stating that a physician might seek
judicial action to override a woman's informed treatment refusal only "[i]f an exceptional circumstance could be found in which a medical treatment poses an insignificant or no health risk to the
woman, entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity, and would clearly prevent substantial and
irreversible harm to her fetus").
218. Id.
219.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY
SUBSTANCE
ABUSE
DURING
PREGNANCY,

H-420.976:
available

ALCOHOL AND OTHER
at
http://www.ama-

assn.org/ama/noindex/category/1 1760.html (click "accept"; search "420.976"): AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, POLICY H-95.976: DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES - THE NEXT GENERATION,

available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11760.htm
(click "accept"; search
"95.976").
220.
Helene Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 J.A.M.A. 2663, 2667 (1990);
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 36, at 36. Similar concerns have

been raised about mandatory maternal HIV testing in order to reduce maternal-fetal transmission of
the virus. See, e.g., Comm. on HIV Prenatal/Newborn Testing, Prenatal/NewbornHIV Testing, 49
THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 420 (1994).

221.
See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 400 (111.App. 1997) (reversing a trial
court's decision to appoint a hospital the "temporary custodian of Fetus Brown, with the right to
consent to one or more blood transfusions for [his mother] when advised of such necessity by any
attending physician").
222.
Cole, supranote 220.
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fetus.223 More frequently, they are a direct challenge to a pregnant
woman's right to have an abortion.224
In Alabama, trial judges have appointed fetal "guardians" as part of
their procedures for determining whether pregnant teenagers can obtain
an abortion without parental consent, a practice whose legality the Alabama Supreme Court has declined to address.22 5 Such fetal guardianships turn what may already be an intimidating but parentalistic proceeding into an adversarial one, effectively changing the burden of proof established by the legislature in authorizing a judicial bypass proceeding.226 For example, in one case, the trial court appointed a guardian ad
litem for the fetus, whom the court denominated "Baby Teresa., 227 The
guardian ad litem called three witnesses who worked at organizations
opposed to abortion, "Sav-A-Life" and the "COPE Crisis Pregnancy
Center," and cross-examined the minor about whether she had consulted
these or other anti-abortion groups in making her decision.228 In another
case, a judge (perhaps the same one) declared,
I have... as has been my practice for five years now, appointed a
lawyer to represent your unborn child, because I do not feel that the
court should be placed in the position of being a cross-examiner, an
advocate for one side or the other, so I've appointed someone to represent the silent voice in this case.229
In 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor petitioned to be appointed
guardian of the fetus in the case of a severely retarded woman who had
been raped at the group home where she resided, in order to prevent the
woman from having an abortion. 230 The rape victim suffered from autism, cerebral palsy, and a seizure disorder, in addition to her retardation,
223. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 400, 406 (reversing a trial court's decision to
appoint a hospital the "temporary custodian of Fetus Brown" and appointing the Cook County,
Illinois Public Guardian as the "guardian ad litem" for Fetus Brown in order to override the pregnant
woman's refusal of blood transfusions, based on her religious beliefs).
224. See Benten v. Kessler, 1192 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14747 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding in a
pregnant woman's class action suit to enjoin the Food and Drug Administration's ban on the importation of RU-486, an abortifacient drug, that an attorney could not intervene on behalf of the
woman's non-viable fetus, declaring that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision
for appointing a guardian ad litem for a fetus"). See also In re Nancy Klein, 1989 N.Y. App. Div.
LEXIS 1613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding, in the case of a comatose woman injured in a accident,
that her husband should be appointed guardian with authority to terminate her pregnancy, and that a
stranger could not be appointed guardian of her fetus, since a non-viable fetus was not "a legally
recognized 'person,"' (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))).
225. In re Anonymous, 810 So. 2d 786, 795 (Ala. 2001).
226. As one trial judge explained, "it has been my practice for three years now when I'm faced
with these cases to not only have a lawyer for you but to have a lawyer to represent the interest of
the unborn child." Id.at 789. See also In re Anonymous, 889 So. 2d 525, 525 (Ala. 2003) (Johnstone, J., dissenting, in discussing evidence of the trial court's bias against abortion).
227. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429, 429-30 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
228. In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d at 429-30.
229. In re Anonymous, 889 So. 2d at 527 (Johnstone, J., dissenting, in discussing evidence of
the trial court's bias against abortion) (emphasis added).
230. In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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but the putative guardian only expressed concern that the woman was
taking medications which could injure the fetus. 231 Both the trial judge
and the mid-level appellate court rebuffed the request for guardianship,
holding that Florida law did not authorize such an appointment.232 They
noted that Florida law instead authorized guardians to be appointed for
mentally incompetent women to protect their interests, with the guardian
to consider whether an abortion was appropriate as "necessary to save
the life or preserve the health of the pregnant woman," subject to court
approval.2 33 In response to the decision in J.D.S., Governor Jeb Bush
announced his intention to seek a change in Florida law, but these efforts
have been unsuccessful so far.234
E. New Abortion Laws
New laws seeking to limit abortions reflect new fetal protection in
two different ways. First, in addition to the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Act, 235 a number of states, as well as Congress, have enacted laws which
seek to limit women's access to necessary health care by prohibiting socalled "partial birth" abortions, a term which suggests that the fetus in
such cases is fully formed or capable of being born. 236 Second, laws
have been proposed in Congress and state legislatures which, in the name
of requiring "informed consent," make the fetus more vivid and alive,
with the goal of discouraging women from choosing abortion.
So-called "partial birth" abortion laws are criticized on four major
grounds.2 37 First, and foremost, these statutes do not acknowledge that
most "partial birth" abortions take place under urgent or even emergent
medical circumstances. These include the discovery that the fetus is anencephalic, hydrocephalic, or suffers from a fatal genetic defect, or the
determination that an alternative abortion procedure would put the
mother's health at risk.238 If "partial birth" abortions are prohibited,
231.
232.
233.
2006)).
234.

In reJ.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 536.
Id.
Id. at 539 (discussing the requirements of FLA. STAT. ANN. 390.0111(1) and (3) (West
Bob Mahlburg, Senate Chief Wary of Fetus Guardian Bill [-] Governor Finds House

Support, Won't Back Down on Legislation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 2004, at B 1,

235.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2006).
236.
The Virginia law, for example, refers to the types of abortion prohibited as "partial-birth
infanticide." VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-7 1.1 (West 2006).
237.
A full discussion of "partial-birth" abortion bans is beyond the scope of this article; in any
case, the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the federal law next term. Carhart v.
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), affg Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb.
2004), cert. grantedsub nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
238.

PLANNED

PARENTHOOD,

ABORTION

AFTER THE

FIRST TRIMESTER,

available at

http://www.plannedparenthood.org/news-articles-press/politics-policy-issues/abortionaccess/trimester-abortion-6140.htm (citing SHELDON CHERRY & IRWIN MERKATZ, COMPLICATIONS
OF PREGNANCY: MEDICAL, SURGICAL, GYNECOLOGIC, PSYCHOSOCIAL, AND PERINATAL (4th ed.

1991) and MAUREEN PAUL, A CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION (1999)).
Medical complications for the woman include infections, heart failure, malignant hypertension,
uncontrolled diabetes, renal disease, depression and suicidal tendencies. Id. In addition, many
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women may be rendered sterile or otherwise unable to have other children, suggesting that "partial birth" abortion bans are not only antifemale, but also "anti-life" in practice. 39 Second, these "partial birth"
laws describe abortion procedures using language inconsistent with
medical parlance, making it impossible for a physician to know whether
the technique used in a particular case is proscribed and thus rendering
the law unconstitutionally vague. 240 Third, the laws' lack of an exemption for the mother's health is incompatible with prior decisions of the
Supreme Court, which has held repeatedly that the state's interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus cannot supersede its interest in protecting the health and life of the pregnant woman.2 4 1 Finally, these laws are
not limited to "late" or third trimester abortions, but could apply as early
as twelve weeks, when a fetus would clearly not be viable, and thus are
242
incompatible with Roe v. Wade
and PlannedParenthoodof Southeast243
Casey.
v.
Pennsylvania
ern
Recently, proposals have been offered which, while nominally permitting abortion, conceptualize the fetus as a child in order to encourage
women not to have abortions. The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of
2005 would require that abortion providers inform all women seeking
abortion that Congress has determined that an "unborn child" may experience pain at twenty weeks or more after fertilization, 244 give each
women face barriers that delay their access to abortion until the second trimester, including poverty,
partner abuse, geographic difficulty in finding an abortion provider, and teenage status. See Brief for
Seventy-Five Organizations Committed to Women's Equality as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 340122.
239.
Forcing physicians to use other, older abortion techniques increases the risk of infection
and laceration as an option increases the chance of uterine perforations, cervical lacerations, hemorrhaging, and infection, all of which can lead to sterility. See Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1069-70, aff'd 130 F.3d 187 (1997).
240.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939-46 (2000); see also Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d
791 (8th Cir. 2005), aff'g Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), cert. grantedsub
noma. Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
241.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-3 1; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.
2005).
242.
410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973).
243.
505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
244.
Before an abortion could be performed, the woman would have to be told the following:
You are considering having an abortion of an unborn child who will have developed, at
the time of the abortion, approximately XX weeks after fertilization. The Congress of the
United States has determined that at this stage of development, an unborn child has the
physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is substantial evidence that by this
point, unborn children draw away from surgical instruments in a manner which in an infant or an adult would be interpreted as a response to pain. Congress finds that there is
substantial evidence that the process of being killed in an abortion will cause the unborn
child pain, even though you receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs. Under the Federal
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, you have the option of choosing to have anesthesia or other pain-reducing drug or drugs administered directly to the pain-capable
unborn child if you so desire. The purpose of administering such drug or drugs would be
to reduce or eliminate the capacity of the unborn child to experience pain during the abortion procedure. In some cases, there may be some additional risk to you associated with
administering such a drug.
S. 46, 109th Cong. §2902 (2005).
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woman an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Brochure,2 45 and require her to
sign an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Decision Form, indicating
whether or not she wishes to have her "pain-capable unborn child" to
receive anesthesia.24 6 Other proposals would set an even earlier date for
a woman contemplating abortion to be told about the fetus' potential to
experience pain. 247 At least one law would impose a twenty-four hour
waiting period in which the pregnant woman is to consider the information regarding fetal pain prior to having the abortion,248 exacerbating the
pressure on women not to have an abortion.24 9
Although legislative mandating of explicit informed consent requirements is not unprecedented,250 the Unborn Child Pain Awareness
Act of 2005 is unusual in its detailed explanation of the procedure contemplated. 251 All other laws mandating the specifics of the informed
consent dialogue require informing the patient of the consequences of the
contemplated medical procedure to her, not a third party. Imagine, for
example, a statute requiring a prospective kidney donor be told about the
impact of the decision to donate on the donor's child, because of the risk
that the donor might die after donating the kidney. Courts have increasingly recognized that as competent adults, parents are able to accept or
reject medical treatment based on their personal views of what is best for
them, and have not required them to take their children's interests into
account. 252
245.
This Brochure would be developed by the Department of Health and Human Services, and
include: "the same information as required under the statement under subsection (b)(2)(A)(i), including greater detail on her option of having a pain-reducing drug or drugs administered to the unborn
child to reduce the experience of pain by the unborn child during the abortion." S. 46, 109th Cong.
§2902 (2005).
246.
The law would require that the woman sign an Unborn Child Pain Awareness Decision
Form, which shall:
(A) with respect to the pregnant woman(i) contain a statement that affirms that the woman has received or been offered all of the
information required in subsection (b);
(ii) require the woman to explicitly either request or refuse the administration of painreducing drugs to the unborn child; and
(iii) be signed by a pregnant woman prior to the performance of an abortion involving a
pain-capable unborn child.
S. 46, 109th Cong. §2902 (2005).
247.
Under the Montana Unborn Child Pain Prevention Act, all women contemplating abortion
at 16 weeks or later would have to be informed that the fetus could feel pain. H.B. 238, 59th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005).
248.
H.B. 238, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2005).
249.
Imposing a waiting period is believed to add a significant barrier to abortion access.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 228.
250.
See, e.g., S.G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer
Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202 (1994) (discussing state laws that require
that women contemplating mastectomy be told of the range of treatment options available); and
similar laws governing hysterectomy (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1690 (West 2006)) and
sterilization (OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.225 (West 2006)).
251.
Cf OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1998) (popularly known as Oregon's Death with
Dignity Law).
252.
See, e.g., Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1024 (Mass. 1991) (holding that
a mother who was a Jehovah's Witness could decline to receive a medically recommended blood
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Several legislators have introduced laws which compel women to
contemplate their fetuses as "unborn" children in other ways. These include laws that require that women be given the opportunity to visualize
their fetus in a sonogram and to hear the fetus' heartbeat, as a precondition to the "informed consent" necessary to receive an abortion, 253 as
well as laws that provide federal funding to purchase sonogram equipment for this purpose.254 These laws increase government involvement
in a heretofore private trend: the use of sonogram technology by antiabortion groups, 255 which have found that women are less256likely to
choose abortion if they see a sonographic image of their fetus.
II. THE FETUS AND CHILD IN AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY

A. The Status of the Fetus in American Law
To put current "fetal protection" law in context, it is necessary to
trace briefly the common law and statutory trend toward recognition of
the fetus as a legal entity, although in most instances this recognition
arises after a child has been born.257 At common law the fetus was not
considered a legal person, and it was only after birth that a child had legal rights. The "born alive" rule governed criminal, 258 tort, 259 and inheritance 2 60 law.

transfusion, even though doctors testified that without it she was likely to die, leaving her young son
with only one parent).
253.
See, e.g., S.B. 76, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (amending title 28, article 34, chapter 2,
section 1.1 of the Indiana Code to require that at least eighteen hours prior to abortion, a woman be
told of the "availability of fetal ultrasound imaging and auscultation of fetal heart tone services to
enable the pregnant woman to view the image and hear the heartbeat of the fetus and how to obtain
access to those services").
254.
The proposed Informed Choice Act would authorize the Department of Health and Human
Services to make grants to tax-exempt "community based pregnancy help medical clinic[s]" to
provide ultrasound equipment to be used to give the woman a "visual image of the fetus," information about its probable gestational age, and information on abortion and its alternatives. H.R. Con.
216, 109th Cong. (2005).
255.
Since 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services has been funding crisis pregnancy centers because they support President Bush's "abstinence-only" position on premarital sex
education. See Kashef, supra note 5.
256.
Neela Banerjee, Church Groups Turn to Sonogram to Turn Women from Abortions, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at Al.
257.
See infra notes 260-273. But see Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, at 920
(Mass. 1975) (permitting parents to recover under a wrongful death theory due to bus company's
negligence that caused the stillbirth of a viable fetus).
258.
See supra text accompanying notes 113-121 (noting the born-alive rule precluded prosecution for homicide for causing the death of a fetus); See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d
654, 655-57 (Ky. 2004) (discussing the history of the rule).
259.
See, e.g., Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damagesfor Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R. 3d 411 (2004).
260.
See, e.g., Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 910 (Ga. 1951) (discussing
common law rules on inheritance, permitting children to sue after birth for interests that came into
being while they were in utero); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (amended 2005) (permitting
children conceived before an individual's death but born thereafter to inherit). See also David E.
Koropp, Note, Setting the Standard: A Mother's Duty During the PrenatalPeriod, 1989 ILL. L. REV.
493, 495, n.13.
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1. Tort Liability
The first case to apply the "bom alive" rule in American tort law
was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.2 6 1 In Dietrich, a pregnant

woman slipped and fell and suffered a miscarriage, with her four or five
month old fetus living only for a few minutes. Mr. Justice Holmes, then
sitting on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, observed that "no
case ... has ever decided that, if the infant survived, it could maintain an

action for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb." In his
"the unborn child was a part of
view, this was wholly appropriate, since
262
"
injury.
the
of
time
the
at
mother
the
Dietrich was followed for seventy-five years, until the 1946 decision in Bonbrest v. Kotz. 263 In Bonbrest, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that a viable fetus, injured through
medical malpractice, had a cause of action against the physician who
negligently delivered him. The decision spawned a rapid retreat from the
born alive rule, accomplished by both statutory and case law. Today,
every state allows a suit for prenatal injuries if the infant is born alive, 2 4

and most states permit a wrongful death suit to be brought on behalf of a
viable fetus who succumbs prior to birth due to prenatal injury. 265 2 A
66
minority of states also permits suit on behalf of a non-viable fetus.
Other states have recognized causes of action for loss of consortium on
the part of parents whose fetus has been killed due to the tortious acts by
others.267
261.
138 Mass. 14 (1884).
262.
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17 (emphasis added).
263.
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
264.
Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W.Va. 1995).
265.
See Michael P. Penick, Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 19 AM. JUR. 3D Proofof Facts 107
(2004); Jill D. Washburn Helbling, Symposium, To Recover or Not to Recover: A State by State
Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 363 (1996). See also Meyer v. Burger
King Corp., 26 P.3d 925, 928-30 (Wash. 2001) (holding that the Washington worker's compensation
statute did not bar a suit brought by a child allegedly deprived of oxygen in utero due to his mother's
employer negligence). Indeed, employers' fear of tort liability for causing harm to the fetuses of
their female employees is a major rationale of fetal protection policies in the workplace, which
exclude some women from high-paying but hazardous positions. See Elaine Draper, Reproductive
Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies after Johnson Controls, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 117, 118,
121 (2001). For a fuller discussion of the gendered nature of the construction of workplace risks, see
id. and discussion infra at text accompanying notes 323-344. Nine states (California, Florida, Iowa,
Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia) require that a child be born alive
before a suit for prenatal injuries can be brought. See Penick, supra; Helbling, supra.
266.
See, e.g., Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d. 787 (S.D. 1996) (holding that the
South Dakota wrongful death statute should be interpreted to authorize a cause of action for wrongful death for non-viable fetuses, and surveying the law in other jurisdictions in the process); Connor
v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 91-93 (Mo. 1995) (construing Missouri's wrongful death
statute to permit a cause of action for a non-viable fetus in light of a Missouri statute of general
applicability that declares that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception....").
267.
See, e.g., Broadnax v. Gonzales, 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004) (permitting a woman to
recover for emotional injury for a miscarriage or stillbirth due to medical malpractice, even if she
herself does not suffer physical injury); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Iowa 1983)
(holding that a parent could recover for loss of consortium even though Iowa does not recognize a
cause of action for wrongful fetal death, because a loss of consortium action is based on parental,
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Only a handful of American courts have addressed the question of
whether tort liability can be imposed on pregnant women based on their
conduct during pregnancy. Three courts have upheld such liability,
while three courts have rejected it. These cases are important in addressing the normative question of who is the reasonable pregnant woman, as
well as the related question of who gets to evaluate her conduct.
Grodin v. Grodin268 was the first case to permit a woman to be sued
for her actions while pregnant. 269 The Michigan Court of Appeals allowed the father of a child born with discolored teeth to sue the child's
mother (and his wife) for these injuries, allegedly caused by the woman's
taking Tetracycline® while pregnant. Without analyzing the consequences of its decision for pregnant women, the court framed the question as a simple one of fact: did the woman's use of Tetracycline® constitute a "reasonable exercise of parental discretion?" If it did, this conduct would fall within an exception to the general abrogation of parentalchild tort immunity under Michigan law, and the woman could not be
sued.270

Two other cases, Bonte v. Bonte, 271 and National Casualty Co. v.
Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N.A.,272 also permitted suit to be
brought on behalf of children who were injured due to their mothers'
alleged negligence while pregnant. In Bonte, the mother was struck by a
car while crossing the street and her child was born with severe brain
damage and cerebral palsy. 273 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that a suit could go forward, relying on the abrogation of parent-child tort
immunity (in part in recognition of the availability of insurance as a
source of recovery) and the law that a child born alive can bring a cause
of action for injuries suffered in utero against a third party.274 The court
rejected the argument that either the unique relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus or the potential deprivation of a woman's right
to control her life during pregnancy should preclude liability. 275 The
court held that a pregnant woman was "required to act with ...the same
standardof care as that requiredof her once the child is born. 276
rather than fetal, loss). Loss of consortium has been recognized as a cause of action at least since the
time of Hammurabi, although his code explicitly calculated damages based on the social class of the
pregnant woman. The Code of Hammurabi, §§ 209 and 213 (L.W.King trans.), available at
http://www.leb.net/-farras/history/hammurabi.htm (declaring that a free born woman was entitled to
receive ten shekels for her loss while a maid-servant was entitled to receive two shekels).
301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
268.
Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869.
269.

270.
The court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the "'reasonableness' of the
[mother's] alleged negligent conduct." Id. at 871.
271.
616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
272.
Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464.
273.
274. Id.at 465-66.
275. Id.at 466.
276. Id.
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A similar result was reached by a Florida appellate court in National
Casualty Co., which ruled that a child could sue its mother for injuries
allegedly caused by her negligent driving while pregnant, up to the
amount of her automobile insurance coverage.277 The court's brief opinion held that there was no reason to "den[y]... recovery merely because
of the identity of the tortfeasor, '' 278 rejecting concerns about the impact
of its decision on the mother's privacy and personal health, and distinguishing State v. Ashley, in which the Florida Supreme Court held a
pregnant woman who shot279
herself and caused the death of her fetus could
not be charged criminally.
In contrast, three courts have adamantly rebuffed suits brought by
children against their mothers for injuries suffered in utero. In Stallman
v. Youngquist,280 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a child who suffered prenatal injuries in a car accident in which her mother was driving
could not sue her mother for negligence. 281 The court first criticized the
Grodin decision, suggesting that the Michigan court had confused the
question of whether parental tort immunity should be abrogated with the
different issue of whether a pregnant woman owed a tort duty to her fetus. 282 The Stallman court confronted the latter issue directly. It emphasized that the relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus she
was carrying was unique and "unlike the relationship between any other
plaintiff and defendant,, 283 and thus could not be analogized to other
negligence situations. The Illinois Supreme Court held that in view of
the "fact of life" that a pregnant woman's "every waking and sleeping
moment... shapes the prenatal environment which forms the world for
the developing fetus, 284 it was impermissible to impose a duty of care
on a pregnant woman.2 85
The court asserted four grounds for its decision. First, it would be
impossible to either limit or define the duty of a pregnant woman toward
her fetus, since many actions taken in a woman's life, even prior to conception, could affect a fetus.286 Second, it would be impossible to develop an objective standard applicable to women from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, whose access to health care differed, and who
might or might not know whether they were pregnant.2 87 Third, the court
recognized that creating a common law cause of action had the potential
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

National Casualty, 807 So. 2d 86.
Id.at 87.
Id. at 87-88 (citing State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997)).
531 N.E.2d 355 (I11.
1988).
Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
Id.at 358.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 359-61.
Id.at 360.
Id.
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for "unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the [female] citizens of this State., 218 It held that if a duty was to be recognized, it must be by the legislature, "only after thorough investigation,
study, and debate., 289 Finally, the court urged that "[t]he way to effectuate the birth of healthy babies is not... through after-the-fact civil liability in tort for individual mothers, but rather through before-the-fact
edu290
cation of all women and families about prenatal development.,
Chenault v. Huie29 1 addressed the more difficult factual circumstances in which Huie, a pregnant woman (and her boyfriend) abused
alcohol and other drugs while she was pregnant, and she gave birth to a
child with developmental problems and cerebral palsy. 292 Huie's sister
sued on behalf of the child, seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for Huie's alleged negligence and gross negligence.29 3 The Texas Court
of Appeals declined to recognize a child's common law cause of action
against its mother for prenatally-caused injuries. The court declared that
while "the law wisely no longer treats a fetus as only a part of the
mother, the law would ignore the equally important physical realities of
pregnancy if it treated the fetus as an individual entirely separate from
his mother., 294 The court pointed to the difficulty of establishing an
objective, uniform standard of care for pregnant and potentially pregnant
women, noting the inevitable subjectivity of after-the-fact jury decisionmaking, which would lead to inconsistent and unpredictable jury verdicts, as well as the invasion of women's autonomy and right to control
their daily lives. 295 The court declared that recognizing a duty of women
toward their fetuses was the province of the legislature, which alone
could conduct the necessary "research and analysis of scientific and
296
medical data ...[and] evaluat[e] ...broad matters of public policy.
Finally, the court expressed the concern that imposing civil liability
might be counterproductive, because women who feared civil liability
might not be candid with their physicians, and thus would receive less
than adequate prenatal care.29 7
29 8 the Massachusetts Supreme
In 2004, in Remy v. MacDonald,
Judicial Court declined to permit a child to sue its mother for prenatal
harm.299 In Remy, the plaintiff alleged that her mother drove negligently
while pregnant, causing the plaintiff to be born prematurely with adverse
288.
289.
290.

Id.at 361.
Id.
Id.

291.
292.

989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475.

293.

Id.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.at 475-76.
Id.at 477-78.
Id. at 478.
Id.
801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004).
Remy, 801 N.E.2d at 266.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

health consequences. The court followed Stallman and Chenault, emphasizing the substantial disagreement about whether pregnant women
should be held liable for causing fetal harm, observing that there were
virtually unlimited circumstances in which a woman could be sued, and
declaring that there was no principled way to limit the liability of pregnant women for causing fetal harm to the motor vehicle context. 300 The
court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Grodin, Bonte, and National
Casualty Co., and found that courts should recognize "that there are inherent and important differences between a fetus, in utero, and a child
already born, that permits [sic] a bright line to be drawn around the zone
of potential tort' 30liability
of one who is still biologically joined to an in1
plaintiff.
jured
The approach of Remy, Stallman, and Chenault is similar to that set
forth by the Supreme Court of Canada, whose reasoning is instructive.
The Court has held consistently over the last fifteen years that a pregnant
woman and her fetus share a unique relationship, in which there is only
one legal person, rather than two persons with potentially adverse positions. 302 In Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.
(D.F.), the Court noted, "[T]he law has always treated the mother and
unborn child as one. To sue a pregnant woman on behalf of her unborn
fetus therefore posits the anomaly of one part of a legal and physical
entity suing itself., 30 3 In Dobson v. Dobson, the Court explained that
there was no principled way to limit the circumstances under which the
woman could be held liable, due to the extraordinarily close physical
proximity between the woman and her fetus, and the enormous range of
actions which the woman could take which could have a detrimental
effect on fetal development. 30 4 "Everything the pregnant woman eats' 30or5
drinks, and every physical action she takes, may affect the foetus.
The Court further identified two important public policy concerns "militat[ing] against the imposition of maternal tort liability for prenatal negligence[:] ... the privacy and autonomy rights of women and . . . the
difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial standard of conduct for
pregnant women. ' ' 30 6 The Court emphasized that simply because a
woman is pregnant, she does not lose "the right to make personal decisions, to control [her] ...bodily integrity, and to refuse unwanted medi300.

Id. at 264-66.

301.

Id. at 267.

302.
Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 IM
27-29 (holding that a pregnant woman addicted to solvents could not be civilly committed for treatment) and Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 174 D.L.R. (4th) I 1 (rejecting tort liability for a pregnant
woman who allegedly drove negligently, causing injury to her fetus and declaring that, "[t]he relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus is unique and innately recognized as one of great
and special importance to society").
303.
Winnipeg Child & Family Services, 3 S.C.R. at 27.
304.
See Dobson 174 D.L.R.. at 20.
305.
Id.at 27.
306.
Id. at 21.
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cal treatment.
The Court finally noted the difficulty in developing a
workable judicial standard of conduct for pregnant women, stating it
would be impossible to articulate an objective standard because the context of every pregnant woman's life is different, with women who are
well-educated and ignorant, rich and poor, with and without access to
good health care and good prenatal care. 308 The court observed that "the
reasonable pregnant woman" standard would inevitably be interpreted in
light of the trier of fact's prejudices about the proper conduct of pregnant
women. 309
2. Child Neglect and Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights
In contrast to the split over whether pregnant women should be liable for prenatal torts, all states agree that a woman's use of alcohol or
other drugs while pregnant is a proper trigger for taking custody of a
child as "neglected," and may be the basis for terminating her parental
rights.310 The jurisprudence in this area can be succinctly summarized:
"Courts rarely side with drug abusing parents where children are concerned."3 Courts do differ, however, over the jurisdictional question of
whether a fetus may be considered a child and the further question of
whether a woman's substance abuse during pregnancy is in itself sufficient to justify the loss of parental rights.31 2

307. Id.at 1 32 (citing the ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 955-56 (1993)).
308. Id. at 54.
309. Id.at 53.
310. Some states statutes explicitly authorize courts to consider prenatal substance abuse. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 19-3-102(l)(g) (West 2005) (declaring that a child is neglected or
dependent if it is born with controlled substances in its system); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 70011.3(14)(c) (West 2006) (declaring that a child born dependent on controlled substance is a "deprived
child"). Other states have achieved the same result through judicial interpretation of more general
child neglect criteria. See, e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (applying
CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE § 300 (a) (West 2006) to a child born to a mother who ingested drugs
during pregnancy); In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a newbom with a positive toxicology screen is per se an abused child under the Ohio civil child abuse
statute); see also In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (quoting N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (a) (iii) (1981)) (holding that allegations that a mother admitted drug use
while pregnant and that her infant had a positive toxicology test are sufficient to permit a child
neglect proceeding to go forward).
311.
Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent's Use of Drugs as Factor in A ward of Custody of
Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination ofParentalRights, 20 A.L.R. 5th 534, §2 [b] (2005).
312. In In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a woman's use of drugs
while pregnant could not, standing alone, justify the termination of her parental rights, and also
found that by taking the child away immediately after birth, the state made it impossible for the
mother to establish that she had an appropriate and ongoing relationship with her child. 613 A.2d
748, 752-53 (Conn. 1992). See also In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action No. S120171, 905 P.2d 555, 558 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "while chronic use of drugs or alcohol by either parent during the mother's pregnancy may reflect a pattern of substance abuse and may
be so telling of the kind of environment to which the child will be born as to justify the child's immediate removal from the parents at birth, chronic substance abuse during pregnancy in and of itself
does not reflect an inability to parent that would justify severance of a parent's fundamental rights");
see also supra text accompanying notes 201-13 (regarding the jurisdiction of juvenile and family
courts over fetuses, as opposed to children). Other courts have come to a different conclusion, cf In
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As always in child abuse and neglect cases, there are competing
goals and strategies, which are magnified in the case of parents 313 who
use alcohol and other drugs. The law's basic premise is that it is the
child's, rather than the parent's, best interests, which are paramount.
This leads to early intervention by child welfare authorities to protect a
child at risk,3 14 and means in practice that many courts have ruled that
children born with positive toxicology screens for illegal drugs and/or
other evidence of prenatal drug exposure may be temporarily removed
from their parents' custody.3 15 On the other hand, parental advocates
may urge a watchful waiting period and argue that more family support
services and drug treatment should be provided, in order to make it more
likely that children may remain with their parents, whose interest in the
enjoyment of a relationship with their children is constitutionally protected.316 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (AFSA) 3 17 gives
states financial incentives to expeditiously terminate parental rights, with
the laudable goal of not leaving children in foster care limbo while their
parents struggle to get their lives in order.318 Since the law translates "the
best interests of the child" as "less time spent in foster care," the result
has been faster termination of parental rights.31 9 Many commentators
have asserted that "the 12-month permanency clock for children ignores
the clock of treatment for addiction, which is at best 24 months," and that
the statute operates in a draconian and counter-productive manner in the

re Baby Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 464 (Ohio 2000), but in most cases there are factors in addition
to the mother's prenatal drug use that are cited in support of the decision to terminate parental rights.
See, e.g., In re W.A.B., 979 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
313.
It is important to remember that there are often two parents involved, and frequently that
the father is also a drug user or the one whose physical and emotional abuse exacerbates the
mother's vulnerability to drug use. See Francisco G. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the termination of a father's parental rights where his alcohol abuse and
domestic violence had not been addressed and he supported the mother's assertion that she did not
have a drug problem when there was overwhelming evidence to the contrary).
314.
See, e.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d at 284 ("[A] court cannot and should
not 'await broken bone or shattered psyche before extending its protective cloak around [a] child
pursuant to... article 10 of the Family Court Act ....' (citations omitted)). Courts have justified
their decision by citing the child's "right to begin life with a sound mind and body." Stallman, 531
N.E.2d at 358 (citations omitted).
315.
See, e.g., In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (holding that there was substantial evidence
to support the juvenile court's finding that a newborn was "in need of proper and effective parental
care or control" in light of the infant's positive toxicology results for opiates and amphetamines,
post-birth behavior which suggested prenatal drug exposure, and the mother's continued drug use
after losing custody of another child due to her drug use).
316.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In
re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1251 (N.J. 1999).
317.
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections in
42 U.S.C.A.).
318.
42 U.S.C.A § 671(a)(15) (West 2006).
319. See Laureen D'Ambra, Terminatingthe ParentalRights of the Mentally Disabled, 49 R. 1.
BAR. J. 5, 7 (2001) (discussing the law's shorter time frames for children to remain in foster care,
with the goal of promoting permanent placement for children); Dorothy Roberts, The Challengeof
SubstanceAbusefor Family PreservationPolicy, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 72, 73-76 (1999).
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case of drug-abusing women. 320 The AFSA's push for a quick decision
about termination of parental rights is also problematic in view of most
states' inadequate drug treatment resources. 321 Many drug treatment
programs are simply not tailored to mothers, who need both child care
and a treatment philosophy different from the "confrontational" and individually focused style typical of drug treatment programs designed
with the male drug addict in mind.32
B. The Failureto ProtectFetuses and Childrenfrom Work-Related
Harms
In contrast to the emphasis of prosecutors, child abuse agencies, and
some tort plaintiffs on the mother's body and behavior as the locus of
both fetal harm and protection, government and private actors have
largely been silent about systemic deficits in the American workplace
that place parents and their offspring at risk. Two aspects of workplace
life bear special scrutiny: the dangers to fetal and childhood development posed by male and female workers' exposure to toxic substances,
and the lack of economically viable parental leave policies, which prevent many parents from adequately addressing the health and emotional
needs of their newborns and young children.
1. Workplace Exposure to Hazardous Substances
Employers have responded to the risk that workplace exposure to
toxins and other dangerous substances will injure future children by en320. See Roberts, supra note 319, at 77, 86 (quoting Cornelia Grunman, Parents Give Advice
on Reforming DCFS; Agency Criticized at Panel Hearings, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1999, at Metro
Chicago 3).
321.
Federal law requires 5% of its Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block
Grant program to improve drug treatment access for pregnant women, but states may seek a waiver
of this requirement if they can show that there are no access problems. See 45 C.F.R. § 96.124
(1993)(c)-(d). Only 14% of the drug treatment facilities in the United States have program specifically designed to treat pregnant and postpartum women. OFFICE of APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003, DATA ON

SUBSTANCE
ABUSE
TREATMENT
FACILITIES
38
(Sept.
2004),
http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/04nssats/nssatsrpt_04.pdf. Compounding the lack of adequate treatment facilities for pregnant women, only 35% of the facilities had programs for persons needing
treatment for both substance abuse and mental illness. Id. at 37. Such individuals are especially
likely to fall through the cracks of government sponsored program, as legislation is usually targeted
at one, but not the other, of these illnesses. Georganne Chapin, Sanctioning Substance-Abusing
Home Relief Clients with the Loss of Medical Benefits-Legal and Policy Concerns, 7 N.Y.S. BAR
ASS'N HEALTH L. J. 35, 39 (Spring 2002).
322. See Roberts, supra note 319, at 78; Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 262 (1999); Kathryn T. Jones, PrenatalSubstance Abuse:
Oregon 's ProgressiveApproach to Treatment and Child Protection Can Support Children, Women
and Families, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 797 (1999); Holly A. Hills, Deborah Rugs & M. Scott
Young, Justice, Ethics, and InterdisciplinaryTeaching and Practice:The Impact ofSubstance Abuse
Disorderson Women Involved in Dependency Court, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 359 (2004); Jane C.
Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance Abuse and Child Welfare: The Legal
System's Response, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 88 (1999).
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acting "fetal protection" policies limiting the exposure of women of
child-bearing age to such substances.323 The Supreme Court ruled in
1991 in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls3 24 that a fetal
protection policy which excludes women from the workplace as a means
of reducing the risk that a child will be harmed by prenatal toxic exposure constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.325 The employer's actions will be illegal unless the
employer can demonstrate that its policy is a bona fide occupational
qualification, that is, "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business." 326 However, many employers still implement
"fetal protection" policies, admitting in effect that they would rather be
sued for sex discrimination than for damages for causing prenatal injury.32 7 These employers continue to focus exclusively on the risks of
harm to future children posed via the female body (including harm to the
woman's reproductive system and to the fetus) rather than acknowledge
the harm that many substances pose to the male reproductive system.
However, when studies show that a substance poses harm to the male
reproductive system, industry and government frequently have acted to
ban the substance entirely.32 8
2. Parenting Leaves
American law has also failed to mandate paid parenting leaves,
which would permit parents to take care of newborns, as well as older
children who become ill. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) 329 requires employers of more than fifty employees to grant
323.
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (West 2006),
and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (West 2006), both mandate that
the government set safe levels of workplace exposure to many dangerous substances, both acts have
been weakened by court rulings about the level of scientific proof required for the government to
demonstrate "significant risk." See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that before promulgating any occupational safety and health standard, the Secretary of Labor must find that there are "significant risks"
in a workplace which can be eliminated or decreased by a change in the standard).
324.
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
325.
Johnson Controls,499 U.S. at 207.
326.
Id. at 200 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)(1)). In Johnson Controls,the defendant company manufactured batteries, in which lead was a major ingredient. Although the company initially
permitted pregnant women to work in the manufacturing process, informing them of the dangers of
lead exposure, after eight women tested with higher blood lead levels than recommended by OSHA,
the company issued a "fetal protection" policy. This policy excluded "'all women except those
whose inability to bear children is medically documented,"' but it made no provision for men to
lower their lead exposure, which has also been shown to pose a risk of fetal harm. Id.at 190-92.
327.
Draper, supra note 265, at 121.
328.
The pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB), for example, was cancelled because of its oncogenic and mutagenic risks, as well as reproductive risks to male workers. See EPA Limitation on
Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,234 (Oct. 11, 1983); see also OS14A Limitation on Levels of
Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,956 (Department of Labor document regarding EDB's effects on male reproductive capacity); cf Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187
(1991).
329.
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A, 5
U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.C.A.).
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employees up to twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave for the birth or
adoption of a child or for reasons related to illness, 330 many critics assert
that this is insufficient to support vulnerable children in need of parental
attention and that the unpaid character of such parental leave means that
existing race and class hierarchies are not remedied. 33 1 The United
States' policy stands in marked contrast to those of other developed na332
tions, which give much more generous leaves to working parents.
Almost half of American workers are not covered by the FMLA,333 and
even among those who are, only a fraction avail themselves of its leave
provisions, because they cannot afford not to work.334 No federal law
mandates paid parental leave for the period connected with pregnancy,
childbirth, and the early stages of infancy, 335 and California and Ohio are
the only two states to mandate any form of paid parental leave.336 In
contrast, other developed nations either mandate or offer paid parenting
leave, at least for some portion of this critical stage of fetal and childhood health and development, 337 and many countries offer additional
financial or child-care support to single parents, those who are most
likely to need leave from work to care for a newborn or ill3 3child
and are
8
simultaneously the least likely to be able to afford to do SO.
America's failure to provide paid leave for child-bearing and parenting is both physically and socially harmful to children, as well as economically short-sighted. Many studies indicate that breast-feeding provides important health benefits to newborns,339 and it is certainly much

330.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(4)(a)(i) (West 2006) (defining "Employer" as any person employing more than 50 people); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(B), (C) (entitling an employee to 12 weeks
leave for the birth or adoption of a child).
331.
Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience:
Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 219, 222-31 (2004) [hereinafter
Ten Years of Experience].
332. Id. at 231-36.
333.
Erin Gielow, Note, Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1539 (2002)
334.
Id. at 1546.
335.
In April 2006, Representative Caroline Maloney introduced HR 5148, the Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act. The Act would ensure paid leave for 6 of the 12 weeks that federal
employees are authorized to take parental leave. H.R. 5148, 109th Cong. (2006) (referred to H.
Comm. on Gov't Reform), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5148:.
336.
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.136 (West
2006) (providing that permanent government employees shall receive 70% of their salary for four of
the six weeks in which they are authorized to take parental leave).
337.
Dowd, supra note 331 at 233-36 (summarizing European Union law, and comparing, inter
alia, the approach of France, which mandates maternity leave and provides much more generous
paid leaves to mothers than to fathers, and Sweden, which is gender-neutral in its paid parenting
leave policies); see also Naomi S. Stem, The Challengesof ParentalLeave Reforms for French and
American Women: A Callfor a Revived Feminist-SocialTheory, 28 VT. L. REV. 321, 324-25 (2004)
(describing the French statutory scheme).
338.
Gielow, supra note 333, at 1547.
339.
American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Breast Feeding and the Use of Human Milk, I 15 PEDIATRICS 496, 496-97 (2005); see also Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the
American Workplace, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 471, 474-76 (2001); Judy Heymann,
Editorial, We Can Afford to Give Parentsa Break, WASH. POST, May 14, 2006, at B07.
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easier to breastfeed when not working full-time. 340 Both newborns and
older children whose health needs are not met promptly are likely to be
sicker for longer periods of time, adding to state and federal health care
expenditures. 341 In addition, parents who are distracted by ill children
left at home may be less productive workers.342 Studies of parental leave
practices in other countries show that parents who are given generous
paid leaves to care for their children rarely abuse it, 343 and that children,
parents, and employers benefit when the law provides a framework for
parents to care for their children's health without jeopardizing the familial economy. 3 "
C. EnvironmentalExposures
Children and fetuses are exposed to an astounding number of toxins,
teratogens, mutagens, and carcinogens in the environment.345 While the
full effects of these exposures are not yet known,34 6 and a comprehensive
discussion of environmental hazards is beyond the scope of this paper,
one recent example of government actions putting children at risk is instructive. In March 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
promulgated the so-called Clean Air Mercury Rule,34 7 which reversed a
2000 EPA rule and substantially expanded the ability of American power
plants to continue to emit mercury and other toxic air pollutants. The
EPA announced that coal- and oil-burning power plants were not subject
to the requirements of §112 of the Clean Air Act, which would have required them to install new equipment to reduce mercury emissions. Instead, the new rule created a complicated system of "cap-and-trade" pol340. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 339 at 498; Christrup, supra note 339, at
480-81.
341.
Cf KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 12 (citing a study in
Washington State showing that children who lack health care insurance were less likely than those
who do to have had a clinic or physician visit within six months and are twice as likely to have
received care at an emergency room during the same period).
342.
See Gielow, supra note 333, at 1541-43.
343.
DECKER, supra note 64, at 10 ("Contrary to the widely held belief that employees would
abuse a liberal leave policy, the average usage rate of [Sweden's generous leave policy, which is 90
days per year to care for a sick child] ... is seven days a year.").
344.
See Gielow, supra note 333, at 1540-42.
345.
In recognition of the risks posed by these exposures, in 1997 President Clinton formed a
Task Force on Environmental Health and Safety Risks to Children, to improve inter-agency cooperation within the federal government to provide greater protections for children's health. Exec. Order
No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (April 23, 1997).
346.
Robert L. Brent & Michael Weitzman, The CurrentState of Knowledge About the Effects,
Risks, and Science of Children's Environmental Exposures, 113 PEDIATRICS 1158, 1159, 1164-65
(2004), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/1 13/4/Sl/1 158 (noting the wide
range of conclusions reached about the risk that pesticides and other environmental toxicants pose to
children, urging that more, carefully controlled, studies be undertaken to evaluate issues such as the
susceptibility of children compared with adults, the impact of exposure to multiple environmental
hazards, and observing that where there is sufficient data to act, as in the case of lead, there is no
reason to delay).
347.
Mark D. Sullivan & Christine A. Fazio, The EPA 's New Clean Air Rules: Mixed Results
for Air Quality, N.Y. ST. B.J. 11, 15 (Jan. 2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
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lution allowances which permitted the power plants to increase their
mercury pollution by purchasing emissions allowances from other facilities.34 8 Since half of all Americans live within thirty miles of a coalburning power plant, children and their families living near a power plant
were likely to be exposed to substantially more mercury emissions than
they are now. 9 Eleven states filed suit to invalidate the new Rule.350
Congressional critics also sought to overturn the Rule, citing the
significant risks that mercury poses to fetuses and children. They noted
that mercury was a recognized neurotoxin, which causes devastating
effects on fetuses and young children because it interferes with normal
brain development. They further noted that 4.9 million women of childbearing age have elevated levels of mercury, 630,000 infants are born
with elevated mercury levels, and 1,500 children are born each year with
mental retardation due to in utero exposure to mercury.3 5' Ultimately,
this Congressional effort was defeated. Although EPA agreed to reconsider the rule,352 in May 2006 the agency reaffirmed its original posi353
tion.
D. Lack of Health Care Access in the UnitedStates andIts
Consequences
1. Uninsured Children and Adults
Americans continue to lack health insurance coverage in record
numbers. In 2005, 51.4 million Americans (almost 18%) were uninsured
for at least some part of the previous year, and 29.3 million (more than
10%) had been uninsured for more than a year.354 Although children
were more likely than adults to have health insurance, 9.2 million chil348.

Sullivan & Fazio, supra note 347, at 15-16; Kim McGuire, New Mercury Rules Decried,

Environmental Coalition PlansLawsuits over EPA Changes, Activists Say the New Limits Will Allow
More Mercury Pollutionfrom Coal-Burning Power Plants-Which They Say Violates the Clean Air
Act, DENVER POST, May 18, 2005, at B-02.
349.
Mark Clayton, In Bid to Cut Mercury, US Lets Other Toxins Through, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2005, at 13, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/

0331/pl3sOl-sten.html (noting also that coal-fired power plants also emit many other serious pollutants, including "vanadium, barium, zinc, nickel, hydrogen fluoride, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, and
selenium").

350.
Don Hopey, 11 States Sue EPA on Mercury Rules: PennsylvaniaJoins suit Saying Emission Standards Inadequate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 19, 2005, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05139/507051 .stm.
351.
Senate Debate on Disapproval of EPA Rule Promulgation, 151 CONG. REC. S9912,
S9913-14 (2005).
352.
Sullivan & Fazio, supra note 347, at 16.
353.

EPA, FINAL RULE RECONSIDERING TWO MERCURY ACTIONS: (1) RECONSIDERATION OF

RULE REVISING EARLIER REGULATORY FINDING AND REMOVING CERTAIN ELECTRIC STEAM
GENERATING UNITS FROM THE LIST OF SOURCE CATEGORIES; AND (2) RECONSIDERATION OF THE
CLEAN
AIR
MERCURY
RULE
FACT
SHEET
1,
2
(May
31,
2006),
http://www.epa.gov/air/mercuryrule/pdfs/fs20060531 .pdf.
354.
ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2005 1
(Mar. 2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur200603.pdf.
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dren (more than 12%) lacked health insurance for some portion of the
year and an additional 3.9 million (more than 5%) had been without
health care coverage for more than a year.355 There are also substantial
racial and ethnic disparities in insurance status, with Hispanics suffering
the greatest access problems, although African-Americans also lagged
behind their white counterparts. One-third of all Hispanics were uninsured for at least part of the previous year and one-quarter lacked health
care coverage for more than a year. 356 About 13% of pregnant women
lack health insurance coverage, 357 despite efforts to expand Medicaid
during the last two decades.358 Medicaid does insure a greater proportion
of pregnant than non-pregnant women,359 and pays for a third of all
American births.3 6 °
The consequences of lack of health insurance for adults and children are profound. While prenatal care is seen as an important factor in
leading to good birth-outcomes, 36' many poor and low-income American
women continue to lack prenatal care,362 and those who receive some
prenatal care often receive it late in pregnancy, when it is less effective.363 Similarly, while pediatricians and health policymakers agree that
well-child visits are essential to providing necessary screening and other
preventative care, 364 half of uninsured children fail to have even one
well-child visit a year.365 Children with private health insurance coverage are much more likely to have received all necessary immunizations
than those who are uninsured or have government health insurance.366
355.
Id. at 8. This percentage that has not changed since 2002. Id. at 2-3.
356. Id. at 4. See also URBAN INSTITUTE, HEALTH INSURANCE TRENDS (2005), available at
http://www.urban.org/tookit/issues/healthinsurance.cfm?renderforprint--l.
357.
KENNETH E. THORPE, JENNIFER FLOME & PETER JOSKI, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH
INSURANCE
COVERAGE AMONG
PREGNANT WOMEN,
1999 5-6 (2001), available at

http://www.marchofdimes.com/files/2001FinalThorpeReport.pdf.
pregnant women lacked Medicaid coverage in 1999. Id. at 10.

Forty-seven percent of poor

358.
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 5; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-10: PRENATAL CARE: EARLY SUCCESS IN ENROLLING WOMEN MADE

ELIGIBLE
BY
MEDICAID
EXPANSIONS
7-8
(Feb.
1991),
available
at
http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/143346.pdf (describing legislative changes).
359.
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supranote 32.
360. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, MATERNAL AND
CHILD HEALTH UPDATE 2002: STATE HEALTH COVERAGE FOR LOW-INCOME PREGNANT WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND PARENTS 1 (June 10, 2003), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/MCHUPDATE02.pdf.
361.
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supranote 32.
362. Id.
363.
Id. at 8-9 (analyzing results of Medicaid expansions of the 1980's and early 1990's).
364. See, e.g., MEDICAID FACTS, supra note 29, at 1. The American Academy of Pediatrics
recommends that children receive 10-11 well-child visits before the age of three, in order for pediatricians to monitor child behavior and development and prevent illness and behavioral and educational problems in the future. Steven Blumberg, Neal Halfon, & Lynn M. Olson, National Survey of
Early Childhood Health, NationalSurvey of Early ChildhoodHealth: Parents' Views on Preventive
Care for Infants and Toddlers, 113 PEDIATRICS
1899 (2004), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/I 13/6/S1/1899.
365.
URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356.
366.
National Survey of Early Childhood Health, National Survey of Early Childhood Health:
Parents' Views on Preventive Carefor Infants and Toddlers, supra note 364, at 6.

2006]

THE NEW "FETAL PROTECTION"

2. Medicaid and SCHIP Need Improvement
Medicaid is a partnership between state and federal governments,
which provides health insurance to the very poorest of American children
and adults, persons with disabilities, and elderly needing long-term
care. 367 All states participating in Medicaid agree to provide the same set
of federally mandated services for children,368 which are known as Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Services (EPSDT).36 9
These provide essential care for children, particularly those with disabilities and other special needs. 370 However, many children have not received the mandated EPDST benefits, either because they cannot find a
physician willing to accept the low Medicaid reimbursement rates, 371 or
because some states have failed to adequately define the EPSDT services
in their managed care contracts.3 72 Several suits have been brought by
groups of parents challenging the denial of benefits,3 73 but it has been an
uphill struggle to ensure that children enrolled in Medicaid receive all the
367.

For a good overview of the Medicaid program, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

GAO-01-749,

MEDICAID: STRONGER EFFORTS NEEDED TO ENSURE CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO

HEALTH SCREENING SERVICES 1-8 (July 2001) [hereinafter GAO, MEDICAID REPORT].
368.
States differ in the extent to which they provide covered services to the near-poor, as well
as the desperately poor. For example, all states provide coverage to parents who earn no more than
the Federal Poverty Level, which is $16,600 for a family of three in the Lower Forty-Eight states.
Only 14 states have raised their eligibility levels about the Federal Poverty Level. NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, POOR PARENTS ON MEDICAID TARGETED FOR CUTS 1-2 & 3 n.8

(Feb.

2006), availableat http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/FSPoorParentsTargeted_06.06.pdf.
369.
Some state variation is permitted in what services are covered under the rubric of "family
planning," which includes birth control, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, and sterilization,
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, MEDICAID, BIRTH CONTROL AND WOMEN'S HEALTH I & 2 n.2

(Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/FSMedicaidBirthControlandWomens
Health_05.31.06.pdf, thus risking reversal of recent gains in health outcomes for children and their
parents, including the decrease in the rate of teenage pregnancy. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION,
2005
KIDS
COUNT
POCKET
GUIDE
7
(2005),
available
at
http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/sld/db05_pdfs/entire db.pdf (noting that the teen birth rate has steadily declined since 1991, reaching its lowest level ever, 43 births per 1,000, in 2002). Medicaid
provides two-thirds of all federal and state family planning funding. NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER, MEDICAID, BIRTH CONTROL AND WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra at 1.

370.
See MEDICAID FACTS, supra note 29, at 1. EPSDT services provide all necessary preventative, diagnostic, and screening care necessary to prevent and treat acute and chronic health conditions, including both physical and mental ailments. Medicaid's goal in insisting that they be provided is not only to ameliorate individual patient suffering, but also to prevent the development of
more serious health problems, which are both expensive and debilitating. Id.
371.
ld. at 2.
372. Id. Some contend that the increased enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries into managed
care is the source of this failure, id, while others assert that managed care enhances access to health
care services, because Medicaid beneficiaries now have a medical home, rather than being forced to
hunt for a provider willing to accept the historically low Medicaid fees. See Vernon Smith & Linda
Hamacher, The "Good Olde Days" of Fee-for-Service Were Not So Good After All: Managed Care
Has Made Things Better 3, 6-8 (Ass'n of Health Ctr. Affiliated Health Plans, Working Paper, May
2003), availableat http://www.ahcahp.org/publications/Working/20Papers/ffs%/20is /20bad.pdf.
373.
Suits have been brought in at least 28 states. See GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note
367, at 9; see, e.g., Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cit. 2002) (holding that
parents could seek injunctive relief against Michigan and managed care organizations with which
Michigan had contracted to enforce the children's rights to receive EPSDT services); see also Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (upholding a federal court consent decree in which Texas health
officials agreed to provide EPSDT services to the more than one million child beneficiaries of the
Texas Medicaid program, many of whom received services via managed care).
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services to which they are entitled. 374 Other barriers to health care access
under Medicaid are discussed below.
The State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was inaugurated in 1997, with the goal of giving states additional options in addressing the health care needs of children. In contrast to Medicaid, whose
recipients are entitled to receive all mandated EPSDT services, SCHIP
permits states to offer a less generous package of benefits, with the goal
of reaching a larger group of enrollees.375 SCHIP also authorizes states
to provide services to the low-income parents of eligible children, and
this opportunity for parental enrollment has increased the number of
children who receive health care services.37 6 However, children's health
advocates, notably Sara Rosenbaum, have strongly criticized the SCHIP
program for 77promising more than it actually delivers in terms of services
to children.
Unlike Medicaid,378 the SCHIP program can be curtailed if states
decide it is too generous or that they cannot afford it.3 79 In the late
1990s, when the economy was strong, many states engaged in significant
outreach activities, and Medicaid and SCHIP enrollments boomed, even
though many eligible children and families were still not enrolled in the
programs. 380 But as the economy faltered in the early twenty-first century, many states began to face large budget deficits. They scrambled to
limit enrollment in SCHIP, either by freezing enrollment numbers, increasing procedural obstacles to enrollment, imposing cost-sharing
measures, or limiting outreach activities.381 As a result, SCHIP enrollment has fallen dramatically in many states.382
Further, as a result of the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005,383 federal and state spending on Medicaid will be significantly
curtailed,3 84 and some Medicaid enrollees will have to spend much more

374.
375.

GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 1-2, 7-8.
Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 18-21.

376.

KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 9-10.

377.
Rosenbaum, Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 18-21.
378.
Medicaid provides states with some flexibility in provision of services through its waiver
procedures, but historically it has been difficult for states to make major cuts in services. However,
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171, has made significant changes in Medicaid. See
discussion infra in text accompanying notes 384-388. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID 1-3 (Feb. 2006),
[hereinafter KAISER, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT], available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
7465.pdf.
379.
380.
381.

KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 2.
KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 2,4
KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 1-2.

382.
Id.; see also KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, 1-4.
383.
Pub. L. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (signed by President Bush Feb. 8, 2006).
384.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates $4.8 billion in reductions over the period
2006 - 2010 and $26.1 billion over the next ten years. See KAISER, DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, supra
note 379, at 1.
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out of pocket for their health care.38 5 Congress made major changes in
Medicaid, permitting states to charge families with incomes greater than
150% of the federal poverty level ($24,900 for a family of three in 2006)
premiums and cost-sharing (co-pays, etc.) for health care services, although these cost-sharing requirements are not to be applied to pregnant
women and certain eligible children.3 86 In addition, the law makes it
harder for certain groups of children to receive the preventative EPSDT
services previously mandated.3 87
3. Insurance Alone is Not the Answer
Two decades of research on Medicaid and SCHIP have shown that
merely making government insurance available is insufficient to ensure
adequate care, for a number of reasons. 388 First, because Medicaid was
originally conceived of as part of the welfare system, it lacks necessary
political support,389 and many health care professionals choose not to
participate because of the very low reimbursement rates.3 9 ° Medicaid
recipients often feel stigmatized, and many eligible families are discouraged from enrolling. 391 As noted, in some states, the shift of poor children and families into Medicaid and SCHIP managed care programs has
created access and service problems which parallel those of middle class
families in managed care,392 with children failing to receive preventative
screenings or other mandated services.393 In other states, however,
Medicaid managed care delivers better health care services to its enrol-

385. Although it appears that the primary impact of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA)
will be to curtail government spending on behalf of elderly and disabled adults, the DRA will also
affect some children and their families. Id. at 1-6.
386. Id. at 1-3.
387.
Id. at 3.
388.
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 32, at 5.
389.

John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 340 N. E. J. MED. 403,

407 (1999) (noting that "Medicaid underscores the ambivalence of a society that continually struggles with the question of which citizens deserve access to publicly financed medical care, and under
what conditions").
390.
GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supranote 367, at 13-14.
391.
Alexandra Marks, Healthcare 'Crisis' Grows for Middle Class, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2002, at USA 3; Lauren Terrazzano, More Kids Uninsured; L.I. Is One of the
Nation's Richest Areas But Its Children Are Insurance-Poorin GreaterNumbers, NEWSDAY, Aug.

20, 2005, at A08.
392.
Some access problems are inevitable in a system which provides disincentives to treat.
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (describing the incentives inherent in both managed

care and fee-for-service medicine). For a fuller discussion of the problems of managed care, see
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN, & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
POLICY 1180-1298 (2d ed. 1998). Of course, one should be cautious in bashing managed care, since
the fee-for-service health care system also has undesirable incentives, particularly to over-treat,
which can be equally bad for patient well-being. Id. at 160-83.
393.
GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 9-10, 12-13. For example, only 19% of
Medicaid enrolled children five and under had been screened for lead poisoning, even though this
group of children is "almost five times more likely than others to have a harmful blood lead level."
Id. at 12. Only a fifth of eligible children aged two to five had visited a dentist within the previous

year. Id.
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lees than the traditional fee-for-service model.394 In any case, since
Medicaid and SCHIP enrollees are frequently less well-educated, lack
child care and convenient transportation, and are not native English
speakers, it may be difficult for them to receive all of the care to which
they are entitled.395
Further, either by design or inadvertence, Medicaid and SCHIP
have substantial barriers to enrollment and utilization. These include
complex eligibility rules (including in many states, denial of eligibility if
the parents have even limited assets), cumbersome forms to fill out at
inconvenient locations, and requirements of frequent reenrollment, as
often as every six months.3 96 SCHIP permits enrollees to be charged
premiums or co-payments.39 7 This can be a significant burden for lowincome families enrolled in SCHIP. 398 Although it is necessary to ensure
that enrollees meet the statutory means tests, and to acknowledge the
possibility of "crowd-out" (the phenomenon by which consumers shift
from privately funded health insurance to public programs),3 99 if concerns about fraud or crowd-out become a major focus, many children
will not have access to health care.400
4. Inadequate Substance Abuse Programs
The resources presently available to treat women who abuse alcohol
and other drugs are woefully inadequate. There are three major problems
with most substance abuse programs: 1) they fail to recognize the significant relationship between domestic violence and women's mental
illness and substance abuse; 40 1 2) they do not take into account the differing treatment needs of men and women; 40 2 and 3) they do not provide the
complementary support necessary for pregnant women and mothers to
succeed in beating their addiction.40 3 Only 14% of the drug treatment

394.

See, e.g., Patrick J. Roohan et al., Quality Measurement in Medicaid Managed Care and

Fee-for-Service, the New York State Experience, 21 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 185 (2006); Smith &
Hamacher, supra note 372.
395.
GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra note 367, at 14.
396.

KAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supra note 160, at 4-10 (summarizing recent

changes made by states in Medicaid and SCHIP and their impact on enrollment).
397.
Id. at 7, 13.
398.
Id. at 6-8.
399.
Id. at 14-15. For a general discussion of the crowd-out phenomenon, see John V. Jacobi,
Government Reinsurance Programs and Consumer-Driven Care, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 571-73
(2005).
400. See URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356.
401.
Only 35% of drug treatment facilities in the United States have programs for persons
needing treatment for both substance abuse and mental illness. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-SSATS): 2003, DATA ON
SUBSTANCE
ABUSE
TREATMENT
FACILITIES
4
(Sept.
2004),
available
at

http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/03nssats/nssats-rpt_03.pdf.
402.
See id.
403.
See id.
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facilities in the United States have programs specifically designed to treat
pregnant and postpartum women.
Many women who abuse alcohol and other drugs were sexually
abused or beaten as children and have significant mental health and selfesteem issues, which make it much more likely that they will misuse
drugs.4 °5 Without acknowledgement of the causal connections between
domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental illness and active intervention to prevent current domestic violence from continuing, women
will not receive the support necessary to recover from addiction and
mental illness.40 6 Those who work in the government agencies that deal
with domestic violence victims, including police, hospital staff, and social workers need more training in understanding the broad context of
domestic violence, in order for their interventions to be appropriate and
effective.40 7
Many drug treatment programs are not designed with the needs of
women in mind. For example, traditional confrontational approaches,
effective with male drug addicts, do not work well with women,40 8 and
women also have better treatment outcomes in programs that are for
women only. 40 9 For women who are long-term abusers, residential programs are most effective, 410 but these programs must take into account
the needs of women with children.411 Child care, housing, health care,
job training, and other vital supports are necessary if women are to stay
"clean" and become self-sufficient.412 Further, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act should be amended to provide an exemption from its strict
time limits, to acknowledge that addiction recovery does not fit neatly
into the statutory timetable.4 13 Finally, more programs must emphasize
prevention, to treat addicted women before they become pregnant.4 14
5. The Consequences of America's Inadequate Health Care System
Research over the last several decades has made clear the consequences of inadequate health care for America's women and children.
Both maternal and infant mortality are higher in the United States than in
404.
Id.
405.
Paltrow, supra note 12, at 477; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 1.
406.
WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supranote 12, at 3.
407.
Id.
408.
SANDRA L. BLOOM, THE PVS DISASTER: POVERTY, VIOLENCE, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 165 (2002).
409.
Id. at 164; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12, at 5, 23.
410.
BLOOM, supra note 408, at 108 (citing M. Daley et al., The Impact of Substance Abuse

Treatment Modality on Birth Weight and Health Care Expenditures, 33 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS
57-66 (2001)).
411.
BLOOM, supra note 408, at 164.
412.
Id. (citing NAT'L INST. OF DRUG ADDICTION, TREATMENT METHODS FOR WOMEN 13652
(1999)).

413.

See generally Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies, supra note 9.

414.

See generally WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, supra note 12.
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many other nations.4 15 American children are more likely to be bom preterm and at low or very low birthweight,4 16 and are less likely to have
preventative doctors' visits, obtain necessary immunizations, and access
necessary reproductive and mental health care.417 Study after study has
shown that a focus on pregnant women as a vehicle for ensuring healthy
children is too little, too late. Instead, comprehensive solutions, which
address the systemic failure to take care of America's children, must be
developed.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If we are to truly assist children to become healthy adults who are
able to embrace life's opportunities, we must explore new ways of thinking about the health of children and the women who bear and raise them.
There are six areas where change is crucial: ending poverty, providing
universal health care, expanding substance abuse prevention and treatment programs, enhancing environmental and workplace protections,
instituting no-fault compensation for children who are harmed in utero,
and ending criminal and civil actions against pregnant women who may
be placing their fetuses at risk.
End Poverty
Even making this recommendation seems both naive and incredibly
ambitious; yet it is an inescapable fact that being poor has serious adverse consequences for children's health and development. Children
living in poverty (who are also more likely to be malnourished and
homeless) have more learning disabilities and mental retardation, lower
IQs, and higher rates of mental illness, behavioral problems, and greater
physical health problems, than middle-income children. 418 The effects of
childhood poverty continue through adulthood, perpetuating the cyclical
connection between inadequate parental income and childhood disease
and dysfunction.41 9 With twelve million American children living in
families with incomes less than the federal poverty level (and five mil-

See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
IOM Report, supra note 55.
417.
KAISER, ENROLLING CHILDREN, supra note 57, at 1; GAO, MEDICAID REPORT, supra
note 367, at 9, 12-13.
418.
Charles Oberg, Maternal & Child Health Program, School of Public Health, University of
Minnesota, The Impact of ChildhoodPoverty on Health andDevelopment, HEALTHY GENERATIONS,
May 2003, at 2 & 3 nn.7-10; See also Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Trajectories of
Poverty andChildren'sMental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 207, 207 (1996).
419.
Anne Case, Darren Lubotsky & Christina Paxson, Economic Status and Health in Childhood: The Origins of the Gradient, 92 AM. ECON. REVIEW 1308, 1308-09 (2002). Studies indicate
that malnutrition in utero has significant life-time consequences, which actually are more pronounced as people age. See Gina Kolata, So Big andHealthy Nowadays, Grandpa Wouldn't Know
You, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at Al.
415.
416.
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lion of those children living on less than half that amount),42 ° intervention is critical.
Provide UniversalHealth Care
Universal health care coverage is essential if we are to provide children with the health care services necessary for them to grow, learn, and
develop into healthy and productive adults, who in turn will have healthy
children of their own. While there are many historical and philosophical
reasons for America's reliance on the market to provide health care for
its citizens,42 ' we can no longer afford to ignore the health care needs of
the one-sixth of the population who lack health insurance of any kind.422
Estimates of the cost of providing health care coverage for all Americans
range from thirty-three to sixty-nine billion dollars annually, 423 potentially less than the amount the American government currently spends on
the war in Iraq. 424 While several states have recently enacted laws expanding health care coverage 425 a comprehensive solution requires a federal effort.
At the very least, a uniform federal health care program for children
with a comprehensive set of benefits and services should be established.42 6 This would avoid the cyclical contractions and expansions of
state Medicaid and SCHIP programs which presently accompany economic upswings and downturns and make it difficult for states to pay for
420.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDHOOD POVERTY, MAILMAN SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
WHO ARE AMERICA'S POOR CHILDREN
1, available at

http://www.nccp.org/pubcptO5b.html.
421.
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Why Can't We Do What They Do? National Health Reform
Abroad, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 433 (2004).
422.
URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356 (finding that 46.6 million Americans did not have
insurance in 2005). As a practical matter, the uninsured do receive some health care through emergency room visits. Such care is expensive and often time-consuming. It is estimated that one-third
of the care provided at hospital emergency departments is inappropriate. Ceci Connolly, Some
FindingNo Room at the ER; Screening Out Non-Urgent Cases Stirs Controversy, WASH. POST, Apr.
26, 2004, at AO1. The high costs of providing emergency room care required under EMTALA, the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, and state anti-dumping laws are borne by
hospitals and ultimately, the tax-payer. See Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (N.Y 2001)
(discussing the problem of immigrants who are denied care until their medical situation becomes an
emergency).
423.
URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 356. These estimates appear to be in 2004 dollars. If it is
not possible to establish health care for the entire population immediately, then, at a minimum, full
coverage for children's health care should be established now, before the mass of Baby Boomers age
into retirement, Medicare, and the need for long-term care.
424.
In February, 2006, the Department of Defense stated that it was spending $4.5 billion a
month (or $54 billion a year) on the Iraq war. Mark Mazetti & Joel Haveman, Iraq War is Costing
$100,000 per Minute, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006; Mark Silva, $70 Billion Soughtfor War Costs;
White House Says Another $50 Billion Neededfor 2007, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2006, at C1.
425.
The most notable are the Massachusetts Health Care Access and Affordability Act, ch.. 58
(2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sI060058.htm, and the Maryland Fair
Share Health Care Fund Act, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-101 et. seq, partiallyinvalidated
by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006) (finding the act preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
426.
The Medicaid EPSDT program should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling. See Rosenbaum,
Markus & Sonosky, supra note 29, at 43; see also supra text accompanying notes 370-401.
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adequate health care in times of fiscal exigency.4 27 With national universal coverage, children will not lose access to vital health services because
their parents move or change jobs, fail to fill out cumbersome paperwork, earn slightly more or less income, or are unable to afford premiums and co-payments. 2 s Further, boys and girls who receive good
health care will become adults who are more likely to bear healthy children.
Ultimately, however, if we want to meet the goal of having more
American children in good health, it will be necessary to provide health
care for all adults as well. Issues of nutrition, infertility, sterility, sexually transmitted diseases, and reproductive problems must be addressed
in the adult population if we are to achieve better birth outcomes.
Provide Expanded and TargetedSubstance Abuse Programsfor Pregnant Women andAddicts Who Are Likely to Become Pregnant
As noted above, substance abuse education and treatment programs
must be expanded and improved in order to serve both addicted women
and the children they bear. Treatment which takes into account the special needs of women with drug and alcohol problems
has been shown to
429
be effective and to save money over the long run.
Improve Environmental, Workplace, and Public Health Protections
At the same time, medical treatment alone is insufficient to ensure
children's health. Environmental, workplace, and other public health
laws must be strengthened to protect children from exposure to toxic
substances, whether exposure is in utero or after birth. In addition, the
government should mandate paid parental leave so that parents will be
able to care for their children when they are infants or ill.
Establish a No-FaultProgramto Compensate Children Who Suffer PrenatalHarm
One way that the government can respect the autonomy of pregnant
women, compensate children who are harmed due to prenatal injury or
exposure to toxic substances, and respond to the fears of employers and
others about tort liability is to establish a national prenatal injury compensation program. Such a program could be funded by modest contributions by employers and manufacturers of toxic substances, including
alcohol. Such a program could be modeled on the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury (NCVI) program, 430 enacted in 1986 to encourage vac427.
428.

Smith & Hamacher, supra note 372, at 12-13.
See generallyKAISER, IN A TIME OF GROWING NEED, supranote 160.

429.
BLOOM, supra note 408, at 163-75.
430.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-33, created a
program to provide compensation children injured by state-mandated vaccines, as a means of ensuring that children who suffer injury from vaccination will be compensated, that parents will be en-
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cine manufacturers to continue producing vaccines for childhood diseases while simultaneously compensating the small number of children
who were injured as a result of vaccination, and thus reassure parents
who might otherwise decide not to vaccinate their children. The NCVI
has proved extraordinarily successful in meeting all three of its goals,
and has been touted as a model for other tort-based consumer protection
problems. 4 3 1
The program I propose acknowledges that women, men, and children face risks from the food and drink they consume, the environment,
and the workplace, and that manufacturers of dangerous substances
should be held responsible for the harm caused by in utero exposure,
even when they try to minimize those risks. Children who suffer harm
from an otherwise socially desired or valued product must be compensated, just as they are under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Program. The proposed program would involve a compromise, limiting
liability of manufacturers and employers in exchange for guaranteeing
compensation to prenatally injured children. These trade-offs are superior to the current approach of excluding women from the workplace or
otherwise penalizing women for their conduct during pregnancy. Manufacturers would have an incentive to minimize the exposure to the toxic
substances they use and produce, whether it is lead used to make batteries, mercury and other environmental contaminants, nicotine and tar in
cigarettes, or alcohol in wine, beer, and liquor.4 32 Even sellers and distributors of illegal drugs could be made to contribute to the PIC fund, by
requiring monetary victim restitution as part of their criminal sentences.433

courage to vaccinate their children, and that manufacturers will not be discouraged from entering
and participating in the vaccine market because of fears of liability for products that are "unavoidably unsafe." Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Catherine B. Bowman, No-Fault Compensationfor Unavoidable Injuries:Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 16
U. DAYTON L. REv. 277, 279 (1991).

431.
Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance, Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAw 59, 76-88 (1999); Geoffrey Evans, Update on Vaccine Liability in the UnitedStates: Presentationat the National Vaccine Program Office
Workshop on Strengthening the Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the UnitedStates, 12
February 2002, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S130-S137 (Mar. 1, 2006), abstract availableat
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi: 10. 1086/499592&erFrom=7871817745
69628204IGuest. Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, manufacturers pay a
tax of $0.75 per dose of vaccine administered. Ridgway, supra at 62, http://content.nejm.org/
cgi/reprint/340/5/403.pdf.
432.
Thus, for example, alcohol manufacturers and distributors would have an economic incentive to make warning labels about the effects of alcohol during pregnancy clearer, more conspicuous,
and more explicit. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Alcohol Warning Labels
Go Unnoticed, Poll Finds (Aug. 20, 200), available at http://www.cspinet.org/booze/batf
labels2001 _press.htm.
433.
Cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5ElI, 8B1.1 (2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/5el_l.htm and http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/8bl_l.htm (requiring
individual and organizational defendants to pay restitution to their victims).
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End Civil Commitment andInvoluntary Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women
The involuntary restraint and compulsory medical treatment of
pregnant women is counterproductive, deterring women from seeking
medical and psychological help. Physicians and hospitals are fallible.
They do a profound disservice to those whom they wish to help when
they rely on court orders rather than trying to advise and persuade pregnant patients about what is in their (and their fetuses') best interest.
There is substantial evidence that health care providers are relying on
racial and class stereotypes when they decide when to seek judicial intervention.4 34 Similarly, there is no reason for legislatures to disable
women from exercising the right to self-determination when pregnant, by
rendering their advance medical directives invalid.
End Civil and CriminalLiability of PregnantWomen for Causing
PrenatalHarm
The thesis of this article is that holding women civilly or criminally
liable for their actions while pregnant is bad public policy. Imposing
criminal or civil liability deters women from seeking medical care, including treatment for drug and alcohol addiction, leading to worse, rather
than better, birth outcomes, and raises significant normative questions
about who is the reasonable pregnant woman. 43 Some American
courts, 436 as well as those in other countries, 437 have acknowledged that
there is no way to prescribe the standard of appropriate behavior while
pregnant with any certainty, that making a judgment about recklessness
or negligence is inevitably subjective, and thus is freighted with the possibility of prejudice and bias. Further, most efforts at criminal prosecution or civil commitment have focused on poor women and women of
color, 438 despite evidence that drug usage during pregnancy is equivalent
across racial and economic lines, with the only difference being that
white and middle-class women tend to use alcohol, a legal drug, rather
than cocaine.43 9
Attacking pregnant women provides a simplistic solution to a complex problem. Courts and legislatures should avoid this meretricious
solution, recognizing the unique relationship between pregnant woman
434. See generally Chasnoff, supra note 10; Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra
note 9.
435.
Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 477-78 (Tex. App. 1999).
436.
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 477-78; Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (111.
1988); Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 310-15 (Md. 2006).
437.
Dobson v. Dobson, 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can. 1999); Winnipeg Child & Family Services
(Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), 3 S.C.R. 925 (Can. 1997); Paton v. United Kingdom, App. No.
8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408, 415 (1980).
438.
BLOOM, supra note 408, at 109; Chasnoff, supra note 10; Roberts, Unshackling Black
Motherhood,supra note 9.
439. BLOOM, supra note 408, at 109-10.
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and the fetus. 440 Government policymakers should acknowledge that the
vast majority of pregnant women want only the best for the fetus whom
they are nourishing, and that in almost all cases women who are not acting in the best interests of their fetus are facing heavy burdens of poverty, addiction, lack of access to quality health care, and domestic abuse.
The way to help such women, and the children they will bear, is to
change the system in which they are now struggling, not to make pregnant women the scapegoat for that system's failures.

440.

Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
LEE GOLDMANt
INTRODUCTION

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in
part that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law
. "
This Clause "guarantees more than
fair process"--it imposes substantive restraints on government power.2
Although the Court's substantive due process doctrine often has been
criticized, 3 it is now well established 4 and provides protection for socalled fundamental rights.5
According to traditional doctrine, if government action substantially
interferes with a fundamental right, the state must demonstrate that the

t
Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, J.D. 1979.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The counterpart Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes an identical restraint on the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 719 (1997)).
3.
See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
& UNNAMED 3 (1997) ("This paradoxical, even oxymoronic phrase-'substantivedue process'-has
been inflated into a patched and leaky tire on which precariously rides the load of some substantive
human rights not named in the Constitution."); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (explaining substantive due process is a "momentous
sham"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)
("' [Sjubstantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness."').
4.
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-20; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); see
also David Crump, How Do Courts Really Discover UnenumeratedFundamentalRights? Cataloguing the Methods ofJudicialAlchemy, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 838 (1996) ("The Supreme
Court consistently has... recognize[d] unenumerated fundamental rights .. "); James E. Fleming,
Securing DeliberateAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995) ("Griswold today is a case that any
nominee, to stand a chance of being confirmed, has to say is rightly decided.").
5.
Although substantive due process and fundamental rights doctrine sometimes are used
interchangeably, they are not equivalents. Substantive due process, in addition to securing certain
fundamental rights, see infra note 13, protects against arbitrary government action, see Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 766 (Souter, J., concurring); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting), safeguards individuals from conduct by
government officers that "shocks the conscience," County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)), and limits the size of civil punitive damages, State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). Nevertheless, this article focuses on the fundamental rights
branch of substantive due process generally, and the right to privacy, specifically.
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6
action is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
If no fundamental right is involved, the government need only establish a
rational basis for the challenged action.7 Thus, determining whether
there is a fundamental right involved becomes critical. Unfortunately,
given the political differences of the Justices and the lack of any clear
conceptualization in this area, determining whether a fundamental right
exists has proven to be a Herculean task.

The Supreme Court Justices have adopted two, often conflicting,
approaches to determine whether a case involves a fundamental right.
The more liberal Justices, seeking to protect minority interests, ask
whether a right is central to personal dignity and autonomy or is at the
heart of liberty. 8 The more conservative Justices, fearing judicial activism at the expense of democratic preferences, insist that a right is not
fundamental unless it is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 The former test is
easily criticized as too indeterminate,' 0 the latter as protecting only those
rights that don't need protection." The difficulty in determining whether
a fundamental right exists is compounded by disingenuous application of
12
the Court's compelling government interest and rational basis review.
It is not surprising then that there is little clarity on questions ranging
from the constitutionality of bans on same-sex marriages or the sale of
sex toys to criminalization of adultery, incest, or the use of marijuana for
medical purposes.
This article proposes a conceptualization of a central branch of the
fundamental rights doctrine-the constitutional right to privacy,' 3 which
6.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 721; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
686 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973)). Despite what traditional doctrine
provides, this article argues that a sliding scale approach to fundamental rights issues best balances
competing government and individual interests and is consistent with actual Supreme Court practice.
See infra notes 177-234 and accompanying text.
7.
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766-67 & n.9 (Souter, J., concurring); Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 638-39 (1986).
8.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion);
see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.").
9.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
10.
See, e.g., Crump, supra note 4, at 854-56.
11.
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140-41 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition
andFundamentalRights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101, 115 (2002).
See infra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
12.
13.
In addition to providing protection for privacy interests, the fundamental rights branch of
substantive due process, see supra note 5, incorporates key provisions of the Bill of Rights against
the states, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and
Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 833, 842 (2003), and includes protection for the rights to vote, see Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); to travel interstate, see United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); to access the courts, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956), and to be free of totalitarian legislation, see Poe, 367 U.S.
at 521-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert L. Calhoun, Democracy andNaturalLaw,
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remedies some of the deficiencies in the Court's jurisprudence. Specifically, this article argues for a Lockean view 14 of the Constitution as a
pact between individuals and the government to forego certain rights that
are necessary to further society's interests, but with a reservation of
rights in certain private areas where the government does not belong.
When the government regulates in an area where it does not belong, presumptively it needs the regulation to be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. If regulation is in an area where the
government does belong and the regulation does not significantly affect
private interests, presumptively the regulation is valid as long as there is
a rational basis for the regulation. However, if a regulation in an area
where the government belongs significantly affects private interests, a
balancing test should be applied, giving deference to the legislature's
initial determination of the appropriate balance. By specifically indicating the areas where the government does and does not belong and identifying the most important variables in the balance when balancing is appropriate, this article hopes to bring a degree of clarity, or at least honesty and consistency, to an area in which it too long has been lacking.
The proposed conceptualization appears to be consistent with the views
of the Framers and early political philosophers, 15 as well as most of the
Court's case law.' 6 By providing a conceptualization and admitting to
balancing in some cases, the recommended approach provides more honest analysis, better guidance to lower courts, and desired flexibility in
evaluating regulations impacting important individual interests.
Part I of this article provides a brief review of existing fundamental
rights law and the problems associated with both defining fundamental
rights and applying the Court's standard of review. Part II defines the
proposed right of privacy, specifying and justifying the areas where the
government does and does not belong. It explains the factors to be considered in the proposed balancing or sliding scale test and responds to
anticipated criticisms of the balancing approach. Finally, Part III ad5 NAT. L. F. 31, 36 (1960)); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 806 (1989),
rights that are deemed fundamental to the structure of our governmental system. The constitutional
right to privacy, as used in this article, refers to the unenumerated right to privacy protected by
substantive due process. The article does not address privacy interests protected by specific provisions of the Constitution, for example, the Fourth Amendment's right to be free of unreasonable
search and seizures, see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring), or tort concepts of privacy. See generallyDaniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing
Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1100 (2002); Samuel D. Warren, & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890).
14.
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 353 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 323-29 (2004); A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS
218-20 (1992); Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due
ProcessAnalysis of PersonalAutonomyRights, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 85, 110-12 (2000).
15.
See BARNETT, supra note 14, at 68-76; Niles, supra note 14, at 108.
16.
See infra Part I.
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dresses many of the "hot" substantive due process questions, such as the
validity of bans on gay marriage and the use of medical marijuana, to
illustrate application of the recommended approach.
I. EXISTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS/PRIVACY LAW

A. Determining Whether a FundamentalRight Exists
Ironically, much of the modem fundamental rights/privacy doctrine
derives from dissents in a case dismissed for lack ofjusticiability. In Poe
v. Ullman,1 7 plaintiffs challenged a Connecticut statute forbidding the
giving of contraceptive advice and the use of contraceptives. 18 The
Court held that there was no justiciable controversy based on its finding
that Connecticut had chosen not to enforce the statute. 19 Both Justice
Douglas and Justice Harlan dissented.20 Foreshadowing the Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,2 1 the Justices found the statute unconstitutional as an invasion of privacy, a liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 Their approaches, however, presaged what
would become a continuing controversy for the Court. Justice Douglas
found that privacy is a right "implicit in a free society,, 23 finding support
for the right in both the "totality of the Constitutional scheme" and the
common law right "to be let alone. 2 4 He specifically rejected the notion
that tradition was a suitable basis for defining protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, stating
The due process clause . . . guarantees basic rights, not because they
have become petrified as of any one time, but because due process
follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what is
deemed reasonable and right. It is to be applied, according to this
view, to facts and circumstances as they arise, the cases falling on
one side of the line or the other as a majority of the nine justices apliberty or
praise conduct as either implicit in the concept of ordered
25
as lying without the confines of that vague concept.
Justice Harlan, finding the contraceptives ban an "invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal life," 2 6 agreed that the Connecticut statute violated the fundamental
rights belonging "to the citizens of all free governments. 27 Justice
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
(1951)).
26.
27.

367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Poe, 367 U.S. at 498.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509, 522.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Poe, 367 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. & n.12.
Id. at 518 n.9 (quoting OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 80
Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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28
Harlan, citing Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
also found that the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment "conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
29
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.,
However, Justice Harlan, unlike Justice Douglas, did not feel comfortable allowing judges to roam at large. 30 Rather, he thought the balance
between the liberty of the individual and the demands of an organized
society should have "regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.'
This disagreement concerning the proper role of tradition and the perspective from which it should be defined has been a continuing controversy for the Court.32

The Court as a whole explicitly recognized a right to privacy and
invalidated Connecticut's contraceptives ban in Griswold.3 3 Two years
later in Loving v. Virginia,34 the Court held that a ban on interracial marriages violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
finding the freedom to marry a "vital personal right[] essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."35 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 the
right to use contraceptives recognized in Griswold was extended to unmarried couples. 37 The Court stated: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child., 38 The
39
Court next held a ban on abortions unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade,
stating that the "right of privacy.., founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty

. . .

is broad enough to encompass a

woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy., 40 The
right of privacy was further expanded in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.4 ' In that case, the Court ruled unconstitutional a zoning ordinance
that limited occupancy in dwelling units to families narrowly defined to
28.
29.

277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478

(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
30. Id.at 544 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
31.
Id.at 542. Justice Harlan went on to recognize that tradition "is a living thing," and
defined the relevant tradition broadly as privacy in the individual's marital relations. Id.at 539, 542,
552.
32.
See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S.
110, 123 (1989).
33.
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
34.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id. at 12. The Court first held that the Virginia statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.at 11-12.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Id at 454-55.
38. Id.at 453 (emphasis added).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id.at 153.
41.
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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exclude the plaintiff and her two grandsons. 42 The plurality opinion affirmed that the Court had "long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 43 In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,44 the Court, although affirming Missouri's right to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes to withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment, assumed and strongly suggested that the Due Process Clause
protected the right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. 45
Most recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,4 6 the Court, overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick,4 7 held unconstitutional Texas' statute making homosexual
sodomy illegal.4 8 The Court indicated that "Liberty protects the person
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places .... [It] presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of
49
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
Even as the right of privacy was expanding, several Justices, fearing
a return to the Lochner era, expressed concern about the potentially
unlimited reach of the Court's expansive language and ad hoc identification of fundamental rights. 50 The Court's retrenchment began with Bow42.
Id. at 506.
43.
Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
44.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
45.
Id. at 281.
46.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
48.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
49.
Id. at 562.
50. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion). In
Moore, the plurality stated:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are
risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties
without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history
of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (footnote omitted). In addition, Justice White in his dissent stated:
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights should
not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the
Constitution .... [Given] that much of the underpinning for the broad, substantive application of the Clause disappeared in the conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary
in the 1930's and 1940's, the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause ....
Id. at 544 (White, J. dissenting). In Griswold,Justice Goldberg explained:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases
in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted
[there]... as to be ranked as fundamental.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Similarly, Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold,noted:
The Due Process Clause ... was liberally used by this Court to strike down economic
legislation in the early decades of this century, threatening, many people thought, the
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607

ers v. Hardwick,51 a challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute. Justice
White, writing for the Court, warned:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. That this is
so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive
and the Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of
much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach
of those Clauses, particularly if it52requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental.
The Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, found the sodomy statute constitutional and rejected the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
provided protection of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults. 53 Justice White limited the reach of the Due Process Clause by
defining the right to be protected narrowly, asking whether there is a
fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. 5 4 By focusing on the specific conduct, rather than aspirational

goals, 55 Justice White was easily able to conclude that such a right was
not "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed"' 56 or "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition," 57 the two alternative tests he identified for determining fundamental rights.5 8
Justice Scalia, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,59 sought to further restrict the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence. In Michael H., a
putative natural father whose blood tests indicated a 98.07% probability
of paternity challenged a California statute creating a presumption that
tranquility and stability of the Nation. That formula, based on subjective considerations
of 'natural justice,' is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about
personal rights than those about economic rights.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905)).
51.
52.

478 U.S. 186, overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.

53.
54.

Id.at 196.
Id.

55.
The four dissenting justices challenged the majority's definition of the right involved
stating, "This case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in sodomy' . .. than Stanley v.
Georgia ...was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies .. " Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id.at 191 (majority opinion)). "Rather, this case is about 'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be
let alone."' Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478

(1928)).
56.

Id.at 191-92 (majority opinion) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26

(1937)).
57.
58.

Id.at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
Id.at 191-92.

59.

491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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the father of a child born to a married woman was the woman's husband.60 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion began by quoting Justice
White's reasons for being "extremely reluctant to breathe . . . further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause.",61 To "limit and guide
interpretation of the Clause," Justice Scalia insisted that a liberty interest
be "rooted in history and tradition." 62 No alternative test was offered,
and unlike in Poe, the focus of the Court's review of tradition was historical.63 Moreover, writing for himself and the Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia explicitly adopted Justice White's strategy of defining the relevant
tradition narrowly. 64 Justice Scalia opined that the appropriate inquiry is
[T]o the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting,
or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If, for
example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the
rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we
would have to consult and (if possible) reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general. 65
In Washington v. Glucksberg,66 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
a majority, upheld the state of Washington's ban on assisted suicide and
placed his own limiting gloss on the test for fundamental rights.6 7 He
first reiterated the Court's reluctance to "expand the concept of substantive due process . . ,68 Although acknowledging that many of the
rights and liberties previously recognized by the Court sounded in personal autonomy, 69 the Chief Justice refused to recognize any right to
make all important, intimate, and personal decisions. 70 To determine if a
fundamental right existed, the Chief Justice first required a "'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."' 1 By finding the
"careful description" of the fundamental right asserted by reference to

60. Id. at 114-15.
61.
Id. at 122 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 544 (White, J., dissenting)).
62.
Id. at 122-23.
63.
Id. at 124-25.
64.
Id. at 127 n.6.
65.
Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, vigorously dissented. He
challenged Justice Scalia's reliance on tradition, his strictly historical perspective, and his definition
of the relevant right at the most specific level of generalization. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a separate dissent. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
66.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
67.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
68.
Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). To justify this
reluctance, the Chief Justice observed: "'[G]uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.' By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right
or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action." Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
69. Id. ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital
privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion." (citations omitted)).
70.
Id. at 727-28.
71.
Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
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the statute being challenged,72 the Chief Justice effectively garnered a
majority for Scalia's previously unadopted "most specific level" of generalization rule, or something very close to it. 73 The Chief Justice further
limited expansion of substantive due process rights by requiring the asserted right to be both "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed ....,,7

Glucks-

berg's conjunctive test necessarily is more restrictive than Bowers' disjunctive test or Michael H's focus solely on tradition. Glucksberg's
conjunctive test necessarily is more restrictive than Bowers' disjunctive
test or MichaelH.'s focus solely on tradition. As in MichaelH, Glucksberg's inquiry into relevant traditions was historical.75
Although not overruling prior cases establishing fundamental rights,
the conservative majority, through Bowers, Michael H., and Glucksberg,
appeared to completely transmogrify fundamental rights/privacy doctrine. In effect, the Court was saying, "this much but not more." It was
against this background that the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas.76
Lawrence not only overruled the Court's earlier decision in Bowers,
but contained broad open-ended language reminiscent of the Court's
earlier fundamental rights/privacy case law. Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, began his opinion by stating, "Liberty protects the person
from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places ....[It] presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct., 77 He then specifically rejected Justice White's narrow framing of the relevant issue in
Bowers. 78 According to Justice Kennedy, "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the
claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
at 723.
72. See id.
73.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Statutes prohibit distribution of contraceptives,
abortion or interracial marriage; they do not make the decision whether to beget a child or to marry
illegal or ban privacy or personal autonomy.
74.
Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion); Palko,
302 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added)).
Id. at 721.
75.
76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy quoted at length the
broad description of liberty contained in the Court's opinion in Planned Parenthoodof Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992):
These matters [decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education], involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
78. Id.at 566-67.
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intercourse., 79 Justice Kennedy instead focused on whether the government could interfere with personal relationships between consenting
adults.80 In answering that question, Justice Kennedy derided the Bowers Court's exclusive reliance on history. 81 He opined, "[h]istory and
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry,, 8 2 and found the laws and practices of
the past half-century of the most relevance. 83 Moreover, he defined recent history broadly as showing "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in8 4deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."
Although Lawrence's broad definitions of the liberty interests involved and its limitations on the use of tradition seemingly are a resounding rejection of the conservative trilogy of Bowers, Michael H., and
Glucksberg, the case has not been so read by lower courts.8 5 Many
lower courts 86 refuse to view Lawrence as a fundamental rights case at
79. Id.at 567.
80.
Id. at 567, 571.
81.
Id.at 571-72.
82.
Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
83.
Id.at 571-72.
84.
Id.at 572 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
85.
See Abigail Alliance For Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445
F.3d 470, 477 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing cases); see also infra note 86.
86.
See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 575
(2005); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (1 th Cir. 2004); Lofion v. Sec'y of the
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-16 (1 1th Cir 2004), cert. denied 543 U.S.
1081(2005); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517-19 (2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 2006
WL 1835429 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring); Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va.
2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). These courts appear to give a very cramped interpretation of Lawrence. In addition to the broad language quoted in the text, the opinion states the
issue as "whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise
of their liberty under the Due Process Clause .... Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. To answer that
question, the Court reviews many of its earlier fundamental rights cases, id.at 564-66 (discussing
Griswold, Eisenstadtand Roe), not cases decided under a rational basis standard. Additionally, the
Court quotes the Bowers Court's statement of the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers
afundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ...... Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
The Lawrence Court found that statement failed "to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake" and
overruled the Bowers decision. Id. at 567. In overruling Bowers, the Court focused on the Bowers'
historical review, id. at 567-73, and referred to the subsequent broad language of the Court in Casey
as casting doubt on Bowers. Id. at 573-74. That analysis implies that the Bowers Court erred by
failing to find a right entitled to heightened scrutiny, rather than by overvaluing the justification
offered by the State. That implication is reinforced by the Court's endorsement of Justice Stevens'
dissent in Bowers. Id. at 577-78. In Stevens' view, the Court's fundamental rights case law precluded criminalization of sodomy as to all citizens. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Lawrence Court's conclusion that there was "no legitimate state interest which [could]
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, is
not necessarily inconsistent with heightened review. First, the Court might have meant that because
there was no legitimate justification, there was no need to inquire if the State's justification was
compelling or outweighed the appellants' liberty interest. Second, the Court might have meant that
although society's interest in morality is legitimate, there is no sufficient interest to justify intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual, an interest subject to heightened protection. See
Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN. L. REv. 1140, 1157 (2004). Finally, the phrase
could have been used in the same sense in which Justice Stevens used it in his Bowers dissent, an
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all because the Court does not speak of creating a fundamental right and
is viewed as applying a rational basis test based upon its conclusion that,
"[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." 87 Because the conservative approach appears to remain dominant, the next
section will highlight its shortcomings.
B. Problems with "Historyand Tradition" as the Basisfor Defining
FundamentalRights
The primary advantage of the "history and tradition" test is its
greater objectivity, binding judicial discretion so that the courts do not
interfere with the democratic process. 88 Actual application of the test,
however, has proven that the greater objectivity is more theoretical than
real. First, the definition of the right being asserted will often determine
the outcome. For example, is there a tradition of government noninterference with private intimate relations between consenting adults or
a tradition supporting sodomy? 89 Second, even where there is agreement
concerning the right involved, historical research often will be disputed. 90 There can be disagreement about the relevant time as well as
the relevant sources. 9' Lastly, traditions are often conflicting. For example, there is a tradition outlawing adultery or sodomy, but there is also
analysis the Court specifically found should be controlling. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. In Bowers,
after finding that prior cases precluded application of the sodomy statute to the public generally,
Justice Stevens analyzed whether the State could justify selective enforcement of the law. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 218-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Steven found no "legitimate interest" for doing
so. Id.
This author speculates that the Court intended heightened review, but was afraid to say so
explicitly. The Supreme Court has stated that classifications that burden fundamental rights are
subject to heightened review. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). By protecting homosexual conduct, the Court may have feared
they effectively would have made homosexuals a protected class. The Court clearly was not prepared to address the consequences of such a holding, going out of its way to clarify that its decision
did not address the constitutionality of state laws prohibiting gay marriages. See, e.g., Lawrence,
concurring).
at 585 (O'Connor, J.,
539 U.S. at 567, 578; id.
87. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
88. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2081, 2105-06 (2005);
Crump, supra note 4, at 863.
89.
Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) with Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, rehearing denied
478 U.S. 1039 (1986), overruled in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice Scalia's lowest
level of specificity test is designed to overcome this shortcoming. However, Justice Scalia's test is
itself malleable. Results vary depending on how factually detailed one makes the statement of the
issue and which facts are excluded when moving to the next level of abstraction. See Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057,
1092-93 (1990). More fundamentally, the lowest level of specificity test is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion).
90. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L. J.177, 202-03 (1993); Tribe
& Dorf,supra note 89, at 1087-89; ELY, supra note 3, at 60, 103.
See Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After
91.
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2004). This is particularly true when issues
involve medical and technological advances unanticipated by earlier generations. Id. at 12; see also
Crump, supra note 4, at 862-63.
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a tradition of non-enforcement of such laws; there is a tradition respecting equality, but also a tradition of subjecting various groups to a variety
of forms of ostracism or prejudice. 92 Not surprisingly, Justices often will
resolve these conflicts based on what best furthers their own predilections.9 3
The fundamental problem with the "history and tradition" test,
however, is not its failure to achieve increased objectivity, but its inconsistency with the structure of the Constitution. As Professor Ely observed, tradition's "overtly backward-looking character highlights its
undemocratic nature: it is hard to square with the theory of our government the proposition that yesterday's majority . . .should control today's., 94 This is especially true when yesterday's majority was composed primarily, if not solely, of white, wealthy, straight men. 95 Moreover, if the only rights receiving protection were those historically and
currently valued by society, there would be no need for the fundamental
rights doctrine, 96 at least other than to provide protection from the maverick state. This would ignore the Court's Constitutional role as a protector of minority interests, and is inconsistent
with the Fourteenth
97
purposes.
anti-majoritarian
Amendment's
This article does not suggest that tradition, if one can be agreed
upon, is irrelevant. Tradition, representing the combined wisdom of
generations, often will have much to recommend it. 98 Moreover, if the
Court breaks too radically from ongoing traditions, it risks institutional
credibility. 99 What is objectionable is the blind adherence to tradition.
Although some traditions are worthy, others reflect ignorance, prejudice,
or inequalities in power.'0 0 One should learn from history, not mechanically follow it. It is for this reason that this article recommends adoption
of a right to privacy defined more specifically and considers tradition
only as part of its sliding scale review, and then only if the circumstances
upon which the tradition was based have not changed.' 0'

92. See Brown, supra note 90 at 203; ELY, supra note 3, at 61.
93. See Wolf, supra note 11, at 126-128; Brown, supra note 90, at 210-11.
94. ELY, supra note 3, at 62. Professor Ely further argues that if the Framers wanted to freeze
tradition, they would have wrote out the tradition rather than seek to protect it through open-ended
language. Id.
95.
Wolf, supra note 93, at 126-27.
96. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wolf, supra note 11,at 115.
97.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton); ELY, supra note 3, at 62; Niles, supra note 14, at 118; Crump, supra note 4, at 861.
98. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2106.
99. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100.
See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2106; Niles, supra note 14, at 141. The fact that the government has a longstanding tradition of violating individual rights does not make it legitimate. See
id., Tribe & Dorf,supra note 89, at 1088.
101.
See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
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C. The AppropriateStandardof Review
Once a fundamental right is found, the Court repeatedly has stated
that the government cannot infringe upon that right unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 102 In the
absence of a fundamental right, the government can justify its action by
demonstrating a mere rational basis for its conduct.' 0 3 Because "the review standard for ordinary liberties is so deferential, and the standard for
preferred liberties so rigid," 104 outcomes
often are ordained by the desig105
nation of rights as fundamental or not.
Despite the clarity of the Court's doctrine, there is much in the
Court's language and practice that suggests balancing of interests is appropriate. Indeed, Justice Harlan's influential opinion in Poe10 6 seemingly required a balancing of interests. He opined, "'liberty' is not a
series of isolated points," but a "rational continuum."' 1 7 It includes not
only freedom from arbitrary restraints, but also "recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment."' 0 8 Justice Harlan further argued that due process, through
the course of the Court's decisions, "represent[s] the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of an organized society."' 109

One technique the Court has employed to balance interests is to impose a "substantial" or "undue" burden threshold for determining
whether a fundamental right has been infringed. The paradigm example
is Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in PlannedParenthoodof South0 In Casey, Justice O'Connor
eastern Pennslvaniav. Casey. 11
reaffirmed
the fundamental right to choose an abortion."' However, she opined
that,
102.
See supra note 6.
103.
See supra note 7.
104.
Ira Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,
1030 (1979).
105.
Id.at 1029-30; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 417 (1997). The two-tiered approach appears to be particularly popular among the conservative justices. That approach avoids the always-feared subjective decision-making required by a
balancing of interests. It also discourages a court, realizing that the compelling interest test makes
most government regulation improper, from finding a right fundamental in the first instance.
106.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
107.
Id.at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
108.
Id.;
see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality
opinion); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973).
109.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 542; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765; Casey, 505 U.S. at 850;
Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion).
110.
505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring);
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978).
Il1.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

[t]he fact that a law which serves a valid purpose... has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where the state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
decision does the power of the State reach
into the heart of the liberty
2
protected by the Due Process Clause."
The Court necessarily also balances interests when applying an intermediate standard of review. In Carey v. PopulationServices International,113 although invalidating a restriction on the distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen, the Court explicitly indicated that a
lower level of scrutiny was appropriate when minors claimed an infringement of their right to privacy. 114 The Court also has found intermediate review appropriate in cases deciding when the government may5
involuntarily administer anti-psychotic drugs to a mentally ill patient."
In such cases, the court must find (1) the government interest important;
(2) "involuntary medication will significantlyfurther those concomitant
state interests"; (3) "involuntary medication is necessary to further those
interests"; and (4) "administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.""16 Similarly, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,1 7 the Court, invalidating a local regulation limiting who could live together, stated,
"[w]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced8 and the extent to which they are served
by the challenged regulation."''
The Court even has explicitly balanced interests. In Youngberg v.
Romeo, 119 the Court found that an involuntarily committed mental patient had a liberty interest in minimally adequate training. 120 The Court
defined adequacy "as that training which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 121t Youngberg
was cited in Cruzan.' 22 The Court in that case stated, "determining that a
person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process Clause does not end
the inquiry, 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been vio112.

Id. at 874 (citations omitted).

Applying this standard, Justice O'Connor found that al-

though the spousal notification provision was invalid, the 24-hour waiting period, informed consent
and reporting and record-keeping requirements were not. Id. at 881-91.

113.

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

114.

Id. at 693 n. 15 (The Court reasoned that lesser scrutiny was appropriate because the right

of privacy implicated "'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of decisions', and the
law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability of making important decisions."
(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977))).
115.
See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
116.
Id.
117.
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
118.
Id.at 499 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
119.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
120.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318-19.
121.
Id.at 319 n.25.
122.
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
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lated must be determined23by balancing [the] liberty interests against the
relevant state interests." 1
Perhaps it was not coincidence that in the two most recent Supreme
Court substantive due process decisions, Lawrence 24 and Troxel v.
Granville, 25 the Court didn't even state what standard of review it was
applying. 126 The Court finally may have begun to recognize the limits of
tiered analysis and acknowledge its frequent practice of balancing interests. Nonetheless, lower courts have consistently cited to traditional doctrine. 127 They require the government to demonstrate that an infringement of a fundamental right is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest. 128 It is for this reason that tiered analysis is critiqued below.
D. Problems with the Tiered Review
The primary problem with tiered review is its inflexibility. 129 As
Justice Harlan recognized, liberty is a "rational continuum." 130 It makes
little sense to assume that unless a regulation must be narrowly tailored
to a compelling government interest it is valid except if irrational, no
matter how overbroad or how much it infringes an individual's liberty.
The problem is particularly acute when tiered review is combined with
the Court's narrow definition of fundamental rights.131 For example,
consider a law that makes it illegal for overweight people to eat pies,
cake, ice cream, bread, potatoes, or pasta. The Court would have a difficult time identifying a right to be overweight or to eat those foods as
fundamental under its current jurisprudence and the government has a
rational basis for the regulation-to reduce the health risks attendant to
123.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
124. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
125. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
126. See Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792,2807-08 (2005).
127. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.
2004); Littlefield v. Fomey Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 288 (5th Cir. 2001); Hodgkins v. Peterson, No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-TAB, 2004 WL 1854194, at *7-*8 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 23, 2004); Loomis v.
United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517 (2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878-79 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005); State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101, 1109-1110 (Fla. 2004); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333,
341 (N.J. 1977). But cf Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 519 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (recognizing that "it is well established that when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake, courts are
to employ the exacting strict scrutiny test," but questioning if Troxel v. Granvillemeans courts are to
apply some other standard of heightened scrutiny to claims alleging violation of the fundamental
right to familial relations).
128.
See supra note 127.
129.
Cf Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter stated that it is
better to decide by "candid and informed weighing of the competing interests ... than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved").
130.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131.
Of course, the Court has tried to narrowly define rights, in part, because under the twotiered approach, government regulation has little chance of surviving when the Court finds a right to
be fundamental. See supra note 102-04 and accompanying text.
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excess weight.' 32 Yet, the statute seems to be drastically overbroad and
infringe significant liberty interests. 133 Perhaps, recognition of the difficulties created by tiered review's inflexibility explains the Supreme
34
Court's sometime disingenuous application of its enunciated standard. 1
Nonetheless, it is better to candidly acknowledge the weighing of competing interests. Only then can we "actually increase the possibility of
accountability and135ultimately hope to reduce the power of idiosyncratic
decisionmaking."'
The fact that the Court's application of tiered review often is disingenuous is reason enough to reject it. However, the Court's repeated
refusal to acknowledge the realities of balancing and overrule tiered review also has created practical problems in the lower courts. First, fear
that a valid government interest might not survive the tightest fit of strict
scrutiny makes courts disinclined to find a liberty interest in the first instance. 136 Indeed, this fear, combined with Supreme Court warnings
about its reluctance to create new fundamental rights, 137 virtually paralyzes courts from recognizing rights by analogy. 138 Consequently, an
individual effectively can challenge a regulation infringing a liberty interest not specifically recognized by the Court only if she is willing to
132.
It might be argued that paternalistic concerns should not be considered legitimate even
under rational basis review. However, the government could still justify the regulation as rational by
claiming that the increased risk of the overweight person's suffering sudden heart failure endangers
other drivers.
133.
A possible response to this hypothetical is that it is just that-a hypothetical; that we can
trust legislators not to enact such a silly law. One reply is that the framers of the Constitution established a tripartite system of government precisely because they didn't trust legislators always to act
wisely. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 476-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Ed. 2003); Williams, 378 F.3d at 1240 n.l 1. However, the problems suggested by the hypothetical are not limited
to silly laws. Consider a law banning the use of drugs. If the liberty interest at stake is defined by
reference to the statute, as suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg, no fundamental right
is involved. 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). The government has an obvious legitimate basis for the
regulation, for example to reduce the incidence of driving while impaired. However, the statute's
application to a bed-ridden terminal cancer patient for whom the drug is the best or only form of
relief from excruciating pain seems to infringe significant liberty interests. Cf Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that application of Controlled Substance Act to users of marijuana for
medical purposes, despite state law allowing such use, did not violate Commerce Clause); see also
Note, Last Resorts andFundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985, 1985-87 (2005); infra notes 263-70 and
accompanying text.
134.
See supra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
135.
Brown, supra note 90, at 215.
136.
See, e.g., Williams, 378 F.3d at 1240 (declining to find a right to sexual privacy by consenting adults because such a right would subject activities such as incest, prostitution, and obscenity
to strict scrutiny, something the court was not prepared to do). A possible problem created by this
reluctance to subject a regulation to strict scrutiny is what might be called a tyranny of labels. A
court fearing strict scrutiny in one context might reject an asserted fundamental right that it might
wish to recognize in another. For example, in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), the Court,
upholding a police regulation on personal grooming, rejected the asserted liberty interest in choice of
one's hair length. One might question whether a law requiring all citizens to shave their heads,
which might be justified as reducing the incidence of head lice (even in the absence of an epidemic,
or even an increase in frequency), should be upheld merely because it is rational.
137.
See supranote 50.
138.
See, e.g., von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d at 487 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
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incur the costs of litigation through an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Additionally, lower courts have repeatedly refused to recognize a right to
private consensual sexual relations among adults, a liberty interest seemingly found by the Court in Lawrence, 139 because the Court did not specify it was applying strict scrutiny.140 If the Court continues its trend of
not identifying the standard of review it is applying, the law in the lower
courts will only be further distorted.
It is time that Supreme Court policy and lower court practice be
harmonized as to both the identification of fundamental rights and the
standard of review to apply to such rights. To do this, there needs to be a
better conceptualization of the area and a more honest statement of the
standard of review actually applied. The proposals in the following section seek to do just that.

II. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS

A. The Conceptualizationof PrivacyRights
The conceptualization proposed by this article is heavily influenced
by the writings of John Locke 14 1 and John Stuart Mill. 142 As suggested
earlier, the beginning premise is that the Constitution should be viewed
as a pact between individuals and the government to forgo certain rights
that are necessary to further society's interests, but with a reservation of
43
rights in certain private areas where the government does not belong.1
Broadly speaking, 144 the government, to further society's interests, has a
right to regulate the individual's interaction with the larger world. It
should be presumed, however, that the government does not properly
control the world of the self, defined as one's thoughts, feelings, bodily
146
145
with consenting adults.
integrity, and private intimate relationships
139.
See supra note 86; see also Carpenter, supra note 86, at 1155; Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence 's Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the Doctrine of UnconstitutionalConditions, 50 VILL L. REv. 117 (2005); Herald, supra note 91, at 38 (all finding such a right).
140.
See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 126 S.Ct. 575
(2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-16 (11th Cir.
2004) cert. denied 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517-19 (2005);
Stanhardt v. Arizona, 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872,
878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
141.
See LOCKE, supranote 14.
142. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Legal Classics Library Ed. 1992) (1859).
143. See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
144.
Precise definition of the areas the government does not belong is not possible without
some recourse to intuition. See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. Civ. RTs.-CIV.
LIBERTIES L. REv. 233, 236-42 (1977). Yet, as Justice O'Connor observed in Casey, "[Il]iberty must
not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality opinion).
145.
What constitutes an "intimate" relationship cannot be defined precisely. To decide
whether a group is sufficiently personal to warrant protection under the right to intimate association,
the Court considers "'factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from
critical aspects of the relationship."' Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000)
(quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
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In effect, those areas are viewed as controlled 47
by private governments,
adults.
consenting
the
and
individual
the
of
that
The Supreme Court on many occasions has endorsed this "right to
be let alone" or "area the government does not belong."' 148 As early as
1928, Justice Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution ... recognized the significance of

man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
149
men.
146.
It may seem anomalous to include intimate relations, which are necessarily dependant on
another, as part of the world of the self However, intimacy is necessary for the full development of
the self. Intimacy requires the ability to care and be cared for and "has a great deal to do with the
formation and shaping of an individual's sense of his own identity." Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom
ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633-36 (1980). The Supreme Court itself has observed
that Constitutional protection for such relationships is warranted and "reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others." Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) Casey, 505
U.S. at 851. Almost by definition, private intimate relations exclude the outside world and hence
should exclude the government.
Professor Ely has questioned why food, housing or jobs are not considered fundamental
rights, suggesting that the Court only favors "upper middle class" rights. See ELY, supra note 3, at
59. Certainly, it might be argued that jobs, housing, or food, in some sense, are necessary to the
development of the self. They are at least fundamental to a person's existence. While these interests
are important, the right to privacy should not cover them. The purpose of the Bill of Rights, including the Due Process Clause, was to protect the individual from government excesses, see, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1187-88
(1996), not to define a minimal level of subsistence to be enforced by the judiciary. Moreover,
privacy is concerned with preventing the government from infringing on the individual's prerogative. The proper decision-maker concerning government benefits, obviously, must be the government. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. By contrast, if government regulations
allocated jobs universally or defined what foods must be eaten, the government would need to justify
this infringement of individual prerogative. Of course, the government can .choose to, and to some
extent does, provide for minimum subsistence. However, that is more properly decided by consensus through the legislature, the branch of government that controls the purse, rather than by judicial
fiat. See Doff, supra, at 1235; Crump, supra note 4, at 903.
147.
Cf MILL, supra note 142, at 22 ("Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.").
148.
See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Casey, 505 U.S. at 847; Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,.494 (1965).
149.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). It is
logical to ask if there is textual support for the asserted right to be let alone. The most logical source
is the Ninth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). However, the
Supreme Court has shown little inclination to use that Amendment and the weight of legislative
history suggests the Amendment was designed to protect state, not individual, rights. See Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost OriginalMeaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX L. REV. 331 (2004); Kurt T.
Lash, The Lost Jurisprudenceof the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEx. L. REV. 597, 598-600 (2005); Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 227-28
(1983). The right to be let alone also can be supported by the overall structure of the Constitution
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There are many reasons to protect this realm of private decisionmaking. First, the individual has the most information concerning their
personal preferences. Second, self-definition is an end in itself and is
necessary for complete development and happiness. 5 0 Third, the freedom to develop oneself can lead to genius that benefits society. 5 ' Conversely, the inability to control one's life can lead to unrest and divisiveness that undermines societal stability. Fourth, government control of
private decisions risks the tyranny of the majority feared by Madison and
the other Framers. 152 For that matter, the whole concept of deliberative
democracy is meaningless
if there is no individuality because the self is
53
formed by the state.
Although there is no bright line between the "public" and "private"
worlds, analogy may be made to the concept of boundaries in psychology. Just as one knows that a mother should not order food for an adult
child in a restaurant, the government should not decide in which private
sexual acts consenting adults can engage. The goal in both situations is
to allow the individual to become fully actualized. Although neither the
mother nor the government can or are under an obligation to make the
individual happy, they should allow the necessary condition for happiness, proper ego boundaries, 154 to develop.

and its concern for individual rights. Although the "right to be let alone" may not be specifically
enumerated, the Constitution is a short document that can't be expected to have specified every right
protected. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); BARNETT, supra
note 14, at 259; J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699,
704 n.35. Nor does the enumeration of some rights necessarily preclude protection for others. For
example, if someone you know to be a "clean freak" lends you their car and tells you not to have any
food or drink in the car, not to write with pencil, pen or marker while in the car, and not to take any
non-toilet trained babies in the car, you should know that taking your dog in the car and leaving its
poop on the passenger seat is beyond the bounds of your authorization, despite its lack of specification. A full discussion of the textual and historical support for fundamental rights is beyond the
scope of this article. It is enough to observe that the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that
the Constitution does protect certain unenumerated fundamental rights. See supra note 4.
150.
See, e.g., MILL, supra note 142, at 102, 106; RuEVEN BAR-LEVAV, THINKING INTHE
SHADOW OF FEELINGS 193, 330 (1988).
151.
SeeMILL, supra note 142, at 117-18.
152.
See supra note 140.
153.
See James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberateAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1995);
Note, Last Resorts and FundamentalRights: The Substantive Due ProcessImplications of Prohibitions on MedicalMaryuana, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1985, 1987 (2005).
154.
Ego boundaries, as psychoanalytic thinkers define them, are the boundaries conceived to
exist between the self and the outside world. See Matthew Maibaum, A Lewinian Taxonomy of
Psychiatric Disorders, THE INT'L SOC'Y FOR GESTALT THEORY & ITS APPLICATIONS, 2001,
http://gestalttheory.net/archive/maibaum.html; BAR-LEVAV, supra note 150, at 330; CHARLES
BRENNER, AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 59 (rev. ed. Anchor Books 1974)

(1955). It would probably be more accurate to speak of self-boundaries than of ego boundaries, but
the latter phrase is the psychoanalytic term or art. See Maibaum, supra. Strong boundaries are a
prerequisite for a fully developed self and allow the individual to achieve true intimacy and happiness. See BAR-LEVAV, supra note 150, at 150, 158-59, 193, 330-31; JOHN BRADSHAW, BRADSHAW
ON: THE FAMILY 43, 47, 55 (1988).
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B. Non-PrivateAreas

Admittedly, the phrase "area where the government doesn't belong"
is amorphous and specifying the area as including one's thoughts, feelings, bodily integrity and one's intimate relationships doesn't fully remedy this problem. Perhaps what best clarifies what should be considered

private is a description of what is not private. For the reasons explained
below, the government should be presumed to act where it belongs' 55
when it provides government benefits, regulates commercial activity and
57
activity in public areas,

56

and seeks to prevent harm to others. 1

1. Government Benefits
There can be no privacy right to government benefits, under this article's conceptualization because rights dependent on the government, by
definition, can't be an area the government does not belong. A denial of
benefits also does not interfere with fundamental rights in the same way
as regulation of such rights-individuals can do as they wish and they
are in no worse a position than if the government did not exist. For similar reasons, there is no obligation on behalf of the government to publicly
fund fundamental rights. 158 Although the government does not have the
obligation to support private choices, it should not be able to deny benefits to which an individual would otherwise be entitled, absent a rational
relation to the purposes of the benefit. 5 9 For example, although the government does not have an obligation to fund abortions, it would be improper for it to deny food stamps to persons who have had an abortion.

155.
The presumption may be rebutted when the purpose of the government action is to infringe individual rights. Improper purpose should be presumed if the government lacks a rational
basis for its actions. See State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing rational basis review for a challenged statute).
156.
The government also "belongs" in the area of foreign affairs. This is specifically provided
for in the Constitution and necessarily involves the government. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 3, 10,
11; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. Apparently, this is so obvious that the Court has never had to
address a fundamental rights challenge in this area. A proper role of the government also includes
resolution of competing fundamental rights. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
324 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1689).
157.
Government action in an area it belongs often will affect rights in an area it does not
belong. For example, a law that limits the amount that can be charged for an abortion, a commercial
regulation, can impact the women's right to choose whether to have a child and infringe her right to
bodily integrity. In such cases, this article recommends evaluation of the government action under a
sliding scale analysis. See infra notes 237-54 and accompanying text.
158.
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-200 (1991); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 317 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-17 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469
(1977).
159.
To this extent, substantive due process interacts with equal protection. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); cf Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (finding that denial of
admission to bar must have rational connection to applicant's fitness or qualifications to practice
law).

2006]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

A denial of benefits in such a case is tantamount
to a fine and must be
60
'
right.
fundamental
the
of
regulation
a
as
treated
2. Commercial Activity
There is no privacy right to commercial activity under this article's6
proposal. It is difficult to characterize commercial activity as private.' 1
It is engaged in with others and does not by itself involve any sense of
intimacy. More importantly, one of the primary reasons for the "more
perfect union" was the need for the government to be able to regulate
commercial transactions. 162 Periods of laissez-faire economics proved
economic regulation necessary to prevent harm to others. Thus, regulation of commerce, specifically provided for in the Constitution, 163 must
be treated as an area in which the government belongs.164
A return to
65
Lochnerism is not a risk of this article's proposal. 1
3. Activity in Public Areas
Tautologically, activity in public areas is not private. As part of the
Lockean pact, the government has the right to regulate the individual's
interaction with the larger world. 166 Public areas represent the commons
and demand regulation by the people rather than the individual. This
would explain why public nudity can be prohibited and why environmental regulations are legitimate. The paradigm non-public area, of
course, is the home. 167 The government's ownership interest also allows
it to make rules on government owned property. For example, the government is not under8 any obligation to permit abortions to be conducted
in public hospitals. 16

160.
See infra notes 177-207 and accompanying text for treatment of government regulations
of fundamental rights.
161.
See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 85, 149 (2000); MILL, supra note 142, at 170.
162.
See THE FEDERALIST NoS. 11-13 (Alexander Hamilton); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
16 (2005); Niles, supra note 161, at n.120.
163.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164.
To offset an infringement of privacy rights, however, the government must have a rational
basis to believe the marketplace needs regulation. See Clinkenbeard,123 P.3d at 878. This article
also would require the government's justification to be the actual, rather than a hypothesized, reason
for the regulation. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1307 n.13 (2nd ed.
1988). Where the activity the government seeks to regulate has been ongoing, a court should require
documentation for the need for the regulation. See Hodgkins v. Peterson, No. 1:04-CV-569-JDTTAB, 2004 WL 1854194, at *8 (S.D. Ind. July 23, 2004).
165.
Lochnerism, named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905), here refers to the
Court's use of substantive due process to replace a state's reasonableness assessment with its own on
matters of economic policy.
166.
See Niles, supra note 161, at Ill & n.14.
167.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
168.
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989).
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4. Harm to Others
The basic role of the government in the Lockean system is to prevent harm to others, both physical and economic. 169 Without the impartial magistrate that is the government, power rather than justice would
determine rights. 170 Mill also recognized that the individual's natural
rights ended where they caused harm to others. 171 This principle is
hardly controversial and the Supreme Court has recognized that it is172a
government function to protect non-consenting parties from harm.
This is just part of the government's police powers.
However, the concept of harm to others needs to be refined, lest this
exclusion eliminates all fundamental rights. Unless one is a hermit living
in the woods, all actions can cause some harm to others. A person's
choice to discontinue life-support affects all who know him or her.
Knowledge that an individual engages in sodomy may offend or cause
psychological harm to those with conservative sexual preferences. An
important limiting principle was suggested by Hobbes-that one's rights
as against another should be limited by what he would allow other men
against himself. 173 Thus, finding a person's appearance or habits offensive to contemplate should not be considered harm to others because
others would not want their appearance or habits subject to approval of
the individual. 174 Another limiting principle, suggested by Mill, is that
harm to others cannot be solely derivative of the harm to the individual. 175 This limitation is necessary because any decision one makes can
harm oneself and therefore harm someone who cares about you. A third
limitation is that harm to others generally must result from action, not
omission. 176 This follows from common law principles and protects
against laws such as one requiring donation of body parts to another.

169.

See LOCKE, supra note 156, at 276

("Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the

inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges in
their own Case, since 'tis easily to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an
Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it."); BARNETT, supra note 14, at 70-71.
170.
See LOCKE, supra note 156, at 271-72.
171.
See MILL, supra note 142, at 21-22, 140.
172.
The government also has an interest in preventing harm to minors or incompetent persons.
Such persons can be deemed incapable of a valid consent. See ParisAdult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57.

173.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 188, 190 (C.B. McPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
174.
See TRIBE, supra note 164, at 1409. Professor Tribe finds this result completely analogous to recognized First Amendment principles. Id. "The expression of ideas or emotions cannot be
shut off to protect unwilling viewers or hearers without 'a showing that substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner,' since any 'broader view ... would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections."' Id.
(citations omitted).
175.
See MILL, supra note 142, at 26.
176.
See id.at 24-25.
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C. Standardof Review
This article recommends a multi-factored sliding scale standard of
review in which the balance is presumptively predetermined in two categories of cases. Specifically, when the government regulates in an area
that it belongs, and there is no significant effect on privacy rights, the
government regulation is presumed valid unless irrational. By contrast,
when the government directly regulates in an area it does not belong, the
regulation is presumed invalid unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling justification. This mirrors current rational basis and compelling interest review. More commonly, however, the government will
regulate in an area in which it belongs, but the regulation will have a
substantial effect on privacy rights. In that case, a court should directly
balance interests using factors described below, giving deference to the
legislative determination.1 77 This approach resembles that of the Court
under the First Amendment,178 the constitutional provision most closely
analogous to privacy rights. 179 The section below describes the sliding
scale, its relevant factors and presumptive categories, and responds to
criticism of balancing jurisprudence.
1. The Sliding Scale
Common sense dictates that the more central the right and the
greater the infringement, the more compelling should be the government
justification and the tighter the fit should be between the regulation and
the justification. 18 0 A weak justification or poor fit relative to the privacy infringement creates an inference that the regulation was improperly motivated or irrational.181 That alone should be sufficient to invalidate it. 182 To determine the suggested balance and ferret out improper
177.
Deference is appropriate to the legislative determination because it represents the results
of the democratic process. Although deference is a vague term, the Court has had much experience
giving it meaning when reviewing lower court decisions. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
178.
In the First Amendment context, incidental restrictions on speech that do not have a significant effect on free expression are upheld unless irrational. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478
U.S. 697, 702-04 (1986); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 140 (1969); Dorf, supra
note 146, at 1201. Laws that discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint are subject to strict
scrutiny. See Boos v. Barry 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988); Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in ConstitutionalDoctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 920
(1994). An incidental restriction on speech that targets or disproportionately effects expressive
activity is subject to balancing. See Arcara,478 U.S. at 710; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968); Dorf, supranote 146, at 1202.
179.
The First Amendment protects free expression, in part, because it allows for selfactualization, much like privacy rights. See C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 995 (1978); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966).
180. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 772 n.12 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Niles, supra note 161, at 132-33.
181.
See ELY, supra note 3, at 145-47; Niles, supra note 161, at 133 & n.155; Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
182. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion); Dorf, supra note 146, at 1182-83; TRIBE,
supra note 164, at 1312.
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motivation, courts should consider the importance of the right infringed
and the extent of the infringement, the alternatives available to the individual, the directness of the infringement, as well as the justification and
fit. Because privacy protection is, in part, designed to protect against the
tyranny of the majority, 83 the court also should consider whether those
affected are underrepresented or if there are other reasons to question the
validity of the democratic process. Finally, to ensure institutional stability and avoid the tyranny of the minority, tradition may be considered.
Although the Court does not acknowledge applying a balancing test,
these factors have support in the case law. 184 The application of these
factors will be illustrated in Part III.
a. Importance of the Right Infringed and the Extent of the Infringement
This article does not suggest that fine gradations between rights are
possible. However, few would argue that an invasion of bodily integrity
in the form of a restriction on hair length is indistinguishable from a law
requiring all individuals to donate a kidney. The primary determinant for
measuring the importance of the right infringed should be the consequence the regulation has on the life of the individual. 185 This is one
reason the right to choose whether to have a child is so valued. Having a
child alters your way of life dramatically. A child requires years of financial and emotional support and reduces the parent's freedom of
movement and activity. 186 Although for most, the rewards of parenthood
far outweigh the burdens, for those where that is not true, parenthood can
negatively reshape their lives. 187 In any event, pregnancy also has extreme consequences for the woman's bodily integrity. Women experience weight gain, distortion of their bodies, emotional changes, fatigue,
and often sickness.
No matter how important is the right infringed, if the extent of infringement is small, the consequences to the individual are diminished.
Thus, a ban on abortions must be treated much more seriously than a
regulation requiring a 24-hour waiting period before an abortion
is per88
formed. The Court explicitly recognized this factor in Casey. 1

183.

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

184.
See infra notes 185-217 and accompanying text.
185.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 737, 783-84 (1989).
186.
See Karst, supra note 146, at 641 n.90.
187.
For some, placing the child up for adoption may reduce the burden of having a child.
However, for many, psychologically or morally, that is not a valid option. Id.
188.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87; see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386; id. at 396 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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b. Alternatives Available to the Individual

Closely related to the effect on the life of the individual are the alternatives available to the individual despite the government regulation.' 89 For this reason a ban on the sale of condoms should not be
treated the same as a ban on the sale of all contraceptives. The latter
makes sexual intercourse a much greater risk and has much greater potential to significantly alter the life of the individual. For similar reasons,
a federal regulation might be treated slightly more harshly than an identical state regulation. Although the option to move to another state is not
available for many, the option to move to a different country, for most, is
even more theoretical than real. 190 Also relevant to the availability of
alternatives is the penalty imposed. 19' If the consequence of violating
the law is only a small fine, the option of a knowing violation remains an
option. A penalty requiring, or even allowing for, years of imprisonment
effectively removes that option.
c. The Directness of the Infringement
To the individual whose rights are infringed, it may not matter if the
infringement is direct or incidental. Nonetheless, this factor is relevant
to determine whether the government regulation should be treated as the
cause of the infringement as well as whether the government had an improper purpose. 192 If the infringement is too indirect, it may not be considered the proximate cause of the individual's injury. For example,
environmental regulations may force a business to close, which in turn
may deprive one of the laid-off workers from having the money to fund
an abortion. This should not give rise to a claim for violation of the
worker's privacy rights. It is equally clear that the environmental regulation, with such an indirect affect on privacy rights, could not have been
motivated by a purpose to infringe those rights.
d. Justification and Fit
When considering the government's justification, the Court should
only consider the legislature's actual purpose, not merely some hypothesized purpose. As explained by Professor Tribe:
189.
Cf Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (explaining that a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of prison restrictions infringing a constitutional right is "whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates").
190.
A local regulation leaves even more geographic options available to the individual than a
federal or state regulation. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 550 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting). Nonetheless, once one goes below the federal level, a competing consideration offsets,
to some extent, the availability of other geographic options. Specifically, the greater the number of
locations that do not have the challenged restriction, the weaker is the local government's argument
that the regulation is needed. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (1 th Cir. 2004); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1110 (Fla.
2004).
192.

See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391 (Burger, J., concurring); Doff, supra note 146, at 1182-83.
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Knowing why government chose to enact a particular requirement,
and why it is being enforced on a given occasion, bears on the way in
which the requirement is likely to be perceived and hence the degree
of affront it is likely to carry; it bears on the extent to which government's action is likely to chill protected choices in adjacent areas by
persons who will inevitably understand not only what government
has demanded but the principle on which government appears to have
acted; it illuminates the degree to which invalidation of the requirement would serve to educate government itself with respect to the
sorts of designs those in power should resist; and it assists courts in
the inevitably difficult task of deciding how much weight to give to
an alleged concern, recognizing that the history of how an argument
found its way into a case-whether by hindsight or more genuinelysheds at least some light on how
the doubts regarding the argument's
93
validity ought to be resolved. 1
While a legislature can always reenact the invalidated regulation,
providing a record that the purpose was as the government attorney hypothesized, many legislators would not be willing to engage in such a
charade. In any event, the reason for deference to the legislature is that it
represents the democratic process. 194 If the hypothesized purpose was
not what the legislature intended, there should be no deference.
Given the importance of the rights at stake, the Court should require
the government to provide support for the need for its regulation unless
judicial notice would be proper.' 95 The greater the infringement, the
weaker the justification, and the poorer the fit, the greater should be the
government's burden for evidentiary support. A record would be instrumental in determining the government's actual purpose and help
evaluate the weight of the government's interest. For example, if the
government justifies a regulation prohibiting midwives from providing
abortion services based on safety concerns, it would be significant if
midwife abortions led to complications in fifty percent or .0001 percent
of abortions.
Assuming the government has a valid justification, a court must still
consider the fit between the regulation and the government's asserted
purpose. 196 Of course, perfect fit is rarely possible. The degree to which
the fit is imperfect, however, should be used to diminish the weight of
the government's justification. If the regulation is seriously underinclusive, it suggests that the asserted purpose either was not the true
purpose or is not especially weighty. If a regulation is significantly over-

193.
194.
195.
2004 WL
196.

TRIBE, supra note 164, at 1307 n.13.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002).
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 97; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969); Hodgkins,
1854194, at *8.
See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 396 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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inclusive,1 97 there are individuals whose rights are infringed for no apparent reason. In that case, the government should be required to pass a
more tailored regulation.
The most common and significant justification that the government
asserts is to prevent harm to minors 98 and non-consenting adults. 99 In
analyzing this justification, a court should consider the severity of the
injury, how speculative it is, and how directly it affects others. In judging the severity of the injury, physical injury presumptively should be
considered more significant than economic or psychological injury.
Whatever the severity of the injury, it should be downgraded by the likelihood that it will not occur.2 °0 When the severity of the injury, downgraded for its speculativeness, is small, or the injury is too indirect, an
inference is raised that the injury was not the true purpose of the government regulation or, even if the true purpose, is insufficient to outweigh a significant infringement of privacy rights. This would be particularly true to the extent the fit was poor.
e. Likelihood of Defects in the Democratic Process
The principal argument against balancing and judicial scrutiny 20of
legislative judgments is that it interferes with the democratic process. '
Accordingly, when there are potential defects in the democratic process,
greater judicial scrutiny is justified.20 2 The primary factor to consider
here, derived from Caroline Products' famous footnote four, 20 3 is

whether the individuals whose rights are infringed were underrepresented in the legislative process.20 4 It is likely that legislators tend
to undervalue the interests of minority groups to which they do not be197.
A regulation should not be considered over-inclusive if there is no reasonably satisfactory
alternative to eliminate the over-inclusiveness that still achieves the government purpose. For example, consider a drug regulation that prohibits marijuana distribution. Even if the government is
not concerned with distribution to someone who uses marijuana for medical purposes, the regulation
is not necessarily over-inclusive to the extent it covers a distributor to such a person if the exclusion
of such a person would defeat enforcement of the statute. Such might be true if uncertainty as to a
distributor's customers prevented arrest for possession of large amounts of marijuana. Admittedly,
determining the necessity of what might otherwise be considered over-inclusive often will be a
difficult fact question.
198.
Minors are presumed to be incapable of informed consent. The government also has an
interest in ensuring that adult consent is informed and real. See ParisAdult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57.
199.
For Mill, prevention of harm to others is the only justification for infringing an individual's liberty interests. See MILL, supranote 142, at 24.
200.
Cf Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The invasion of constitutionally
protected liberty and the chance of erroneous prediction are simply too great.").
201.
Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing:A Modelfor the ProperScope of Balancing in
ConstitutionalLaw, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1393, 1429 (2006).
202.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
203.
CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
204.
See Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
984 (1987).
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long.2 °5 Greater scrutiny also is justified when the interests infringed
may not have been fully considered
given the hurly-burly of politics, or
20 6
belong to unpopular groups.
f. Tradition
As suggested earlier, tradition is not a valid test for defining fundamental rights.20 7 Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider tradition, to
the extent one can be agreed upon, 08 when balancing individual rights
and government interests. Traditions are likely to be wise as they represent the considered judgment of many people over an extended period.20 9
Knowledge of historical traditions also can inform judgments about legislative intent. 210 Finally, institutionally, the Court would lose respect if
its judgments regularly were in opposition to public sentiment. 21 Tradition loses its persuasive force, however, to the extent the assumptions
underlying the tradition have changed. For example, if the basis for the
tradition against acknowledging gay marriages is the inability of gay
couples to have children, innovations in artificial reproductive methods
diminish the weight to be given to that tradition.21 2
2. Presumptive Categories
Presumptive categories are not truly exceptions to the sliding scale
approach. Rather, they are situations where a rebuttable presumption
exists as to the result of the balancing process. Again, the two categories
where rebuttable presumptions exist are where government action in an
area it belongs does not have a significant effect on individual rights, and
where the government directly infringes privacy rights.
a. Government Activity Where It Belongs that Does Not Have
a Significant Effect on Individual Rights
The threshold requirement of a significant effect to trigger heightened or full sliding scale review when the government operates in an area
it belongs recognizes that almost any government regulation can indi205.
Id. at 984 n.243 (explaining that the Court plays a representation-reinforcing role) (citing
ELY, supra note 3, at 88-104).
206.
Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 984.
207.
See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
208.
See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 2106; supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
209.
See id.
210.
See Brown, supra note 90, at 189.
211.
See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
212.
Often, there may be disagreement about whether the premises behind a tradition have
changed. For example, is there an increased recognition that gay couples may have children from
prior heterosexual marriages or a greater frequency of adoption by gay couples that would undermine the assumption that gay marriages do not involve children? The burden of establishing that
postulates upon which a tradition is based are no longer valid should be upon the person seeking to
diminish the significance of the tradition. Conversely, the person relying on tradition should have
the burden of establishing the tradition. In any event, tradition is not intended to be a binding, or
even a critical factor, but merely a variable worth considering.
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rectly or incidentally affect privacy interests. For example, laws against
theft can prevent a poor thief from obtaining the funds necessary for an
abortion. A husband who murders his wife might assert that the homicide laws interfere with his right to choose with whom to have an intimate relation. It would not be efficient to require extended review of
such due process challenges, and in the absence of a significant effect,
the constitutional right to privacy is, at most, only marginally implicated.21 3
The question remains, however, what is a significant effect? No
precise definition is possible and once again, a certain measure of intuition is required. Nonetheless, some general principles suggest themselves. The more remote the effect, the fewer the number of people affected, the greater the alternatives available to the individual, the less
likely a regulation should be considered significant.2 14 The Court already imposes similar threshold requirements in the privacy and First
Amendment areas. 215 Application of the significant effect requirement
should prove no more elusive.
b. Direct Regulation of Privacy Interests
When the government directly regulates in an area it does not belong, the regulation should be presumed invalid unless the government
can satisfy the traditional strict scrutiny test. When a law singles out
protected conduct and is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest, "it is a fair inference that the law's principal pur21 6
pose is the illegitimate one of frustrating the exercise of a right.,
Again, that alone should be sufficient to invalidate the law.217
3. Criticisms of the Sliding Scale Approach Do Not Recommend
Against Its Adoption
A sliding scale or balancing approach is not without its critics.2"'
They argue that such an approach is too unpredictable, is just an excuse
for justices to legislate their personal preferences, usurps the role of the
legislature, and actually waters down protection of important rights.2 19
213.

Of course, the government action still must be rational. See Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986);
Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
214.
To this extent, this category involves balancing. However, the threshold is designed to
allow dismissal of the extreme cases, such as the hypothetical situations posited in the text, without
any significant litigation. In cases of doubt, the assumption should be that there is a significant
effect so that the matter can be decided after a more detailed sliding scale review.
215.
See supra notes 110-12, 163.
216.
See Dorf,supra note 146, at 1235.
217.
See supra note 182.
218.
See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 943; Crump, supra note 4, at 906; Porat, supra
note 201, at 1395.
219.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 984-94; Crump, supra note 4, at 906, 910; Michael A.
Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An "Alien's " View of Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Balancing, Governmental Power, and JudicialImperialism, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 5, 9, 31-33 (2005).
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These arguments cannot justify courts' continued adherence to tiered
review. A balancing test can be unpredictable and an excuse for justices
to legislate their personal preferences. However, virtually all constitutional interpretation is value-laden. 220 Indeed, the Framers probably recognized as much, which likely is one reason why the Framers subjected
judges to two layers of approval.2 2'
Certainly, existing law is not better. One commentator has gone so
far as to describe the Court's current approach as "like the methods of
modem alchemy, conjuring up mystical formulae to conceal the sleight
of hand by which a judge transforms the base metal of personal inclinations into the gold of fundamental rights., 222 The recommended approach, by providing transparency, should reduce unpredictability as well
as judicial discretion. "By candidly acknowledging and celebrating the
exercise of judgment, we can actually increase the possibility of accountability and ultimately hope to reduce the power of idiosyncratic decisionmaking." 223
The more serious criticism of balancing is that it is undemocraticby substituting the judgment of nine justices for the representatives of the
people, balancing usurps the role of the legislature. 24 First, this article's
proposal does not call for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature. The Court should give deference to legislative findings.
Nor can the Court affirmatively legislate. It can only protect rights from
government infringement. The need for the Court to fulfill its role as the
primary protector of individual rights is particularly acute given the reality that Congress and state legislatures often don't consider the Constitutionality of the laws they pass.22 5 However, it is not necessary to view
the judiciary as better equipped to protect individual rights than the legislature.22 6 It is obvious that the protection of important rights by two
branches of the government is better than protection by just one. A
multi-branch veto to legislation viewed as infringing rights may stymie
majority preferences and to that extent seem undemocratic. However,
the Framers were concerned with abuses of power and consequently created a government with a system of checks and balances. 227 This artiSee ELY, supra note 3, at 67; Tribe & Dorf,supra note 89, at 1060, 1062.
220.
221.
See Brown, supra note 90, at 220 n.230.
222.
Crump, supra note 4, at 805.
223.
Brown, supra note 90, at 215; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 184 (1920) ("[Judges] themselves have failed adequately to recognize
their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of
the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very
ground and foundation ofjudgments inarticulate, and often unconscious . .
224.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 984.
225.
See Brown, supra note 90, at 186 (citing James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American DoctrineofConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155-56 (1893)).
226.
Cf.ELY, supra note 3, at 67 (although recognizing undemocratic potential of legislature,
questioning whether there is any reason to believe that the judiciary is any better).
227.
See Tribe & Dorf,supra note 89, at 1064.
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cle's proposal merely asks the judiciary to fulfill its role in that system.
Moreover, given the vagueness of the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment, reliance on precedent may be the best way to achieve predictability and consistency.228 There is no one better to interpret precedent than the Supreme Court.229
The argument that balancing waters down the protection of the most
important rights is somewhat disingenuous as those least interested in
protecting individual rights are the ones who typically present it. 230 In
any event, important rights will be protected if in fact it is agreed that
they are truly important. Indeed, balancing may result in greater protection of important rights because courts, fearing the restrictiveness of
strict scrutiny, will no longer need to avoid calling important rights fundamental.
The fact is that balancing is the way most people resolve issues.
They consider the pros and cons of a course of action and try to decide
which outweighs the other. Balancing "is the mark of a reasonable, rational, subtle mind.",231 The Supreme Court balances in numerous areas,232 including in the area of fundamental rights.233 This article only
asks that the balancing process involving privacy rights be done explicitly and clearly.
III. APPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD
This section applies the suggested proposal to several of the actual
substantive due process issues confronting the courts today.234 Although
I would like to pretend that the proposal provides complete predictability
and is totally value-neutral, that would be nonsense. Judgment is required for all Constitutional questions and such judgment necessarily is
affected by the decision-makers' values and experiences. What recommends the suggested approach is its transparency. Competing interests
are identified and reasons for their weighting are specified. Litigators
will know how to build an appropriate factual record. Admittedly, unresolved questions abound. However, the more the Court resolves these

228.
Id.
229.
Id. at 1065.
230.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 204, at 1004.
231.
Id. at 962.
232.
See id. at 963-73.
233.
See supranotes 106-26 and accompanying text.
234.
Without knowing the specific regulation enacted, the purpose of the enactment, or the
factual record presented, it is not possible to resolve all issues that might arise. Alternative bases for
constitutional challenge, such as the Equal Protection Clause, also are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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issues with clarity, the easier it will be to answer the remaining unresolved questions.23 5
A. Abortion
There is little question that regulation of abortion impacts important
fundamental rights-the rights to bodily integrity and to choose one's
intimate relations.236 It is equally clear that the government is acting
where it belongs when it regulates abortions. Bans on abortions, in at
least some contexts, are commercial regulations, designed to prevent
harm to others, and control activity in public places. Accordingly, a balancing of interests is required under this article's proposal. This section
concludes that a ban on all abortions is unconstitutional. Although
analysis of every type of lesser regulation is beyond the scope of this
After
article, treatment of such regulations should mirror existing law.
237
test.
balancing
a
itself
is
standard
burden
undue
all, the Court's
1. Extent of Infringement
238
can have a
A complete ban on abortions, as suggested earlier,
huge effect on the life of the individual. Pregnancy plays havoc with a
woman's body and parenthood involves a lifetime of emotional and financial commitments. There are few, if any, adequate alternatives for
someone wanting an abortion. Giving birth and placing the child up for
adoption may limit the lifetime effects on the mother, but does nothing to
eradicate the infringement on the woman's bodily integrity. It also carries significant emotional consequences for the mother as well as the
child. Abstinence is obviously unsatisfactory and birth control is not
foolproof or available to some. The penalty for illegal abortions has traditionally been penal 239 , making civil disobedience an unsatisfactory
option. A complete ban is a direct regulation of the rights of women, a
group that remains under-represented in the legislative branch. Although
historically abortions may have been prohibited, recent tradition is to the
contrary.24 0

For example, if the Court barred adultery prosecutions in the case of spousal consent, see
235.
infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text, it likely would preclude an action for statutory rape when
there was parental consent, see infra note 280 and accompanying text.
Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 739-40.
236.
237.
Although the analysis would be similar, as with all balancing tests, one can disagree about
the conclusions. See id. at 878 ("Even when jurists reason from shared premises, some disagreement
is inevitable .... That is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which must accommodate life's complexity.").
See supranotes 186-88 and accompanying text.
238.
239.
See Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of EqualProtection,44 STAN. L. REV. 261,314 (1992).
240.
See PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. at 846.
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2. Government Justifications
The government might seek to justify a ban on abortions as necessary to prevent harm to others, whether the fetus, the husband or the
mother, to preserve the sanctity of human life, to prevent overreaching
by unscrupulous practitioners of desperate or emotionally distraught
women, or to regulate public morality. None of these justifications for a
ban on abortions should be considered sufficient to offset a ban's significant infringement of individual rights.
a. Harm to Others
Harm to the fetus as a justification for a ban on abortions falters because a fetus is not a person and does not have rights under the Constitution.24 ' If it were otherwise, states not only could forbid abortions, but
would be compelled to, at least unless the health of the mother was implicated.242 Similarly, a pregnant woman who consumed alcohol or caffeine might be arrested for child abuse. Nor can the government imbue
the fetus with rights at the expense of an existing person's constitutional
rights. As Professor Dworkin explains:
The suggestion that states are free to declare a fetus a person ... assumes that a state can curtail some persons' constitutional rights by
adding new persons to the constitutional population. The constitutional rights of one citizen are of course very much affected by who
or what else also has constitutional rights, because the rights of others
may compete or conflict with his....
...If a state could declare trees to be persons with a constitutional
right to life, it could prohibit publishing newspapers or books in spite
of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, which could not
be understood as a license to kill. 243
Although a fetus cannot be imbued with rights, it might be argued
that "killing" a fetus harms society by diminishing the value of life. This
argument, however, has more in common with political sound bites than
legal reasoning. 244 The "value of life" is employed selectively. For example, those who oppose abortion often support the death penalty.24 5
The Court itself did not let the "sanctity of human life" stop it from im-

241.
Id. at 860.
242.
Ronald Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,59
U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 398-99 (1992).
243. Id. at 400-01.
244.
When vetoing expanded federal support for embryonic stem cell research, President Bush,
a strong proponent of the death penalty and opponent of abortion, said the bill violated his principles
on the sanctity of human life. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, First Bush Veto Maintains Limits on Stem
CellResearch, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at Al.
245. See Arthur L. Rizer 111,Does True Conservatism Equal Anti-Death Penalty?, 6 HOWARD
SCROLL SOC. JUST. L. REV. 88, 115 (2004).
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plicitly recognizing a right to die. 246 Moreover, abortion no more diminishes the value of life than prohibitions on abortion reduce the value of
having children raised by people who want them. In any event, such
abstract harm cannot outweigh the very real, direct, and substantial infringement of women's privacy rights.247
Abortion can harm the interests of a potential father who desperately wants to become a parent. The problem, however, is that when a
mother and father disagree about whether to have a child, the view of
only one can prevail. As between the two, the balance weighs in favor of
the woman who physically bears the child and who is most affected by
the pregnancy.2 48
Finally, abortions can harm the women who choose to have them.249
However, if a woman's privacy interests mean anything, it must mean
that a woman has the right to decide whether the potential harms to her
from an abortion are outweighed by her desire to discontinue the pregnancy.250
b. Commercial Justifications
The government has an interest in regulating the commercial
arena. 251 If the legislature found that abortion providers were taking
advantage of women seeking abortions, it would be justified to impose
reasonable regulations in the form of licensing, safety requirements, or
even price regulation. If evidence showed that providers, interested in a
quick profit, pressured women to have abortions that they later regretted,
246.
See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
247.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 914-16 (Stevens concurring in part, dissenting in part).
248.
See id. at 896 (plurality opinion); Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy:Relationships and
Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1077, 1109 (1998). This is not to suggest that the
government doesn't have any interest in protecting the rights of the father. A regulation that encourages a woman to consult the father that does not threaten the abuses identified by Justice O'Connor
in Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-93, should be permissible. For example, a law might require the abortion
provider, at the time an appointment is made, to suggest consultation with the father or discuss the
impact the abortion decision has on others. Such a law would not significantly infringe the woman's
privacy interests, yet would encourage communication with and the involvement of the father, which
if nothing else, should lead to more stable relationships.
249.
See Andrew A. Adams, Aborting Roe: Jane Roe Questions the Viability of Roe v. Wade,
9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 325, 331-32 (2005).
250.
Again, while the government interest in protecting the mother isn't sufficient to ban an
abortion, it could justify reasonable regulations to ensure that the woman's consent is informed and
considered. Although this article disagrees with Casey's conclusion that a 24-hour waiting period
does not unduly burden women's right to an abortion (particularly given the district court's findings
of fact, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86 (plurality opinion)), it would view a one-or two-hour waiting
period, with an exception for medical emergencies, as permissible. For many women, the 24-hour
wait would significantly increase the difficulty in obtaining an abortion and, absent more than anecdotal evidence, this article would assume that the government's interest could be served almost as
well by the lesser wait. If the government was able to develop a record that showed that a significant
percentage of women regretted having an abortion and would have changed their mind if required to
wait 24 hours, the balance could come out differently. Requiring abortion clinics to develop followup records for this purpose should be permissible.
251.
But see supra note 164.
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a ban on commercial abortions might be justified. There is no reason to
believe this currently to be the case. The government certainly has not
developed evidence establishing such a problem. Finally, even if such
evidence were developed, and given the extent of the infringement it
would have to be a strong record, the government could not justify extending the ban on abortions on that basis to provision of abortion by free
clinics.
c. Justifications Based Upon Public Activity or Effects
A government ban on abortions also might be based upon its police
power to regulate public places and public morality. The obvious limitation of this justification is its inapplicability to abortions performed in
private. As suggested earlier, the offense created by the mere knowledge
that abortions are being conducted cannot support a ban on abortions. 252
The government should be able to ban abortions in government owned
buildings, public places, or even places open to public view. 253 Insuch
places, the privacy interests of the individual are diminished and the infringement generally will not be significant given the alternatives available, i.e., private abortions. Making abortions unavailable in public hospitals may deprive low-income women, particularly in rural areas, of the
abortion option. Nonetheless, the government has the right not to support abortions under this article's proposal. 4
In short, although numerous regulations affecting the abortion decision might be possible, a complete ban of abortion would be invalid under this article's proposal.
B. Gay Marriage
The initial question when analyzing a ban on gay marriages is
whether there is an infringement of any protected right. Although under
traditional doctrine, marriage is a fundamental right,255 this article's pro252.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
253.
For example, the government should be able to require abortion providers to have blinds
on their windows.
254.
See supra note 158.
255.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Even under traditional doctrine, there is the
question whether the fundamental right to marriage is limited to relationships between members of
the opposite sex. A number of courts have said that it is. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 05239,
2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. July 6, 2006); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). If so, a ban on
gay marriage need only have a rational basis. This interpretation of the fundamental right to marriage seems to be a strained and result-oriented reading of Court precedent. In no case, recognizing
a fundamental right to marriage, has the court suggested such a limitation. Indeed, the Court has
said, "the right to marry is of fundamental importancefor all individuals." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384
(emphasis added). The Court has recognized that marriages are "expressions of emotional support
and public commitment" that for many have "spiritual significance, Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96, and
are "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. These reasons to treat marriage as fundamental
are equally applicable to gay marriages. Furthermore, if marriage was limited to relationships of the
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posal would not consider marriage a protected privacy right. Rather, it is
just a benefit provided by the government. Accordingly, a government
can choose not to support gay marriages, refusing to give it official recognition. 256 What the government cannot ddo is deprive gays of benefits
because they are not married unless it has a rational basis unrelated to
infringing gays' privacy rights.257 Given the literally hundreds of rights
that follow from marriage, the government would be hard-pressed to
justify each and every one. 58 For example, there doesn't seem a rational
basis for denying gay couples' access to their "significant other" in public hospitals that limit visitation to relatives. Similarly, it is hard to justify depriving gay couples the right of inheritance without a will. The
Court in Hernandez v. Robles,259 attempted to justify these types of discrimination as rationally related to inducement of marriage and its attendant benefits to children. Such a justification is bootstrapping. It is
equivalent to saying that only persons who have not had an abortion are
"bubbas." The benefit of government recognition as a bubba can be rationally justified as supporting childbirth which is necessary for the continuation of our society. The government can't then say only bubbas can
receive food stamps and justify it as inducing bubbadom and its attendant
benefits to society.
opposite sex based on the traditional definition of marriage, it could just as well be limited to relationships of the same race. That position was rejected in Loving.
Of course, under traditional doctrine if there were a fundamental right for gays to marry, a
government ban on such marriages would be subject to strict scrutiny. See supra note 6. Given the
number of childless heterosexual marriages and homosexual marriages with children, the typical
child-based justifications for treating gay marriages differently could not satisfy the narrow tailoring
required by that test. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Hernandez, 2006 WL 1835429 (Kaye, J., dissenting); Goodridge v, Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 961-64 (Mass. 2003) (finding procreation or child-rearing justifications unable to meet
rational basis scrutiny).
Contrary to the suggestions of some, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy andPolyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 279-80 nn.6,
8, 13-15, recognition of gay marriages would not necessitate acceptance of polygamous marriages.
In the latter case, consent is not easily refused. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569, 578. Without a valid
consent, the government can deny recognition of polygamous marriages because they run the risk of
psychological harm to existing spouses. Lack of consent would also distinguish denial of marriage
to one's pet or favorite flower. See Sunstein, supranote 88, at 2083.
256.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text. In any event, the government mightjustify its
support of only heterosexual marriage as rationally related to its interest in supporting stability where
accidental children are possible. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. 2005).
257.
See supra note 159-160 and accompanying text. There is a question whether a ban on
gays' right to marry does infringe their privacy rights. This article believes that denying gays the
right to marry infringes the individual's choice in intimate sexual relationships, a right recognized in
Lawrence. See supra note 86. If one believes Lawrence did not recognize such a right, or that this
right is not significantly infringed, the ban on gay marriage would fall under my first presumptive
category, see supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text, and be valid. One taking that position
might suggest that whether or not the state recognizes gay marriage, the individual is free to have
sexual relationships with whom they wish. This article would reject that argument as an exercise in
semantics. The reality is that depriving gays of the benefits of marriage is punishing them for their
sexual preferences. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 788 (Alaska 2005).
258.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 05239, 2006 WL 1835429, at *2 (N.Y. July 6, 2006)
(counsel identified 316 benefits based upon marriage); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57 (Mass.
2003); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 196.
259.
No. 05239, 2006 WL 1835429, at *21 (N.Y. July 6, 2006).
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Even if one agrees that the unwillingness to allow gays to marry deprives them of many benefits without a rational basis unrelated to infringing gays' privacy rights, there remains the question of remedy. It
may be that the proper remedy simply is to invalidate each of the benefits
dependent on marriage that discriminate against gays. However, if the
purpose of such benefits is to encourage stable, committed relationships,
the proper relief may be to invalidate bans on gay marriage,26 ° or require
the enactment of a civil union provision providing gay couples with identical privileges as married heterosexuals. 26'
C. Medical Marijuana
The government's general regulation of recreational drugs is not
jeopardized by this article's proposal. Such regulations would be valid
under my first presumptive category.2 62 The government's interest in
preventing harm to others clearly outweighs the indirect and limited infringement on privacy rights and precluding drug enforcement would be
a clear break from tradition.263 The difficult issue is whether the ban
should apply to users of recreational drugs such as marijuana for medical
purposes. Of course, if there were other reasonable alternatives to marijuana to deal with the medical concerns, the ban should apply to such
users. The denial of one drug when equivalent ones are available does
not affect the life of the individual one iota more than the ban on marijuana use for recreational users. However, what if the only satisfactory
relief from pain is provided by marijuana? This article would put the
burden of establishing the unique medical benefits of marijuana on the
user. Given the findings of the attorney general that marijuana does not
have such unique uses, the burden would be heavy. 264 If the individual
user were able to sustain that burden, this article likely would preclude
the government from prosecuting such an individual for possession or
use of small amounts of the drug.

260.
The conclusion suggested in text is not dependent upon finding gays a protected class.
Rather, it follows from a lack of a rational basis for depriving gays of many of the benefits from
marriage other than to punish them for their choice of committed, intimate relationship.
261.
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23;
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 196.
262. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
263.
The life of the recreational user will not be dramatically altered by a ban on recreational
drugs, particularly given the availability of prescription drugs and alcohol. On the other hand, the
government has an interest in preventing the secondary effects from marijuana use such as theft,
assault, driving under the influence and accidental injuries. These effects are concerns even if the
individual is using drugs in the privacy of her own home.
264. This article does not address the appropriate forum for an individual user's challenge. It
may be that the individual should first challenge the attorney general's findings in an administrative
forum. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005); County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F.
Supp. 2d 1192, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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Assuming marijuana uniquely relieved pain, a ban on its use would
significantly affect the individual's interest in bodily integrity. 265 Given
that the government is acting in an area it belongs (commercial regulation, preventing harm to others), a sliding scale analysis is appropriate.
By assumption, the extent of the infringement would be great and there
would be no satisfactory alternatives available to the individual. Although the infringement would be indirect, 266 the government's interest
would not be especially strong. Many of the alleged harms from marijuana use are indirect, speculative, or unlikely to occur. For example, it
is not clear what effect marijuana use has on crime and most marijuana
users do not get into car accidents.267 One also might question how
strong the government's interest is when it does not regulate alcohol, a
substance with very similar effects to marijuana. This is not to suggest
that the government has no interest in marijuana enforcement. 268 Rather,
that it is not sufficiently strong to outweigh the medical marijuana users'
significant privacy interest in controlling their pain. 269 The government
might argue that an exemption for medical marijuana would undermine
the government's general drug enforcement efforts. Nonetheless, even if
this interest was sufficient to outweigh the individual's privacy interest,
given the experience with medical marijuana exemptions in other coun-

265.
Although the Court has never held that relief from pain implicated an individual's privacy
rights, five justices in Glucksberg, suggested there was a fundamental right to use physicianrecommended medication to alleviate pain and suffering to control the circumstances of their death.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by
Ginsberg, J.); id. at 743, 745 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 790
(Breyer, J., concurring). In Regina v. Parker,49 O.R.3d 481 (Ont. C.A. 2000), the Canadian court
explicitly found that a ban on the use of medical marijuana infringed the individual's right to bodily
integrity.
Normally, the indirectness of the infringement would suggest that the government had a
266.
proper purpose. This is certainly true with respect to the Narcotics Act generally. One wonders,
however, whether the inclusion of marijuana as a schedule one drug (a drug subject to abuse, devoid
of legitimate medical uses, and lacking accepted safety under medical supervision 21 U.S.C. 812) in
1970 wasn't, at least in part, motivated by animus toward the "hippie" generation.
See Marcia Tiersky, Medical Mari'uana:Putting the Power Where it Belongs, 93 Nw.
267.
U.L. REV. 547, 574 (1999).
Even the Canadian Justice who found the use of medical marijuana protected under the
268.
Canadian Constitution found that the government did have a valid interest in marijuana enforcement
generally. See Regina v. Clay, 49 O.R.3d 577, 592 (C.A. Ont. 2000). Obviously, the more dangerous the drug, the stronger the government's interest. Thus, an exemption for marijuana use does not
mandate an exemption for cocaine or heroine use.
The remaining sliding scale factors are not especially helpful. The users of medical mari269.
juana may be under-represented in the legislature, but legislators likely would view their interests
sympathetically. Although there is at least a recent tradition of regulating marijuana, that tradition
would have little weight given that the premise on which the tradition was based, the lack of a
unique medical use, has changed by assumption. Moreover, an increasing number of states have
recognized the medical benefits of marijuana, see Note, Last Resorts and FundamentalRights: The
Substantive Due Process Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1985, 2005 n.107 (2005) and the U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) which requires
marijuana to be listed as a controlled substance, exempts use for medical purposes. See Clay, 49
O.R.3d 577, 590 (C.A. Ont. 2000). If anything, the experience in other countries raises questions
about the government's need for regulation.
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tries, 270 the burden should be on the government to demonstrate the validity of this concern.
D. CriminalSexual Conduct
This article's proposal will not have a significant practical effect on
prosecution of criminal sexual conduct cases. The two primary types of
statutes that might be invalidated, fornication and adultery statutes, are
currently rarely enforced.2 7' Cases involving rape, prostitution, and incest would proceed largely unchanged.
1. Fornication
A fornication statute could not properly be enforced under this article's proposal as to consenting adults having sex in private. 272 Such a
statute directly infringes on the individual's privacy rights. Because the
government would be acting in an area it did not belong, it would need to
demonstrate a justification that was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. The government could not credibly claim
any such compelling interest given such statutes' history of nonenforcement. 273
The government could regulate public exhibition of sexual acts.
That is an area the government belongs and does not significantly infringe any privacy rights. Such regulation would be presumptively valid.
The government also could deny certain benefits to persons having private sexual relations with a consenting adult. For example, a public university could preclude professors from fornicating with students. There
are rational reasons unrelated to infringing the professors' privacy rights
for such a denial, including fear of sexual harassment suits or perceived

270.
See supra note 269. For a description of the Canadian system for exemption of medical
marijuana, see Marijuana Medical Access Regulations, SOR/2001-227, discussed in R. Wood,
[2006] N.B.J. No. 254, 1, 7-8 (N.B.C. June 20, 2006).
271.
See Karst, supranote 146, at 670, 674. The non-enforcement of criminal statutes does not
moot the question of its constitutionality. The constitutionality of criminal statutes also can affect
civil liability. For example, in Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35 (Va. 2005), the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant engaged in sexual relations with her knowing that he was infected with the herpes virus
and that he was contagious, and failed to inform her of those facts. If the fornication statute was
constitutional, the plaintiff would have been guilty of criminal conduct and, under a Virginia law
analogous to the "unclean hands" doctrine, her tort action would have been barred. Martin, 269 Va.
at 38. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, reversed the lower court decision, and allowed
the plaintiff's tort case to proceed. Id. at 38, 42-43.
If it is true that Lawrence recognized a right to private consensual sex between consenting
272.
adults, as this article has argued, see supra note 86, fornication statutes would be invalid under
existing law also. Even if Lawrence didn't recognize such a right, it could be argued that the right to
beget a child, a right the Court has recognized, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565
(2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 & n.10 (1972), necessarily includes the right to do
what is a prerequisite for that right. See State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339-40 (N.J. 1977).
273.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The government has a
strong interest in ensuring that the sexual relations are truly consensual. However, the rape statutes
fully protect that interest.
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bias by other students.274 The school also could want an announced policy so that students wouldn't erroneously confuse faculty concern for
sexual advances.
2. Adultery
Adultery statutes directly interfere with private sexual relations between consenting adults. The government, however, could assert that it
is seeking to prevent harm to the spouse and children of the adulterer. A
sliding scale analysis would then be appropriate. To the extent the adulterer is deprived of sexual relations with someone she cares deeply for, it
is a significant infringement. The infringement is direct. The harm asserted by the government is speculative, indirect, and does not involve
physical injury. There also would be an issue with fit. If the adulterer
has no children and the spouse has not complained or consented, there
does not appear to be reason for the statute. On the other hand, divorce is
an alternative that would avoid application of the statute, there is a tradition against adultery, and, unfortunately, adulterers probably are not under-represented in the legislature. What might be the deciding factor is
the history of non-enforcement of adultery statutes.275 As with fornication statutes, that seriously undermines the government's assertion of
need.276
3. Rape
Under this article's proposal a basic rape statute would be valid. A
rape statute does not interfere with any privacy right 277 and the government has a strong interest in preventing harm to the non-consenting
party. Less clear is the proposal's effect on statutory rape provisions.
By definition, statutory rape does not involve consenting adults, and the
government has an interest in protecting minors from harm. Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that minors also have constitutional rights,
including the right to privacy.278 A statutory rape statute does burden the
minor's right to intimate relations. Although, the minor may be deemed
incapable of a valid consent, by analogy to the abortion cases, 279 a statutory rape statute, to be constitutional, might need to have an exemption
274.
In the case of a teacher-student relationship, there also would be a question if consent
could be easily refused. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 756-57.
275. See supra note 271.
276. The government might alternatively justify prohibitions on adultery as a rational condition
on the benefit of marriage. However, it is unclear that such a condition is ever specified, and if it
was, why the remedy should be criminal prosecution rather than the elimination of the benefit of
marriage, i.e., divorce.
277. Rape, by definition, does not involve private consensual conduct.
278. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977).
279. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1979); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990). Admittedly, the abortion cases are not a perfect analogy. Statutory rape statutes do not
impose the same infringement on the individual as a ban on abortion. Rather than significantly
interfering with the mother's bodily integrity and imposing lifetime consequences, a statutory rape
statute only requires lesser forms of sexual gratification for a finite period of time.

2006)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

for when there is parental or judicial consent. 280 The need for such an
exemption would be strongest in cases involving little disparity in the
ages of the sexual partners. In such cases, intimacy is common and no
longer has the same tradition of disapproval.
4. Prostitution
Laws against prostitution should be valid. The government can justify prostitution laws as commercial regulation necessary to preserve
public morals and prevent harm to others. Ostensibly, prostitution laws
interfere with private intimate relations between consenting adults.
However, there is a question whether sex for a fee can be considered
truly intimate. Even if such laws were analyzed under the sliding scale,
the balance probably would favor the government. The interference with
privacy rights are indirect and of limited significance for most.2 8 l Alternatives are available to individuals-sex with willing participants, masturbation, prostitutes in Nevada or foreign countries, and there is a tradition of laws banning prostitution. The government's concerns with public morality, crime, and health risks are real. Although the injuries are
indirect and somewhat speculative, they can be severe. Regulation rather
than prohibition can limit these effects. Nevertheless, the government's
choice for a complete ban probably should be given deference given the
relatively limited infringement of privacy rights and the tradition of
criminalizing prostitution.
5. Incest
Laws prohibiting the paradigmatic cases of incest would be unchanged by this article's proposal. Minors are not capable of consent
and the government has obvious interests in avoiding the psychological
harm to the minor and the potential physical harms to any offspring produced by the incestuous relationship.282 A more difficult question is how
to treat incest involving adults. Here there is no question that there is
interference with the individual's right to private intimate relations with
consenting adults. The infringement is direct and for some is significant
because it deprives the individual of intimate relations with one who may
be the love of his or her life. For such a person, there is no substitute and
the infringement lasts a lifetime, not merely until adulthood. Nonethe280.
Under current law, failure to include a parental approval provision also might violate a
parents' presumptive right to control their child's upbringing. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65-69 (2000).
281.
Perhaps a truly repulsive person might argue that prostitution is the only avenue for them
to have sex with another. However, it is unclear how the individual could carry his burden of proof
and doubtful that a court would want to suggest that someone is incapable of attracting a person of
the opposite sex because of their appearance.
282.
Obviously, an exemption in the case of parental consent is unnecessary when the parent is
the party guilty of incest. Even if the adult is another relative, a parental consent provision should be
unnecessary. Unlike in the case of statutory rape, conflicts of interests are involved when the accused is a relative and incest has a long and ongoing tradition of societal disapprobation.
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less, the government has an interest in preventing offspring with increased likelihood of birth defects and decreased intelligence. Although
such harm is speculative, the physical harm may be severe. The government could also argue that the consent is not valid when one of the
incestuous parties is in a position of trust or if consent might otherwise
be difficult to refuse.28 3 There might be an applied challenge in a case
where children are not possible or there is no blood relationship, 28 and
there is no reason to question the validity of the consent. However,
given the tradition against incest and the deference due to the government, the incest statutes should be facially valid.
E. Artificial Reproduction
The government can regulate the commercial aspects of artificial
reproduction with nothing more than a rational basis unrelated to infringing privacy rights. However, a ban on artificial reproduction should be
invalid. For many seeking birth artificially, there is no alternative
method to have a child. Depriving someone of the parent-child relationship is a tremendous infringement of the individual's privacy rights. It is
a direct interference that has lifetime consequences. There also is no
tradition of outlawing artificial reproduction techniques. If it were
shown that there was a much greater chance of abnormalities through
artificial methods of birth or if a population control problem of much
greater dimension than currently exists developed, the government might
be able to justify a ban on artificial reproduction. However, given the
significant infringement of privacy rights, the government would be required to develop a strong record to that effect.
F. Sale of Sex Toys
Several cases have upheld a ban on the sale of sex toys. 285 These
cases would remain good law under this article's proposal. A state's ban
on the sale of sex toys has a de minimus affect on an individual's privacy
rights. For most, the use or non-use of sex toys does not significantly
283.
See supra note 274.
284.
For example, some incest statutes cover relatives by adoption. See, e.g., ALA CODE §
13A-13-3 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78.1 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-302 (2005);
TEx PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02 (2005). There also is a question whether the possible harms justify
prohibitions of incestuous relationship involving first or second cousins. See Robin L Bennett, et.
al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguinous Couples and Their Offspring: Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 11 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 97 (2002) (first
cousins are only 1.7-2.8% more likely than unrelated parents to have children with birth defects or
mental retardation); Richard Coniff, Go Ahead, Kiss Your Cousin: Heck, Marry Her If You Want To,
DISCOVER, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.discover.com/issues/aug-02/features/featkiss/ ("firstcousin marriages entail roughly the same increased risk of abnormality that a woman undertakes
when she gives birth at 41 rather than at 30"); Denise Grady, Few Risks Seen to the Children of I'
Cousins, N.Y.TIMES, April 4, 2002, at Al (stating that medical geneticists have known "for a long
time that there was little or no harm in cousins marrying and having children").
285.
See, e.g., Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11 th Cir. 2004); Pleasureland Museum, Inc. v. Beutter, 288 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2002).
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affect their life. There are alternatives available to the individual, including traditional sex or manual stimulation. Sex toys generally even can be
bought from other states without leaving one's home. The state easily
can justify the sales ban as maintaining public morals and eliminating the
secondary effects of the sale of such devices. 286 However, a statute prohibiting the private use or possession of sex toys should be problematic.287 Obviously, private use cannot be directly justified by public morals or the secondary effect of sales. Nor could a state justify the ban on
use as necessary to prevent sales. Unlike drugs, the sale of sex toys generally is not done surreptitiously on the streets. Direct enforcement of
the sales ban is relatively easy. Although for most, the effect of the ban
is not significant, for some, sex toys are used therapeutically to alleviate
sexual dysfunction. 28 8 Absent any reasonable justification, this minor
infringement of privacy rights should be sufficient to invalidate a prohibition on use.
CONCLUSION

If consistency has any value, the Court's fundamental rights/right to
privacy jurisprudence is bankrupt. The Court fluctuates between alternative tests to determine whether a fundamental right exists. The dominant
test in the lower courts, the "tradition test," lacks its promised objectivity, conflicts with the structure of the Constitution, and is incompatible
with Court precedent. The standard of review for fundamental rights is
even more problematic. The Court's language and practice are inconsistent. Hornbook law states that a law that infringes privacy rights must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Yet, in
many cases the Court applies an open-ended balancing test. This dichotomy between language and practice confuses lower courts and effectively paralyzes them from finding new fundamental rights.
This article has suggested a Lockean conceptualization of the right
to privacy-a pact between individuals and the government to forego
certain rights that are necessary to further society's interests, but with a
reservation of rights in certain private areas where the government does
not belong. The areas the government does not belong include one's
thoughts, feelings, bodily integrity, and private intimate relationships.
By contrast, the government acts in a proper area when it provides government benefits, regulates commercial activity and activity in public
places, and seeks to prevent harm to non-consenting parties. A denial of
government benefits is valid unless it has no rational basis other than to
harm privacy interests. Government regulation infringing privacy inter286. PleasurelandMuseum, 288 F.3d at 993 n. 1.
287.
Cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) (Prohibition of private possession of
obscene material cannot be justified as "necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribution" of obscene material).
288. See Herald, supra note 91, at 23-26.
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ests is judged by a balancing test which considers the importance of the
right infringed, the extent of the infringement, the alternative available to
the individual, the directness of the infringement, the government's justification and how closely the regulation fits the government's needs, the
likelihood of defects in the democratic process, and tradition. Where the
government regulates in an area it belongs and doesn't significantly infringe privacy rights the balance is presumed to allow the regulation
unless irrational. Where the government infringes rights in an area it
does not belong, the regulation is presumed invalid unless the government demonstrates that its regulation is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest. In the majority of cases, where government regulation is in an area it belongs but significantly infringes
privacy rights, detailed balancing is required. Balancing is what people
do; it is what the Court does. 289 It is time for the Court to openly and
honestly acknowledge its practice and provide clear guidance to the
lower courts.
The recommended approach was applied to resolve a number of privacy issues facing the courts. Admittedly, one can legitimately disagree
with the conclusions reached. Nonetheless, what recommends the suggested methodology is its clarity. Competing interests are identified and
the reasons for their weighting are specified. Litigators will know how
to build an appropriate factual record, and lower courts will have a blueprint for analysis. Most importantly, a uniform approach would bring
some measure of consistency to an area that for too long has lacked it.

289.

See supranote 144 and accompanying text.
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INTRODUCTION

The quick emergence of the Internet from a network that facilitates
limited communications among academics and governmental agencies to
a worldwide and extremely popular medium has changed and challenged
the worlds of law and business in a variety of ways. Yet the content industry, especially its segments which involve the production and distribution of popular music, have perhaps been the most affected by the
Internet's ability to allow for global, efficient, and cheap communications and data exchange. Over recent years, the leaders of the music
industry have witnessed their existing business models come under attack. Rather than purchasing or licensing music from them directly,
Internet users of all ages are accessing songs and other forms of content
of their choosing online, without the consent or control of those holding
the legal rights to such content ("copyright holders")' and without compensating them for such use. 2 In doing so, online users rely upon techno1.
Throughout the analysis, I will refer to such entities as the "copyright holders," without
addressing the specific intricacies of copyright law that set out the rights afforded to those that
compose, author, and record the specific works. In the context of this paper, these distinctions are
not crucial.
2.
For recent information as to the extent of the file swapping phenomenon, see David W.
Opderbeck, Peer-to-PeerNetworks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property Reverse
Private Attorney GeneralLitigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1696-99 (2005); see also Neil
Netanel, Impose a NoncommercialUse Levy to Allow FreePeer-to-PeerFile Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 2-4 (2003).
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logical innovations that provide access to vast amounts of content, and
the quick transfer of data among users. Yet concerns regarding the
strength and prospect of current business models are no longer limited to
the music industry alone. Movie studios and other entities involved in
the production of content3 are quickly acknowledging the challenges they
face in the twenty-first century given the ease of digital copying and the
extent of content available online, and are constantly contemplating
proper strategies to respond.
The troubles of the content industry, however, are not merely conceming the existence of destructive technological applications and communication networks. The technological innovations mentioned have
caused substantial changes in the behavioral patterns of a (mostly) lawabiding segment of society. Citizens (especially, but not only, youngsters) are constantly and in many instances knowingly violating copyright law and infringing upon the rights of the copyright holders.4 In
other words, within certain social circles, social norms are now quite
different than the actual copyright laws on the books. 5
In view of these developments, the content industry's leaders are
moving swiftly to secure and even improve their position in the online
content markets. In many instances, they are making use of their influence and capital to guarantee the assistance of regulators in these efforts.
As part of these efforts, they have suggested and begun to implement
new models of content distribution that are premised upon secured networks and encrypted content.6 With these measures in place, copyright
holders should be able to capitalize on the Internet's broad communications and worldwide access, while assuring that they will be compensated for all instances in which their content is used. These models, usually referred to as digital rights management ("DRM") schemes, are facing a broad opposition of scholars, activists, and concerned citizens.
This broad "coalition of dissent" forcefully argues that DRM schemes
will impede on the public's rights to fair use, privacy and other fundamental rights.7 Others argue in addition that there is no evidence that the
content industry's existing business models are compromised and that
the content providers' income is reduced in view of unauthorized online

3.
Examples include eBooks, software and games; however, the analysis set out in this
article will focus exclusively on music and video content.
4.
For interesting insights as to the rationales for such file-sharing, see Gali Einav, College
Students: The Rationalefor P2P Video File Sharing, 2004 CITI Working Papers (on file with author); see also DAVID CALLAHAN, THE CHEATING CULTURE 185-87 (2004). For a discussion of file

sharing and social norms, see Opderbeck, supranote 2, at 1700-01.
5.
See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 243-44 (2004); see also Tim Wu, When
Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 722-25 (2003).
6.

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 170 (2003) (discussing the early origins

of this idea).
7.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
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content access. 8 The DRM schemes are also criticized by other powerful
industry players, such as telecommunication providers and hardware
manufacturers, 9 whose interests are not always aligned (and at times are
even opposed) with those of the content industry.' °
Beyond the overall attack on DRM, several scholars have been arguing for the complete or partial abolishment of copyright protection in
the online context. Such protection, they argue, is no longer required as
copyright holders can easily compensate for the income stream that the
unauthorized online access to content is diminishing through the other
advantages the online environment provides." Artists could use the
Internet to promote their offline products (such as live performances,
CDs and other forms of merchandise) or even rely on the users' benevolence to compensate them for the enjoyment of their works (in the same
manner the local artist is tipped at a street corner).' 2 Clearly such arguments are not embraced by the content industry, and as such are not
likely to be implemented on a broad scheme.
Within this spectrum of intellectual debate (which has many practical implications) concerning the future of copyright protection in the
online realm, between strong online copyright protection and copyright
abandonment, several new ideas and models have been recently discussed; ideas that offer sufficient incentives to generate content production in the digital era by well-compensated artists, while protecting the
social interests involved. These are Alternative Compensation Schemes
("ACS") for the use of content online that are specially tailored to meet
the specific challenges of the online world. These models, set forth by4
13
prominent legal scholars such as Terry Fisher and Neil Netanel,
which rely in part on earlier scholarship ("The ACS scholars"),"5 provide
for indirect compensation to the copyright holders of various works,
which would be distributed by a governmental entity. The extent of the
8.

See generallyCALLAHAN, supra note 4.

9.

See generallyFISHER, supra note 5, at 242.

10.
Interesting problems arise when a media conglomerate (such as Sony or GE) includes
both a manufacturing and content division. Here, while one division might suffer from the-ongoing
file swapping, the other benefits by growth in the sales of relevant hardware. Here the conglomerate
struggles in formulating its overall strategy in addressing these matters, and at times takes contradicting positions.
11.
See Netanel, supra note 2, at 74-76.
12.
Netanel refers to these forms of solutions as "digital abandon." See Netanel, supra note 2,
at 74-76. This dynamic is at times referred to as the "Street Performer Protocol." See John Kelsey &
Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copyrights, FIRST MONDAY (1999),
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_6/kelsey/#k4.
13.
See generally FISHER, supra note 5.
14.
See generally Netanel, supra note 2.
15.
See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The CreativeDestructionof Copyright:Napster and the
New Economics ofDigitalTechnology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 263-70 (2002); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813, 813 (2001). For a recent summary of these models, see Jessica Litman, Sharingand Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 34-35 (2004).
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copyright holders' compensation would depend on the relative uses of
their content online, and would be distributed from a designated fund.
The fund would be financed through levies set on specific services and
equipment that are related to the online experience. As I will illustrate
below, the recent scholarship addressing these alternative models for
compensation in the Internet context is not engaged in merely floating
abstract notions and legal concepts. The ACS Scholars go to great
lengths to draw out, in extensive detail, the ways in which these schemes
could and should be implemented.
According to the ACS scholars, implementing these models will
meet several important objectives. These models will allow society to
maintain a vibrant market of content production and online distribution,
while changing today's reality in which millions of citizens are rendered
infringers (and at times outlaws) by copyright laws. 16 In addition, the
shift to the ACS model will hopefully mitigate several inefficiencies in
today's business and legal frameworks: the existence of costly and extensive litigation that is required for resolving copyright disputes and
sharpening the meaning of legal rules and terms; 7 the imbalance of
power between the large media conglomerates and artists that have yet to
transition into stars; and the fact that only a small portion of all artists are
able to make a decent living off their talents.1 8 Yet perhaps above all, the
ACS scholars' objective in constructing these models is to allow for the
enrichment of the public sphere with a great variety of easily accessible
content for both the users' consumption and modification.1 9 By doing so,
they aim to promote important ideals related to free speech and democracy.
In this article I closely examine and constructively critique the ACS
models and scholarship. In doing so, I part from the already growing
base of literature addressing this issue that has been quick to reject ACS
for a variety of reasons, without taking a close look at its internal dynamics. 20

I, however, choose to focus on the model's inner workings-its

"nuts and bolts" that are the mechanisms aimed at transforming this
model from abstract policy ideas into actual regulations and business
practices. In doing so, I examine whether the model could be implemented as described and the possible outcomes of such implementation.
This analysis leads to concrete suggestions for several changes in the
16.

See FISHER, supra note 5 at 243.

17.

Id. at 245-46.

18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 245.

20.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1408-10 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine HarmsFree Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J.
535, 589-90 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 653,

708-12 (2005).
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model to provide for its smooth, efficient, and fair implementation. In
addition, it offers several points for future consideration regarding the
balancing of benefits the scheme will bring against the unintended consequences of its implementation. In this article, therefore, I hope to lead
the way to future scholarship and technological innovation that will respond to the challenges this paper draws out and addresses.
To thoroughly address this issue, the article is structured as follows:
In Part I, I draw out the legal, business, and technological background
leading to the current reality in which the ACS schemes might prove
necessary. In view of the fact that a great deal of legal and other scholarship (including, of course, that of the ACS scholars) has addressed this
background in length, I chose to address these facts in brief, while adding
references to the most recent legal, technological, and business changes
occurring in the online realm. In Part II, I address the DRM solutions
promoted by the content industry, the legal and policy rationales that
stand behind this model, as well as their shortcomings in terms of economic feasibility and technological sustainability. The importance of
this part of the analysis is to establish a baseline for comparison which
will serve us in the latter parts of this article. Only after understanding
the DRM scheme can we later compare it to those offered by the ACS
scholars while trying to establish which will lead to better results for
artists, content owners, users, and society in general. In Part III, I address in further detail the ACS models, while focusing on the issues
drawn out by Professor Fisher in his recent book, Promises to Keep,2 1
and Professor Netanel in a recent article published with the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology. 22 In Part IV, I offer a constructive critique of the alternative compensation models, while addressing difficulties in their implementation and problematic results that might arise from
their adoption.
Before going further, I must introduce several underlying assumptions that are needed to explain the somewhat limited scope of the discussion and analysis at hand. While the arguments presented throughout
this article at times strongly oppose those promoted by the ACS scholars,
I accept the notion that the implementation of these schemes is politically
and legally feasible. Furthermore, I accept most of the legal and economic descriptions and analyses the ACS scholars provide as to the
structure of today's content markets. In addition, I agree that unless the
mentioned changes are made, courts and legislators will maintain today's
legal status quo that embraces the rights of the copyright holders. For
instance, I concede the fact that courts addressing today's copyright law
in the near future will continue to find online file sharing as an infringement of copyright and will continue to allow the "breakdown" on such
21.
22.

See generally FISHER, supra note 5.
See generally Netanel, supra note 2.
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infringers, which include many users that are usually law-abiding citizens. Within this framework and while applying these assumptions, I
engage in an analysis that hopefully will promote this strand of scholarship that offers an interesting answer to a much discussed question.
I. THE CONTENT MARKET IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A PRIMER ON WHERE WE ARE TODAY

To understand the ACS scholarship, we must first acknowledge the
motivations and concerns of the ACS scholars, as well as the technological, economic, and legal foundations of their analysis. We must do so to
later examine how and whether these are met in the blueprint they provide for the ACS. Generally, from the perspective of the ACS scholars
(which I share), today's innovations create an opportunity made possible
by technology, and a crossroadsfor regulators. To meet important social
objectives, the ACS scholars have a strong preference towards one path.
However, in view of regulatory paths taken in the past and the balance of
power at the present, they believe that in the future, unfortunately, another path will be taken. Thus, they draw out an ambitious plan that
would allow for the maximization of the social benefits of technology,
while allowing content creators to maintain some of the rights and benefits they have today.23 As we are quietly approaching a crucial crossroads at which regulatory decisions concerning the future of copyright
policy must be made and the other dominant options currently debated
are in their opinion extremely unattractive, the authors strongly promote
ACS, with its many shortcomings and compromises they are the first to
admit. I devote the following paragraphs to draw out the opportunity, the
crossroads, and the pressures at this juncture to better understand the
background for the emergence of the ACS models and the urgency in
addressing the model at this time.
A. Opportunity
Before addressing the opportunities made possible by technology, a
few words about the technology itself. When referring to "technology,"
commentators in this field usually mean the software, hardware, knowledge, and communications infrastructure made available to a growing
portion of the American public, and to almost every college student2 4 : a
connection (broadband, in most cases) to the Internet, a computer, or
23. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 6-10; Netanel, supra note 2, at 45-46.
24.
This part of the discussion might call for an analysis of the "digital divide;" the fact that
not all segments of the population have equal access to these technological riches and opportunities.
I decide not to address this issue within this analysis, both because I do not wish to broaden the
scope of this article and analysis, and because I believe this is a matter that will be resolved over
time--or at least severely mitigated. For interesting data and perspective on this matter, see Amey
Stone, The Digital Divide That Wasn't, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Aug. 19, 2003,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2003/t2OO3O819_4285-tcl26.htm?chan=sear
ch.
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other devices that allow for data storage and content use, and software
that allows for quickly searching and downloading such content from the
Internet, as well as transforming various forms of content available offline into formats that could be easily subjected to the online processes
mentioned.25
While many associate technology which promotes "digital copying"
with threats to content holders or even the "death of copyright, 2 6 it is
essential to point out that the technology itself creates many opportunities for large media firms, copyright holders, and the general public. The
large media firms, at first, can make use of such technologies to cut the
costs of packaging, manufacturing, and marketing. Rather than print and
burn CDs, ship them across the country, and incur other costs related to
the physical manifestation of digital content, such firms can provide their
content directly to consumers online.2 7 The dollars saved from these
improvements will not only find their way to the firms' shareholders and
executives, but also to consumers who would benefit from reduced prices
for media content and artists that are funded by these media firms. For
users, the new media technologies present additional benefits, as the new
technologies create an extensive and varied media market in which users
could easily find whatever form of content they might desire, and at all
times. Furthermore, the digital medium transforms users from passive
content recipients to active speakers who "rip, tear and bum" 28 text, music, and video on their way to creating new and improved works, while
"glomming on" 29 their own statements to existing works using the wonders of modem technology. The importance of this benefit is not confined to the commercial context. As commentators point out, the existence of the technologies mentioned and the opportunities they create
enrich the public domain with new forms of expression from many new
outputs which address an array of topics. 30 This outcome is extremely
important to our social fabric and can promote a democratic culture with
a variety of speakers and ideas available to all. 3'

25.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 13, for an additional description of this technological background.
26.
For a brief demonstration of articles that carry this title, see for example Eben Moglen,
Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY (1999),
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/anarchism.html; see also Lunney, supra note 15, at 813.
27.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 19.
28.
This famous Apple slogan has become a term now commonly quoted by scholars aiming
to demonstrate the potentials of the new technology. See, e.g., Netanel, supranote 2, at 5-6.
29.
This was a term coined by Jack Balkin to illustrate today's ability to make use of content
to generate new ideas. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom ofExpressionfor the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,9-12 (2004).
30.
Fisher refers to these benefits as "Semiotic Democracy." See FISHER, supra note 5, at 2831.
31.
See Balkin,supra note 29, at 1-2, for an additional discussion regarding this issue.
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B. Threats and Crossroads
The flip side of the various benefits mentioned above, is (as many
content providers are acknowledging) that the new technologies and the
dynamics they make possible generate a substantial threat to the content
providers' existing business models. The online exchange and distribution of content takes place at a dear price to copyright holders (or so they
argue) who strongly object to these practices. They object because of the
lost revenue such sharing causes and the loss of control over the uses of
their content.
It should be noted that addressing the threat to content providers as
a whole is somewhat misleading, as every segment within the content
market is affected differently by the emergence of the Internet and digital
copying. Within the music industry, it is argued that illegal file swapping causes a dip in the sales of CDs, as users will not purchase content
they can now get for free online. However, there is only limited empirical evidence to support this intuitive assertion.32 Within the various
video markets, on the other hand, identifying the threat to existing business plans is somewhat trickier. Motion pictures, for instance, present an
interesting test case. For many years this medium was considered an
"experience good, ' 33 "consumed" as part of a larger experience that involved going to the cinema with others.34 Therefore, merely sharing
such content online should not seriously affect the revenue stream from
the box office. However, over the recent decade, Hollywood has discovered an additional stream of revenue in DVD sales that are proving to be
extremely lucrative. 35 Therefore, it is argued that file-sharing compromises this revenue stream as well, by causing a dip in such sales. 36 File
swapping might also affect additional revenue streams, such as movie
rentals and the fees for broadcasting these films on various television
channels at a later time.
Television shows present an even more complicated issue. Generally, in this medium, revenue is generated through advertising and financed by those paying for advertisements slotted throughout the programs. Thus, sharing such content online after "stripping" it from these

32.
See supra note 8; FISHER, supra note 5, at 31-34; Stan J. Liebowitz, Pitfalls in Measuring
the Impact of File-sharingon the Sound Recording Market, 51 CESIFo ECON. STUDIES 439, 440
(2005), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowitlintprop/pitfalls.pdf.

33.

For more on this term in this context, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS

427 (2006).

34.

Socializing with friends, eating popcorn, etc.

35.

See DVD Sales Reshaping Film Industry, CBSNEWS.COM, http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2003/1020eveningnews/main579020.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
36.
Note, however, that it is more difficult to download entire motion pictures, and is less
appealing to view them on computer screens. That is why it is assumed that the damage to the motion picture is less severe than in the music context. For more on this issue, see FISHER, supra note
5, at 5.
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advertisements, adversely affects this business model as well. Other TVbased business models generate revenues directly from viewers in the
form of subscription fees.37 Here file sharing online directly undermines
the subscription business model, while allowing non-subscribers to enjoy
content that was solely intended for subscribers. Yet it should be noted
that both TV-based business models are currently in flux as viewers
make use of TiVO and other PVRs to skip advertisements during viewing shows and even send these shows to others. 38 In view of the above,
television stations are now reconsidering and revising their business
models. Some are doing so by providing content online for free or at low
prices through online vending sites.
Though the differences among the various media regarding the
ways in which they are affected by the online realm are an intriguing
topic, I will leave the analysis of such differences for future discussions.
For the purposes of this article, I will address the content industry as a
whole (unless indicated otherwise) while referring to the basic argument
that online unauthorized file sharing adversely affects the business model
and revenue stream of content providers.
The brief description above clearly points out that the threats and
benefits of the Internet age lead to crucial crossroads, at which policy
makers and courts must confront the fears of the content providers, and
draw out rules that address the future uses of digital content online. In
addition to the problems mentioned above, today's status quo presents a
serious educational and legal challenge as well: many law abiding citizens are infringing on the copyrights of others and at times are subject to
criminal punishment. Furthermore, in many cases the acts constituting
infringement are carried out intentionally and with full understanding of
their legal ramifications. 39 This is indeed an unwanted turn of events and
might have serious effects on the ethical behavior of individuals in other
social contexts. 40 The status quo is also allowing content companies to
selectively sue users for extensive damages. These steps are frowned
upon by many even within the
content industry and is far from contribut41
ing to these firms' goodwill.
At this juncture, the content industry is strongly pushing for a protective legal scheme that would allow them to maximize control over
their content-schemes that promote the use of DRM systems. I address
the DRM option, its advantages, shortcomings, and the reasons it is approached with disdain by many legal scholars and public activists, in Part

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

For example, premium channels such as HBO and Showtime generate such revenues.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 131.
See generallyCALLAHAN, supra note 4, at 185-88.
Id.
See Netanel, supra note 2, at 3; FISHER, supra note 5, at 126-27.
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II below. However, the urgency in applying a new policy paradigm to
the use of content online is also shared by those opposed to DRM, who
understand as well that society is reaching a crucial crossroad concerning
the regulation of online content consumption.42
After establishing the opportunities and the problematic crossroads
we now face, I move on to address the options at hand or the paths to be
taken. I start with the DRM model, move on to additional models contemplated today, and finally reach the ACS. In doing so, I describe how
business and policy makers faced and dealt with similar challenges at
junctures in the past, how those were resolved, and what that might tell
us of the paths most likely to be taken in the future.
II. EXAMINING THE COMPETITION
In this part, I address several models set forth to suggest a path of
action at the crucial crossroads we are facing. I describe some ideas
briefly, while emphasizing DRM (which is the main contender at this
time), and address several elements, advantages, and shortcomings of
this model that will prove essential for the later segments of our analysis.
Readers who are well versed in the intricacies of the recent "copyright
wars" and the models set forth to resolve the problems at hand should
therefore feel free to skip ahead to Part III (or Part IV if well versed in
the dynamics and mechanisms of the ACS models).
A. The FoundationsandAdvantages of DRM
The DRM business model is premised on technological, business,
and legal assumptions and requirements. I now address them in turn,
while mentioning the potential benefits this model has in store.
1. Business Model
In an ideal setting, the DRM system will allow large content firms,
or even individual artists, to set up a portal or website in which they
would provide users with their content online for a price to be paid prior
to such usage. These systems will allow consumers to select from a wide
range of possible products and transactions. For instance, users could
choose to pay for one or multiple uses, for uses at one outlet or at several
possible locations and through various applications. In addition, users
could choose to purchase the right to pass such content on to others or to
modify it if they choose to do So4 Needless to say that without paying
for the service, access would not only be prohibited and unauthorized,
but almost impossible (at least for the lay computer user), as the system
would be secured and encrypted. Ideally, future DRM tools will facilitate online stores that offer all forms of content, be it audio, video, or any
42.
43.

See generally FISHER, supra note 5.
See GOLDSTEIN, supranote 6, at 201.
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reading material at a low price and a guaranteed high quality. 44 In this
way, many argue, the DRM model will fulfill the promise of today's
technologies and bring us to an outcome that is welcomed by both artists
and consumers. Limited versions of these DRM models already existfor instance Apple's online music store iTunes, that relies on trusted systems installed in the music player on the user's computer, and on that of
the Apple's iPod (both of which comply with Apple's overall protocol).45
2. Technology
The business model drawn out above calls for the creation of a challenging technological infrastructure; it requires the development of software and hardware that would work efficiently, seamlessly, and with
minimal malfunctions (which lead to consumer frustration and loss of
revenue to the content provider). Therefore, the system would require a
"trusted systems" infrastructure, which must efficiently attend to the
management of the many forms of content available. When doing so, it
must correctly link between the relevant content and the individuals who
were provided with authorization to use it, while limiting such authorized
use to the exact usage for which the consumer has paid. In addition, it
must include a reliable payment system that could accurately and securely account for the purchases of content use. Finally, the DRM system must be "secured" to ensure that users cannot exceed the authorized
use they purchased. Meeting this final challenging objective includes
difficult tasks: assuring users cannot "hack" into the DRM systems and
access content without authorization, assuring users cannot make copies
of content in which they were granted limited access, or pass such content on to other individuals or applications when denied the right to do
so. For meeting this objective, DRM engineers apply several forms of
encryption and rely on changes and modifications to today's existing
hardware and software. I will address specific technological challenges
while discussing several shortcomings of this system below.
3. Law & Policy
While the implementation of DRM seems to amount to a technological and business matter, it raises difficult legal and policy questions
on several conceptual layers. First, on the most basic level, there are the
system's legal "nuts and bolts." Although the security of the system
would be guarded by technology, it must be bolstered by specific legal
protection that would allow content holders to sanction (with help from
the government and the criminal system) those attempting to tamper with
the system or the business model as a whole. Such legal rules will prohibit tampering with the DRM infrastructure and construction of pro44.
45.

See FISHER, supranote 5, at 155.
Id. at 156. For more on this, visit www.itunes.com.
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grams that can do so. In other words, these rules will resemble the anticircumvention provisions included in the DMCA. 46 Also, for the DRM
scheme to work, an additional set of rules must require hardware manufacturers to comply with specific standards that would facilitate the setting of DRM in place. Such standards are needed to assure that no applications used for the consumption of content would allow for the "leaking" of such content outside the trusted environment.4 7 Finally, those
advocating the implementation of DRM at times argue for stricter prohibitions against unauthorized users themselves and even for "self help"
remedies to be placed in the hand of the copyright holders, which resemble those existing in the "general" realm of property law4 8 (such as allowing content providers to aggressively attack the P2P networks and
even install viruses within the computers of "heavy" file swappers).4 9
On a more abstract level, the endorsement of DRM systems represents adherence to a specific jurisprudential perspective as to the role and
strength of the protection amounted to intellectual property in general
and copyright specifically. According to Fisher, DRM models (as well
as other models that provide extensive protection to the copyright holder)
are premised on a simple, yet dangerous, policy assertion: that copyright
in musical and video works must be protected almost to the same extent
as other "strong" property rights (such as rights in real property), and
therefore include (among others) the rights to exclude all unauthorized
actions and take aggressive steps to assert these property rights (which
include the self help measures mentioned above). 50
However, as many point out, this policy assertion is problematic.
Musical and video content has indeed been afforded property protection
to promote the continuing creation of new content.5 Yet the accepted
theory behind this legal rule is that absent such protection, individuals
would "free ride" and use the newly created content extensively, without
the consent or compensation of the author (a phenomenon broadly associated with most "public goods"). This would lead content creators to
apply their talents elsewhere, where they could fully reap the fruits of
their hardship and labor,52 and thus would lead to a sharp decline in the
46.

For more on this issue, see Lunney, supra note 15, at 823-45; FISHER, supra note 5, at 87-

98.
47.
Recently, the FCC attempted to put in place regulation requiring hardware manufactures
to comply with specific standards that would allow for the tracking of content use. This attempt,
referred to as the "Broadcast Flag," has been struck down by courts that found the FCC to exceed its
authority by setting these regulations in place. For more on this issue, see generally Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the BroadcastFlag,25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 603 (2003).
48.

See FISHER, supra note 5, at 150.

49.
Id.; see also Netanel, supranote 2, at 18-19.
50.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 143.
51.
Id at 199-203.
52.
See Litman, supra note 15, at 30 (noting somewhat cynically that with lower levels of
compensation, artists might opt to become investment bankers).
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quality and quantity of new content in the public sphere.53 This rationale
is not identical to those upon which other property rights are premised.
Indeed, copyright differs from other "classic" property rights, such as
real property or chattel, in several crucial ways. First, it is non-rivalrous;
it allows users to make use of such "property" simultaneously without
one individual's use degrading the ability of others to make use as well.
Furthermore, in the digital age, the marginal cost for making perfect copies is close to zero. Therefore, the intangible goods protected by copyright have always been provided with a narrower realm of protection
than holders of other forms of property.5 4 For instance, the copyright
holders' right to exclude others is limited by the right of others to engage
in the "fair use" of such rights (even without the right holders' consent).
In addition, copyright is limited by scope (mere ideas are not protected)
and by time.
The tension between content firms' perspective, that strive to command full excludability and other rights usually paired with "property,"
and critics of this position that stress differences between the underlying
rationales for legal copyright protection (which includes severe limitations on this property right) and those of other property rights lead to
several critiques of DRM we will examine below.
B. DRM Disadvantagesand Shortcomings
Though the DRM business model has several appealing traits and is
embraced by many content holders, it has been subject to a great deal of
scrutiny and criticism. 55 These critiques have led the ACS scholars to
advocate their somewhat radical solutions as an alternative so to avoid
the problematic consequences of DRM. I will briefly address these critiques, while referring to the technological, business, and legal assumptions and requirements mentioned above.
1. Technology & Business
From the technological perspective, many technologists argue that
DRM systems cannot and will not meet the ambitious objectives drawn
out above (a secure and sustainable trusted system). This is because it is
not feasible to implement such systems, as the security challenges DRM
presents are too great, and the risks and vulnerabilities are too varied.56
Here, technologists commonly refer to the experience the industry has
had with limited DRM schemes, such as the DVD player, and the speed
53.

Another rationale (that is not as salient in U.S. jurisprudence) is the protection of the

"moral rights" of the author, who has a right to maintain the integrity of the work she authored, and
receive credit for its use. This rationale does not dominate US copyright law and policy, and there-

fore is not discussed in this article. For more on this issue, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 137-40.
54.
55.

See Netanel, supra note 2, at 30.
See generally FISHER, supra note 5.

56.

Id.

2006] ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MODELS

659

and ease with which these schemes have been "hacked. 57 Furthermore,
a successful DRM system must be flawless and would only be as strong
as the weakest security system on any application connected to the network; a flaw at one point within the system would lead to a "leak" of
high quality content into the illegal file-swapping networks. 58 Since the
DRM system must be implemented in every application used to consume
content, achieving such a high and reliable standard seems somewhat farfetched.
However, these arguments have not gone without a response. The
common counter argument states that although the system cannot be entirely secure against various breaches, the existence of the security measures and the legal sanctions for their breach would sufficiently deter most
attempts to hack and infringe. As a sufficient number of consumers
would make exclusive use of the legal DRM applications to access content, this business model would still prove profitable and successful. 9
Additional critiques of DRM from the technological perspective argue that the implementation of DRM systems in all media players would
cripple these applications (both in terms of hardware and software),
slowing them down and blocking the use of the full potential of the technology. Others argue that setting a DRM standard would adversely affect competition in various hardware and software markets and allow
those setting the standards to box out competitors. 60 As it is quite difficult to assess these arguments at this point of time, I will leave them for
future inquiries.6 1
2. Law & Policy
DRM has come under heavy fire from legal scholars and social advocates concerning a variety of topics: the fact that these systems (and
the legal infrastructure they require) can potentially impinge on the public's right to engage in fair use of copyrighted materials, lead to price
discrimination, change the Internet's open architectural structure, and

57.
For a discussion of the vulnerabilities of the SDMI technology (especially with regard to
the work of Professor Felten in proving the systems weakness), see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at
177-81.
58. Note that the existence of content of high quality is a somewhat rare commodity within
these networks, as many files are corrupted or partial. This is why such leaks will be extremely
harmful as they guarantee access to quality content.
59. See FISHER, supranote 5, at 156-58.
60.
Regarding the anticompetitive elements of DRM in the way it could stall competitors, see
Timothy B. Lee, Circumventing Competition: The Perverse Consequences of the DigitalMillennium
Copyright Act, March 21, 2006, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa564.pdf.
61.
For a most recent analysis of DRM and its vulnerabilities (especially in terms of its crippling effects on the systems it uses), see J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the
Sony CD DRM Episode, CENTER FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF
COMPUTER SCIENCE PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-

ext.pdf.
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intrude on the privacy of individuals. I briefly address these arguments,
in turn.
a. Fair Use and Means of Self Expression
The DRM models allow media firms to control the exact use of the
content they include in their repertoire, while providing a variety of specific usage rights upon request. However, usage beyond the specific
authorization provided to every user would be practically impossible, as
it would be blocked off by the system's security measures. This reality
sharply differs from the one we have today in which copyright holders
usually cannot rely upon technological protection, but are confined to the
protection and enforcement of the law to uphold their rights. The law, as
mentioned above, does not provide for protection against unauthorized
uses at all times, but includes important exceptions limiting the time and
scope of copyright as well as the exception for fair use-the ability of
users to access and modify content without authorization when meeting
specific criteria set out by the law and established by the courts. DRM
systems, therefore, can provide content owners with de facto rights that
exceed those provided to them by law.62
When contemplating this potential future outcome of DRM implementation, several IP scholars assert that it is extremely problematic and
therefore DRM schemes should be rejected, or at least changed.63 They
argue that copyright law, as it stands, sets a delicate equilibrium between
sufficient property rights to the authors (as well as performers, etc.) and
protection of the basic right and liberties of other users, creators and the
broader public. 64 Specifically, they assert that the "fair use" exception
provided to users promotes the distribution of ideas and allows individuals to stand on the shoulders of giants when constructing their arguments
and convey their message more effectively. Thus, the fair use exception
is closely tied to the fundamental concept of freedom of speech and expression. With DRM systems in place, the "fair use" exception would be
effectively eliminated, thus harming important social interests of users,
artists, and society in general. 65 This inability to make fair uses of digital
62.
Also note that while making use of these technologies, content providers are able to control and limit many forms of personal uses, which were not considered legal, yet were outside the
realm of copyright law enforcement for practical reasons. For more on this issue, see Jessica Litman,
Lawful Personal Use, JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMICS (August 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=926575#PaperDownload.
63.
One might argue that the mentioned limitations to the fair use exception for copyright
protection are not a result of legislation, but of technological steps taken by the content holders, and
therefore are irrelevant to this policy discussion. The clear response to this argument is that these
new extended rights are indeed protected by other laws that prohibit users to make unauthorized
uses-such as the DMCA, state and federal anti-hacking laws and additional laws and regulations
that might be put in place to facilitate the DRM scheme. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2006).
64.
For a discussion of this issue, see generally Tushnet, supra note 20.
65.
A common example in this context is of a student preparing a school project about the
Holocaust. The student wishes to use a graphic excerpt from the film "Schindler's List" but cannot
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content and the new technological tools that allow for creating, modifying, and editing content with great ease is a key example of opportunities
missed and therefore a road that must be avoided.
At first blush, this concern regarding DRM and fair use need not
lead to the overall rejection of these models, but rather calls for rules to
assure that the equilibrium mentioned would be maintained even with the
adoption of DRM. For instance, such rules might state that for DRM
systems to benefit from the legal protections addressed above, they must
incorporate a "fair use" exception within the system. They would do so
by providing users with free access to content given the fulfillment of
specific factors that reflect today's legal understanding of the "fair use"
doctrine.
However, as Burk & Cohen explain,66 it is almost impossible to establish ex ante (namely, at the time the DRM systems are structured),
what would constitute a "fair use" in practice. In other words, it is extremely difficult to decide at this early juncture when and to what extent
such uses should be permitted. The criteria as to what is and should be
considered as "fair use" are abstract and ever-changing, and it would be
nearly impossible to translate them into a set mathematical algorithm.
Reality will continue to produce instances that call for recognition of the
"fair use" exception but were not preconfigured into the system. Therefore, the ex ante setting of the "fair use" exception in "code" 67 would
almost always be applied too narrowly and thus impede on the important
interests of the public.6 8
DRM advocates, however, offer an additional response to the "fair
use" challenge. They argue that existing loopholes in the DRM system
which allow for unauthorized uses and cannot be controlled by the DRM
system would in fact allow users to exercise their right to fair use. One
famous loophole is the "Analog Hole," which refers to the assumed inability of DRM systems to block users from making copies of protected
content through various analog means. 69 Through this "hole," users
do so because the content is locked by DRM protection (assuming she owns a DVD copy, for instance). For more on this example, see EFF Post-Hearing Comments Requesting Exemption of
DVDs from Section 1201(a) (June 2000), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
20000623_eff dmca dvd comments.html.
66.
See generally Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001).
67.
For a famous explanation regarding the differences and problems in setting legal rules in
digital code, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6, 89 (1999).
68.
Burk & Cohen, supra note 66, at 65. Burk & Cohen go even further to suggest that
should a DRM system be put in place with insufficient "fair use" embedded exceptions, individuals
should be provided with a "right to hack" the systems and use the protected content without authorization, if such uses amount to "fair use" according to the legal standards. Id.
69.
In this context, it should be noted that there might be a disparity between audio and digital
content (which I have addressed almost throughout the analysis). While there are many ways to
"capture" audio content using analog means without losing quality, video might pose more of a
problem.
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should be able to meet the important social objectives mentioned. Therefore, the objection to DRM on the basis of the inability to provide for a
robust "fair use" right would be resolved. Yet the "Analog Hole" argument must face several challenges. First, DRM architects are striving to
shut this "hole," or at least limit it to content of very low quality (use of
which would not allow consumers to meet the "fair use" objectives mentioned). 70 Second, one could argue that for meeting the important objectives the "fair use" doctrine promotes, merely allowing for copying
through the analog hole is insufficient. This is because the tools for making digital copies of analog outputs are too costly, they require a high
level of sophistication, and above all they might provide the relevant
content in low quality.7' In view of the breadth of this matter, I will not
resolve the question as to the extent of the analog hole and its relevance
to this debate and leave that for future analysis. At this point, I merely
conclude that the analog hole is far from being a "silver bullet" which
will mitigate all "fair use" concerns in a DRM environment.
In summation, it is important to note that the fear of the extensive
control over content, which is premised on the arguments stated above, is
one of the leading reasons quoted for preferring the ACS solutions over
the DRM ones.72
b. Price Discrimination
An additional objection to applying DRM concerns is the pricing
schemes this model enables. These models allow for the construction of
elaborate mechanisms for pricing different services differently. Yet the
DRM systems potentially allow content providers to go even further and
charge different users different prices for the same product or service.
Here, the differentiating factor would be the individual and not the service at hand. Content providers might charge higher prices from consumers that have the ability to pay more. They might also try to overcharge when they believe a consumer has a special need for their content
and would therefore be willing to pay a higher price at that time. When
engaging in such price discrimination schemes, content providers will
tailor their prices using personal information they previously collected

70.
For more on this issue, see Crawford, supra note 47, at 618.
71.
This would occur due to the transfer of the content file from analog to digital. Id. I thank
Phil Weiser for his insights regarding this issue.
72.
In addition to these arguments, on the jurisprudential level, proponents of the DRM models can argue that the "fair use" exception should not be considered as a right - but is merely a
defense against infringement claims in specific instances. In other words, the fair use doctrine in
copyright does not provide individuals with a "right" to use content - and therefore is irrelevant in
this context. Furthermore, they argue that free speech in the First Amendment context is an irrelevant argument to the issue of fair use. The issue at hand does not involve a state action, but one of
private parties. A discussion of this issue exceeds the limited confines of this article.
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about their users, such as data concerning the users' place of residence,
past content consumption patterns, overall financial standing, etc."
Even though "price discrimination" has a sinister sound to it, such 74a
pricing dynamic features several benefits addressed in the literature.
Mainly, it allows for pricing in a range that is closer to the specific user's
actual ability to pay. Therefore, although some users would be charged
with higher prices, others would possibly 75 be charged with lower prices
they could now afford. 76 However, many scholars argue that such benefits are outweighed by the model's potential detriments.7 7 They argue
that these models will lead to a transfer of consumer surplus to the content firms running the DRM applications. There is no guarantee such
funds would be shared with consumers or other artists, but would be
plainly shared with the firms' shareholders and executives. Others argue
that these schemes will create consumer concern and unease given the
omnipresent surveillance and the ongoing analysis of personal information that is required to facilitate this model (an issue that ties into the
privacy concerns addressed below). 78 Knowledge of such ongoing surveillance and its effects on pricing might also change the way in which
users conduct themselves online, leading consumers towards cautious
and restrained behavior-another undesired social outcome of implementing DRM.
c. The Internet Architecture and the End-to-End Principle
Other concerns regarding the implementation of DRM systems focus on their effect on the Internet and future innovations within its realm.
The Internet's tremendous growth over a short period of time has been
commonly attributed to the openness of its infrastructure, which allowed
anyone to contribute and develop new applications without the need to
request permission or receive source codes from controlling entities. In
other words, the Internet has thrived thanks to having the "intelligence"
of the system at the end users' side, while leaving the pipes "dumb. 79
73.

See FISHER, supra note 5, at 165.

CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
74.
NETWORK ECONOMY 39 (1999).

75.
The text cautiously indicates this would only possibly happen, as there will be instances in
which market forces will allow vendors to pocket the entire surplus from such pricing schemes
without lowering prices for specific consumers. Id.
76. On the issue of data mining and the use of personal information to facilitate this business
model, see FISHER, supra note 5, at 167-68; see generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Mine Your Own Business:
Making the Casefor the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of
Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 24-25 (2002-2003).
77.
78.

FISHER, supra note 5, at 168-69.
See generally Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 576-77

(2003) (explaining privacy interests, perceptions of privacy, and DRM intrusion).
79.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 171 (citing Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of
End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. REV.

925, 930-31 (2000)).
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These attributes are commonly referred to as formulating the end-to-end
(E2E) principle.8 °
Broad implementation of DRM systems potentially threatens future
compliance with these attributes. The successful implementation of a
DRM scheme will feature a trusted system embedded within every piece
of hardware connected to the web. Therefore, developers of new applications (be they of software or hardware) must comply with the standards the DRM systems use, which would be proprietary and at times
unavailable, and would not be free (as they are today) to develop applications in an open environment. Therefore, with DRM, the central system
running this scheme would violate the end-to-end (E2E) principle, as the
existence of a central system takes the intelligence of the network out of
the hands of the end users, and thus stalls Internet innovation. Therefore,
the violation of the E2E principle and its effects serves as another reason
to oppose the broad implementation of DRM. 8 '
d. Privacy
Finally, DRM systems take their toll on users in terms of their ability to maintain their privacy. As Julie Cohen points out, the implementation and operation of a trusted system that coordinates the DRM schemes
requires the collection, storage and use of vast amounts of personal information.82 This personal information includes data concerning the
content consumed by individuals, and the times and places they did so.
This data could be later compiled to form a revealing profile for every
user.
Given the sensitive information they include, the existence of such
profiles and databases create several privacy-related concerns: fears that
they would be passed on to the government, used improperly by the content providers for marketing (or other commercial objectives), or sold on
the active secondary database market. In addition, several scholars mention fears that such data would possibly fall into the hands of unwanted
parties in view of improper security measures taken by the database
holders.83 All these reasons and concerns add to the overall discontent
with the DRM solution.

80.
The importance of maintaining the E2E principle and the question as to what extent regulators should intervene in maintaining the Internet's open architecture is now hotly debated in the
context of the "Net Neutrality" debate-whether ISP's should be permitted to discriminate among
content providers when delivering the Internet connection to the end users (and thus violate the E2E
principle). On this issue, see Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating BroadbandNetwork Neutrality
Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 23, 38 (2004).
81.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 172.
82.
Cohen, supra note 78, at 584-85.
83.
See Halderman & Felten, supra note 61, at 1-2, 26 (discussing security risks in trusted
systems).
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C. Summing Up DRM-Learningof the Futurefrom the Past
Thus far, I have demonstrated how DRM models permit copyright
holders, upcoming artists, and even consumers to capitalize on the benefits of new technological innovations. In addition, I presented the many
shortcomings that have led policy makers, scholars, and even business
entrepreneurs to oppose DRM and therefore search for other solutions,
which I address in the following chapters. Yet even in view of the business-related, technological and legal difficulties and shortcomings DRM
portrays, there is a good chance the media industry leaders will remain
unconvinced by the above arguments, and that the DRM model will still
prevail. This concern is fueled by a glance at the recent history of
choices made by legislators and courts on the one hand, and content
firms' executives on the other when dealing with new technologies and
the threats to the existing business models of copyright content distribution. The history of society's dealings with such challenges is one of
capture (in the hands of content industry) and misjudgment (again by the
content industry). In the next few paragraphs I will address the concern
that DRM will prevail after all and the historical background and milestones confirming it, which include instances in which regulators and
courts accepted the positions of content companies regarding the protection of their content. In addition, I will mention several instances in
which content firms moved to block innovative technology and business
models that required they partially concede their control over content,
even when these models would have proven beneficial to consumers,
artists, and at times the content firms themselves.
I start with legal responses to the technological innovations which
came with the emergence of digital content, communications, and, thereafter, copying. Here, the ACS scholars (as well as many others addressing these issues) point out that the content industry has been using its
influence over legislators to strengthen their hold over their assets by
expanding the legal protection afforded to copyright (for instance by
extending the time limitations for the lapse of copyright protection), and
the creation of para-copyrights (additional ancillary rights which protect
the core copyright).8 4 A frequently mentioned example of this latter
phenomenon is the adoption of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions that provide legal protection from attempts to tamper with technological systems put in place by media firms to protect their content from
unauthorized uses.85 In addition, content firms, by way of expensive
lawyering, were able to persuade courts to expand the rights they may
exercise regarding their content, thus blocking unauthorized activities
(and presumably passing legal expenses from their legal battles on to
their customers). Here, courts accepted theories of secondary liability for
84.

Balkin, supra note 29, at 17-18.

85.

Id.
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copyright infringement to block the actions of entities that facilitate the
unauthorized exchange of content files. For instance, the content industry has argued successfully that ventures facilitating (in the case of A&M
Records v. Napster86) or providing the software tools for file sharing are
indeed subject to secondary liability (or inducement in the case of MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster87). On the basis of this history, it is
quite likely that the content industry would be able to successfully influence legislators, regulators, and courts to accept the legal rules required
to set the DRM models in place.
In addition and as mentioned above, many scholars fear that DRM
would be implemented regardless of its many shortcomings which are
harmful to users, artists, and the media firms themselves. Yet these
shortcomings would be overlooked by the content firms who will opt for
DRM while aiming to sustain control over their content. In the past,
large media conglomerates have often opted against new strategies that
would provide less control, but reap other benefits. For instance, scholars often refer to the MyMp3.com venture, which was forced out of business by the large media conglomerates after offering a service that allowed consumers who purchased CDs to access the songs it included at
any location through the website's database. 88 This service, arguably,
would have provided users with additional convenience and perhaps
even promoted CD sales (as they could now be enjoyed with greater
ease). Yet the potential benefit to all parties involved did not deter content firms from burying this venture. In addition, the ongoing attacks of
the media industry against file sharing networks are arguably another
example within this broader pattern of behavior. Several artists have
been arguing that the availability of content has led to many benefits,
especially for those artists who have difficulty in self promotion and in
gaining access to a broader audience. These artists have welcomed the
file swapping phenomenon 89 and argued that it led to increases in ticket
sales to live performances, and in some instances even to increased CD
sales. 90 Again, the content industry has ignored these benefits and
voices, and the industry moved to silence this form of uncontrolled distribution.
In view of these historical trends, the ACS scholars argue that the
content industry would move to implement DRM without hesitation and
86.

239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). For a description of this case, and an analysis that

shows that the final outcomes of this case and others were not clear cut, see FISHER, supra note 5, at
116-23.
87.
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
FISHER, supra note 5, at 99-101.
88.
For example, see John Borland, Musicians Launch National Anti-Napster Campaign,
89.
CINET, July 11, 2000, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-243021.html?legacy=cnet (regarding Courtney Love).
90.
Id.
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consideration of benefits both to them and others. For this reason, they
believe alternative models must be forcefully promoted to counter the
historical force of the content industry.
D. Other Business Models and Suggestions
In addition to the DRM and ACS models (which I address at length
below), there have been other suggestions for resolving the challenge of
compensating copyright holders while promoting various social objectives, in the digital age. I now briefly address some of these proposals
and models. However, for the balance of this article, I examine and consider the DRM model only, as it is considered the most serious contender
and had been openly embraced by many parts of the content industry. 9'
One radical and therefore somewhat theoretical solution calls for the
elimination of copyright protection online. In the online realm, several
scholars argue, there is no need for copyright law protection to promote
content creation and meet other social and individual objectives. The
Internet's ability to facilitate worldwide distribution at nearly zero marginal cost, should allow content creators to rely upon other forms of
compensation. These would more than substitute for the "lost" compensation they would have received from online users. Such sources of income might come from the benevolence and gifts of consumers,9 2 profits
derived from live performances, merchandising, or the sale of CDs offline. However, given the dominance of the media firms and their influence over regulators, it is hard to believe such a policy would be accepted.93
Another option to resolve the issues at hand (as addressed by
Fisher) 94 calls for a "regulatory solution," where the government would
use its authority to directly intervene and set the compensation for the
authors of works consumed online. Although this solution seems awkward at first, Fisher points out that industries and markets that bear some
resemblance to content markets are or were closely regulated. 95 Fisher
also notes that several segments of content markets are already subject to
heavy regulation.9 6 However, it is doubtful that this solution would be
acceptable as it allows for government to intervene in society's choices

91.
For a summary of the broad array of solutions currently contemplated, see Yu, supra note
20, at 698.
92.
A famous example and experiment of using benevolence to generate compensation was
conducted by Mr. Stephen King. For an analysis of this incident, see Kylie J. Veale, Internet Gift
Economies: Voluntary Payment Schemes as Tangible Reciprocity, FIRST MONDAY

http://www.fi'stmonday.org/issues/issue8_12/veale/.
93.
See Burk & Cohen, supra note 66, at 48-49.
94.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 183, 186-95.
95. Id. at 181-84.
96. Id. at 184-85.

(2003),
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regarding speech and content-an interaction that would be broadly
criticized (rightly so) as unhealthy and unwanted.97
Another solution coming from the business realm provides users
with access to a vast repertoire for their own personal use, at a fixed fee
paid on a monthly or annual basis. The business models these companies
(such as iMesh and the "new" Napster) 98 utilize present some of the
shortcomings and challenges of the DRM model (such as the need for a
secured system to block leaking) while limiting others (such as the fear
of price discrimination and to a certain extent, privacy). It remains to be
seen whether consumers would accept these business models, which offer a smaller repertoire than the one available within the illegal peer-topeer (P2P) networks, and for obviously a higher price. 99 However, when
using this model, consumers are assured of the quality of the content and
the legality of their actions.
Finally, other business models appear to have conceded to the fact
that today's distribution networks are uncontrollable. Therefore, rather
than battling them, they choose to take advantage of these networks and
benefit from the broad distribution they facilitate. For instance, advertisers develop prime content which is also intended to promote a brand (by
hidden or even blatant commercial content), and release it within the
network, while hoping it will generate interest and traffic.' 0 0 This dynamic would be interesting to track during the next few years and might
be indeed well suited for some works. However, artists whose content
will not mesh well with sponsorships or embedded promotions cannot
rely upon this model for proper incentives, and will be looking to other
options for compensation.' 0 '
In summary, a great deal of academic and other writing addresses
the digital market's promises, threats and some solutions. At this time,
DRM seems to be the industry's favorite but a nightmare for many others. We will now address an additional option which competes with
DRM-the ACS models.

Litman, supra note 15, at 41-42.
97.
98.
For more information, see iMesh, http://www.imesh.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2006), or
Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
99.
While the abovementioned services are not expensive, the cost of illegal file sharing is
still near zero, with the additional cost of the risk of downloading a low quality copy and the slim
chance of being sued by the media firms. The cost of the illegal service is of course zero, and the risk
of being prosecuted is very slim.
100.
A famous example is the American Express campaign featuring Superman and Jerry
Seinfeld that was released with great success throughout the file sharing networks, see Maria
Mandel, Partner, Executive Dir. of Digital Innovation, Oglivylnteractive, General Session on Consumer Behavior in a Digital World at the Summit on Intellectual Property and Digital Media, The
Cable Center, University of Denver (May 22, 2006).
101.
Netanel, supra note 2, at 76.
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III. THE ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MODELS

A. Elements of the ACS Models
Although the ACS models' specific elements are quite complex, the
models' overall objectives are simple: They strive to fairly compensate
copyright holders for the use of their works online, without directly
charging for the use and enjoyment of such works. In addition, these
models strive to do so while legalizing today's illegal yet widespread file
swapping activities (the models differ as to exactly what elements should
be legalized, as explained below). To meet these objectives, the ACS
models require careful accounting for the actual uses of content online
and thereafter distributing funds that were specifically collected for this
reason to the relevant copyright holders. This elaborate task would be
conducted by a specific governmental agency-preferably within the
Copyright Office (but for this analysis I will refer to it as the "administrating agency"). The scheme has three main components: registration,
collection of funds, and the distribution of funds to the right holders (a
component which includes the process of assessing the relative usage of
works online).10 2 I will briefly explain what each component entails, in
turn. It should be noted that the ACS models have been recently suggested in several variations by various scholars, 0 3 although the general
theme is mostly the same. For this analysis, unless indicated otherwise, I
refer to the model presented by Fisher, which is perhaps the most detailed and comprehensive.
1. Registration
The starting point for implementing this model (as well as for the
flow of content and information within it) is the registration process. At
this point, copyright holders interested in participating in the ACS register a specific work as their own online, and receive a specific code. This
code is to be "watermarked" into the relevant work in its digital format
(be it an audio or video file). From that point, the work could be released°4
online, and its subsequent online uses would not require consent.'
However, thanks to the registration and watermarking process, the copyright holder would be accredited for subsequent uses of the work, and
compensated accordingly.
2. Collection of Funds
The next point would be the collection stage at which the administrating agency must extract sufficient funds from the public so as to
properly compensate the creators for the online use of their content. This
102.
103.
104.

For a description of the various ACS models, see Litman, supra note 15, at 32-33.
Id. at 32-34.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 203.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

stage presents several key questions in its implementation, especially as
to "how much" and "how." When addressing the "how much" question,
the ACS scholars strive to maintain the status quo. In other words, the
collection process is structured to assure that the overall level of compensation through the model would reflect the losses content owners
would incur due to the legalizing of online content file sharing and
streaming.' ° 5 To correctly estimate the status quo and the extent of the
losses incurred, the ACS scholars engage in extensive calculations to
draw out the overall revenue content markets generate, the actual and
predicted harm from the illegal online activity and the percentage of the
06
overall revenue that is and would be lost from such online actions.1
While the actual sums and percentage rates differ among scholars and
sub-markets,' °7 the results the ACS scholars 1present
lead to a very large
08
sum of over two billion U.S. dollars per year.
After establishing that substantial resources are required to create
and maintain a fund for the full compensation of right holders, the models turn to the question as to "how" these sums should be gathered. The
simplest response calls for collecting such sums as part of the general
federal tax system. While this solution has several advantages, 0 9 its
overall and overwhelming shortcoming is that it seems politically implausible. No administration would raise taxes to meet this objective and
risk the public backlash usually associated with tax hikes. In addition,
such changes in general tax policy would lead to a public outcry stating
the fact that the "tax dollars" of individuals who do not use the Internet at
all (or only rarely do so) are cross-subsidizing the increased (not to mention obsessive) content consumption of others." 10 In view of these anticipated difficulties, the ACS scholars suggest that the funds should be
raised by a levy to be set on selected products and services that are
closely associated with the consumption of online content. Here, they
105.
Id. at 208; Netanel, supra note 2, at 46-47.
106.
For instance, see Netanel, supra note 2, at 60-67.
107.
According to Fisher's calculation, we should account for a loss of 20% of revenue in the
music market (which pertains mainly to CD sales) and 5% of the video market, whose most dominant component is DVD sales (but also DVD rentals, premium channels and the growing demand for
V.O.D and pay-per-view). FISHER, supra note 5, at 209-14. Netanel's calculations lead to somewhat
different results (25% loss of revenue in the audio market; 7% in the video market). Netanel, supra
note 2, at 61.
108.
Clearly, it might appear that this segment of the analysis is extremely shaky and might
even appear to some as mere guess work. The authors here attempt to assess a fiture market reaction
based on information on which economists cannot agree upon even today (regarding the question as
to the effect of online file sharing on the content markets). The authors are aware of this line of
criticism-and respond that this is merely a starting point, and the model as well as the sums that
must be collected (and thereafter distributed) will be updated on a continuing basis, in accordance to
updated information from surveys and the industry. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 209-15; Netanel,
supra note 2, at 65-67.
109.
Fisher points out that adding this amount to the general tax burden is unlikely to cause any
radical distortions, and would be relatively simple to implement. FISHER, supra note 5, at 216.
110.
See id. at 217.
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convincingly argue that public opinion would be more likely to accept
this limited taxation scheme in the form of a levy, as its impact and effects on individuals that are removed from online content consumption
would be minimal.
To apply the levy, policymakers must establish the tax base
(namely, which products and services would be subject to the levy), and
the actual level of taxation on products and services that are part of this
base. Both tasks create difficult policy and empirical questions, and the
ACS scholars provide several models to resolve them. The specific ways
in which the base and the level of taxation are formulated need not concern us at this time" '-notbecause they are uncontroversial but because
they would be subject to change in view of updated information streaming to the administrating agency from the industry and from timely reports examining the ways in which content is used and consumed online.
In his book, Fisher draws out an initial taxation base (which would be
subject to change) 12 and sets the levy at about 11.4% (as opposed to
about 4% according to Netanel). 113 In other words, consumers would be
charged an additional fee every time they purchase products and services
that are part of the tax base. In "return," users would be permitted to
make use of an extensive library of content that is available online, in
any way they might desire. They would be permitted to listen or view
the content, and even include it in digital forms of content they produce
so long as they register
their work and include a reference to the content
1 14
they made use of.
3. Distribution of Funds to Right Holders
The final component of the ACS scheme is the distribution of the
funds to the right holders of the relevant works. 15 Again, the initial (and
modest) objective of the ACS scholars is to maintain the status quo when
shifting to the ACS model. In other words, the objective is to provide
rights holders with proper compensation for the revenue lost when legal111. Generally, Fisher draws out four categories that would include the tax base: (1) Equipment that facilitates digital copying-such as CD and DVD burners; (2) Equipment for digital storage-such as blank CDs and flash memory; (3) Internet access providers (although Fisher believes
the levy should be limited to broadband only); and (4) Systems and software that facilitate file sharing. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 217. Netanel suggests adding "dial up" Internet connections to the
levy as well, and would include a levy on the purchase of computers themselves. Netanel, supra
note 2, at 60-62. For the analysis of the tax basis, see FISHER, supra note 5, at 217; Netanel, supra
note 2, at 60-62.
112.
Especially in view of recent changes in the ways individuals connect to the internet - i.e.
through the use of WiFi technology. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 251.
113.
The disparity in these figures stems from the differences in defming the tax base, as mentioned above.
114.
This issue leads to the complicated "derivative works" issue and the problem of accounting for several authors of a single work. The ACS Scholars attend to this matter at length. See
FISHER, supra note 5, at 234-35; Netanel, supra note 2, at 57.
115.

See FISHER, supra note 5, at 202.
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izing online file sharing and downloading. Here, the ACS differ from
more ambitious schemes, that attempt to restructure the way in which
artists should be compensated for content production.' 6 Yet even the
ACS scholars' limited goal presents serious challenges. First, how
would the administrating agency know what part of the overall fund
every copyright holder should receive? In today's content markets, the
public signals its content (or discontent) with various works by paying
for them. Since the ACS models involve indirect compensation there is
no such direct payment per use to rely upon. To resolve this difficulty,
the models turn to a substitute: information about another scarce human
resource-attention. Namely, the models call for allocating the funds in
accordance to the way in which consumers allocate their attention towards specific works-while providing greater compensation to authors
of works that were "experienced" more times.1 17 To achieve this, the
models call for the construction of elaborate "counting" mechanisms that
would allow the administrating agency to count the uses of content
online, sum them up and by the end of every year provide a full report as
to the number of times each work was used. After taking into account
the overall number of works used and the size of the fund for every given
year, the copyright holders receive a check from the government that8
constitutes their "share" of the overall fund collected through the levy."
The construction of these counting mechanisms presents many technical
and policy challenges, and as these issues stand in the core of my critique, I will address them in greater length in a subsequent part of this
article.
Beyond the three components addressed, the model requires several
adjustments in the existing legal regime. First, it requires changes in
current copyright laws so that the downloading and streaming of content
online will not constitute copyright infringement. 19 It should be noted
that the ACS scholars disagree on this point. While Fisher believes all
116.
Fisher mentions several theories according to which compensation should be distributed
(such as models premised on voting), but concludes that in the first stage, it is best to simply maintain the status quo and thus base compensation on usage. FISHER, supra note 5, at 234. For more on
competing voting schemes, see Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets For Virtual Goods: The Mirror
Image Of Digital Copyright? 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 111 (2004).

117.
At this point, the model somewhat differs from the "brick and mortar" reality, in which
the "signaling" usually takes place only once-at the time the content is purchased. However, the
online realm is somewhat inappropriate for this form of measurement, and therefore the authors'
decision to "count" actual uses of the content, as opposed to its mere "download" is indeed correct.
Online, users tend to download a vast amount of content, yet use a minuscule portion of it. Therefore, compensation per download will provide a biased result and will not reflect actual trends of
content usage and appreciation.
118.

FISHER, supra note 5, at 202.

119.
In addition, Fisher addresses the possibility that content owners would argue that the shift
to the ACS model constitutes a "taking." FISHER, supra note 5, at 248-49. Fisher explains why these
arguments would probably be rejected, or would not lead to any meaningful compensation for the
content owners. Id. In addition, Fisher mentions international treaties that might conflict with the
ACS model. Id I will not address the international aspect of the ACS model in this article.
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online use should be permitted, Netanel argues that only non-commercial
uses should be allowed. 120 Of course such changes should also address
(and forbid) the self help measures that content companies are trying to
apply at this time, and have no place in a regime in which the model has
been facilitated.12 ' Second, some ACS scholars argue that with the
model in place, the legal protection of DRM-like secured systems should
be repealed, so as to encourage content providers to participate in the
model's registration and compensation schemes (by making the alternatives seem less attractive). 22 Lastly, the actual implementation of the
model would require regulatory intervention concerning the various
components addressed above. Regulation must address the registration
process and the role of the governmental administrative agency. Moreover, it must set rules regarding the mandatory levy, how it would be
collected and ways to limit its evasion. Finally, regulation must address
the "counting" process, which (as I explain below) would probably include rules concerning the mandatory installment of counting systems
meeting a specific standard on all machines.
B. Similar PastExperiences
These models in general and the legislative changes required for
their implementation in particular might seem radical to some readers, as
they require copyright holders to concede their full control over subsequent uses of their works, and for indirect compensation for such uses.
However, the ACS scholars are quick to point out that while their initiative is indeed innovative, it has deep roots in the existing laws and in
business models governing the consumption of content, where similar
schemes have already been implemented (with varied levels of success)
for quite some time. To make this point, they refer to three instances
within the realm of the content industry: compulsory licensing schemes,
private copying levies and performing rights organizations.
1. Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses have often been set in response to technological changes that made the arms-length negotiations for the use of copy23
righted materials costly, impossible, or unwanted for various reasons.
Examples go as far back to the early twentieth century and the regulation
of piano rollers, 24 with recent examples pertaining to the use of content

120.
121.

FISHER, supra note 5, at 246-47; Netanel, supra note 2, at 37.
See discussion infra Part III.C.

122.
Fisher and Netanel disagree regarding this issue as well, as Netanel calls for repealing the
anti-circumvention provisions. FISHER, supra note 5, at 248; Netanel, supra note 2, at 40.
123.
Such as to limit the ability of copyright holders to use their rights to exercise an unfair and
anti-competitive advantage. See generally Netanel, supranote 2, at 31.
124.

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 64-66.
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26
over cable and satellite television1 25 and most recently, by webcasters.1
In these instances, copyright holders cannot block the use of their content, yet are compensated by users in accordance to a rate set by a neutral
(more or less) 127 entity.

2. Private Copying Levies
In addition to these licensing schemes, in various instances, legislators chose to compensate copyright holders indirectly for private copying, while acknowledging that policing the copyright owners' rights
against such actions is close to impossible. These schemes exist on a
limited basis in the United States (concerning the regulation of the failed
Digital Audiotape Recorder ("DAT")),128 and on a much broader scale in
other legal regimes (such as Canada, Germany, and France). 129 In most
of these instances, rights holders are compensated through a governmental fund that is financed by a levy
set on various applications relevant to
30
the use of such private copies.'
3. Performing Rights Organizations
Finally, in several instances, the copyright holders themselves opt
for a business model in which the rights to use their content are not negotiated at arms length with the end user. Instead, these users negotiate
with intermediaries or collectives, whom at a later time compensate the
right holders from the fees they collect. 131 These intermediaries, such as
ASCAP and other performing rights organizations have been put in place
voluntarily by the rights holders to collect compensation for public performance rights in an attempt to mitigate transaction costs. The intermediaries stand in for the copyright holders, and directly interact with
places of business, such as bars, music halls, and barber shops that pay
them a set fee for a "blanket license" for the right to publicly perform.
This solution is by far preferable to requiring these businesses to locate

125.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 41-42.
126.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 103-05.
127.
Id. (explaining how the webcasting licensing scheme led to uncompetitive results).
128.
See Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2006); FISHER, supra
note 5, at 84-87.
129.
For Canada, see Jeremy F. deBeer, The Role of Levies in Canada's Digital Music
Marketplace, 4 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 153, 153 (2005). For Germany
and France, see P. BRENT HUGENHOLTZ, LUCIE GUIBAULT & SJOERD VAN GEFFEN, THE FUTURE OF
LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 24-25 (2003), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/

other/DRM&levies-report.pdf.
130.
Be they blank disks, or even computers in Germany's case. See HUGENHOLTZ, GUIBAULT
& VAN GEFFEN, supra note 129, at 25-26.

131.
Michael A. Einhom, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in
Broadcasting, 24 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 350 (2001).
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the specific
rights holders and obtain consent for the use of their con32
tent.

However, it should be noted that although these examples demonstrate similar existing dynamics that were successfully implemented, the
project outlined by the ACS scholars is far more ambitious. With ACS
the market scope and forms of usage are much broader and might deter
copyright holders from accepting these proposed models, even though
they resemble those agreed upon in the past. The ACS scholars are well
aware of such possible hesitation on behalf of the content providers, and
offer to ease the way into the full mandatory ACS model by first adopting a voluntary model for content sharing. 33 This model includes the
same components mentioned above, but instead of setting a mandatory
levy, relies upon voluntary contributions by users interested in enjoying
and using the repertoire the model provides. This latter model, which
Fisher refers to as "the coop," has already been set in place in some
countries,134 and resembles an interesting business model addressed
above. 135 However, as I explain above, voluntary "coops" face several
shortcomings and I therefore choose not to further address this option,
and focus the analysis on the mandatory ACS model.
C. PresumedEffects and Model Outcomes
At the end of the day, the ACS scholars envision a model that will
achieve several important objectives, which would justify the vast
framework and radical regulatory changes the model requires. They
argue that benefits from implementing this model span across users, content creators and society in general, as well as weaken the hold of today's
large media conglomerates which exercise extensive power in today's
market setting. Users and consumers will enjoy access to a vast library
of content at a very limited marginal cost, and would not be subject to
manipulative pricing schemes (or price discrimination, as addressed
above).
In addition, consumers would be free to make use of this content 136
to
manner.
creative
and
effective
extremely
an
in
thoughts
their
express
Content creators and artists, according to the ACS scholars, would benefit from the shift to the ACS model as well. They would greatly benefit
from the availability of vast amounts of content for them to "glum on" to
and make use of, thus leading to better and richer outcomes. In addition,
132.

For the history of such organizations, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 68-75.

133.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 252; see also Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms:
Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 71-72 (2004). Gervais
believes that such a voluntary scheme could suffice as a long term solution. Id.
134.

See FISHER, supra note 5, at 258 (regarding Brazil).

135.

See discussion supra Part III.

136.

FISHER, supra note 5, at 238.
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the scholars point out that these models allow creators to distribute their
works throughout the market (by using the net) without relying upon
today's intermediaries. These intermediaries, such as the large record or
motion picture companies would therefore be unable to leverage their
market position to extract high rents and draconian contractual terms
from starting artists. With time, the ACS scholars predict these intermediaries will even give way to other firms that will assist users in choosing
content. Thus, this model will weaken the hold of these few powerful
entities over the forms of content the public consumes, 137 leading to another important outcome from the models' implementation.
Finally, in terms of society as a whole, the ACS scholars mention
several overwhelming benefits stemming from the adoption of this
scheme. 38 First, implementing the model will end the current shameful
state of affairs according to which a large segment of the population (and
an even larger segment of our youth) are deemed "copyright infringers,"
"pirates," and even "criminals." Since all online content sharing will be
deemed legal, this serious social concern would evaporate almost immediately. In addition, the system allows for limiting many undue "transaction costs" that result from today's legal setting. For instance, the ACS
allows for reducing legal costs which arise from the need to resolve
complicated doctrinal questions concerning copyright protection in the
for reducing costs related to the enonline setting. In addition, it allows
139
forcement of copyright online.
Can the ACS model indeed meet these objectives? Could it be successfully implemented as described? I now move to my critical examination to find out.
IV. TAKING ACS SERIOUSLY: EXAMINING AND CRITIQUING
The ACS scholars go to great lengths to assure that the models they
construct should not be deemed a mere intellectual exercise, but a feasible solution with fair chances of actual implementation and success.
Indeed, the implementation of these models would lead to many beneficial outcomes, as drawn out above, and their structure is based on a deep
understanding of the legal and business background of today's content
markets. In view of these elements as well as the breadth of the analysis
and the stature of the scholars involved, I see importance in addressing
these models. In doing so, I choose to examine their "nuts and bolts"

137.
138.
139.

Id.at 238.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 243-44.
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specifically, leaving others140 to address and critique the underlying doctrinal and economic assumptions on which the model is premised. 141
An overall critique of the ACS models is an extensive task. Due to
the breadth of the proposals, such a critique calls not only for an in-depth
analysis of the law and business of copyright, but that of property law,
regulatory law, and taxation law and policy to mention a few. Therefore,
within the confines of this article, my contribution is quite specific-I
closely examine two specific, yet important, issues and questions arising
from the ACS scholarship:
(1) Could a system constructed in accordance to the blueprint provided by the ACS scholars, fairly (accurately, as we will soon see, is too
much to ask for) measure the uses of content? 142 If so, what would the
implementation of measures assuring such fairness entail? By framing
the questions narrowly, I set aside (for now) the difficult questions pertaining to the way in which such funds should be raised, the extent of the
overall level of compensation to be divided among the right holders, and
the way such sums should be updated along the way. Instead, I address
the components of ACS charged with measuring consumption and examine their problematic aspects. I then offer ways in which these problems
might be resolved and draw out open questions for future inquiry and
technological development.
(2) What would the long term effects of implementing this scheme
be? The scholars promoting this model present high hopes that it would
benefit artists and creators, weaken the dominant position and standing
of today's content intermediaries, and enrich society in several ways. At
this point, I assume the model will be implemented as described and
thereafter examine whether the high hopes and extensive objectives of
the ACS scholars would be met, while pointing out where my projected
outcome parts from the ACS scholar's rosy predictions. In some instances throughout the analysis I suggest changes to the model and offer
external mechanisms to meet the important objectives mentioned, while
focusing on modifications to the models' content distribution mechanisms.
A. MeasuringFairly (?): Internal Challenges
To provide copyright holders with fair compensation, the model
must present an extensive and accurate mapping as to how content is
140.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
141.
But see Litman, supra note 15, at 31 (arguing that setting the details could come later). I
disagree, and believe that the many policy issues at hand must be concluded at this early stage in
view of the various choices which must be made (many of which have serious policy ramifications).
142.
It should be noted that Fisher addresses other solutions for accounting for the users'
preferences, such as allowing users to vote for works rather than receive compensation. See FISHER,
supra note 5, at 230, 233. However, this system creates several key difficulties and therefore Fisher
rightfully objects to its implementation. Id. at 232-33.
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used and consumed in the online realm. The model's ability to fairly and
accurately measure usage rates of various works is crucial to its overall
success, for two obvious reasons (1) without such fairness and accuracy,
copyright holders would strongly oppose the model's implementation,
and the entire scheme would lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the public;
and (2) systematic biases within the measuring process will affect the
forms of content society as a whole would generate. In a market operating according to the ACS model, the measurement of content usage is the
primary way for consumers to signal their content or discontent with an
artist or specific work. Such signaling must be correct to assure the progression and evolution of content markets, as by interpreting and reacting
to these signals artists "learn" what form of content is desired by the public, and change their production process accordingly.
The measurement task at hand is colossal. When taking into account the number of Internet users in the United States alone (roughly
100 million) and the number of different "pieces" of content every user
will "consume" a day (this of course greatly varies among users, but I
believe and average of three would be a modest estimate), the number of
factors that must be accounted for in every fiscal year might exceed 100
billion. Thus, when carrying through the measuring task, the administrative agency must overcome both internal challenges (that entail dealing
with an extensive dataset and collecting the information in an effective
and precise, yet non-intrusive manner) and external challenges (from
those who have an interest in intentionally tampering with the data and
tilting it in their favor) as well. I address these challenges in turn, while
examining what steps must be taken to meet them. These steps, however, create severe side effects, in terms of the system's openness and
privacy-which I address below.
1. Internal Challenges & Sampling
The ACS scholars were well aware of the internal challenges, and
offer several suggestions. Generally, they suggest that to meet the
"counting" objective, the model must introduce a sampling system,
which will include several elements. 143 It must include a piece of software to be installed on the end users' machines, that would count their
content uses and "report" to a central registry the total amount of uses of
different forms of content (the "Counting Software"). In addition, there
143.
Id. at 225-29; Netanel, supra note 2, at 53-54. Here, Netanel also mentions existing technologies which engage in similar sampling tasks. Netanel, supra note 2, at 54. A firm that is currently engaged in measuring of content usage through peer-to-peer networks is BigChampagne. See
BigChamapgne Online Media Measurement, The Data, http://www.bigchampagne.con/thedata.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2006) (describing the way the firm gathers information). However, these practices have met some criticism regarding the accuracy of their results. I also doubt whether BigChampagne could provide sufficient information regarding consumption patterns of content of
limited distribution. See Jeff Howe, Big Champagne is Watching You, WIRED, Oct. 2003, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/I 1.10/fileshare.htmil.
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must be a central system that would sum up, on an annual basis, all the
uses streaming in from the individual users (the "Central System"). The
Central System will have additional tasks in assuring external fairness, as
I mention below. Finally, to efficiently deal with the enormous amounts
of data these tasks entail, the ACS scholars suggest that the systems randomly sample a large number of users at any given time, and only include them in the overall database. In other words, while the Counting
Software will be working at all times on the users' machines, the Central
System will randomly select a specific set of users at set intervals (for
instance, every month), and only account for the information streaming
in from these specific users at that time. In that way, the model would be
able to effectively overcome the massive amounts of data the "collection" and "distribution" stages entail. When addressing sampling, the
ACS scholars point out that similar practices have been applied for many
decades to establish the rating of the programming on various broadcast
stations for the benefit of advertisers (ratings carried out by Nielsen and
Arbitron for the television and radio markets, respectively). 44 However,
the scholars conceded that the task at hand differs from those mentioned
above (regarding radio and TV) as the sample size must be substantially
larger than those used in the broadcast context. Yet they do not offer
concrete examples as to the sample's size.
2. Sample Size
A closer analysis of the issue of sampling leads to some interesting
outcomes. At first, with regard to the actual sample size, I believe that
referring to the sampling carried out in the broadcasting context, such as
the Nielsen rating model, is a problematic comparison. 145 In the broadcast context, a sample of mere thousands is used to represent the content
preferences of many millions. Yet the sample required for the ACS
models must be several magnitudes larger. I devote the following paragraphs to the actual size the model must employ, and thereafter move on
to examine the implications of using a sample of such magnitude. It is
interesting to note that the ACS scholars have neglected to address the
actual size of the sample--either nominally, or in terms of the required
percentile of the overall sampled population. As I make apparent in my
144.

FISHER, supra note 5, at 226. For more information as to how these firms engage in

sampling see Nielsen Media Research, Inside TV Ratings: How the Numbers Come to Life,
http://www.nielsenmedia.com/nc/portal/site/Public (follow "Inside TV Ratings" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006); Aribitron, About Arbitron: What We Do, http://www.arbitron.com/

about/home.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
145.
The Nielsen sampling model has created several controversies of its own regarding its
presumed ability to correctly sample preferences in the broadcast context. For instance, it has been
argued that the "ratings" are biased against minorities (this was explained by these groups' aversion
to fill in the logs they were presented with) and other internal errors in the measuring process.
However, many of these problems will not occur within the ACS models in which the sampling is
carried out automatically, and users will not always be aware of the specific instance during which
they are chosen to be sampled. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 227-28.
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analysis below, setting this parameter is not a technical statistical task
which might be left for a later time, but one that required several judgment calls and policy decisions given its potential implications.
Setting the size of the sample involves reaching a compromise between the models' overall efficiency and cost (which are elements advancing the use of a narrow sample), and the fear of unfairness and harm
to the motivation of artists whose works are left outside the sample, or
who are under-compensated if applied too narrowly (clearly elements
advancing a broader sample). Yet striking a balance between these polarizing elements is far from simple. The elements mentioned seem
somewhat abstract, while the task calls for identifying concrete parameters for the sampling process. Therefore, to establish a suitable sample
size, I move to strike a balance between these elements while taking into
account an important and concrete element neglected thus far: the actual
level of compensation copyright holders would receive from the administrating agency through the ACS dynamics. It is clearly unrealistic to
construct a model that would count every instance of content usage
online and provide for full compensation for every such event. Even
setting the counting issue aside, it would prove an unbearable administrative burden to send out checks for mere tens or even hundreds of dollars
to specific users out of the enormous two billion dollar pot every single
year. Yet even to assure that compensation for the sum of $5,000which is a non-negligible sum for many Americans and especially young
artists (and therefore would serve as the baseline for the rest of the analysis)-would not be often neglected, overlooked or under-compensated,
the sample must be of considerable size. Using the $5,000 sum as a
benchmark leads to an important insight; $5,000 amounts to a mere
0.0025% of the overall yearly fund, yet represents 250,000 separate uses
of the specific work every year. Therefore, setting the $5,000 benchmark
implies that the sampling process must be sensitive enough so to identify
0.0025% trends within a dataset of 100 billion bits of data pertaining to
content preferences.
When taking into account this level of sensitivity, an initial statistical analysis concludes that the size of the sample must be about 0.1% of
the overall population (which in this case, as indicated above, would be
about 100 million users, and growing, in the United States alone). In
other words, this calls for a sample of about 100,000 users! Only with
such a sizeable sample, could artists who are entitled to receive annual
compensation of about $5,000 be relatively assured there is a reasonable
chance 14 6 that the use of their works would be accounted for and their
compensation would not be lost to a statistical error. Any smaller sample, in my opinion, would be unacceptable to these copyright holders,
and rightly so. It is therefore apparent that the sampling tasks at hand
146.

See Statistical Appendix, infra note 147.
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sharply differ from that of the Nielsen rating system mentioned by the
ACS scholars. Yet this is to be expected, as the Nielsen ratings pertain to
viewers' choices among merely tens (in the most extreme case that takes
into account the various cable channels) of options. In the situation at
hand, the model attempts to sample a selection of millions of different
forms of content, which display a multitude of consumption patterns.' 47
The assertion that such an extensive sample is required to accommodate artists who are deemed to meet the $5,000 annual threshold can
come under several forms of attack. First, on the statistical level, one
could argue that even with a much smaller sample, artists whose content
is consumed around the $5,000 threshold should not object. Applying a
smaller sample would not necessarily mean these artists are to be neglected and left uncompensated. To the contrary, in many cases, the
exact opposite would occur; not only would the usage of their content be
accounted for, but due to a statistical error acting in their favor, they
would receive a payout that is double or triple the size of the sum that
would reflect the actual consumption of their respective content. Moreover, in the long run, after several years and samples, the chances for
statistical errors of measuring a specific "piece" of content are minimized, and a year of over-compensation would be followed by a year of
under-compensation, and vice versa.
In response to this critique, I return to the important objective of
achieving fairness in the counting process and reasons for such fairness.
I believe that should artists who deserve compensation at the $5,000
level (who stand at the core of those which the model sets to promote and
protect) 148 be confronted with the risk of losing substantial compensation
in a given year due to a statistical error, they would strongly object to
this model, and deem the model unfair, even when facing a similar
chance to "double" their income. Furthermore, I believe such an objection would have substantial merit, as it indeed seems unfair that a large
portion of the population would not receive their fair share of the overall
fund due to an unlucky sample. 49 I also find the "long run" argument
stated above unconvincing. Many forms of content have a very limited
"life span" on the virtual shelves. This does not result from the lack of
space on such shelves, but because of the limited appeal they might have
147.
Statistical Appendix (on file with author), available at http://law.haifa.ac.il/faculty/
lecpapers/zarsky/denver.pdf.
148.
As mentioned, the model strives to protect and promote artists with limited market appeal
and distribution that are served unfairly by today's market. See discussion supra Introduction.
149.
These assertions might sound merely speculative. They are based on conversations with
artists, and the understanding of the alternative options (both those discussed below, and those that
provide for a sufficient sample size) that could allow for accurate compensation to a broader array of
artists. Clearly, establishing whether these assertions are correct will require surveying public opinion. However, should the ACS model be seriously contemplated by regulators as a viable option, I
would assume the court of public opinion will bring the actual opinions and voices of artists on these
issues into play.
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given new materials that are constantly brought into the market. Therefore there would not be any substantial subsequent sampling "rounds" to
potentially offset the unfair errors of one given year, as the public's attention and taste would have already wandered elsewhere. Furthermore,
even if a specific copyright holder would receive her fair share several
years later, she would still be required to "survive" for several years
without receiving sufficient funds-an outcome that might prove unbearable for many starting artists.
The next critiques of my assertion regarding the breadth of the sampling method required (and the goal of protecting the prospective income
of the artists with limited market share) return to the main objective of
the ACS model-maintaining the status quo. Here, the cautious and
careful reader may raise two critiques. First, it could be argued that
forms of content with such a meager usage percentile (0.0025%!) which
the current analysis addresses are usually disregarded in today's media
markets. Therefore these authors need not complain, as the shift to the
ACS model does them no harm. For instance, in the broadcast context,
there are several examples of programs which attracted a small but devoted audience, yet received a "0.0" rating score according to Nielsen. 50
However, given the fact that advertisers have no interest in shows with
extremely low ratings, this sampling error had no real implications. In
the content-retail context, works (such as books, DVDs, or music CDs)
that are consumed in such a limited number which puts them at risk of
being unduly ignored in the overall sampling process are also deemed to
be quickly removed from the shelves of the relevant retailers and thus
destined for oblivion. Therefore, the results of using a limited sample
would, in the worst case, leave these copyright holders at the same point
they are today-which as mentioned is the overall objective of the model
at this time.
Furthermore, a critical reader may add that when taking a realistic
look at today's content business structure and practices, especially with
regard to music industry, artists whose works are consumed at such limited scales (such as those mentioned above), rarely receive substantial
compensation at all. As Fisher explains in great detail,' 51 artists receive
mere pennies on every dollar of CD sales revenue. Yet more importantly, starting artists rarely receive any compensation, as the funds they
might incur are first applied to cover the advances they received (advances that in many cases were used for promotion purposes). 152 Therefore, when structuring a model to maintain the status quo, the interests of
150.
For example, such an instance occurred regarding John McEnroe's short-lived show on
CNBC. For more information, see Wikipedia, Nielsen Ratings, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Nielsen-ratings (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
151.

FISHER, supra note 5, at 55-58.

152.

Id. at 58.
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artists with such limited circulation need not be taken into account, as in
today's world their overall situation is grim as it is.
My response to both of these critiques is that they are flawed, as
they are premised on a comparison between the legal and business setting we have today, and the one created by the ACS models. However,
the ACS scholars' aspiration to achieve a status quo must also take into
consideration the outcomes of other, competing solutions to the challenges of the Internet and digital media. In other words, conducting such
a comparison must take into account the outcome of the use of DRM
systems (that as mentioned above are the leading contenders in today's
policy debates) which are backed by appropriate legal and regulatory
steps. Such a comparison brings a very different result.
Generally, the implementation of DRM leads to several beneficial
outcomes for artists whose works achieve only limited exposure and circulation. At first, DRM systems allow content creators to receive full
compensation for all uses of their content, as limited as they may be.
These models face no difficulties in capturing all traffic and uses of content (in fact, as mentioned above, that is one of the major critiques of this
design) and directly charge per use, regardless of the relative percentage
of such use within the overall social consumption pattern. In addition,
once the DRM systems are set in place, artists would be able to present
their content to a vast crowd with limited expenses associated with the
manufacturing and distribution process. Therefore, copyright holders
would receive more pennies on the dollar, thus weakening the above
mentioned argument that artists with a very limited market share will
rarely receive any revenue after the content industry gets their cut. And
finally, DRM systems will not be limited by shelf-space, as today's
brick-and-mortar stores are,53and therefore would allow for the "long tail"
phenomenon to take place.
In view of the above, authors of works that are consumed in "small
portions" in a DRM architecture over an extended period of time would
witness a stable flow of revenue (as they are starting to see today), which
they would hardly want to replace with the fluctuating, luck-driven revenue stream the ACS model would provide when using a small sample. In
view of all the above, an ACS model using a small sample, which guarantees compensation only for those who produce content with a broad
appeal,' 5 4 would seem to be an unwanted option for authors with smalland medium-size audiences, who would probably opt for a DRM-based
153.
The newly coined term "the long tail" refers to the fact that thanks to the endless shelf
space the Internet e-commerce websites provide, we are witnessing a new and interesting phenomenon - a much greater variety of works are being consumed at non-trivial levels. For more on this
issue, see generally, CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 16 (2006).
154.
For an explanation as to why works with a broader appeal face a lesser risk for a statistical
error, see Statistical Appendix, supra note 147.
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solution given its beneficial traits mentioned above. To avoid this result
and reach an outcome that would be attractive and fair to this important
constituency (which might draw sympathy of large segments of the public), a broad sample must be applied to the ACS collection practices.
In addition to arguments for the use of a broad sample premised on
achieving fairness for artists, other arguments for such broad samples
could be premised on a different interest-the fact that the use of a limited sample would generate an unwanted incentive structure for content
creation. As mentioned, with small samples, the risk of error substantially differs between popular and not-so-popular works. Therefore, with
a limited sample, the model might generate strong incentives for authors
to develop "instant hits," which lead to great exposure over a short period of time during which such hits are "consumed" time and time again,
and quickly thereafter disappear.155 These hits, of course, will generate a
sure revenue stream, as the chances they would be missed by the sam156
pling process are very low. As some scholars argue in other contexts,
a hit-driven content market, in which artists strive to deliver "hits" rather
than works that might be cherished by a limited audience but have no
broad and instant appeal, leads to low quality
content-hardly an out157
come we would strive for the ACS models.
In summation, in this section I am not arguing that the ACS models
are inherently flawed, but that they call for the use of an extensive sample base. However, the relevance of this discussion does not end here.
Recognizing that the model calls for extensive sampling has several important implications. First, implementing ACS will call for the construction of a new and unprecedented sampling model that is very different
from the ones we have today. Therefore, policymakers must establish
whether the task of dealing with such an extensive data set is a feasible
155.
Concerning this final argument, it could be stated that these results do not create unwanted
changes in the incentive structure, but merely point authors in the direction they were heading in the
first place-creating music that would generate the greatest possible revenue! This however, is not
always true: First, the statistical analysis I conducted shows that there is a much greater chance for
the model to account for the use of a "work" that is consumed many times by few users than for
works that are consumedfew times by many users. See Statistical Appendix, supra note 147. Therefore, the sampling structure creates incentives for content that is used many times by the same users-a pattern of behavior which resembles those of today's "instant hits." Second, some artists
might have a preference in producing several works every year, with every work aiming at a specific
crowd, setting or state of mind. This pattern of creation, which might lead to works of high quality,
may become unpopular in view of the risks of not being included in the sampling model.
156.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 79-81.
157.
In addition to the reasons stated in the text, it could be assumed that in some cultures, not
receiving exact compensation for the use the authors' works, would cause aggravation of all artists.
In Israel, for example, AKUM the local equivalent of ASCAP goes to many lengths to provide for a
full account of public performances of works (and have even implemented a costly and sophisticated
system that aims to account for the use of all works broadcasted on various stations rather than make
use of sampling). Interview with Ramat Gan, CEO & COO, AKUM, in Isr. (2005). While the wisdom of such policy (as well as whether it services the interests of its members) can be debated, it still
indicates the motivations and state of mind of artists to have a full picture of consumption patters,
even at a very high cost.
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one. Second (and assuming that applying this sample is indeed feasible,
which is not far fetched given the extensive datasets today's corporations
manage),' 5 8 applying such a vast sample will complicate the process and
create additional costs which must be added to the overall cost-benefit
analysis carried out before applying the model. Third, and most importantly, the use of such an extensive sample affects the way in which the
models' architects can deal with other challenges, as I will show below.
I now move on to point out other problems arising from the implementation of this model that in part result from the necessity of a large sample
base. I start with external challenges and the fear of gaming.
B. MeasuringFairly (?): External Challenges and Gaming
1. Introduction to Gaming
Beyond internal challenges to the ACS architects' efforts to provide
an accurate picture of the patterns of content consumption, we must now
confront challenges arising from attempts of various interested parties to
taint the results of the sampling process. In other words, even after resolving the problems of fairly assessing online consumption patterns, the
ACS model faces serious external challenge that might undermine its
sustainability and render it extremely unfair and unwanted-the challenge of gaming.
By gaming, I (and the ACS literature in general) refer to actions of
online users who strive to artificially inflate the number of registered
uses of content in the administrative agency's final annual report. The
overall reason for engaging in such conduct is clear-to increase the
payout to the individual to whom the relevant work is registered. The
identity of the gamer and his or her specific motivation and sophistication might vary; gaming might result from actions of professional criminals trying to manipulate and abuse the ACS; newly-founded business
ventures that will specialize in "promoting" artists and their works within
the ACS collection process; and even the actions of devoted fans that
strive to promote their beloved artist and in that way prove their loyalty
and affection (possibly after being encouraged to do so by the artist himself). 159 As I will explain and illustrate below, such gaming might be
carried out by use of various means, but generally would constitute an
attempt to simulate the "use" of a specific form of content, a great number of times. This could be done manually, or through the use of auto-

158.
See, e.g., Charles Babcock, Data, Data, Everywhere, INFORMATION WEEK, Jan. 9, 2006,
available at http://wwwinformationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=175801775.

159.
Artists commonly ask of their fans to "check out their website." Therefore, it is easy to
imagine artists encouraging in various ways their fans to access their songs multiple times (it is also
easy to imagine that fans of certain forms of music might be more willing to comply-yet I leave the
discussion of these different trends of fan behavior for future research).
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mated applications, such
as "bots," that would constantly "use" the spe160
cific form of content.

It is fair to assume that given these various reasons and incentives to
game, gaming would indeed occur in the ACS model. The temptation to
game would be too great to resist, even though some of these actions are
fraudulent and illegal according to today's law, and should surely be
rendered illegal by specific rules as part of implementing the model. To
prove this point, it should be noted that various gaming practices are
creating an overall problem in the Internet media market. In several contexts, commercial entities have an interest to artificially inflate the popularity of certain online products (especially content), as this would lead to
a lucrative payout to an interested party. Several examples concerning
Google come to mind. For instance, website owners try to game
Google's PageRank algorithm and system to assure their website would
be prominently displayed as a response to various keywords submitted
by searchers. They do so by (among others) artificially linking to and
from the relevant site. These efforts have created an entire industry
(Search Engine Optimizing--or SEOs) and generate an ongoing cat-andmouse game between Google and those attempting to "game" its rankings. 16 1 In addition, website owners try at times to game Google's
AdSense system, which posts advertisements on websites and compensates the website owner per clicks on these ads. Here, these website
owners attempt to increase their payout by inflating the number of adclicks on their webpage, thus threatening the creditability of Google's
business plan. 162 These examples show, that when business models compensate (directly or indirectly) for mere attention, and such attention
could be artificially simulated online via technological means, then gaming practices would surely be quick to follow.
The existence of successful gaming opportunities and initiatives in a
content market operating in accordance to the ACS model would be extremely problematic. It would threaten the stability of the model, and
lead to discontent and frustration with its overall structure. Not only will
gaming lead to compensation of the undeserving, it will adversely affect
other artists that refrain from these practices. Since the sum to be divided among the right holders is set and limited for every given year, the
distribution of funds amounts to a "zero-sum-game" in which any additional compensation to one claimant directly diminishes or even elimi160.
Some ACS Scholars refer to these practices as "ballot stuffing." See FISHER, supra note
5, at 226; Netanel, supra note 2, at 55.
161.
For more on this dynamic, see JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 161 (2005). For an
explanation as to how the SEO firms work, see Search Engine Optimization: Information from
Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/search-engine-optimization (last visited Oct. 20,
2006). For an explanation of one dynamic, "Spamdexing," see Spaindexing: Information from
Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/spamdexing (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
162.
See BATrELLE, supra note 161, at 187 (regarding "click fraud" of the AdSense system).
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nates the payout to the other. For these reasons, minimizing gaming
should be seen as an important objective both in planning the model's
structure, and throughout its use.
Yet before going further, I offer the following concrete example,
which involves two fictitious individuals, Angela and Bruce, who interact in a content market governed by the ACS model. I believe it might
somewhat illuminate the abstract gaming concerns mentioned above:
Angela is a gifted violist making herfirst independent steps in the
music business. She has made several tapings of pieces she composed
and preformed, and registered them online. Thereafter, she sets up a
personal website, where she makes her works available for streaming
and downloading. By tracking the usage rates of her website and information as to the trends of the popularfile-sharing networks, she learns
that there is an interest in her work by a growing number of avidfans.
Bruce, on the other hand, is a terrible musician yet a shrewd businessman. When the ACS model is implemented, he registers several
works in his name, all of himself banging away on the drums with no
sense of rhythm. He too sets up a website at which his works can be
streamed and downloaded. Immediately thereafter, his works are
downloaded and used an extensive number of times.163 This resultsfrom
the fact that Bruce, who moonlights as an IT expert at several schools
and businesses, has "planted" a small and undetectable piece of software on all of these computers' mainframes. This program causes all
the computers within these networks do download and endlessly "play"
the pieces registeredin Bruce's name.
At the end of the year, the administratingagency divided the annual
fund and sent out "royalties" to the relevant registered right holders.
Bruce (andother entrepreneurs like himsel]) received a hefty sum, which
reflects constant usage and a great amount of interest in his "works. "
Angela received nothing (or close to nothing), as the thresholdfor receivingfunding through the ACS model has been heightened by the actions of Bruce and others, leaving those with works that led to limited,
yet genuine interest,with no compensation whatsoever.
The ACS scholars have been quick to identify the risks of gaming
and have addressed several strategies in which this concern could be
confronted and mitigated. 164 In the following paragraphs, I offer a taxonomy for examining the gaming risks and proper responses, while critically examining the response strategies offered thus far, and suggesting
additional insights as to how to approach the concerns of gaming. I also
163.
This notion of gaming through the use of "bogus content" is not discussed by the ACS
scholars, who focus on the promotion of existing works. 1,however, believe that this form of gaming would be a major threat and concern.
164.

Netanel, supra note 2, at 55-57.
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examine what the effects of such anti-gaming measures would be on
important objectives the ACS scholars point out elsewhere, such as the
E2E principle and maintaining information privacy.
2. Confronting Gaming by Sampling
As gaming might turn out to be a serious and strategic threat to the
existence of the ACS model, it is wise to examine at this early stage what
steps might be taken to mitigate these practices. These steps would be
part of the overall "distribution" stage in which the administrating
agency determines trends of consumption and allocates funds to the deserving right holders. As mentioned, this stage includes: (1) the task of
assessing content usage while relying upon sampling, using (2) Counting
Software installed on every system individuals use for content consumption online, and (3) a Central System run by the administrating agency
for summing up all streaming results. 165 I will examine how every one of
these elements might contribute to mitigating gaming concerns, and what
the implications of changing these elements to confront this challenge
might be.
The first element which the ACS scholars argue would mitigate
"gaming" is the sampling process that is used to create the database, ac66
cording to which the funds are later distributed to the relevant authors.'
Since only a portion of the overall population at any given time is sampled and only the information collected in the sample would impact the
distribution of funds, it would be extremely difficult for a "gamer" to
affect the overall outcome of the fund distribution. This is because there
is only a remote chance that his or her gaming attempts would be accounted for-a fact that would discourage potential gainers from engaging in these practices. Gaming practices of course carry some costs (of
hardware, software, computer power and time) and risks (of getting
caught), and after carrying out a cost/benefit analysis, potential gainers
would choose to focus their time and attention elsewhere. Thus, "sampling" not only provides for a more efficient process, but a safeguard
against external threats to the accuracy and fairness of the distribution
process.
Yet in my opinion and in view of the analysis presented above, relying on sampling alone to battle the threat of gaming is insufficient. This
is because of the previous conclusions reached concerning the size of the
sample the ACS model would require (in order to adhere to "internal
fairness"). As explained, the sample must amount to around 0.1% of the
overall population.' 67 A sample of such magnitude, would not deter prospective gamers from engaging in gaming practices. When conducting
165.
166.
167.

See infra Part V.A. 1.
Netanel, supranote 2, at 56.
Statistical Appendix, supra note 147.
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their costibenefit analysis as to whether to engage in such gaming, they
might presume that given this sample size, it would be feasible to penetrate the sample on a regular basis and assure an increased payout. This
presumption would probably be true.
Clearly, unsophisticated gainers, who will try to achieve this by
endlessly "playing" their works over their own computer, would surely
be disappointed and unsuccessful. However, sophisticated users would
surely apply other means to increase the chances of inclusion in the sample. They would simultaneously use several "identities" from the same
computer; abuse their access to a network of computers, and even distribute computer viruses and "Trojan horse" programs which will cause
other computers to "play" the content of their choice without the actual
knowledge
of these computers' owners (as Bruce did in the example
168
above).

A cautious critic at this juncture, might question the logic of this last
argument, as follows

69

: the sample size should not have an impact on the

gainers' decision whether to engage in gaming or not. What the gainers
would be looking at is the expected return on their business venture
(which is their engagement in gaming practices with their related expenses and risks). This expected return is calculated by multiplying the
probability of their success to place "their" content within the sample, by
the payoff in the case of such success. It is true that the smaller the sample, the smaller the probability of placing within the sample. However,
there is a flip side here as well: the smaller the sample, the larger the
payoff in case of inclusion within the sample. 170 Therefore, whatever the
sample size, the expected value remains the same, and the motivation of
a potential gamer to engage in such gaming should not change. Thus, the
argument goes, sample size is an irrelevant factor.
My response to this argument is, that merely examining the expected return in both instances (the one in which the sample was extremely small and somewhat larger) is insufficient. Even though the
expected return is equal, the risk involved in both investments is very
different: the smaller the sample, the greater the risk that the venture
would fail at every given attempt to game. It is true that the expected
value is the same, and given an unlimited opportunity to engage in gaming at zero marginal cost, attempts to game a small or large sample
should lead to the same economic results. However, marginal costs will

168.

It is fair to assume that in a world operating in accordance with the ACS models that it

would be relatively easy to distribute these forms of viruses and it would happen frequently.
169.
I thank Neil Netanel for engaging me in a discussion regarding this point.
170.
This is because the smaller the sample, the more every sampled piece of content would be
valued in the final process in which the funds are distributed to the right holders. In other words, the
smaller the sample, the more dollars every right holder would receive for every single instance of

usage.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

never be zero and the gaming practices involve risks. In addition, as any
other business venture, this one as well requires some assurance that
there is a relatively high chance that the investors would be able to reap
the fruits of their labor after a reasonable period of time. An ACS model
using small samples will not allow gainers to have such assurance (which
is why small samples would in fact be an affective tool to battle gaming).
Yet as explained above, the sample would by no means be small. Thus,
gaming ventures would be economically viable, and additional measures
must be taken to block them.
Another critique, coming from a very different direction, would argue that the actions described above seem far fetched or too pessimistic,
as there is no real reason to believe that individuals would go to such
lengths in an attempt to squeeze extra dollars out of the ACS model, especially if there is over a 99% chance that any specific gaming effort
would not be accounted for at all. Therefore, sampling will be a sufficient deterrent against gaming. It is of course extremely difficult to predict future behavior and outcome in the ACS model at this early juncture.
However, I believe that given the relative low costs of computer power,
and the way the ACS model is structured, gaming would be sure to become a lucrative business to some and a massive headache to others
(namely, the model's administrators, other artists and regulators) even
when sampling is applied. To prove this point, I refer to another contemporary online dynamic, which is somewhat similar: spare. Here entrepreneurs engage in business practices (that in terms of their legality
could be described as varying from grey to the completely illegal) that
generate an easy profit by multiplying their voices online at a very low
marginal cost. 171 Spammers, and the firms paying for their services, are
not deterred by the low rate of success and response these messages
have. Because of the extremely low marginal cost of sending multiple
messages, merely splinters of one percent in172responses to the spain solicitations is sufficient for them to break even.
Continuing this analogy somewhat further, I believe that comparing
the potential risks of gaming to the very real problems of spam, teaches
an important lesson: mistakes and lack of vision at the early stages of
planning systems lead to serious problems at a later stage. At later
stages, opportunities to make easy profits through abusing the system are
extremely difficult to defeat. Rather, they lead to an extensive "arms
race" between those trying to protect the system and those trying to con171.
Similarities aside, it should be noted that the premise of the spammers business plan is
very different. Rather than benefit from a governmental fund, they strive to capitalize on a very
limited number of gullible consumers that would purchase the services offered through spam, and in
that way render the entire process profitable. See Spain: Information from Answers.com,
http://www.answers.com/spam (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
172.
For one description of the spamming business model, see Spam: Information from Answers.com, supra note 171.
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tinue to contaminate it. In the process, they create an overall waste of
technological innovation, and additional social costs in terms of burdening courts and other law enforcement agencies. Therefore, if the implementation of an ACS model (on a broad or limited scheme) is to be taken
seriously, its planners and administrators must take steps to mitigate the
gaming problem in advance. I now address what steps might be taken,
while explaining how they could be implemented in the other two elements of "the distribution" stage (that attends to monitoring and assessing content usage)-the "Counting Software" and the "Central System."
3. Fighting Gaming-Beyond Sampling
Clearly, additional measures are needed to deter garners and mitigate the effects of their actions. I now address several solutions which
strive to meet this objective. Here, I refer both to solutions mentioned by
the ACS scholars, and my own proposals. The latter are based on proposals mentioned in the context of battling spare. 7 3 Generally, such
strategies will strive to (1) undermine the gamers' business model, and
the outcome of their cost/benefit analysis concerning their decision
whether to engage in gaming, and (2) Block content usage that is clearly
artificial and a result of gaming attempts. 74 The former would mostly be
applied through the users' local "Counting Software," while the latter
through both the "Counting Software" and the "Central System." The
following analysis will address these two components in turn, starting
with the "Counting Software."
At this point, one might ask (as I have been asked several times): Is
this discussion indeed suited for a legal and policy crowd, as these are
not legal nor policy issues but mere technical ones? Shouldn't these
questions be left for technologists, system architects, and computer engineers, who are supposed to identify such risks and move to resolve them
at the time the system would be implemented? Perhaps. Yet I believe
that decisions as to what actions should be taken against garners are far
from merely technical. They involve policy decisions as to the way the
ACS model would be structured, which, in turn, have important implications regarding several issues policymakers and scholars found important
in the past. For these reasons, I not only believe this discussion is timely,
but that it must involve and be of interest to policymakers and lawyers as
well.

173.
As mentioned above the problem at hand somewhat resembles that of spam, and therefore
the some of the solutions selected are ones that are applied to battling sparn as well.
174.
Clearly there would be a problem with definitions here-how should we define, for example, the actions of fans mentioned above (replaying the works of their favorite artist). I assume
these actions would and should be rendered legitimate.
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a. The End Users' End
As mentioned, the garners' business model could be undermined by
forcing gainers to incur costs when attempting to place content within the
sample. With such costs, it would not prove worthwhile to engage in
these practices so to receive the mere pennies for every time the gaming
attempt proves successful. Possible measures for achieving this objective are structuring the "Counting Software" to register a work as "used"
(or "consumed") only if viewed or heard in its entirety, 75 or that additional computational processes must be carried out before the work
would counted. 176 Of course, for this scheme to work, it must be applied
on every machine and application that might be used to "consume" content (whether they are computers, PDAs, or other portable devices such
as iPods or MP3 players). Yet I believe that these measures alone are far
from sufficient. Gainers would clearly try to defeat them by attempting
to penetrate the Counting Software and shut down these anti-gaming
measures. Moreover, they will also try to game the Counting Software
itself, so that it sends out indications that specific forms of content have
been consumed numerous times, even though that was not the case.
Some of these concerns could be dealt with through other measures
I will mention shortly. However, to properly block the garners' efforts,
steps must be taken to protect the Counting Software from tampering. It
is of course difficult to establish today what steps must be taken, but it is
fair to assume that the industry must establish a standard for "safe"
counting software, and that regulation must be put in place to assure that
all manufacturers comply. Furthermore, to assure that the system would
be secured from tampering, 177the protocols for carrying out these tasks
might have to be kept secret.
Walking through the steps required to mitigate gaming by blocking
artificial content usage through measures installed on the users' end (i.e.
the Counting Software) leads to similar outcomes and conclusions. Here,
to block suspicious trends of usage, the ACS planners must establish a
limited number of daily (or monthly) legitimate uses of every form of
175.
FIsHER, supra note 5, at 228.
176.
This is a solution that has been suggested in the Spam context. See Jo Twist, Microsoft
Aims to Make Spammers Pay, BBC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/3324883.stm.
Other solutions have been suggested in the "span" context might fit as well-such as Microsoft's
initiative to charge a miniscule sum for every email used after a very high number. Here the model
might choose to charge users an additional sum (in addition to the levy) if they consumer over a
specific number of works in a set period. See Microsoft, Q&A: Microsoft's Anti-Spam Technology
Roadmap
(Feb.
24, 2004),
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2004/Feb04/0224CallerlD.mspx.
177.
In other words, these applications would be required to use "closed source" code as opposed to "open source" code that provides for many benefits in terms of allowing for other developers and innovators to add on additional and complementary applications and programs to the existing
infrastructure.
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content from a single user. 178 Every additional form of use to be registered with the Counting Software would not be accounted (out of suspicion it is merely a result of gaming) and will not increase the payment to
the relevant right holder. Again, gainers would try to interfere with these
measures by overriding this application, or even figure out ways in which
every "machine" could unnoticeably run several pieces of Counting
Software simultaneously, and in that way defeat this defensive measure. 179 Therefore, again the model's engineers must preempt this threat
by standardizing, securing, and even locking the Counting Software application.
b. ACS vs. E2E
This ongoing circle of action and reaction described above leads to
an interesting final outcome: At first it illuminates additional required
adjustments to the legal system when implementing the ACSadjustments that would address the standardizing of the Counting Software and possibly render illegal any attempts to tamper with its inner
workings as part of an attempt to game. Yet beyond that, it is apparent
that for the ACS model to work smoothly (and battle gaming efficiently),
several elements featured and heavily criticized in the DRM systems,
must be included in this model as well! For instance, standardization of
the Counting Software could be used as means to engage in anticompetitive practices. Furthermore, the ACS model will include elements that would interfere with the Internet's E2E principle.
As mentioned, 180 the E2E principle states the importance of allowing any developer to easily add new applications to the network without
requesting the consent of others. However, with Counting Software that
includes the secured elements mentioned set in place, developers will be
limited to complying with the Counting Software's specifications. This
might prove a problem. As discussed in the DRM context, these developers might not be able to exercise their full potential to innovate when
forced to comply with external constraints. This would diminish the
overall innovation that characterized
the Internet, and thus lead to an
18
unwanted social outcome.

The ACS scholars do not address the tension between the aim to
achieve external fairness in the counting process and maintaining an
open network that adheres to the E2E principle (though in several places
they discuss the importance of maintaining the latter, as a reason to object to DRM solutions). However, as this analysis indicates, a conflict
178.
179.
180.
181.
by DRM,

FISHER, supra note 5, at 229.
Id. at 226 (addressing this threat).
See supranote 80.
1 concede to the fact that the harm to the E2E principle will be less severe than that caused
yet effects this principle nonetheless.
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with the E2E principle might be inevitable. This is not to say that the
ACS model should be rejected on this basis. I believe that much to the
contrary, the other benefits ACS brings into play should justify the limited use of locked and closed components within the Counting Software.
The ACS model promotes creativity by opening up many forms of content to the general public for their unrestricted use-and paying a price in
terms of somewhat limiting innovation in the development of web applications is acceptable.1 82 Clearly, however, others might not share this
view, and therefore this matter must be acknowledged, discussed, and
resolved (even on a temporary basis) prior to implementing an ACS
model.
c. Battling Gaming, the Central System and Privacy
Additional measures that would be surely required to effectively
battle gaming must be implemented through the Central System. These
measures will again strive to locate and thereafter disregard content usage that is artificial and therefore an attempt to game. To do so, these
Central Systems would be structured to limit the number of times a specific work would be counted from a specific destination within a specific
timeframe. A "destination" could be defined as a specific
IP address, a
1 83
specific "machine," or a Counting Software application.
Yet this might not be enough. As gainers would apply dynamic IP
addresses and shift from one machine to another,' 84 the system must have
the ability to detect normal trends of content consumption, and disregard
action patterns that sharply differ from these trends (that indicate gaming
and distortion might be afoot). However, as I will now explain, meeting
this task again conflicts with an important principle the ACS scholars
strive to adhere to-maintaining the privacy of the content users (as opposed to the DRM systems,
which have been criticized for compromising
185
the users' privacy).
At first, a few words about the ACS model and privacy. On its face,
the contemplated ACS models create serious risks for privacy harms.
The models call for frequent reporting of the content consumed by individuals to a data inventory controlled by the administrating agency that
in turn is part of the government. 186 Clearly, the information the ACS
model involves is extremely delicate, as it could provide a great deal of
insight into the individual's personality and most inner thoughts that are
182.
Of course efforts should be made to construct Counting Systems that allow for both the
blocking of distortions and the use of open applications, and in that way enjoy the benefits of both
worlds. This is a point worth explaining to technologists and policy makers upon constructing the
ACS model.
183.
See FISHER, supranote 5, at 228 (alluding to this solution).
184.

See id.

185.
186.

See Netanel, supra note 2, at 55.
See discussion supraPart 11.
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reflected in her decisions as to what forms of content to use and consume. 187 In addition, an individual's knowledge that her entire pattern of
content consumption is constantly being viewed and stored would, have
an adverse effect on the users' online behavior. Individuals will fear that
such data could be passed onto other entities within the government,
commercial entities, or abused by individuals with access to the database.
Not only would such knowledge and fear cause users to feel intimidated
and perhaps a loss of autonomy, 8 8 but it would affect the content users'
choices in selecting content to listen to and view online. Users will conduct themselves in a conforming manner; namely, they would refrain
from listening to content that could be viewed as outside the mainstream
in fear of what others might think.
Clearly these are unwanted results that would lead to the quick failure of the ACS. For this reason, the ACS scholars have specifically addressed this matter, 189 while setting a very high threshold of privacy protection. They state that the model must include rules prohibiting any
subsequent use of the data collected, and requirements that such data be
immediately purged after being summed up to formulate the overall sum
of works consumed at a specific time (a process carried out by the Central System). These rules, which would reflect similar restrictions existing in some media,' 90 will assure users that there is no need for concern
regarding their privacy, and that such fear need not impact their content
preferences and selections.
Although I strongly agree with the ACS scholars' privacy concerns,
I believe these rules set a privacy threshold that is far too high. The personal information pertaining to the content preferences of many individuals is indeed sensitive and raises serious privacy concerns. However, this same information would probably prove crucial in attempts to
mitigate gaming. To effectively battle gaming, the administrating
187. See Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases,52 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 438-39 (2002)
(discussing the privacy concerns arising with regard to the collection of "mere" consumer data). For
a glimpse of the ways in which such concerns generated public outrage in a much more limited
context, see various stories concerning the collection and use of personal data by TiVo. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey Zaslow, If TiVo Thinks You Are Gay, Here's How to Set It Straight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26,
2002, at A1.
188.
For a discussion of privacy concerns stemming from the fear that one's actions are constantly being viewed, see Tal Z. Zarksy, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using ImplementationBased Solutionsfor the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet
Society, 56 ME. L. REv. 13, 32 (2004). For the view that the monitoring must be limited in order to
limit misuse and embarrassment, see Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1212-17 (1998). For the view that such monitoring might harm autonomy,
see Julie Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 1373, 1425 (2000). For additional philosophical background on the fear and privacy concerns
associated with the creation of vast databases that include personal information, see Daniel Solove,
Privacy and Power: Computer Databasesand Metaphorsfor Information Privacy,53 STAN. L. REV.
1393 (2001). See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2004).
189.
See FISHER, supra note 5, at 228; Netanel, supra note 2, at 55.
190.
Netanel, supranote 2, at 55.
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agency must constantly track and analyze the databases of online content
consumption, in order to establish a baseline of normal and abnormal
consumption patterns and in that way identify attempts to distort the
model. At this early stage, it is of course difficult to establish what forms
of data would be required to quickly and efficiently detect these patterns.
However, I will assume that the analysis cannot rely upon the aggregated
data of samples taken throughout the year. Rather, I believe that for the
first few years such analysis would require information concerning the
origins the data, in terms of an IP address, or a specific Counting Software-in other words, information that might compromise information
privacy and would not be available if the privacy measures stated above
are taken.' 9'
An interesting example of another gaming concern, and the way in
which it is confronted, illuminates the nexus between battling gaming
and the use and analysis of Internet traffic. Here I refer to concerns regarding click fraud and the threat to Google's AdSense model. As mentioned, 192 Google is currently battling attempts to "game" their lucrative
business model, according to which website publishers are compensated
per click on advertisements set on this page. In a lawsuit about to be
settled, 193 it has been argued that these practices cause advertisers massive losses, and therefore these practices might indeed threaten to undermine Google's business model. 194 As a renowned security expert
recently noted, 195 these garners at times use sophisticated strategies while
"attacking" from multiple IP addresses and at times using "Trojan
horses" that take over the machines of unsuspicious users and apply them
towards these causes. The settlement mentioned, and the documents
published by experts involved in the case provide us with some insight as
to how Google confronts this challenge. Here too, Google is responding
in several ways. First, its experts automatically block repeated clicks
that are clearly fraudulent. Yet to block more sophisticated gainers,
Google employs teams of experts as well as sophisticated algorithms that
examine the overall database of clicks, which include a data trail about
every click, with information regarding its originating IP address and the
191.
Here I disagree with Ku who holds that privacy would not be a problem as information
beyond the aggregated sums of usage will not be required. This assertion is incorrect given the risks
of gaming. Ku, supra note 15, at 314-15.
192.
See supra Part lV.B.
193.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Complaint, Lane's Gifts and Collectibles LLC v.
Yahoo! Inc., Case No. CV-2005-52-1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2005). On this issue, see Eric Goldman,
Technology & Marketing Law Blog: Lane's Gifts Click Fraud Lawsuit Near Settlement,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/03/lanesgifts cli 1.htm (Mar. 8, 2006, 16:25 EST);
Nicole
Wong,
Official
Google
Blog:
Update: Lane's
Gifts
v.
Google,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/03/update-lanes-gifts-v-google.html (Mar. 8, 2006, 13:58
EST).
194.
See BATTELLE, supra note 161, at 186-88.
195.
Bruce Schneier, Wired News:Google's Click-FraudCrackdown, WIRED NEWS, July 13,
2006, http://www.wired.com/news/columns/0,71370-0.html.
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time it took place. After examining these databases, they attempt to establish what constitutes a normal and abnormal form of ad-related clicking. Thereafter, they move to disregard abnormal clicks, and amend
their
96
on.'
there
from
patterns
clicking
such
disregard
to
automatic filters
Returning to the ACS model, I believe the analysis and example
above provide us with some important insights as to future planning and
the way in which the ACS model must deal with personal information.
Clearly, this analysis should not lead to the conclusion that within the
ACS model, all privacy protection must be abandoned (an outcome that
might undermine the ACS model in its entirety). However, understanding this potential conflict between the need to respond to gaming and
privacy concerns requires us to realign the means of privacy protection
the model will employ. First, the ACS model must abandon the very
high threshold of privacy protection mentioned above that would not
allow for the meaningful analysis required for fraud detection. Clearly,
data regarding content consumption should not be put to subsequent
commercial uses, or passed on to third parties (either commercial or governmental), yet it cannot be purged immediately as well. Rather, the
ACS's privacy policy must be structured to allow the administrative
agency to probe the dataset of information pertaining to the samples
gathered, which also includes data as to the sources of the sample (in
terms of IP addresses or even an identification number for every Counting Software).
Allowing such practices to take place will, of course, generate some
privacy concerns. Individuals may fear that security will be breached
and the data regarding content consumption will leak, or that someone
within the administrative agency will misuse the data. They might also
fear that the government will subpoena such information if it deems it
necessary for an investigation (a realistic option given recent events).
Therefore, steps should be taken to preserve privacy, while maintaining
the ability to battle gaming. For instance, strict security requirements
could be set in place regarding these databases, with harsh punishments
for those who breach them.
Should the steps mentioned prove insufficient to confront fears of
the government systematically misusing this database, the model's planners might consider solutions recently examined by security agencies in
the context of the war on terror. Here, the government is faced with the
challenge of examining vast commercial databases (such as credit card
196.

For an in-depth discussion as to how these practices take place, see Alexander Tuzhilin,

The Lane's Gifts v. Google Report, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/pdf/TuzhilinReport.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006); Click Quality Team, Google, Inc., How Fictitious Clicks Occur in ThirdParty Click FraudAudit Reports (Aug. 8, 2006),http://www.googlc.com/adwords/ReportonThird-

PartyClickFraudAuditing.pdf#search=%22Hw%2lOFictitius%2CIicks%200ccur%/o2Oin%2ThirdParty%20CIick%2OFraud%2OAudit%2OReports%2C%20Click%2OQuality%2OTeam%2C%22 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006).
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and airline databases) that might hold important clues as to future terrorist attacks. Obviously, allowing the government to access these databases without restrictions, while conducting massive "fishing expeditions" creates serious privacy concerns.1 97 To meet this challenge, researchers are trying to formulate ways in which the government could
engage in data analysis and data mining, while searching and detecting
data patterns of dangerous anomalies, without having the ability to "see"
the data itself. 198 Only after such anomalies that indicate the existence of
a security risk are detected, are the law enforcement agents permitted to
receive information as to the actual data within these datasets (as opposed to overall trends).
Shifting back to the ACS model, applying these new technologies
(should they indeed prove workable) would allow for creating a database
of information relating to the users' content consumption to be held in
confidence by a trusted third party that would not be permitted to make
any use whatsoever of the data. Thereafter, the governmental administrative agency would analyze and "mine" this database, without having
access to the data itself. Only after establishing the existence of gaming
patterns, will the agency move to block similar actions in the future.
Clearly this issue requires additional research as to whether it is even
feasible to blindly recognize such patterns in an effective manner and
these options still need to be discussed and weighed before decided upon.
Yet the importance of maintaining the ability to battle gaming must be
borne in mind when addressing privacy questions in the ACS context.
The abovementioned examples show that based on other contexts, balancing gaming and privacy might be possible, with proper planning and
understanding of the interests involved.
I conclude with two final points regarding privacy. First, I note an
additional issue that would require future discussion and analysis-the
ability of the administrative agency to bring action against "serial gamers" (by way of existing or special laws). To do so, the administrative
agency must not only block the gaming practices, but establish their existence, locate the "gamer" and link him or her to the gaming activitiesall tasks that require access to personal information. Clearly the extent
of the gaming problem will set the tone as to what forms of actions
would be taken. Enabling the administrating agency to engage in these
actions will create privacy concerns, as well as concerns of selective enforcement, which will somewhat echo concerns voiced today regarding

197.

For a recent account of this issue, see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD 148-49, 196

(2005).
198.
For additional details, see K. A. Taipale, DataMining and Domestic Security: Connecting
the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. Sd. & TECH. L. REV. 2, 74-81 (2003). For a discussion
of the legal implications of these tools, see ROSEN, supra note 197, at 148, 196.
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the ongoing lawsuit against individuals engaged in file swapping. I leave
these discussions for a later time.1 99
Second, privacy in terms of the ACS model raises an interesting
question regarding the ability of the copyright holder to capitalize on
their right without exposing their identity. In today's content markets,
and especially in one enabled by DRM, creators could sell their works
without the need to establish their identity, and can even rely upon the
use of pseudonyms.20 ° With ACS, however, the administrative agency
must have proper identification and contact information about the copyright holders so as to provide them with proper compensation by the end
of the year. This requirement might compromise the ability to capitalize
on anonymous or pseudonymous works. 20 1 These concerns could be
substantially mitigated by structuring the ACS model in order to provide
for the pseudonymous registration of works. However, allowing such
registration would (again) lead to problems concerning the ability to
track gainers, who would constantly attempt to register bogus works in
their name. I leave the balancing between these objective (anonymous
creation and defeating gaming) for a later time.
To conclude our discussion of achieving fairness when measuring
usage in the ACS model, I point out that the key to this task is balancing.
After correctly establishing the benefits and detriments of every policy
choice and steps, regulators must balance privacy, network openness,
accuracy in measurement and, vulnerability to gaming. I hope this discussion will assist in this complicated task, by drawing out the elements
involved, and the possible tools available for constructing the proper
balance.
C. The Outcome of ACS Implementation
At this point of the analysis, I put aside my examination of the "nuts
and bolts," and move to examine the impact of implementing the ACS
model. I do so while accepting that the implementation of the ACS is
politically and legally feasible. As mentioned above, when Fisher sums
up his description of the ACS model, he mentions the benefits of such
implementation to users, artists, and society on the one hand, and the
much welcomed weakening of today's overpowering media conglomer-

199.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 225-26 (addressing this matter briefly).
200. Note, however, that right holders can rarely enforce their rights without revealing their
identity.
201.
This is of course not to say that the model compromises the important right to speak
anonymously. On this issue, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in
the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 991, 1024 (2004). The question as to whether there is also
a right to financially capitalize on content distributed anonymously should be addressed at a later
time.
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ates on the other hand. 20 2 In this sub-part, I will confront these predictions while closely examining three issues: (1) Which segments within
the content industry might choose to voluntarily exclude themselves
from the model, and whether such exclusion will cause a problem to the
overall implementation of the ACS model; (2) How the model's implementation would affect the balance of power between the various players
in the media market (3) Unplanned and unwanted effects the model's
implementation might have on the creation, development and distribution
of content in the post-ACS digital environment. Throughout my analysis
I examine how these issues compare to the objectives the ACS scholars
set out to achieve, and suggest changes that might be required in the
model's structure to overcome instances in which these objectives will
not be met.
1. Forms of Content-The Limits of the Model (Or: Why Pornography and ACS Don't Mix-and Why We Need Not Worry
About That)
As mentioned above, even though the ACS model consists of many
mandatory elements (such as a levy on services and applications related
to online usage and possibly the use of Counting Software), it still requires voluntary participation of one important group--the copyright
holders who must agree to provide their content online through the open
ACS model. The other option such content owners might exercise is
refraining from providing and distributing their content online altogether,
or limiting such distribution to locked DRM systems that would directly
control the ways in which users access their content. As the ACS scholars argue correctly, this option will be quite unattractive and artists have
strong incentives to participate in ACS. For upcoming artists, the model
provides for vast exposure to a worldwide audience. For already renowned artists, the model provides compensation for online uses that are
already taking place and will probably continue to take place online in
any event (in spite of the industry's attempt to block them) given the fact
that DRM technology cannot provide foolproof locks against the leaking
of content to illegal sharing networks.0 3 In addition, opting for limited
distribution through a DRM model should be undesirable, 2 4 as this reSee supra Part III.
202.
Artists are usually unable to block the migration of their works online, as users upload
203.
versions of the famous works of these artists to the web within the file-swapping networks, while at
times "cracking" various locks installed on these forms of content offline (such as the cracking of
DVD encryption and uploading full length motion pictures to the file swapping network). See
Netanel, supra note 2, at 9-10.
204.
As mentioned, according to Netanel, the adoption of an overall ACS scheme also calls for
the repeal of the legal protection amounted to the trusted systems enabling the DRM infrastructure.
See id. at 40-41. In other words, the implementation of ACS models will call for canceling or limiting DMCA-like provisions that prohibit and criminalize the circumvention of copyright protection
mechanisms. Thus, the authors would have an even greater incentive against opting for the DRM
option. See id. at 59. Note that Fisher objects to this notion-while arguing that individuals should
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quires substantial setup expenses, as opposed to the mere registration the
ACS model entails.

However, even after taking these benefits and detriments into account, some copyright holders might still refuse to participate in the ACS
model. It is, of course, extremely difficult to predict how many and
whom will chose to exclude themselves, yet I believe, it is safe to assume

that a specific segment of the online content market will refrain from
participating in ACS-those creating and producing pornographic materials. 20 5 These copyright holders will probably continue to make use of
trusted systems for distributing their materials, and lead the way in the
development of new applications with greater security.
I draw this conclusion while relying upon several arguments. First,
I believe these copyright holders would refrain from participating in the
ACS in view of the registration process. This process will explicitly link
their names with the production of this form of content in a public register, thus making this information available both to the public and to the
government.20 6 Second, these content providers will fairly assume that
individuals interested in "consuming" such content online, would be uncomfortable with reporting their consumption histories through the use of
the counting systems mentioned above, 0 7 and will therefore try to hide

any traces of such consumption.20 8 This is quite the opposite of many
other settings, where users would be happy to indicate their interest in
specific forms of content, as it would lead to additional compensation for
the artists whose content they now enjoy. The users' reluctance to participate in the counting process would lead to a drop in the compensation
such content providers would reap through the dynamics of the ACS
model (as opposed to the compensation they might reap through other
compensation models).20 9 In view of these arguments, I believe the porbe allowed to make use of both models, and that they would no doubt flock to ACS that is preferable
by far. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 108-10.
205.
In this segment, I only refer to works whose distribution is permitted according to relevant
laws. The online distribution of content deemed illegal requires an extensive analysis that is beyond
the reach of this article.
206.
The motivations here might be mixed. Some might fear the public eye and social backlash of being associated with this form of content. Others might not want the government to have
easy access to such lists. This argument is not without flaws-as the current system requires these
content providers to provide information to both government and the public concerning their activities (when suing to enforce copyright, registering websites or even filing tax returns concerning their
operations). However, I argue that the ACS model would require a great deal of exposure and an
easily accessible central repository.
207.
Note that these concerns will be exacerbated given my previous analysis of the required
balance of privacy measures and concerns with anti-gaming activities that will inevitably broaden
the concerns users will have regarding the governments ability to track, save, and see what content
they are consuming online. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
208. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 227 (describing a similar dynamic regarding the tracking of
content usage by Nielsen Media (in the context of television)).
209.
Note that I need not argue that the consumption of pornography will decline because of
the tracking devices put in place-an argument that is somewhat problematic to prove given the fact
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nography content industry will opt for the DRM model, as opposed to the
ACS model addressed above.21 °
Yet the reluctance of the creators and distributors of pornographic
content to make use of the ACS model need not indicate the model's
weakness. Much to the contrary, I believe such reluctance would
strengthen the model and assist in its implementation, by somewhat silencing two powerful critiques against its adoption. One such critique
would argue that a model that does not charge for marginal uses of content will potentially allow users to access endless amounts of pornographic materials at no additional costs. This, in turn, may lead to an
array of problems, such as unhealthy addictions of online users to such
materials. Another critique (with somewhat of a populist flavor) will
argue that the ACS scheme leads to the cross-subsidizing of the "consumption" of pornographic content online. In plain terms, it argues that
individuals who barely use the Internet in general and file sharing applications in particular, would be indirectly funding (through their contribution to the governmental fund, via the levy) the production of pornography and enabling excessive use of such content.2 11 Clearly, this argument could be made with regard to many other elements and forms of
content.212 However, placing this critique in the "pornography" context
is sure to generate additional support and may threaten the implementation of the model, as it will find its way to the hearts of many citizens.
In summation, pornography has been a driving force in the development of online technologies, and generates a vast amount of online
traffic. According to this analysis, this industry will remain outside the
model. However, in view of the benefits stemming from this outcome, I
believe this should not be a reason to reconsider the way the model is
constructed.
2. The Role and Power of Intermediaries in the ACS Model
a. General
An important objective the ACS scholars aim to achieve in the shift
to the ACS model concerns the realignment of power in the media conthat the consumption of free pornography is extremely popular online. I however argue that users
will take actions to avoid being tracked by the various means mentioned above when consuming
pornography-which would lead to substantial losses to these copyright holders.
210.
Note that DRM creates privacy concerns of its own. See supra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text. However, these concerns can be mitigated by sophisticated consumers making
use of e-cash and similar measures that will not allow for tying their payment method to their realworld identity. Such measures will not be helpful in the ACS world, which must track (for reasons
mentioned above) the actual IP address the consumer is using.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 217.
211.
For instance, conservatives, who use their computers for word processing and email only,
212.
will argue that they are cross-subsidizing the consumption of music and video content which advocates ideas they strongly disagree with (and vice versa). Id.
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tent markets. These markets feature large media conglomerates, which
serve as intermediaries and deliver the works of artists to their prospective consumers. In today's media markets, such intermediaries are
vested with a great deal of power, which according to several scholars
213
leads to unwanted results to artists, consumers and society as a whole.
The ACS model, so it is argued, empowers both artists and consumers
and thus mitigates the unwanted results stemming from the existence of
the overpowering media intermediaries in the current market (a result
stemming from today's market structure).2 14 I hereby examine the assertion that a shift to the ACS model will indeed realign this market balance
and cure the many problems this balance (or rather, imbalance) creates.
In doing so, I provide both an analytical and comparative analysis that
might prove otherwise. Thereafter, I discuss steps that might be taken to
allow the ACS model to achieve this objective. I also address points for
future research to sharpen the understanding of the role of intermediaries
in an ACS content market.
To start out, a few words regarding the role of media conglomerates
as intermediaries in today's content markets. 21 5 First, in terms of their
relation with artists, these firms provide them with funding, connections,
knowledge and expertise, and in this way promote them from anonymity
to stardom. The firms make use of their massive distribution and promotion mechanisms and deliver the relevant forms of content to the actual
and virtual doorsteps of the masses.2 16 Before launching this process,
however, in the music context, most artists assign their rights in the
sound recording over to these intermediaries and in return receive mere
pennies for every dollar to be made in sales of their works. 21 7 Artists are
forced to do so because they lack any other meaningful option to promote their content and deliver it to interested consumers. Second, the
intermediaries provide an important service to the audience (the consumers) as well. They choose specific works from a nearly limitless selection and advise consumers that such content is worthy of their limited
attention.
213.
For one description of market concentration, see ROBERT MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF
THE MEDIA 177-83 (2004). For an opposing view, see BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS
GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA? (2000).
214.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 242. In all fairness, it should be noted that according to Fisher,
the future role of today's powerful intermediaries is unclear-they might be able to capitalize on
their expertise and power to remain vital and profitable in the new realm, but might also be outperformed by newer players. Elsewhere, however, when addressing the effects on artists, Fisher mentions that the model will allow them to be less dependant on a few intermediaries. Id. at 240. Below

I examine this key assertion in depth.
215.
This segment of the analysis is structured in terms of the music industry. The arguments
could be rephrased to meet the structure of the television and film industry, which are probably far
more concentrated.
216.
For example, see FISHER, supra note 5, at 21-22 for the roles of music intermediaries in
today's markets.
217.

Idat 54-55.
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Given the economics of scale and scope content markets involve,
these intermediaries have grown in size, and a limited number of them
dominate a vast portion of the market.2t 8 Beyond several advantages
such integration provides, this phenomenon leads to problematic outcomes on both sides of the equation (i.e. vis-d-vis artists and consumers).
The market power and dominance these firms enjoy allows them to obtain draconian terms when negotiating with artists, thus limiting the artists' actual benefits from the fruits of their talent and labor. 219 With regard to consumers, it is argued that the content selection these concentrated intermediaries provide is dull and mainstream, as well as limited
given the almost endless array of options. 220 This results from the intermediaries' policy of maximizing profits, which at times conflicts with
other social objectives.2 2' In addition to this critique as to the actions of
the intermediaries, it has been argued that permitting a limited number of
corporate entities to control the content consumption patterns of a vast
segment of society is problematic per se, as these entities will control
what the public knows and therefore how it thinks and acts.222
The ACS scholars are well aware of these concerns regarding the
powerful position of content intermediaries in the media market, and
advocate ACS as a way to mitigate these problems. Indeed, at first
glance, the ACS seems to provide a reasonable response to these failings
of today's content markets, with regard to the troubles of both artists and
consumers. First, in terms of artists, the ACS model creates a media
market with an extremely low barrier to entry. Any artist could easily
upload her work to the Internet, where it could be accessed and used by a
very large audience, and receive indirect compensation for the content's
consumption (after going through a quick, cheap, and simple registration
process). Therefore, these artists would not be forced to rely upon the
assistance of the mentioned intermediaries, while making use of the
Internet's infrastructure and features for content distribution and promotion. Also, they need not rely upon the intermediaries for compensation,
which they receive directly from the administrative agency.223 Consumers, too, would benefit from the shift to ACS. They will not be limited to
the content the intermediaries choose to promote and distribute, but
could access a broad array of content directly online, while interacting
directly with the artists themselves.22 4

218.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 213, at 177-83. But see generally COMPAINE & GOMERY,
supra note 213.
219.
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 5, at 54-55.
220.
Id. at 80-81, 238.
221.
Id.
222.
BENKLER, supra note 33, at 202.
223.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 238.
224.
Id. at 239.
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b. The Critical View
Critically reviewing these rosy predictions of the realignment of
forces in the ACS content market leads to some skepticism of their accuracy. The shift to the ACS model will indeed lower several barriers to
entry for artists to the content market, and will allow them to easily upload their content, as well as distribute it directly to consumers. Therefore, the importance of these aspects of the content intermediary's role
will quickly diminish. However, in a market operating in accordance to
the ACS, the role of intermediaries, vis-A-vis consumers, will still remain, and gain importance. Here, consumers will reach out to intermediaries for guidance in selecting content which might meet their specific
interests, be of the highest of quality and thus worthy of their attention.
Indeed, in the ACS model, human attention is a scarce commodity
(which eventually leads to the artists' compensation) and one which consumers will try to guard when facing the abundance of content the model
provides.
The ACS scholars acknowledge and even welcome the prospect of
important intermediaries in the ACS content market. However, they
argue that these intermediaries need not be so powerful as to allow them
to abuse artists.225 In addition, they need not be the same conglomerates
we have today (although these entities have been known to leverage their
market power in one medium towards another). Rather, the ACS model
will lead to the appearance of an abundance of experts, media critics, or
simply music or movie lovers that will comb through the Internet searching for notable materials, and will list and link to them at their respective
home pages.2 2 6 These will be the new intermediaries of the ACS age.
Though this description may seem convincing, I find it too optimistic. It is missing a crucial element I address below-that of the power
which would be amounted to intermediaries in the ACS content market.
Furthermore, I believe there is a good chance that all the ailments that
inflict the general media market will manifest in the ACS content market
as well, thus leading to the reappearance of today's concerns of concentration and imbalance. In the next few paragraphs I will explain why.
As mentioned,22 7 the ACS content market will feature many intermediaries, which will all offer content "consumers" lists of recommended forms of content. The key question, however, is which intermediaries will the public choose to trust and entrust with their valuable attention span, and what will the trends of "intermediary selection" resem-

225.
226.

Id. at 238.
This notion was mentioned by Volokh with regard to the broader Internet context. See

Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.
227.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.

1805, 1815-16 (1995).
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ble. Based on similar instances occurring in other media markets,2 28 I
assume that most of the public will focus on and flock to a limited number of intermediaries. The public will demonstrate a trend of concentration on a limited number of resources. These trends, in turn, will provide
the "popular" intermediaries with a great deal of power. Moreover, I will
argue below that there is a good chance that these "popular" intermediaries will be an extension of the same powerful conglomerates that dominate today's content industry. Thus again leading to the reemergence of
various concerns.
Let us begin with the future trends of "intermediary selection."
Clearly, in the ACS model, almost anyone could become a self appointed
intermediary. However, as recent work in the fields of sociology and
network theory indicates, human attention tends to be concentrated, and
masses tend to focus most of their attention on a very limited number of
resources, for a variety of reasons I need not address here. 229 In other
words, human attention tends to be distributed according to a "power
law," rather than equality among various outputs available. This is best
demonstrated by recent studies concerning the Internet. While the Internet allows almost anyone to set up a website that is accessible world
wide, various analyses of online content consumption, market structure,
and even link structure lead to the somewhat surprising result-the Internet is turning out to be as concentrated as other forms of media (even
though the physical barriers to entry are considerably lower). This concentration is expressed in the overwhelming share of a limited number of
entities in the revenues the online market generates, 230 the attention users
pay to websites, 231 and the number of incoming links other websites post
on their pages.232 These studies show that the Internet content market is
demonstrating interesting trends of concentration that lead to high barriers to entry and new hubs of power. They also show that in today's
online realm it is quite difficult for an independent website to gain a
dominant market position, even though the barriers to entry were assumed to be very low. While we are constantly confronted with anecdotal stories of blogs, video clips and songs that start out in the author's
garage and reach a very broad audience, these are still exceptions to the
228.
229.

See infra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
On these issues, see DUNCAN J. WATTS, Six DEGREES (2003); ALBERT-LASZL6

BARABASI, LINKED (2002).

230.
Eli M. Noam, The Internet: Still Wide Open and Competitive?, TPRC (2003),
http://tprc.org/papers/2003/200/noamTPRC2003.pdf.
231.
See BENKLER, supra note 33, at 238. For a study proving this assertion in the limited
context of blogging, see Shirky: Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality,
http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw-weblog.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
232.
See Matthew Hindman, Kostas Tsioutsiouliklis, Judy A. Johnson, Googlearchy: How a
Few

Heavily-Linked

Sites

Dominate

Politics

on

the

Web

(2003),

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-kt/mpsa03.pdf. Benider sums up these empirical studies.
See
BENKLER, supra note 33, at 238-40. However, Bender (in the context of the mass media in general)
does not believe that the Internet displays or leads to over-concentration, but is just right. Id.
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overall trend and pattern of content consumption online. 3 The market is
mostly dominated by a selected few (the identities of which we will soon
address).
Superimposing these theories and concrete findings on the issues at
hand leads to the conclusion that the world of content intermediaries in
the ACS content market will probably prove to be no exception. Most of
the users (especially those lacking sophistication) will flock in great
numbers to a limited set of intermediaries, who will dominate the "attention" market. Once the dominance of these intermediaries would be established, it would be quite difficult to penetrate this closed circle. At
this point, these intermediaries will command a great deal of power over
artists (and to a lesser degree, consumers).234
Next, let us give some thought as to who these intermediaries might
be (although the actual identity is of only secondary importance for forwarding this argument). Arguably, these intermediaries could be anyone
who wins the public's trust in this ever-changing medium. However,
here again a view of the Internet's trends of content consumption proves
instructive. Reviewing the lists of this medium's most popular destinations leads to a limited number of websites, which include several websites which were founded early on and therefore enjoyed a "first mover"
advantage.235 However it mostly includes websites affiliated with renowned brands of the offline media world (such as Time Warner, Disney
and Microsoft).2 36 The success of these websites could be explained by
these firms' ability to leverage their success and position in other media
markets towards domination in the Internet medium as well. Such leveraging is achieved while making use of their capital, brand, and goodwill
as well as their ability to divert the attention of their audiences in other
media towards their online presence.2 37
Again, let us return to the ACS model. Here, it is fair to assume,
these dominant intermediaries would be able to leverage their dominance
in other media as well. However, an important caveat is in order: in the
"general" online context, the media conglomerates were able to assure
their online dominance by capitalizing on their vast content inventory
which they control through intellectual property laws and are already
233.
C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration:Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839,
895-97 (2002).
234.
For instance, see BATTELLE, supra note 161, at 153-59, for examples of the power of
Google as an intermediary. Battelle demonstartes that if excluded from Google's results this might

cause a devastating outcome for the excluded party.
235.
Ebay, Yahoo! and Amazon.com are examples of such websites. See BENKLER, supra note
33, at 245-46, for conflicting studies regarding the role and dominance of first-mover websites
online.
236.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 213, at 221 (relying upon a study by the ColumbiaJournalism Review).
237. Id. at 177-83, 221-27.
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known to the public. By presenting such content exclusively on their
new websites, they were able to attract Internet traffic and attention. In
the ACS model, such leverage would not be possible, as any other intermediary would be permitted to recommend, present, and link to the content of others. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether these media conglomerates could gain dominance in the ACS media market while relying
on their offline goodwill and trademarked brand alone.
The notion that the Internet would become a concentrated medium
that will allow (and according to the above mentioned studies, indeed
allows) many offline media conglomerates to maintain their strong market position is far from novel. Already in 2000, in an insightful article,
Professor Netanel pointed out that the Internet medium will not lead to
an overall restructuring of the media market power balance, but would
facilitate the continued dominance of the major media conglomerates in
this new medium, for the reasons mentioned above.23 8 I believe this
analysis should be applied to the narrower context of the ACS model as
well, which will share many of the attributes of the broader online context, and lead to similar forms of concentration.
Finally, we reach the third tier of the critique as to the role of intermediaries in the ACS content market, which stems from the previous
two; if merely few intermediaries will command the access to the majority of consumers, then the actual barrier of entry to this new content market will remain extremely high for upcoming artists. These artists can
post their materials online, or integrate them into the file-swapping networks. Yet if the majority of public attention is focused on the content
specific intermediaries recommend (which might be early movers, or the
"good-old" media conglomerates), artists will only reach true fame and
compensation if selected and endorsed by these powerful intermediaries.
Therefore, the actual change in the balance between the media conglomerates and artists might not occur. It is quite possible that upcoming artists would still be forced to sign one-sided agreements with the dominate
ACS intermediaries in order to gain name recognition to the extent that
would lead to substantial compensation (in what would resemble the
infamous payola scheme which often exists between artists and radio
stations).23 9
c. Possible Solutions
For ACS to indeed weaken the position of dominate intermediaries
(which, as I explained, might be the same ones we have today), the

238.
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REv. 395, 440-41,463-65 (2000).

239.
As explained above, a substantial level of usage is required to reach high levels of compensation. See supra Part IV.A. Therefore, given the immense competition these markets will
demonstrate, the role of these intermediaries will be as important as ever.
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model must include additional elements. One somewhat aggressive solution might call for regulatory intervention requiring dominant content
intermediaries to carry all forms of content equally and without discrimination, as well as regulatory steps to assure that dominant firms in other
240
media would not move to take over the online distribution market.
However, the chances such solutions would be accepted are slim, as they
will meet fierce objections. They would especially meet the objection of
the media conglomerates' representatives (that have demonstrated their
ability to influence legislators and assure their interests remain secure)
while arguing that such regulation impedes upon the rights of these content firms to engage in free and unregulated speech.
Beyond the regulatory solution, I suggest that the strengthening of
the artists' position in the ACS realm is achievable by researching, developing, flnding, promoting, and maintaining alternative means to distribute content when shifting to the ACS model (in addition to the measures put in place to achieve proper compensation). One possible option
mentioned calls for reliance upon various sites that provide ranking and
sorting that are formulated in a "bottom-up" process; in other words,
users (working in collaboration) would both classify the many forms of
content available online, and rank them according to their subjective
liking.24 ' The advantage of these forms of recommendations mechanisms, also currently referred to as "folksonomies, ' '242 is that they do not
reflect the preferences of one central intermediary (that might have specific interests), but thousands of individuals. 243 In other words, this is a
"many-to-many" process.
Folksonomies are coming into existence through several websites
that allow users to sort and rank various forms of information, including
content. This new concept is currently being closely examined by academics and businesspeople. At this time, however, I am somewhat skep240.
Fisher addresses a similar option in drawing out a possible broad alternative solution to
the challenges of digital copyright-which includes an extensive regulatory framework to promote
content creation. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 186-98. However, such proposals are usually struck
down because of the overall aversion to governmental intervention in the regulation of content
markets (which at times could be understood as impediments on the free speech rights of various
market actors). Id.
241.
See Thomas Vander Wal, UnderstandingFolksonomy (Tagging that Works) (2006),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/2006presentations/dconstruct/TagginginRW.pdf.
Vander Wal coined
the term "folksonomy" to describe this "bottom-up" process. See id.
242.
For more on this term that is used for bottom-up processes used for sorting and ranking,
see http://www.answers.com/topic/folksonomy. For a current critique of this model's problems by
Clay Shirky, see Clay Shirky, Folksonomy, MANY 2 MANY, Aug. 25, 2004, available at

http://many.corante.com/archives/2004/08/25/folksonomy.php.
As mentioned, this dynamic has
been addressed by Benkler. BENKLER, supra note 33, at 76-80. For a somewhat critical view of
these dynamics, see STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE 159-62 (2002).
243.
Fisher refers to the use of such distribution methods, not in the context of the mandatory
ACS model, but of the voluntary "coop" one. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 254-55. Although he
praises this model (while referring to Benkler's work regarding Slashdot.com), he does not see its
endorsement as part of the ACS, nor discuss its shortcomings or ways it could be promoted. Id.
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tical whether these dynamics, will counter the concerns voiced above.
Although this dynamic seems to reflect a grass roots movement of sorting and ranking, it could be manipulated by powerful interest groups,
which would promote specific forms of content, while again leaving independent and unaffiliated artists outside the loop. This would lead to
the resurfacing of the problems addressed above, and the creation of a
high barrier to entry on the one hand, and an unattractive intermediary on
the other.2 "
This skepticism regarding the role of folksonomies stems from my
belief that they could be tainted and manipulated in various ways. First,
they could be subjected to gaming by external entities, which will rely on
many of the dynamics addressed above to generate results that are favorable to their clients. Artists with financial or other backing would be
able to apply various technological means to simulate broad satisfaction
with their content that would lead to a high ranking. Thus, the fact that
this is a "many-to-many" medium can turn out to be a weakness. Folksonomies could be gamed by internal entities as well; in other words, the
apparently-neutral entities running the ranking and sorting websites
might be overtaken by a large media conglomerate that would secretly or
actively promote "their" artists throughout the various rankings, regardless of the "bottom-up" process. To those who believe these predictions
are somewhat pessimistic, I merely mention the growing interest among
today's large media conglomerates and moguls in social network websites which generate folksonomies of their own. Recently, News Corporation (News Corp.) has purchased the extremely popular MySpace.com
website, which has become a successful platform for launching and distributing new forms of music through a sophisticated recommendation
and accreditation system. While News Corp.'s plans and intentions for
MySpace are unclear, the potential risk for the "contamination" of the
bottom-up
process to meet the objectives of the media moguls is appar24 5
ent.
Could the problems and threats to this form of distribution be resolved? Possibly. But to do so will require additional research regarding
these issues-research that should be funded by the ACS fund (that is
funded by the levy described above) should the model be implemented.
In addition, the fund should finance non-affiliated folksonomy sites,

244.
Benkler frames this concern as the fear that "money" would still allow specific entities to
buy their way into a dominant market position in the connected world (note that Benkler concludes
that the end of the day this problem is substantially mitigated in the Internet medium). BENKLER,
supra note 33, at 234.
245.
See Steve Rosenbush, News Corp.'s Place in MySpace, BUSNESSWEEK ONLINE, July 19,
2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/contentjul2005/tc20050719 5427_
tc 119.htm. Note that News Corp. is still cautious about the ways in which it would use this new
addition to its group, yet already mentions the use of this tool to promote its own content. Id.
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which will provide limited incentives to the sorters and rankers, while
assuring that these mechanisms remain untainted.
Another possible option for content distribution in the ACS content
market, which would not lead to the unnecessary empowerment of intermediaries (be them new or old), is of content distribution among
smaller circles of users who belong to virtual communities. Here, as
opposed to the dynamic mentioned above, I refer to one that could be
defined as "few-to-few" and therefore somewhat insulated from the disadvantages inflicting the broader folksonomies.246 Within these communities, members could inform others of various forms of content they
have "stumbled upon" online, and which they could recommend to other
community members. Such a recommendation will carry merit as it is
both made by a community member whom has earned the other members' trust in the past, and who they know has preferences and tastes that
are similar to their own. As Eben Moglen has pointed out long ago, this
distribution model will allow for the very quick spreading of content and
ideas, while taking full advantage of the Internet's robust and worldwide
network.24 7 Clearly this distribution model sharply differs from content
distribution in the offline world that has been mostly premised on the
"broadcast" or "one to many" model, according to which one central
source sets out to meet the preferences and tastes of a very broad audience. This model could supplement or even substitute other models that
rely on "central" intermediaries that provide general recommendations to
the broad public (that could result from both a top-down and a bottom-up
process).
The Internet allows for this alternative model for content distribution to transpire while making use of communities that are created online
and convene in several possible settings (such as chat rooms, mail-lists,
forums and others) 248 that are referred to as "social software. 2 49 These
communities, of various sizes, are formulated to address or discuss specific, yet mutual topics, which could be related to hobbies, work,
neighborhood, and past experiences 250 or are premised on a common trait

246.
Clearly the empirical question that lurks in the midst concerns the line between a mere
"community" to an overall "many-to-many" folksonomy. I will not address this matter here and
leave it for future research, yet mention that many of the benefits of the "community" come from
both a feeling of intimacy and familiarity with the other community members (notions that are
absent on the broader scale). The question, as to the point at which such intimacy and familiarity
disappear is an extremely difficult one. For this issue, I would use the definition adopted by
Benkler--"larger than a dozen, smaller than a few hundred."
247.
See Eben Moglen, Comment: Liberation Musicology, THE NATION, Feb. 22, 2001, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010312/moglen.
248.
See BENKLER, supra note 33, at 357 (explaining that the Internet is creating many new
looser social networks.
249.
See id.
at 373.
250. Id.at 368.
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or attribute of all the participants. 25' The dynamics of these virtual
communities have led to several astounding accomplishments, such as
the creation of elaborate software tools and detailed content repositories-and all without a "classic" top-down structure.252 In addition, the
Internet is filled with anecdotal examples of various works that gained
worldwide exposure and fame after being passed on through word of
mouth.25 3
This form of distribution carries numerous benefits. Because of its
diffused nature, it does not support the creation of a small yet powerful
group of intermediaries which have an overall grip over a large portion
of society, and as such could leverage their power towards the artists and
consumers. Therefore the existence of content distribution within these
communities could mitigate concerns of overpowering intermediaries in
the ACS model. 4 In addition, the diffused nature of this model makes it
considerably harder to game. Within these communities members
"know" the others by their specific reputation, and therefore are less
prone to manipulation by external or internal forces.255 For these reasons, I believe this form of content distribution is preferable to the use of
the folksonomies mentioned above.
However, content distribution through the use of such virtual communities is not a concept without challenges and problems. This field as
well has generated an enormous amount of recent scholarship, which
addresses these issues. A problem that is constantly mentioned when
addressing these dynamics is that of motivation 256 : How can society motivate individuals to partake in the community dynamic, and in that way
both contribute recommendations and receive feedback within these circles? Clearly participation and motivation to participate are key elements, as without them, consumers will revert to the "customary" modes
of content consumption (and collecting information about such content)
251.
For a recent survey as to these various realms, see James Scott & Thomas Johnson,
Bowling Alone But Online Together: Social Capital in E-Communities, 36 J. COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY 9 (2005).

252.
For instance the free software movement that led to the development of Linux. On this
issue and for additional examples, see BENKLER, supra note 33, at 59-74.
253.
For example the famous "JibJab" cartoons. See Funny Videos, Pictures & Jokes at JibJab.com, http://www.jibjab.com (last visited October 25, 2006).
254.
Benkler makes a similar argument with regard to the broader, Internet context. See
BENKLER, supra note 33, at 255. In other words, he argues that a "thin tail" of user traffic in peer-topeer and other social networks mitigates many of the troubles of media concentration online. Id.
255.
Recent scholarship indeed indicates that "successful communities" include users who
provide personal information about themselves, and in that way contribute to their reputation and the
accreditation of the content they convey. See Chris Forman, Anindya Ghose & Batia Wiesenfeld, A
Multi-Level Examination of the Impact of Social Identities on Economic Transactions in Electronic
Markets (July 2006), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=918978.
256.
On these issues, see the work of Paul Resnick which presents several projects and papers
on the issue of motivation in this context.
See generally Paul Resnick's Home Page,
http://www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
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with all their shortcomings. Another problem arising in this context is
gaming within these circles. Namely, the fear that interested parties
would penetrate these communities, and provide recommendations that
appear trustworthy, yet reflect the actions of interested parties and are
financed by well-to-do artists and their intermediaries. Regarding this
last issue, there is some hope, as recent experiences with recommendation systems in the e-commerce context show great progress in overcoming this difficulty. These sites, as well as other virtual communities,
have been struggling with the challenge of identifying fraudulent recommendations and have begun to learn to neutralize them.257
In view of the advantages of content distribution through virtual
communities, I believe the implementation of the ACS model must include measures to strengthen this mode of distribution. One way to
achieve this is by subsidizing (again, from the ACS fund collected
through the abovementioned levy) computer equipment, support, and
other related expenses for community centers and other not-for-profit
organizations, to promote the formation of online mechanisms which will
facilitate these social networks. Such a subsidy will assure these social
networks will not be connected to any commercial entity that might taint
the content distribution process. Other funds could be used to motivate
participants in these communities by providing limited prizes. Yet
clearly additional research is required to establish other ways to achieve
this objective.
In conclusion of this article's analysis as to the role and power of intermediaries, the shift to the ACS model must also include an examination as to how content would be distributed in a market operating in accordance to this model. This analysis must look into ways to promote
distribution through alternative platforms and networks. It must also
examine whether these platforms and networks will prove to be broad
and robust enough to effectively compete and even replace the distribution mechanisms controlled by today's media conglomerates. Only by
specifically addressing distribution, could the ACS model meet its important objective of realigning the power balance between artists, intermediaries and consumers.
3. The Outcome of the Model-Content and Content Producers
Beyond the model's effects on the media market and its intermediaries, the shift to the ACS model might profoundly change the consumption patterns of content online. These changes in consumption patterns
will be followed by changes in the compensation authors, performers,
and artists receive for creating such content. These last changes, in turn,
257.
For example, Ebay has enhanced its actions against those manipulating vendors' feedback. See EBAY, Frequently Asked Questions: Feedback Manipulation Policy, available at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/announcement/22.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
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will presumably lead to changes in the content which is produced by the
market. 258 In the following paragraphs I examine these changes and their
possible adverse effects on society. Thereafter, I suggest several
amendments to the model to avoid these problematic effects, some of
which resemble the alternative distribution mechanism that were mentioned above in a different context.
A key element to this part of the analysis is an assumption that not
only will the ACS model be accepted for governing the compensation for
content use online, but that this model's grasp will reach beyond this
limited realm and pertain to a significant amount of all content consumption. This assumption is required, as should this not be the case, authors
and artists will continue to receive compensation through today's conventional channels. These other media channels (such as retail, TV, etc.)
will not be affected by the new ACS and dynamics it creates, and would
offset the specific market and social forces of the online model. This
underlying assumption regarding the breadth of ACS is not far fetched;
the Internet is hardly a confined universe of content use and consumption. Today users download music, and through burned CDs or other
portable devices enjoy this content when they are away from their computers. Clearly, in the very near future, the shift of content from the
online world to the offline world (as well as vice versa) would be seamless, and the technical challenges of shifting and streaming video content
from computers to TV sets will be resolved.25 9 With the abundance of
free and high quality content available online (through the ACS model),
it is fair to assume that with time, this realm would become a hub of content exchange and a prime source of compensation for artists. It is at this
point of time where this segment of the analysis will turn relevant. However, as identifying this point of time would be difficult and applying
changes to the ACS model at a late stage costly and complex, I believe
these matters are best discussed and addressed at the early stage of planning the model, as I do now.
In the following paragraphs, I argue that the switch to the ACS
model will generate changes in the consumption pattern of consumers.260
The reason for such changes will be additional limitations and pressures
to be set on the users' attention span upon consuming content. These
258.
This argument is premised on the notion that artists, when deciding what form of content
to create, take into account the amount of profit they might reap from its subsequent sale. Not all
take this notion as a given. See Litman, supra note 15, at 28; Moglen, supra note 26.
259.
Bob Zitter, Time Warner, Summit on Intellectual Property and Digital Media Conference,
The Cable Center, University of Denver (May 22, 2006). Apple has recently announced it is developing the "iTV"-an application that would bridge the PC and the TV with ease, thus resolving the
challenge mentioned in the text. See Nick Wingfield & Merissa Marr, Apple ComputerAims to Take
Over Your Living-Room TV, WALL ST. J., at BI (Sept. 13, 2006).
260.
Fisher generally acknowledges that with the shift to the ACS model, such changes might
occur, but does not elaborate as to their nature or their subsequent effects. FISHER, supra note 5, at
237.
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pressures will come with the adoption of the ACS model, which will
present users with many millions of content options online, at a marginal
cost of zero. Such a variety provided to consumers with no financial
constraints, would possibly create a tendency to engage in constant "flipping;" mercilessly skipping from one form of content to another at the
moment they are displeased with what they are receiving. Such behavior
would resemble television viewing in a multi-channel medium, which
offers thousands of channels to viewers with only limited time and attention span. In this latter example, many viewers indeed respond to this
variety by engaging in constant "flipping" switching from one channel to
another.
Such enhanced "flipping" behavior online could have several outcomes. At first, it might allow content consumers to become more demanding in their pursuit of quality content, and less willing to settle for
mediocre products. Thus, content that rises to the top of the "most
watched and listened to" list would be better than the content that is at
the top in today's market dynamic. This point could be strengthened by
a recent controversial study comparing prime time television programs of
today and those shown in previous decades. 261 This study argues that
some of today's leading television programming introduces shows with
many interweaving story lines, intelligent writing, and thicker and more
intense plots. Given the fact that deciding upon the quality of such content products is an extremely subjective task, these factors might objectively indicate that indeed the content available has improved substantially. One possible reason for this improvement could be the intense
competition for the consumers' attention in a multi-channel age.
Yet the users' limited attention span, and the "flipping" phenomenon may have an adverse affect as well. This adverse effect concerns
forms of content that are of social significance, yet are only fully appreciated after being experienced, watched, or heard in their entirety and
perhaps even only after several such "experiences." I will refer to these
works as "Masterpieces. 262
In a cultural environment that allows for constant "flipping" between forms of content that are all available at marginal cost of zero, it
could be assumed that users will not provide Masterpieces the second
and third chances that are required for their full appreciation. Therefore,
the depth and genius of these works will not be recognized and acknowledged. Rather, users will immediately switch to other forms of content
that would satisfy their immediate "needs" for entertainment and leisure.
261.
For this analysis, see STEVEN JOHNSON, EVERYTHING BAD IS GOOD FOR You 62-116
(2005).
262. Clearly this definition does not comply with the common definition of such works. In
addition, there are, of course, many examples of great works of art which have immediately achieved
commercial success and broad public appreciation.
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Should this dynamic take place, it could generate the following chain
reaction: Users and consumers will not acknowledge the existence and
value of such works, and therefore will not review these forms of content
in their entirety (which, as mentioned above is a prerequisite for generating compensation to the authors in view of "gaming" concerns), nor return to them at a later time. In addition, they would not mention the existence of such works to their peers and friends (while acting as intermediaries in the various networks and structures mentioned above) who
would therefore not learn of these works and refrain from their usage.
Thereafter, authors and creators of such Masterpieces will suffer a drop
in the compensation they receive in an ACS-governed market. Finally,
content producers will choose to under-produce these forms of content
(or Masterpieces) in view of the limited compensation they will reap.
This, in turn, would harm society in general, which would now be deprived of important cultural resources.26 3
It is interesting to note, as a comparison, that today's model for
compensation (in which users directly compensate authors, usually in
advance, for access to content) provides for a more supportive environment for Masterpieces and their authors. Here, the authors of such works
might gain access to the market by receiving support from a large media
conglomerate that attends to funding and distribution after deciding to
promote this specific artist and her work (to meet personal, social or even
financial objectives). 26 Consumers, who would purchase such works
(acting upon the recommendation of the media conglomerates in their
capacity as content intermediaries) would be more willing to experience
such works in their entirety and perhaps even several times. This is because they have already paid for such content, and would be willing to
devote more time to it,265 to justify (in their eyes, at least) such past expenditures. They will also do so, because alternative forms of content
(which must be directly purchased) are scarce. A result of devoting time
263.
As mentioned above, this part of the analysis is somewhat shaky, as it is based on a problematic premise-that the authors of Masterpieces are indeed motivated by the level of compensation they are likely to reap. Those disagreeing with this argument might further argue that in this
context, authors of Masterpieces rarely take into account the success of their writing, and are lead by
other intrinsic or extrinsic incentives (and many of which rarely receive meaningful compensation
for such works during their lifetime). I would argue, that at least some authors of Masterpieces are
not motivated by internal incentives alone, and therefore this discussion is at least somewhat relevant.
264.
See Baker, supra note 233, at 878. Baker explains that in the publishing context, publishers have been known to invest their profits from lucrative publications in important projects that will
probably not make them any money. However, he also explains that these practices are quickly
disappearing as this business as well is becoming "bottom line" oriented. On this issue, see also
Andre Schiffrin, THE BUSiNESS OF BOOKS: How INTERNATIONAL CONGLOMERATES TOOK OVER
PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY WE READ 91, 95, 108 (2000).

265.
My assumption stated in the text as to the consumers willingness to allocate more time
and attention resources to products they have already purchased and paid for relies on the "Sunk
Costs Fallacy" -a cognitive phenomenon, according to which individuals want to cut their losses,
but continue to engage in actions that allow them to capitalize on costs they already incurred. For
more on this phenomenon, see Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk cost fallacy.
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to this work would be the users' ability to recognize the true value of the
Masterpieces and thereafter revisit such content and recommend it to
others (who would go ahead and purchase such content). This, in turn,
will provide for additional compensation to the Masterpiece right holders.
Yet the challenges the ACS model presents to the compensation for
and production of Masterpieces might be countered by several advantages this model has in store; advantages that arise from the model's distribution dynamics. The ACS models can easily integrate and promote
content distribution networks that employ small groups congregating
online, and allow for the quick and efficient diffusion of ideas and content between people with a common interest and in many cases similar
traits and preferences.266 These "virtual communities" can prove a fertile
ground for effectively distributing information about Masterpieces in a
dynamic that could overcome the "flipping" threat addressed above.
This is because, within such a community, members recommend to each
other works they believe will meet their specific taste and liking. Within
these circles, it is fair to assume that users would be willing to accept
recommendations and act upon them, even if this would mean resisting
the "temptation" to flip to another form of content if the recommended
work seems at first unsatisfactory. They will do so because users would
learn from experience that recommendations given within these systems
will prove worthy of their time and attention--even though at first glance
they might not appear as such. In addition, within these secluded circles,
members will know a great deal about each other-a factor that would
contribute to the effectiveness of the recommendation.267
The notion of distributing information regarding Masterpieces
through social networks is of course far from novel-and is probably one
of the main ways in which information regarding these forms of content
travels. However, the online social networks include several important
improvements and advantages: They allow for the creation of broader
and richer communities that are not hindered by geographical distances
and bring together people with common interest from very different
backgrounds. Furthermore, in a market operating according to the ACS
model, such networks not only can recommend the work but provide it
directly, either by linking or allowing downloading.
Therefore, to sum up this point, examining the possible effects of
the ACS model on the creation of Masterpieces provides us with an addi-

266.
In many cases, this common interest is the reason for the creation of the online forum or
community (for instance, a recommendation on a new jazz album in ajazz-fan forum). In others, the
common interests might be incidental (for instance, a neighborhood forum, in which one neighbor
who know the others well, recommends a book she believes they will appreciate).
267.
See Forman, Ghose & Wiesenfeld, supra note 255 (discussing the importance of personal
information regarding participants to the success of the internal dynamics of virtual communities).
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tional reason as to why the implementation of the ACS model should
include tools, funds, and applications that would promote social online
networks. With such robust networks, the potential damages the pressure
and limitation on the users' attention cause Masterpiece production,
could be substantially mitigated.
However, with the implementation of the ACS model, policy makers must remain alert and constantly examine whether this model facilitates sufficient exposure, consumption, and thereafter, production of
Masterpieces. Should this new marketplace lead to underproduction of
Masterpieces, policymakers must consider promoting the production of
such works using other, more direct measures. For instance, the administrative agency could be required to set aside limited sums from the overall, levy-financed, fund. These sums could be than used towards the
direct promotion of Masterpiece production, by providing prizes for extraordinary works and scholarships for their authors. This dynamic has
indeed been suggested (for other reasons) by some of the ACS scholars.268 It is also commonly applied in Europe with regard to the funds
collected
via levies to compensate artists for non-authorized personal
9

uses.

26

Clearly this last suggestion presents several shortcomings. The
funds and scholarships mentioned will be distributed by a committee of
"experts" that might be biased, engage in elitism and paternalism when
deciding what does and does not amount to a Masterpiece worth financing and promoting. The famous controversies surrounding the National
Endowment for the Arts would surely be echoed,27 ° with all their political implications, as politicians decide what form of content is worthy of
public funding. However, in specific instances, this partial solution will
indeed be required in order to allow the sponsoring of Masterpieces,
which might be lost as a result of the contemplated shifts in compensation policy and trends of content consumption.
CONCLUSION

In this article, I chose to address and contribute to a new line of
scholarship that offers an interesting policy solution to the difficult challenges of today's digital content market. The ACS scholars have drawn

268.
See Lunney, supra note 15, at 915-16. (arguing for such allocation from the fund to provide to marginalized artists). But see Netanel, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that such practices should
be limited, as they might lead to "rent seeking"). I agree with Netanel's overall concern, but disagree with his result given my analysis of Masterpiece consumption above.
269.
See HUGENHOLTZ, GUIBAULT, & GEFFEN, supra note 129, at 68-69 (summarizing the
states that allocate some of the funds to a "social fund").
270.
FISHER, supra note 5, at 217. For more information regarding the case law and controversy
this
fund
involved,
see
Freedom
of
Expression
at
NEA,
http://www.csulb.edu/-jvancamp/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
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out an elaborate and thoughtful blueprint for an extensive and innovative
model. I have attempted to continue this line of scholarship by sharpening issues that remain open, pointing out some matters that require additional thought and analysis and examining others that should be somewhat changed. I have emphasized the need to develop mechanisms for
content distribution (in addition to those focused on compensation) and
mentioned several existing online models that might be fitting for the
task.
Yet, at the end of the day, I assume that many readers will still remain unconvinced by the arguments set forth and maintain their position
that the implementation of an ACS model (even with the improvements
suggested herewith) is politically, technologically, or economically infeasible. To these readers, I say that the journey this article draws out
was not traveled in vain. The analysis conducted above has taught us
important lessons regarding the business and policy implications of the
development of new technological tools in an ever-changing content
market. These lessons will prove fruitful when facing future challenges
that will be sure to arise in the Internet society.

DISPUTED-CONSENT SEARCHES: AN UNCHARACTERISTIC

STEP TowARD REINFORCING DEFENDANTS' PRIVACY
RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects citizens'
rights to privacy by prohibiting unreasonable government searches and
seizures.' Government officials, however, may overcome this barrier by
obtaining a warrant based upon probable cause.2 Courts assess probable
cause through a totality of the circumstances approach that, in order for a
finding, requires information sufficient to justify a reasonably prudent
individual in believing that an offense has been committed. In general,
a person claiming a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights
must satisfy two requirements. First, that individual must prove that a
search or seizure actually occurred within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 4 Second, the person must show that the search or seizure
violated reasonableness. 5 Failure to establish both requirements destroys
any Fourth Amendment claim. However, the warrant requirement embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not unconditional, and several exceptions exist which may allow police officers to engage in a warrantless
search. Specifically, exceptions include: searches incident to a lawful

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Id; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The FourthAmendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 53, 54-65 (1996) (providing a general discussion of the Fourth
Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (explaining further that
probable cause is a practical, non-technical consideration based on the everyday observations of
reasonable people).
4.

See, e.g., PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIzuRE LAW: A

FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 10-12 (2005) (explaining that standing requires a showing that 1)
the complaining party's privacy right is at issue, 2) a government agent conducted the search or
seizure, and 3) the search or seizure was of the party's person, house, paper, or effects).
5.
Id. at 167 (explaining that unreasonableness determinations require a balancing of the
degree and nature of intrusiveness against the weight of the government interest served by the search
or seizure); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (stating generally that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions").
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arrest,6 searches made under exigent circumstances,9 7 moving vehicle
searches, 8 and searches made upon voluntary consent.
This comment addresses the voluntary consent exception to the warrant requirement, as applied in the recent Georgia v. Randolph ° decision. Initially, the Supreme Court qualified the consent exception as
applicable against the individual who provided consent to police. I"
However, soon thereafter, the Court verified the legitimacy of consent
given by a third party, holding that any person reasonably presumed to
possess common authority over the premises could consent to a warrantless search.' 2 Specifically, the Court upheld the lawfulness of a
search made pursuant to consent given by a present occupant against the
subsequent objection of the absent nonconsenting co-occupant. 13 Although these cases were instructive for interpreting the consent exception
when the nonconsenting party was absent, the Court did not address the
constitutionality of a warrantless search when two or more present cooccupants disagreed as to whether police could enter. Tellingly, lower
courts across the nation facing this issue reached opposite holdings concerning the validity of disputed consent searches based on differing interpretations of the relevant Supreme Court precedents. 14
Spurred by this unsettling disparity, the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue in Georgia v. Randolph. 15 In Part I, this comment will
provide an overview of the relevant Supreme Court decisions that evaluate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as it relates to the voluntary consent exception. Part II will review the majority, concurring, and
6.
E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that "it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.").
7.
E.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973) (defining exigent circumstances as
those that would endanger the lives of the responding officers, or of others, in the absence of a
timely investigation).
8.
E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-58 (1925) (permitting warrantless
searches of moving vehicles if probable cause suggests the vehicle contains contraband, instruments
of a crime, or evidence of a crime).
9. E.g. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (permitting warrantless
searches without probable cause when express or implied consent is given).
10.
126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
11.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243-45 (stating, however, that under some circumstances a third
party may give lawful consent).
12.
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that a co-occupant possessing common authority over the home may consent to a police search against another occupant of
that home, even in spite of that absent, nonconsenting party's refusal); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (holding that whether the occupant truly possesses common authority
over the premises is immaterial in determining the legality of the consent given; instead, the only
consideration courts must address is whether police were objectively reasonable in thinking that
individual possessed common authority).
13.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.
14.
ComparePrimus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a search
of Defendant's premises upon consent of his roommate was valid despite the defendant's presence),
with State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a search of Defendant's home
upon consent of his wife, but in his presence and with his clear refusal, was invalid).
15.
Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1528 (2006).
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dissenting opinions in Georgia v. Randolph. 16 Finally, Part III will analyze the Court's decision by focusing on: 1) the practical implications of
the decision, specifically with regard to the inherent conflict between
personal privacy and law enforcement, 2) the holding's place within the
established jurisprudential trend of limiting privacy through the thirdparty consent legal standard, 3) the benefits and latent costs of the logic
employed in the Randolph opinion, and 4) potential solutions available
for addressing the problems likely to arise in the decision's aftermath.
Ultimately, this comment will conclude that Randolph occupies a position of limited authority because its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment applies only to the rare situation in which multiple, present cooccupants disagree on the issue of consent. Further, it will be suggested
that the Randolph holding encourages police to circumvent the protective
nature of the holding. And finally, this comment will suggest that
Randolph is likely to generate confusion amongst lower courts and law
enforcement agents, because it is presently unclear whether the holding
signals a reversal of the Court's view of Fourth Amendment searches, or
merely a deviation from a viable trend.
I. BACKGROUND

Among the several exceptions to the warrant requirement, investigating officers find the voluntary consent exception particularly attractive as an alternative to obtaining a warrant.1 7 This is true for several
reasons. First and foremost, police often seek consent from a suspect
because it permits entry in situations where probable cause does not exist
to substantiate a warrant. 18 Further, even when probable cause does exist, consent searches function as an instrument of convenience that police
can use to skirt the burdensome process of obtaining a warrant.19 This
factor is particularly true when police would otherwise have to travel
long distances to acquire a warrant. 20 Last, officers often prefer consent
searches in lieu of a warrant because the scope of a permissible search
may extend to areas it likely would not reach under the auspices of a
warrant.2'

16.

Id.at 1515-43.

17.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 250

(4th ed. 2004) (stating that "[t]he practice of making searches based on consent is by no means a
disfavored one.").
18.

See WAYNE

R. LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT 5 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that the scope of a consent search is frequently broader
than the scope of a search justified by a warrant, because the consenting party rarely conditions or
qualifies the scope of consent).
19.
See id. at 4-5.
20.
See id. at 5.
21.
See id. (explaining that the objectively reasonable scope of a consent search is frequently
broader than that justified by a search warrant, because the consenting party rarely conditions or
qualifies the scope of consent).
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The general rule governing the voluntary consent exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement holds that the consenting individual must give permission voluntarily and under non-coercive circumstances.2 2 Courts regularly uphold both written and verbal consent,
whether given pursuant to a police request, or of the suspect's own volition. And further, the Supreme Court has upheld the lawfulness of consent searches even under circumstances in which the suspect is not aware
of the right to refuse,23 as well as situations where police have already
taken the suspect into custody. 24 In addition to the requirement that consent to a police search be given voluntarily, these searches are limited in
scope by a standard of "objective reasonableness." 25 Specifically, "objective reasonableness" evaluates what a reasonable person would understand the scope of consent to include after considering the interchange
between the officer and the suspect. 6 The Supreme Court has addressed
the voluntary consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement on several occasions. 27 Those decisions are briefly characterized here.
A. Reasonablenessas the Standard
In Stoner v. California,8 the Court considered whether a hotel clerk
could lawfully provide police with consent to search a guest's room.
Though recognizing that a clerk does possess some limited right of entry
for purposes such as cleaning or inspecting the room, the Court decided
that a hotel employee does not retain the authority to consent to a search
against the guest. 29 The Court reasoned that police have no rational
foundation to conclude that a hotel clerk possesses such authority.30
Three years later, in Katz v. United States,31 the Court elaborated on the
22.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that the prosecution has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that consent was "in fact voluntarily given and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied.").
23. Id. at 248-49 (stating, however, that a person's knowledge of the right to refuse should be
taken into account in the totality of the circumstances determination of whether the consent was
voluntary).
24.
See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976), but see Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983) (holding that, on the contrary, when consent given by a suspect unlawfully taken into custody is acted on, it should be considered involuntary and therefore in violation of
the Fourth Amendment).
25. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991).
26. Id. (referring to "area of consent" as meaning the actual physical parts of the premises that
the consenter has given the officer permission to search).
27. See generally Nancy J. Kloster, Note, An Analysis of the GradualErosion of the Fourth
Amendment Regarding Voluntary Third Party Consent Searches: The Defendant's Perspective, 72
N.D. L. REV. 99, 104-15. (1996) (providing a detailed analysis of the Court's trend in deciding cooccupant consent cases).
28.
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
29.
Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489.
30.
Id. at 488; see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961) (holding that
a landlord may not consent to a search of the home leased to a tenant, because it is not reasonable for
police to assume that a landlord possesses that authority).
31.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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meaning of "reasonableness" by holding that Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches was not confined to the home.3 2
Instead, this protection extended to all areas where the suspect enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 33 Of particular influence in subsequent cases was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion which established a
two-prong inquiry focusing on whether: 1) the suspect had a subjective
expectation 34of privacy, and 2) society would view that expectation as
reasonable.
B. Assumption of the Risk and Third Party Consent
In Frazierv. Cupp, 35 the Court upheld the legality of consent given
by a third-party based on an assumption of the risk doctrine. Specifically, the Court held that whenever two or more people jointly use an
item or place, each individual implicitly assumes the risk that the cooccupant (or co-possessor) might share that item or place with others.3 6
Two years later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,37 the Court considered
whether the husband-wife relationship supported an inference that either
spouse could consent to a search against the other. 38 Acting on the standard established in Katz, the Court determined that this relationship did
support such an inference because, unlike the situation in Stoner, it is
reasonable for police to assume that one spouse has the authority to consent to a search of the home in the other spouse's absence. 39 Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of United States
v. Matlock,40 and held that any time two or more individuals possess
"common authority" 41 over a premises, the consent of any individual
alone trumps the subsequent objection of another, absent co-occupant.4 2
In Minnesota v. Olson4 3 however, the Court upheld the privacy rights of
an overnight social guest arrested in the course of a warrantless search,
and held that houseguests have privacy rights parallel to those of occu-

32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (finding, under the factual circumstances, that this protection extended to the content of phone conversations made in a public phone booth).
33.
Id. (stating specifically that "[t]hese considerations do not vanish when the search in
question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone
booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
34.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35.
394 U.S. 731 (1969).
36.
Frazier,394 U.S. at 740 (holding that when two cousins shared use of a bag, one cousin
had authority to consent to a police search because through their joint use, both parties assumed the
risk that the other would share the contents of the bag).
37.
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
38.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 489-90.
39.
Id. at 474, 487-90.
40.
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
41.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (8th ed. 1999) (defining common-authority as: "the
principle that a person may consent to a police officer's search of another person's property if both
persons use, control, or have access to the property.").
42.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.
43.
495 U.S. 91 (1990).
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pants because "it is unlikely that [the host would] admit someone who
44
want[ed] to see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest."
C. FurtherLimiting Privacy
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,45 the Court faced the issue of
whether, in order for the search to comply with the "voluntary" requirement, 46 police were required to inform the consenting occupant of his or
her right to refuse the search. In light of the expansive view the Court
had taken with regard to warrantless searches, it unsurprisingly held that
a suspect did not have to be aware of the right to refuse the warrantless
search in order for consent to remain valid. 47 Finally, in Illinois v. Rodriguez4 8 the Court took its greatest leap yet in restricting defendants'
privacy rights. In Rodriguez, the Court considered a third-party consent
search when the individual who provided consent to police did not actually reside at the home, and had no common authority over it. 4 9 Nevertheless, the Court held that whether the third-party actually possesses
common authority over the premises is irrelevant to the determination of
the search's validity.5 ° Instead, courts must only address whether it was
objectively reasonable for police to have believed that the third-party had
common authority.51
Therefore, prior to Georgia v. Randolph, the Court established a
clear trend of gradually eroding defendants' Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, while correspondingly broadening the scope of lawful police
searches. By late 2005, an opportunity arose for the Court to address the
consent exception as it applied to multiple co-occupants possessing
common authority over the premises, but who disagreed over consent to
a police search. 52 In light of precedent, as well as the Court's trend of
limiting privacy, little hope must have remained for pro-privacy advocates seeking reinstatement of the protective measures once apparent in
the Fourth Amendment.

44.
Olson, 495 U.S. at 99.
45.
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
46.
See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (referring to the requirement that consent be given
voluntarily, and under non-coercive circumstances).
47.
Id.(holding that, as long as the consenter isn't coerced by police, the prosecution need not
show that the consenter had knowledge of his or her right to refuse in order to establish that consent
was voluntary).
48.
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
49.
See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
50. Id.at 188-89.
51.
Id. (holding that the search was valid despite the consenting third-party not having common authority, because it was objectively reasonable to assume that party had common authority
when she was holding a baby and referring to the apartment as "ours").
52.
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1520 (stating "[n]one of our co-occupant consent-to-search cases.
has presented the further fact of a second occupant physically present and refusing permission to
search").
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II. GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
A. Facts
In late May of 2001, Scott and Janet Randolph separated when
Janet, along with their son, left the family's Georgia residence and
moved to her parents' home in Canada.5 3 Janet and her son did not stay
long though, and they returned to Scott at the family's home in Georgia
within two months. 4 On the morning of July sixth, police responded to
a domestic dispute at the Randolph home. 55 When the police arrived,
Janet informed the officers that Scott had removed their son from the
home, and that he would not tell her where the child was. 56 Furthermore,
Janet informed police that Scott was a cocaine addict, and that there were
"items of drug evidence" in the home. 57 Scott proceeded to inform the
officers that he had taken the child to a neighbor's house out of fear that
Janet would leave the country with him again, and further, that it was
Janet and not he who abused drugs and alcohol. 58 After locating the
Randolph's child at the neighbor's house, the responding officers confronted Scott and Janet, both of whom were present outside the house,
and asked for consent to search the home. 59 Despite Scott's unwavering
refusal to consent, Janet gave the officers her permission to enter the
house. 60 Acting on Janet's consent, the officers entered and followed her
into an upstairs bedroom where they found a straw caked with cocaine
residue. 61
B. ProceduralHistory
Scott Randolph was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine
on the basis of the evidence obtained by the search. 62 Upon a motion to
suppress the evidence, the trial court denied Scott's motion. Specifically,
the trial court held that the search was valid because Janet had common
authority over the home, and therefore had the power to consent to the
search.63 After losing at trial, Scott appealed the ruling to the Georgia
Court of Appeals. In reviewing the decision, that court reversed the trial
court's holding, and was later upheld by the state supreme court on the
basis that "consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given
by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1519.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(referring to common authority as defined in Matlock).
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who is physically present at the scene." 64 The Georgia Supreme Court
acknowledged United States v. Matlock65 in its decision, but distinguished it because Scott Randolph was physically present to refuse consent. 66 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to evaluate the decision. It affirmed, holding that "a warrantless search of a shared dwelling
for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present
resident cannot be justified as reasonable as 67to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident."
C. The U.S. Supreme Court'sDecision
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Georgia v. Randolph holds "that a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is
68
dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant."
The majority rests its decision on three points: 1) the social expectations
analysis originally outlined by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Katz v. United States,69 2) United States Supreme Court precedents, and
3) the resolution of potentially troublesome implications of their holding.
a. "Social Expectation" Analysis
The majority's primary theory evaluates reasonableness as a function of social expectations between co-occupants. 70 To that end, the
opinion presents a hypothetical situation in which someone arrives at a
shared residence and encounters two co-occupants: one inviting entrance,
and another refusing.71 In such a situation, the majority assumes that,
due to widely understood social expectations, "no sensible [visitor]
would go inside., 72 The majority then analogizes the hypothetical guest
to a police officer seeking permission to search, and concludes that because it would be unreasonable for the guest to enter facing such a disagreement, it would likewise be unreasonable for the officer to enter.7 3
The majority's syllogistic logic leads it to conclude that "[d]isputed permission is thus no match for this [privacy] value of the Fourth Amend-

64.
Id. (quoting Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)).
65.
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
66.
Randolph v. State, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836-37 (Ga. 2004).
67.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
68.
Id. at 1528.
69.
389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
70.
Randolph, 125 S. Ct. at 1521 (citing Matlock for the proposition that "the reasonableness
of such a search is in significant part a function of commonly held understanding about the authority
that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests.").
71.
Id. at 1522-23.
72.
Id. at 1523.
73.
Id.
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ment, and74the State's other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh it."

b. Precedent
Additionally, the majority considers a prior case that "took a step
toward the issue" of warrantless searches. 75 In Minnesota v. Olson,76 the
Court assessed the privacy rights of an overnight social guest arrested in
the course of a warrantless search, and held that houseguests have privacy rights parallel to those of occupants because "it is unlikely that [the
host would] admit someone who want[ed] to see or meet with the guest
over the objection of the guest.",77 Based on that decision, the majority
goes on to reason that "it presumably should follow that an inhabitant of
shared premises may claim at least as much, and it turns out that the coinhabitant naturally has an even stronger claim. 7 8 Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court reinforced the Georgia Supreme Court's holding that
Randolph is distinguishable from Matlock, and therefore not contradic79
tory, due to the physical presence of the nonconsenting occupant.
0

8
c. "Loose Ends"

The majority concludes by addressing two potentially troublesome
results, and then attempting to dispel them as inconsequential concerns
that are not weighty enough to overpower its ultimate holding. 8' First, it
tackles the apparent double standard created by comparing this holding
with the Court's long-standing endorsement of citizens bringing criminal
activity to light.8 2 Ultimately, the majority reconciles the two by stating
that "society can often have the benefit of [citizens bringing to light
criminal activity of others] without relying on a theory of consent that
ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow a warrantless search., 83 Specifically, the majority reasons that the consenting co-occupant can either
deliver the incriminating evidence to police,8 4 or inform police of the
relevant information to assist in obtaining a warrant. 85 Second, the majority addresses the dissent's primary objection that the holding will

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1524.
Id. at 1522 (referring to Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
495 U.S. 91 (1990).
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 99).
Id.
See id. at 1527.
Id. at 1524.

81.

Id.

82. Id. at 1527; see, e.g., Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (stating that "it is no part of the
policy underlying the Fourth... Amendment[ ] to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of
their ability in the apprehension of criminals.").
83.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1524.
84.
Id. (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487-89 (referring to a situation where the defendant's
wife turned incriminating guns over to the police)).
85.
Id.
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shield spousal abusers. 86 While recognizing the prevalent domestic violence problem, 87 the majority characterizes this criticism as a "red herring" 88 and argues that "this case has no bearing on the capacity of the
police to protect domestic victims. ' 89 In support of this proposition, the
majority asserts that police may always enter, under the exigent circumstances exception,
when there is reasonable evidence that a domestic
90
threat exists.
2. Concurring Opinions
a. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens writes a very brief concurring opinion which largely
strays from addressing the issue of disputed consent searches. The concurrence, which appears to be directed at (and later responded to by)
Justice Scalia, serves almost exclusively to criticize "originalism" as a
tool for constitutional interpretation because it fails to account for
changes in contemporary society. 91 Specifically, Stevens explains that
when the Constitution was adopted in 1791 only a man's consent would
be of import as a female could not at that time make legal decisions. 92
Accordingly, under an originalist's viewpoint, police officers seeking
consent to search would only be required to receive permission from the
husband. However, taking special care to highlight the discrepancy, Stevens points out that this concept is no longer valid because, "as a matter
93
of constitutional law ...the male and the female are equal partners."
b. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer also writes a concurring opinion, his purpose being to
defend against the dissent's assertion that this holding will shield spousal
abusers. Specifically, Breyer stresses the importance of reasonableness
when determining the legality of Fourth Amendment searches, and further, that evaluation of reasonableness must turn on the totality of the
circumstances. 94 Accordingly, Breyer notes that under circumstances in
which police officers engage in a consent-based search with the sole objective being to recover evidence, and one occupant makes a clear objection, the search would be unreasonable absent any other Fourth Amend86. Id. at 1525.
87. Id. (citing numerous government and private statistical reports addressing the widespread
domestic violence problem plaguing U.S. society).
88. Id. at 1526.
89. Id. at 1525.
90.
See id. at 1526 (citing United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 32 (lst Cir. 1992); United
States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d
1311, 1313-15 (Colo. 1995)).
91.
Id. at 1528-29 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to all societal changes, including specifically the modem day equality of sexes).
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 1529 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
94.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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ment exceptions.95 However, Breyer goes on to remark that "were the
circumstances to change significantly, so should the result." 96 In making
this statement, Breyer implies that any sign of domestic violence or other
dangerous conditions would alter the totality of the circumstances, and
potentially make entrance reasonable under the exigent circumstances
exception.
3. Dissenting Opinions
a. Chief Justice Roberts
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, who is joined by
Justice Scalia, begins by pointing to several deficiencies in the majority
holding. Ultimately, they97conclude by identifying what, in their opinion,
is "the correct approach.
First, the dissenters argue that the holding establishes a rule that will
apply to various police searches in such a random fashion that it misses
the true interest protected by the Fourth Amendment: a reasonable right
to privacy. 98 In making this point, the dissent draws attention to the factual similarities present between Randolph, and those in the Matlock99
and Illinois v. Rodriguez.10 0 This comparison suggests that because
Randolph implicitly contradicts the precedents, the holding is illogical. 10'
In other words, the dissenters argue, a rule that endorses protection for
defendants lucky enough to be standing at the threshold, 102 but not those
sleeping in an adjacent room or detained in a nearby squad car 10 3 is arbitrary and unfair. 104 Specifically, the dissent challenges the decision to
draw such a fine line between the nonconsenting occupant who is present
at the threshold to refuse consent, and the nonconsenting occupant who
happens to be away when the police arrive, but later contests the validity
of the search.' 05
The second criticism, which the dissenters argue as being rooted in
the randomness deficiency, suggests that the holding will shield spousal
abusers by prohibiting police intervention when the perpetrator refuses to

95. Id. at 1530.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 1531, 1536, 1539.
99. 415 U.S. 164.
100.
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
101.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "when the development of FourthAmendment jurisprudence leads to such arbitrary lines, we take it as a signal that the
rules need to be rethought").
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1534, 1536 (comparing the protection provided to the defendant in Randolph with
the lack of protection afforded to the defendant in Matlock, who was detained in the police squad
car; or the defendant in Rodriguez, who was napping in the next room).
104.
Id. at 1536.
105.
See id.
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consent. 106 Although they acknowledge the majority's response, 07 Roberts and Scalia rebut the majority's presumption that domestic violence
automatically gives rise to the exigent circumstances necessary to authorize warrantless entrance.10 8 And even in circumstances where it does
apply, justifying the rule on such
a contingency is, according to the dis0 9
sent, unreasonably "strange."'1
Third, the dissenters argue that the social expectation analogy is
plagued with unfounded assumptions and faulty logic for presupposing
that any reasonable houseguest would automatically leave upon disagreement between roommates. 110 The dissenters attack this assumption
with their own hypotheticals which suggest less clear "social expectations." For example, what if the guest was a family member; what if the
guest had traveled long distances; or what if the guest was accepted by
several, and only rejected by one roommate?"' And further, the dissent
questions, if the law recognizes no superiority or inferiority between cooccupants as the majority so clearly pronounces, 112 then why should
the
13
law implicitly assume that the occupant refusing consent prevails?"
Finally, the dissent asserts that the majority opinion incorrectly applies the social expectation analysis as originally articulated in Katz.114
Specifically, the dissent argues that the majority is mistaken because it
uses the analysis to review the issue of consent, rather than correctly
106.
Id. at 1531 ("[T]he cost of affording such random protection is great, as demonstrated by
the recurring cases in which abused spouses seek to authorize police entry into a home they share
with a nonconsenting abuser."); see also id. at 1537 ("Perhaps the most serious consequence of the
majority's rule is its operation in domestic abuse situations ....).
107.
Id. at 1538 (referring to the majority response that the dissent's spousal abuse argument is
a "red herring," and the ruling will not shield spousal abusers because of the continued prevalence of
the exigent circumstances exception).
108.
Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding no
exigent circumstances justifying entry when police responded to a report of domestic abuse, officers
heard no noise upon arrival, defendant told officers that his wife was out of town, and wife then
appeared at the door seemingly unharmed but resisted husband's efforts to close the door)); see also
id.
at 1537 (inferring, as well, that in circumstances where domestic abuse is present but no exigent
circumstances exist to allow police entry, the nonconsenter will "inflict retribution" on the consenter
as soon as police leave).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1532 (stating that "such shifting expectations are not a promising foundation on
which to ground a constitutional rule, particularly because the majority has no support for its basic
assumption - that an invited guest encountering two disagreeing co-occupants would flee - beyond a
hunch about how people would typically act in an atypical situation").
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 1523 (Souter, J.) (stating that "there is no societal understanding of superior and
inferior" between co-occupants).
113.
Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (responding to the majority's presumption that a cooccupant has no authority to demand his guest be admitted by stating that "it seems equally accurate
to say.., that the objector has no 'authority' to insist on getting his way over his co-occupant's wish
that her guest be admitted."); see also id. at 1541 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "men and
women are no more 'equal' in the majority's regime, where both sexes can veto each other's consent, than on the dissent's view, where both sexes cannot").
114.
Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(referring to the two-part test which asked whether: 1)the suspect had a subjective expectation of
privacy, and 2) society would view that expectation as reasonable)).
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applying it to the overall inquiry of reasonableness in the expectation of
privacy." 5 Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts points out, "the social
expectations concept has not been applied to all questions arising under
the Fourth Amendment, least of all issues of consent."' 1 6 Therefore,
according to the dissenters, the majority utilizes the social expectation
analysis inappropriately, because it confuses the contextual meaning of
reasonableness. As a result, the dissent claims, social expectations
should not be used to evaluate the Fourth Amendment's protection of
privacy as it relates to the consent exception. 7
The dissent ultimately offers a "correct approach" ' 1 8 to the issue
presented in Randolph, based on the same assumption of the risk doctrine
prevalent throughout the precedents. 19 Its rationale is very simple: "[i]f
an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or those papers or places with the government.' 120 Accordingly, it is reasonable for police to search the premises upon the consent
of any single occupant, because all other occupants impliedly assume
that risk by living together.' 2' The dissent argues that its approach is
preferable because it flows naturally from23the precedents, 122 and is logically grounded in the concept of privacy. 1
b. Justice Scalia
In addition to joining Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia offers 1an
24
independent response to Justice Stevens's criticism of "originalism."'
First, he challenges Stevens's assertion that "originalism" would have
justified police in searching the home over the objection of a married
woman when the Constitution was adopted in 1791.125 He further defends "originalism" by arguing that this mode of constitutional interpretation can operate flexibly, despite Stevens's doubts. Specifically, Scalia
states that "there is nothing new or surprising in the proposition" that the
Constitution may remain unchanged while bodies of law to which it refers do change.' 26 Scalia concludes by criticizing Stevens's "celebration"' 127 of the majority's professed endorsement of women's rights, ar115. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1537.
116. Id. (suggesting that the social expectations concept should not be used to examine the
issue of whether consent was reasonable).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1531.
119. See, e.g., Frazier,394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
120. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
121.
Id. at 1534 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7).
122.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1536.
123.
Id.
124. Id. at 1539-41 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
125.
Id. at 1540.
126.
Id. (arguing that "originalism" does not prohibit the Constitution from taking account of
changes in other bodies of law).
127.
Id. at 1541.
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guing that in light of domestic violence patterns the decision will actually
defeat the basis of their pronouncement, and instead lay the foundation
for even greater violence toward women. 128
c. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas pursues a simple argument unaddressed in the other
129
opinions. Specifically, he asserts that Coolidge v. New Hampshire
"squarely controls this case.," 130 In Coolidge, officers questioned the
wife of an absent defendant pursuant to a homicide investigation. Subsequently, and of her own accord, the wife invited the officers into the
home and permitted them to conduct a search. By their search, the police
obtained guns and clothing belonging to her husband. The evidence later
served to convict him of murder.13' Thomas relies upon the holding in
Coolidge that "when a citizen leads police officers into a home shared
with her spouse to show them evidence.., that citizen is not acting as an
agent of the police, and thus no Fourth Amendment search has occurred."' 132 In doing so, Thomas argues that the facts in Randolph are
indistinguishable from Coolidge.133 Accordingly, Janet Randolph was
not acting as an agent of the officers. For that reason, Justice Thomas
explains, no Fourth Amendment search ever occurred. Therefore,34the
trial court's initial denial of the motion to suppress was appropriate. 1

III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Randolph135 addressed
whether police could lawfully search the home when one occupant disputes another occupant's consent. 136 Under existing law, lower courts
had reached incongruous results in answering this question, 137 and the
justice system as a whole needed an authoritative ruling from the Supreme Court. In Randolph, the Court answered by formulating a clear
rule' 38 which will help lower courts shape future decisions. Jurisdictional differences in holdings deciding this issue, albeit a limited one,
will disappear and the justice system should benefit from a consistent
128.
Id.
129.
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
130.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 446.
132.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1541-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
488-498).
133.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct., at 1542.
Id. at 1542-43.
134.
135.
126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1518-19.
136.
ComparePrimus v. State, 813 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a search
137.
of Defendant's premises upon consent of his roommate was valid despite the Defendant's presence),
with Randolph v. State, 604 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a search of Defendant's home
upon consent of his wife, but his presence and clear refusal, was invalid).
138.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526 ("We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared
dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.").
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and predictable approach to the validity of disputed-consent searches.
To that extent, the holding in Randolph is clearly beneficial.
However, the Randolph holding simultaneously forecasts a novel
set of problems that lower courts will have to address as a result. Generally, this analysis will to point out Randolph's potential deficiencies,
balancing them with the decision's clear benefits for a comprehensive
assessment. Attention will focus on unanticipated practical effects likely
to arise in the aftermath of the holding, scrutinizing the tension between
citizens' privacy rights, and the police's ability to enforce the law. Additionally, the Court's well-established trend of limiting Fourth Amendment privacy rights will be evaluated, paying heed to issues that may
arise as a result of Randolph's departure from this trend. And finally,
potential solutions available to both courts and police will be suggested
to assist in dealing with these new issues.
A. Privacy Rights Versus Law Enforcement: PracticalImplications of
Georgia v. Randolph
1. Practical Implications for Citizens' Privacy Rights
At first glance, the Randolph decision appears to expand privacy
rights, for the first time in several decades of Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment decisions, 139 by holding in favor of the defendant on a voluntary consent issue. 140 The Court announces a straightforward holding
that attempts to limit the scope of permissible police searches in favor of
protecting the refusing defendant's privacy. 141 However, in spite of this
seemingly simple directive, there is a strong possibility that Randolph
will actually act to limit the right of privacy even further. This restriction
of rights is most likely to manifest itself through changing police behavior in response to situations of disputed consent.
Specifically, Randolph creates an incentive for police, upon encountering a situation in which co-occupants might disagree on the issue of
consent, to immediately detain and remove the occupant most likely to
refuse a search. In taking this action, police can then pursue consent
from the remaining occupant without regard to whether the detained occupant would agree.142 Accordingly, the holding encourages police to
take action that, from a practical standpoint, completely undermines the
rule's original purpose of preserving a nonconsenting co-occupant's privacy rights in the face of another, consenting occupant. 143 This induce139.
See supraPart I.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1528 ("This case invites the straightforward application of the rule
140.
that a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as to
him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.").
141.

Id.

See id. at 1527 ("[Tjhe potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the thresh142.
old colloquy, loses out.").
143. See id at1528.
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ment is further supported because the holding does not purport to overrule United States v. Matlock'" or Illinois v. Rodriguez,14 5 but merely
distinguishes them. In those two cases, the Court held that neither an
occupant sleeping in the next room,146 nor one detained in a squad car, 14 7
could later object to a search. By refusing to overrule those two decisions, the Court essentially endorsed their holdings as good law, thereby
informing lower courts and police that searches made under similar circumstances are still legally viable. 148 As a consequence, Randolph will
likely encourage police to circumvent its holding by removing potential
nonconsenting occupants, thereby nullifying the very Fourth Amendment
protections it seeks to espouse.
A second implication of this decision concerns its limited effect on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As the majority opinion readily admits, 149 Randolph confines its authority to such a unique set of circumstances that it will very rarely apply. 150 It is interesting that the majority
so readily admits the narrowness of its holding, because earlier in the
opinion it justifies acceptance of this issue in the first place on the judicial system's need for a decision on this issue.'51 Nevertheless, this decision will be of only limited effect in protecting privacy rights because,
coupled with police incentive to detain hostile suspects, it will be the rare
situation in which lower courts and legal counsel can point to Randolph
as authoritative, controlling authority. Instead of "drawing a fine
line,"' 152 as itdid, the Court might have been better served by opting to
rely on the broad and longstanding precedents through application of the
assumption of the risk doctrine, 53 as it concerns co-occupancy. Though
reliance on this doctrine would have forced the Court to come to the opposite conclusion, 54 doing so would have enabled the Court to avoid the
144.
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
145.
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
146.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
147.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
148.
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1527.
149.
See id.
("[Ilf [Rodriguez and Matlock] are not to be undercut by today's holding, we have
to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in
fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search,
whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses
out.").

150. See id.
151.
Compare Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 ("[We have to admit that we are drawing a fine
line; if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the cotenant's permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby
but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.") (emphasis added), with Randolph,
126 S.Ct. at 1520 ("We granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on whether one occupant
may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is
present and states a refusal to permit the search.").
152.
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1527.
153.
See, e.g., Frazier,394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
154.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that if the Court had
relied on the assumption of the risk doctrine, it could only have come to the conclusion that the
search against Mr. Randolph did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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implicit contradiction with the relevant precedents, 155 while simultaneously reinforcing the vitality of a consistent
line of decisions dealing
56
with Fourth Amendment consent searches. 1
2. Practical Implications for Law Enforcement
Because all Fourth Amendment decisions implicitly struggle with
the delicate balance between citizens' privacy rights and law enforcement capabilities, Randolph equally carries with it practical implications
for police officers in the course of their work. Although it is difficult to
predict the full extent of changing police behavior following this decision, both the majority and dissenting opinions reflect on one recurring
situation this holding is almost sure to affect on a regular basis: domestic
157
violence. Because domestic violence already plagues U.S. society,
and because this rule undisputedly affects police response to domestic
violence situations, 158 the opposing opinions devote considerable attention to the rule's likely effect on the issue. 159 Not surprisingly, they
reach wholly inconsistent conclusions.
While the majority presents a solid argument that the dissent's criticism is a "red herring,'' 60 its opinion fails to look beyond the legal theory in order to appreciate the reality of domestic violence. Moreover,
evidence of domestic violence may permit police entry under the exigent
circumstances exception161 in some disputed-consent circumstances;
however, often times no such evidence will exist to, literally, open the
door to a search. It is easy to foresee a situation in which police respond
to a domestic violence call only to find that no actual violence has yet
been inflicted. Police are powerless to act at that point. However, as
recognized by the dissent, consider the retribution that will be carried out
once the police leave. 162 Similarly, it is likely that police will rarely get
an opportunity to view evidence of violence in the first place, as the bat155. E.g., Matlock, 415 U.S. 164; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (referring to contradiction created when comparing the decision in Randolph which disallows searches made when the
suspect is standing at the door, to the decisions in Matlock and Rodriguez which allow searches
made when the suspect is either detained in the nearby squad car, or sleeping in an adjacent room).
156.

See supra Part 1.

157. See Kapila Juthani, Note, Police Treatment of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse:
Affirmative Duty to Protect vs. Fourth Amendment Privacy, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 51, 56
(2003). See generally Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1525 (presenting a substantial list of government and
private reports analyzing the extent and nature of the domestic violence problem in the U.S.).
158. See, e.g., Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515; see also Scheiber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 458-59 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (referring to two, of many, relevant Fourth Amendment consent cases where the original police response arose from domestic violence).
159. See Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1525-26 (explaining the majority's perspective of the holding's affect on domestic violence); see also id.at 1537-38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
160. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526 (referring to its failure to account for the exigent circumstances exception).
161.
Id. at 1525 n.6 (listing the exigent circumstances that render consent irrelevant).
162. See id at 1537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that violence will be exacerbated when
domestic disputes are reported, but police are unable to take action due to the lack of evidence which
would permit intervention).
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tered and frightened woman will remain out of view for fear of severe
future consequences if she comes out and pleads for protection.
On a broader level, Randolph will also have the practical effect of
contributing to police officers' general confusion concerning a suspect's
privacy rights. Responding officers will constantly confront unclear
situations where there is not an obvious consenting or nonconsenting
occupant standing at the doorway. Does the refusal still trump if the
refusing occupant is shouting his rebuff up the stairs from the basement?
What if either occupant is under the influence of alcohol or drugs? What
if the nonconsenting occupant is on the telephone with the consenting
occupant, stating his refusal through the phone? Prior to Randolph, these
potential contingencies did not present an issue. Police officers, operating under the established assumption of the risk principle, 163 needed only
to concern themselves with obtaining consent from the co-occupant
standing in the doorway. Thus, although these possibilities were irrelevant prior to Randolph, drawing such a fine line makes these questions
suddenly important.
B. A Departurefrom the Court's Trend of Limiting Privacy Rights
Beginning with the decision in Frazier v. Cupp,' 64 and extending
over thirty years up to Randolph, the Supreme Court adhered to a generally recognized trend of expanding the validity of warrantless, consentbased police searches, and correspondingly limiting defendants' privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment. 165 Consequently, Randolph, which
reinforces the individual privacy interest at the expense of valid police
searches,1 66 comes as an unexpected departure from this trend. 167 While
the consequences of departing from an identifiable trend in constitutional
interpretation may not necessarily be severe, the resulting judicial uncertainty creates problematic issues.
Prior to Randolph, lower courts across the nation benefited from a
clear understanding of the Supreme Court's consistent trend of upholding
the validity of police searches. However, post-Randolph, courts are suddenly placed into a state of confusion about the direction of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence. Specifically, state courts
will struggle to decide whether this decision forecasts an impending reversal in Fourth Amendment decision-making, or whether it's merely a
detour in the continued path of generally limiting privacy. This creates a

163.
Supra Part I.B.
164.
394 U.S. 731 (1969).
165.
See generally Kloster, supra note 26, at 104 (providing a detailed analysis of the Court's
trend in deciding Fourth Amendment search cases).
166.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
167.
See supra Part I (referring to the trend of limiting privacy rights and expanding the
boundaries of valid warrantless police searches).
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negative impact on the judicial system as a whole because it signals inconsistency and unpredictability.
C. UnreasonableReasoning
The logic employed by the majority opinion can be questioned with
regard to two specific facets of the decision. First, a recurrently problematic result of the holding concerns its apparent neglect of precedent.
Moreover, the majority attempts to deal with this problem by "drawing a
fine line"' 68 and dismissing the contradiction with precedent cases as a
"loose end" 169 to be tied up. 170 However, the reality of the holding, especially concerning Matlock and Rodriguez, is that the decisions considered collectively bear little logical relationship to one another. Worse,
the logic employed by the Court in each decision serves to effectively
contradict the logic used in the others. 171 Consideration of the holdings
together begs the question of how justice may be reconciled when a nonconsenting occupant lucky enough to be standing at the threshold prevails, but a nonconsenting occupant napping in the next room, or detained in a nearby squad car, loses out. Factually, the differences are so
minute that the majority struggles to distinguish them. 172 Consequently,
following Randolph a stalemate of Supreme Court decisions pits limited
privacy rights against expansive police discretion to search, and the determinative factor as to which rule will apply falls solely upon the arbitrary circumstances surrounding the suspect's location with respect to the
doorway.
Additionally, the "social expectation" reasoning utilized by the majority as a tool to assess reasonableness is questionable for two reasons.
Initially, the model is faulty because it misses the true inquiry of reasonableness as defined by precedent, which is the individual's "legitimate
expectation of privacy."' 173 The majority mistakenly equates this legitimate expectation with the disputed-consent social expectation hypothetical, 174 assuming without explanation that it leads to the correct conclusion that entry violates reasonableness. However, as the dissent points
out, social expectations comprise a very different set of assumptions than
those encompassing the legitimate expectation of privacy. 75 Accordingly, one might assume that his roommate won't turn over evidence of
168. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
169. Id.
170.
See supraPart II.C. 1.c.
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1527 (referring to the Randolph holding as compared to Matlock
171.
and Rodriguez).
172. Id.(admitting that they are drawing a fine line, and arguing that the "formalism is justified").
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
173.
See Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1522-23 (referring to the hypothetical situation laid out in the
174.
majority opinion, where a social guest arrives at a residence and is greeted by two co-occupants in
disagreement over whether the guest may enter).
175.
Id.
at 1533.
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his drug problem to police, based on social expectations between
them. 176 However, because he shares a living space with that roommate,
any legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to their shared dwelling
has "already been frustrated,"' 177 and regardless of friendship-based expectations between them, there can be no legitimate expectation of protection from police searches if consent is given by one roommate. Thus,
the majority's reliance on the social expectation hypothetical could be
considered inappropriate because it equates the social expectations of cooccupants with the legitimate expectations of privacy.
The concepts are
78
1
results.
different
yield
accordingly
and
different,
The second problem that arises with regard to the hypothetical is the
majority's unwarranted assumption that the nonconsenting occupant's
decision prevails in the event of a disputed-consent situation. 179 Moreover, the majority opinion clearly holds that whenever two co-occupants
disagree on the issue of consent to a police search, the nonconsenting
occupant prevails. This assumption generates query as to why, when the
occupants share an equal status of authority, 180 the party refusing consent
must be considered the winner. 181 Thus, the social expectation analysis
could be considered imperfect even within its own boundaries, because it
stresses the fact that co-occupants share equal authority, but then assumes without justification that the nonconsenting occupant prevails in
situations of dispute.
D. Solutions
Despite the unanticipated problems likely to arise following the Supreme Court's holding in Randolph, some possible solutions exist that
may assist to alleviate any negative affects. First and foremost, judges
deciding Fourth Amendment disputed-consent search cases should engage in an intensive fact-based analysis of the situation in front of them,
and require the particular situation to precisely match Randolph's distinct
factual background before applying it as precedent. Although Randolph
seems to inherently conflict with prior precedents such as Matlock and
Rodriguez, if courts can devote special attention to the factual background so as to apply the respective precedents only to identical factual
176.
ld.
177.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (referring to the meaning of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the context of co-occupancy).
178.
Id.
179.
Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1523 (stating that "there is no societal understanding of superior
and inferior" between co-occupants).
180. Id.at 1523 ("[T]here is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right
or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders,").
181.
Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It seems equally accurate to say - based
on the majority's conclusion that one does not have a right to prevail over the express wishes of his
co-occupant - that the objector has no 'authority' to insist on getting his way over his co-occupant's
wishes that her guest be admitted." (emphasis added)).
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situations, no overbearing contradictions will arise. Doing this will alleviate the confusion created by the Supreme Court's seemingly conflicting decisions by limiting the scope of future holdings to situations which
match the appropriate precedents.
Second, courts should embrace a Preliminary Effort Test, 8 2 which
requires officers pursuing a co-occupant consent search to, at least, make
an initial attempt to obtain consent from all accessible inhabitants. Specifically, this test would initially require responding officers engaged
with any occupant of the residence to inquire as to whether any other cooccupants are present on the premises. If the officers are led to believe
that other occupants are at home, this test would additionally require the
police to obtain consent from all additional occupants before entering to
search. Adoption of this test would be beneficial for several reasons.
First, the Preliminary Effort Test is commensurate with the reasonableness inquiry explicit in the Fourth Amendment, 83 because it requires
police to take the simple step of initially asking whether other occupants
are present, and then obtaining consent from any that are there. Similarly, this test reinforces the enduring vitality of the warrant requirement
in the Fourth Amendment' 8 4 because police would be required to pursue
the alternate course of obtaining a warrant in the event that a roused cooccupant decides to refuse the search. Last, application of this test would
benefit the judicial system by preventing officers from circumventing the
purpose of Randolph 's holding by immediately detaining potential nonconsenting occupants.1 85 Incongruous situations similar to Matlock or
Rodriguez would not arise to frustrate the holding, because police would
be required to make an initial effort to seek out other inhabitants, and
receive consent from them before engaging in a search. Although this
test creates an added burden on police, it would greatly reduce the possibility of engaging in an illegal search.
Finally, in the event that police are unable to obtain a warrant, they
should be encouraged to pursue the traditional alternatives to a warrantless search more readily. For one, officers responding to situations
of disputed consent should simply request that the consenting occupant
retrieve and hand over any incriminating evidence that the officers hope
to discover in the event of a search. This alternative is likely to be viable
in many disputed consent circumstances where the two occupants are at
odds with one another,18 6 as the consenting individual will be willing to
182. See Elizabeth A. Wright, Note, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Refusal, Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1841, 1874-77 (2005)
(proposing the "Reasonable Attempt Test"); Gregory S. Fisher, Search and Seizure, Third Party
Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and the Fourth Amendment, 66 WASH. L. REv. 189, 202-08
(1991) (proposing "Discretionary Restraint" as a framework for addressing third-party consent).
183.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184. Id.
185. See supra Part III.A.2
186. See, e.g., Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
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take whatever steps are necessary to implicate their co-occupant. Additionally, when the consenting occupant is unable or unwilling to deliver
the incriminating evidence to the responding officers, they can at least
aid the officers in obtaining a legitimate search warrant by establishing
probable cause. In choosing to pursue either of these warrantless search
alternatives, police will benefit by preserving the ability to obtain incriminating evidence against the suspect, while at the same time eliminating the possibility of engaging in a warrantless search.
CONCLUSION

In the immediate wake of Georgiav. Randolph, the decision's longterm impact on Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence is
unclear. While the holding may signal a pending reversal in the Court's
prior predilection to limiting citizens' privacy rights, it may also represent only a slight divergence in a continually viable trend. Perhaps the
Court will have the opportunity to resolve this query in future decisions,
potentially even those based on Randolph's shortcomings. Regardless of
its eventual impact, Randolph currently holds a position of limited application which is likely to create confusion and foster practical dilemmas.
As Randolph begins to assert its presence in the world of Fourth
Amendment privacy rights, one can only hope that, as the majority opin187
ion suggests, these problematic issues prove to be mere "loose ends"'
capable of being tied up.

Andrew Fiske*

187.
Id.at 1527.
*.
J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Alan Chen for his valuable input.

BROWN V. SANDERS: INVALID FACTORS AND APPELLATE
REVIEW IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION

Death penalty jurisprudence in America is dynamic. Since Furman
v. Georgia' in 1972, the states and the United States Supreme Court have
elaborated constitutional and practicable systems of capital punishment
and sentencing.2 The Court has worked to ensure that the death penalty
cannot be imposed arbitrarily, and to allow sentencers to review mitigating factors that can support lesser sentences.3 Meanwhile, state appellate
courts have examined death penalty statutes to ensure they meet revised
sentencing guidelines. 4 The Supreme Court has carved out a jurisprudential approach to sentences rendered using invalid sentencing factors after
new statutory factors were found too vague to ensure the constitutional
rights of offenders. 5 The Court has maintained guidelines for valid factors6 and has addressed cases in which sentences were imposed after a
jury considered factors later determined invalid.7
This comment addresses a recent capital decision by the United
States Supreme Court. Brown v. Sanders8 is the latest in a series of cases
addressing death sentences issued after the consideration of invalid sentencing factors. In deciding Brown, the Supreme Court eliminated the
distinction between "weighing" and "non-weighing" jurisdictions 9 which
had been in place for fifteen years.' ° While this change in jurisprudence
will simplify the examination of sentences derived from invalid sentencing factors, the majority opinion in Brown failed to clarify the role of
appellate review under the new system.
Part I provides an overview of the constitutional requirements for
death sentences, and the approaches taken with respect to invalid sentencing factors. Part II discusses the decision in Brown. Part III analyzes the decision, first in a discussion of its elimination of weighing and
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, CapitalSentencing Doctrine and the Weighing - Nonweighing
Distinction,47 STAN. L. REV. 1347, 1347-48 (1995).
3. Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX. L. REv. 441, 444-46; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1352-53.
4.
See, e.g., Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 888-89 (2006).
5.
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973-75 (1994).
6. Id. at 972-73.
7.
See, e.g., Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 888.
8.
126 S.Ct. 884 (2006).
9. Id at 891-92.
10. See generally Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (holding that in death penalty
cases it is constitutionally permissible for courts to weigh or reweigh aggravating or mitigating
circumstances).
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non-weighing jurisdictions, and then in regard to the risks to future cases
regarding the requirement for appellate review which is strikingly absent
from the opinion. In eliminating the distinction, the Court attempted to
clarify the sentencing process for all jurisdictions, but neglected to discuss the crucial role of appellate review under the new system.
I.BACKGROUND

Three requirements apply to all death sentences: guided discretion,
individualized sentencing, and appellate review. I When a sentencing
factor used to meet either of the first two requirements is found invalid,
appellate courts have previously determined whether the state is a weighing or a non-weighing jurisdiction to decide whether the sentence may
stand. 12 Appellate review is always a requirement, but any sentence rendered after consideration of invalid sentencing factors may be "reweighed" or may go through harmless error analysis during the appellate
process.13
A. GuidedDiscretion
Furman v. Georgia14 established that a sentence of death is uncon15
stitutional if a sentencing body had complete discretion in imposing it.
The Supreme Court explained that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."1 6 Statutes developed in response to Furman were upheld if they limited the group of offenders eligible for death, thus guiding
the discretion of the sentencing bodies.' 7 Most jurisdictions now meet
this requirement by defining eligibility factors for the death penalty.18 If
the nature of a crime satisfies the factors required by the state, the sentencer has the opportunity to impose the death sentence.19
11.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 193 (1976) (guided discretion); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (individualized discretion); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890
(1983) (appellate review).
12. E.g., Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 889 (2006).
13. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750-54 (1990).
14.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
15.
Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 441-42; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1349.
16.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
17. Zant, 462 U.S. at 874, 879; Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1349-50; Marcia A. Widder,
Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty
Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1341, 1347-48 (1994).
18.
See, e.g., Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 889; see also Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1351 (suggesting
that all guided discretion statutes require a showing of certain aggravated factors before imposing a
death sentence); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994) (explaining that a defendant
cannot be sentenced to death without a finding of at least one "aggravating circumstance," which
serves to limit the number of defendants eligible for the death penalty).
19.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889; see also Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 446 (explaining that a
factftmder can sentence a defendant to death only where at least one aggravating circumstance has
been proven).
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B. IndividualizedSentencing
The second requirement for a constitutional death sentence is that
the jury analyzes any mitigating factors in the circumstances of the crime
or the character of the defendant. 20 This provides an individualized sentence for every offender eligible for death.2 1 Because of the severity and
finality of the death penalty, the Constitution requires that even if an
offender is found eligible through guided discretion, his character and
circumstances must be weighed against the aggravating factors found by
the sentencer.22 As opposed to their limited discretion in determining
eligibility for death, the individualized sentencing requirement ensures
that juries may consider any mitigating evidence that comes to light.23
Though sentencers may impose the death penalty on eligible offenders,
they may always consider mitigating factors, and they are never required
to issue a sentence of death.2 4
C. Appellate Review
After Furman, appellate review is a safeguard that has ensured the
constitutionality of death sentences. 25 Gregg v. Georgia26 emphasized
that in a system of guided discretion "the further safeguard of meaningful
appellate review is available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner., 27 The Court in Zant v.
Stephens28 noted that Georgia's sentencing procedure could be approved
in part because every death sentence was reviewed by the state supreme
court "to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate." 29 In the context of invalid sentencing factors, appellate review becomes even more important to prevent an unconstitutional sentence.
Barclay v. Florida30 presents Florida's approach to appellate review
of death sentences. As in many other jurisdictions, there is an automatic
appellate review of any death penalty case by the state supreme court.3'
If a jury used an invalid sentencing factor to determine eligibility for a
20.

Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112

(1982).
21.
See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950; Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.
22.
Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950. Though not declared a constitutional requirement in the cases
immediately following Furman v. Georgia,the court recognized prior to its decision in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, that any jury's sentencing procedure involved a balance of the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case. Widder, supra note 17, at 1358.
23.
Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1353.
24.
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (striking down a
mandatory death penalty statute).
25.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
26.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27.
Id.
28.
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
29.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 876.
30.
463 U.S. 939 (1983) (upholding Florida's death penalty statute where the state supreme
court reviewed each death sentence).
31.
Barclay,463 U.S. at 953.
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death sentence, the United States Supreme Court requires either a reweighing of all the factors or a harmless-error review if no mitigating
factors are present.32 However, within this review it is accepted that the
sentencing process involves subjective decisions.33 The subjectivity of a
sentencer's decisions is appropriate after the class of defendants eligible
for the death penalty has been narrowed. After a defendant is found to
be eligible, the sentencer uses discretion to impose a sentence appropriate to the offense and any mitigating factors.3 4
When an invalid factor is used in sentencing, appellate review or
harmless-error analysis is required by the Eighth Amendment.35 Barclay
requires that when an invalid factor has been used in a death penalty decision, there be a reweighing of the factors leading to the sentence by
either a jury or an appellate court.36 When an appellate court affirms a
death sentence, there must be no "automatic assumption that [an invalid]
factor has not infected the weighing process., 37 Barclay made it clear
that appellate review is a constitutional requirement for any death sentence involving an invalid sentencing factor.38
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized this precedent in
prior and later cases. In Zant, the Court described "mandatory appellate
review" of a sentence imposed using an invalid sentencing factor as an
"important procedural safeguard" that was necessary to "avoid arbitrariness and assure proportionality" in sentencing.3 9 When there is a risk of
guided discretion going astray, appellate review is the safety measure
that ensures the constitutionality of a death sentence. Clemons v. Mississippi ° also discussed the importance of "meaningful appellate review" in
cases involving invalid sentencing factors. 4' Though Clemons is most
often cited as an example of a weighing state, the decision rested on the
Mississippi Supreme Court's failure to analyze whether the use of an
invalid sentencing factor was a harmless error. 2
Stringer v. Black4 3 reaffirmed the importance of appellate review in
cases with sentencing errors. 44 The case framed the harmless-error re32.
See id.at 954-58. Additionally, if a judge imposes a death sentence over the jury's recommendation, the state supreme court applies a clear and convincing standard to all the facts in
favor of death to determine if the sentence should stand. Id.at 955-56.
33.
Id. at 950. See Widder, supranote 17, at 1373.
34.
See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889; Widder, supranote 17, at 1374.
35.
See Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36.
See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749, 751.
37.
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992).
38.
See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 958.
39.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
40.
494 U.S. 738 (1990).
41.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749.
42.
Id.at 753-54; see also Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 453.
43.
503 U.S. 222 (1992).
44.
Stringer, 503 U.S. at 237. But see Srinivasan, supra note 2, at 1367 (arguing that Stringer
added harmless-error analysis as a new element to individualized sentencing).
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view requirement in respect to the distinction between weighing and nonweighing states, which it defined.45 Stringer indicated that where an
appellate court has determined that there would have been no difference
in a sentence without the analysis of an invalid factor, the sentence is
constitutional.46 But the reviewing court may not assume such, and
harmless-error review or appellate reweighing of sentencing factors is
47
necessary to ensure that an offender has been sentenced individually.
Nonetheless, whether the state weighs or does not, an appellate review of
an invalid sentencing factor is a constitutional requirement for a death
sentence to stand.
D. Non-Weighing States
In Zant v. Stephens,48 the Supreme Court addressed a sentence that
had been issued according to Georgia's statutes concerning guided discretion and individualized sentencing. On appeal, one of the factors
making the defendant eligible for the death penalty was found to be unconstitutionally vague.49 The Court had to determine whether the use of
the invalid factor in determining eligibility required the sentence to be
vacated.5 °
In Zant, the aggravating (eligibility) factors were used to narrow the
class of offenders eligible for death, but the jury was not required to specifically analyze those factors in imposing a sentence.5 1 Zant is now
considered to be an analysis of a non-weighing state because of the jury's
ability to consider non-statutory factors in sentencing. 52 Georgia's statute provided that at least one statutory eligibility factor must be found by
a jury for a defendant to become eligible for the death penalty. 53 However, once a jury found the existence of one of the eligibility factors beyond a reasonable doubt, it could examine any other evidence from the
trial proceeding and any mitigating circumstances to determine the final
sentence.54
In Zant, though one factor used in determining eligibility for the
death penalty was found to be invalid, the Court determined that the defendant was still eligible for his sentence, based on the valid eligibility
45.
Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229. Courts have used the term "weighing" in regard to sentencing
for some time. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 880. Justice Breyer argues in his dissent to Brown v. Sanders
that Stringerv. Black was the first case to codify the distinction between weighing and non-weighing
in jurisdictional approaches to eligibility factors as aggravating factors. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
46.
Stringer,503 U.S. at 232.
47.
Id.; Widder, supra note 17, at 1344.
48.
462 U.S. 862 (1983).
49.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 867.
50. Id. at 864.
51.
Id. at 879-81; Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 447-48.
52.
Hombuckle, supranote 3, at 447-48.
53.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 871-72.
54. Id.
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factors that were found by the jury. 55 The purpose of the statutory factors in Georgia was primarily to guide the discretion of the jury in finding defendants eligible for the death penalty.5 6 After the jury placed a
defendant beyond that barrier, it had the liberty to base its sentence on all
the evidence before it. 57 The Supreme Court held that the existence of at
least one valid eligibility factor was sufficient to make the defendant
eligible for the death penalty under Georgia law. 58 Although the categorizing of some evidence as an "aggravating circumstance" (as eligibility
factors are termed by Georgia statute) "might have caused the jury to
give somewhat greater weight to respondent's prior criminal record than
it otherwise would have given," the Court did not find this to be a Constitutional error, as the jury properly had all available evidence before it
in determining the sentence. 59 Because the invalid factor was not specifically a part of the sentencing process (i.e., because the invalid factor
60
was not given any specific "weight"), the Court upheld the sentence.
The Court limited its holding to states with statutory schemes similar to Georgia's. 61 The opinion distinguished the circumstances in Zant
from a possible case in which a sentencer would be "specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty." 62 It was
just such a case which elicited the next refinement in death penalty jurisprudence.
E. Weighing States
Seven years after it decided Zant v. Stephens, the Supreme Court
addressed death sentences imposed with an invalid factor in a jurisdiction
using the same set of factors for determining eligibility (guided discretion) and for imposing sentences (individualized sentencing).63 Clemons
v. Mississippi distinguished "weighing" jurisdictions from those following Zant's model. 64 Mississippi's statute, unlike Georgia's, used a set of
statutory aggravating circumstances both to determine eligibility for the
death penalty and to determine whether the death penalty was warranted. 65 Rather than using any evidence before it to determine the sentence, Mississippi juries were required to "weigh" specific statutory factors against any mitigating circumstances, also outlined in statute. 66 The
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.at 884, 890.
Id.at 875.
Id.at 872.
Id.
Id.at 888-89.
Id.;
see also Clemons, 494 .U.S. at 744-45; Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 450-5 1.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
Id.
See Widder, supra note 17, at 1352-53.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 744-45; Hornbuckle, supranote 3, at 448-49.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745.
Id.
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jury's task was to determine if there were "insufficient mitigating circumstances ...to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 67
The Court found a risk of "skewing" sentences in these jurisdictions
if a jury was instructed to weigh an invalid factor during the sentencing
process.68 It held that such an error did not necessarily invalidate the
death sentence, but that "meaningful appellate review" or a "reweighing"
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was required to preserve a
sentence issued after weighing of an invalid factor.69 If a new jury or an
appellate court determined that the error was harmless, the sentence
could be upheld.70 Because it was not clear in Clemons that the appropriate reweighing or review had been performed by the appellate courts,
the death sentence was vacated.7'
The distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions
was crystallized in Stringer v. Black. In reviewing another Mississippi
case, the court clarified the procedures 72used under Georgia (nonweighing) and Mississippi (weighing) law:
In a nonweighing State, so long as the sentencing body finds at least
one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor does not infect the formal process of deciding
whether death is an appropriate penalty. Assuming a determination
by the state appellate court that the invalid factor would not have
made a difference to the jury's determination, there is no constitutional violation resulting from the introduction of the invalid factor in
an earlier stage of the proceedings. But when the sentencing body is
told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing court may
not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been
removed from death's side of the scale. When the weighing process
itself has been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or
reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices
to guarantee that the
73
defendant received an individualized sentence.
In Stringer, one of the aggravating factors used in determining a
sentence was found to be vague or imprecise.74 In a weighing state such
as Mississippi, the sentence could not stand after the use of such a factor,
unless the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were reweighed.75
Because the aggravating factors were "weighed" in the sentencing process, as opposed to simply determining eligibility, a sentence in a weigh-

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.at 745 n.2.
Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 890; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-50.
Id.at 748-49; Hombuckle, supra note 3, at 453-54.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 753-54.
Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id.at 237.

75.

Id.
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ing state resulting from the use of an invalid factor could not stand without review.76
II. INSTANT CASE-BROWN V. SANDERS
A. Facts
The respondent, Ronald Sanders, and a companion broke into the
home of the two victims. 77 They bound the victims and beat them on
their heads with a blunt object. 78 One victim subsequently died. 79 Sanders was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery,
burglary, and attempted robbery. 80 At the eligibility phase of sentencing,
the jury found four special circumstances under California Penal Code
190.281, any of which would have made the defendant eligible for the
death penalty. 82 At sentencing, after considering sentencing factors including the special circumstances from the eligibility phase and "the circumstances of the crime," the jury sentenced the respondent to death8 3
B. ProceduralHistory
The respondent appealed to the California Supreme Court.84 The
supreme court affirmed the death penalty, though it held that two of the
special circumstances found by the jury in the eligibility phase were invalid, under the weighing standard from Zant v. Stephens.85 After exhaustion of state remedies, 86 the defendant filed a motion for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court of the Eastern District
of California. 87 The district court denied relief. 88 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the sentence, on the grounds that the rule
from Zant applied by the state court was not applicable to California as a
weighing state.89 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether California is a weighing or non-weighing state, and
whether the consideration of invalid sentencing factors by the jury required the sentence to be vacated. 90

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 888 (2006).
Id.
Id.

80.

Id.

81.
82.
83.

CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.2 (West 2006).
Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 888.
Id.

84.

Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(A) (West 2006).
Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 888; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).
Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 889.
Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 889.

90.

Id.
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C. The MajorityDecision
Justice Scalia issued the opinion in Brown v. Sanders, joined by
91
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas.
He began by distinguishing the two methods currently employed by the
states to meet the narrowing requirement for death sentences required by
Furman v. Georgia.92 Scalia explained the procedures used in sentencing by weighing and non-weighing states, specifying, however, that all
jurisdictions are required to meet the requirements for guided discretion
and individualized sentencing by allowing a sentencer to weigh the factors meriting a death sentence with mitigating circumstances. 93 Scalia
also devoted extensive dicta at this point to arguing against Justice
Breyer's understanding that all jurisdictions require harmless error review of invalid sentencing factors, as well as highlighting the distinction
94
between the types of jurisdictions as it was discussed in Stringer.
Scalia argued that Zant did not present a requirement for harmless error
review, and that there is no such requirement in non-weighing states cre95
ated in Clemons.
However, because both types of jurisdictions face similar problems
with invalid factors, the majority declared a new rule, eliminating the
distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions.96 Invalid
sentencing factors will not upset a sentence of death unless analysis of
that factor would provide a jury with facts and circumstances to which it
would not otherwise have access. 97 The trigger of a requirement for
harmless error review would be the presentation of new facts to a sentencer that98it would not have seen without analysis of an invalid sentencing factor.
Scalia argued that part of the reasoning for the elimination of the
distinction is that most jurisdictions allow evidence to be presented to the
sentencer through an eligibility factor or a sentencing factor, but that not
all states fit neatly into the weighing/non-weighing categorization.99 He
noted that even in states that were placed by the court into one of the two
categories, the particular scheme may have had elements of both.100
The opinion noted that under the former classification, California
would have been a non-weighing state, validating the death sentence in
91.
Id. at 884.
92. Id. at 889-91.
93. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889-91.
94. Id. at 891 n.3.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 891-92.
97.
Id. at 892.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 891-92.
100. Id. at 892 n.5 (discussing Stringer's use of an invalidated aggravating circumstance that
was not an eligibility factor).
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Brown under both the old and new systems. 1 1 Because the sentencing
jury was able to consider the facts and circumstances related to the invalid factors under the heading of another valid factor, the majority held
that the sentencing
process was not skewed, and that the sentence was
02
constitutional. 1
D. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent, in which he is joined by Justice Souter, argued that the majority failed to address the question on which certiorari
was granted.10 3 The issue presented to the Court was whether California
is a weighing state.' 4 Though the majority did provide an answer to this
question, Stevens maintained that the Court's choice to change settled
sentencing law will complicate future decisions, and does not address the
concerns presented by the California court in that context. 0 5
E. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, reiterated that the question on certiorari was whether California is a weighing state. 0 6 However, Breyer argued that the more important issue for sentence review
should turn on the nature of the sentencing error at trial rather than on the
category of the issuing jurisdiction. 1 7 Appellate review of all death sentences rendered using invalid sentencing factors should be concerned
with whether
an error in sentencing was harmless beyond a reasonable
08
1
doubt.
Breyer discussed his opinion in regard to the two stages of sentencing that he found relevant in all jurisdictions, though he mentioned
briefly that some states combine the stages into one proceeding.' 0 9 First,
sentencers determine eligibility for the death penalty, and only after this
process do they weigh mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances (often in the form of eligibility factors)." 0 Breyer argued
that both types of jurisdictions face the same risks when juries consider
invalid sentencing factors: giving undue weight to an issue or piece of
evidence that should not have been under consideration."' Because information is presented under the rubric of an aggravating factor, it is

101.
102.
103.

Id.at 893.
Id.at 894.
Id.at 896.

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 898.
Id.at 896, 898.
Id.at 896-97.

110.

Id.

111.

Id.at 898-99.
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unduly weighted for sentencers whether or not they may consider additional factors."12
Breyer read the decisions in Zant and Clemons, though they created
the weighing/non-weighing distinction, as turning on the harmlessness of
the errors made at trial: "Despite the Court's occasional suggestion to the
contrary, the weighing/nonweighing distinction has little to do with the
need to determine whether the error was harmless ... reviewing courts
should decide if that error was harmful, regardless of the form a State's
death penalty law takes."" 3 Breyer discussed the prejudice that can result from a sentencer's consideration of an invalid sentencing factor,
reiterating that much of the distinction between the types of jurisdictions
does not accurately reflect the statutory constructions of a number of
states. 1 4 Breyer presented California as an example of the failure of the
categories, as a state which presents one set of factors for guided discretion, and which adds additional factors (which define but do not limit the
circumstances considered) for the individualized sentencing procedure.15
He analyzed Stringer v. Black as the first case to frame the appellate
review process as a weighing/non-weighing issue, and to equate invalid
factors in non-weighing states with harmless error automatically.' 6 For
Breyer, this is not an accurate depiction of death penalty jurisprudence.
He also found that Scalia denied the importance of the emphasis placed
on sentencing evidence inconsistently with Clemons, and "diminishe[d]
the need to conduct any harmless-error review at all." ' 1 7 The majority
decision to treat any error that does not present new evidence as harmless
will limit the actual and8 necessary harmless-error review in many death
penalty cases to come."
III. ANALYSIS
This comment addresses Brown v. Sanders'19 in the light of capital
sentencing precedent, and questions its impact on future cases. It commends the majority for the elimination of the distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions, as this will clarify the issues surrounding invalid sentencing factors. However, it questions the opinion's
failure to set a universal standard for appellate review under the new
scheme.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
Id.at898, 900-02.
Id. at 898-900.
Id. at 900.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902.
Id. at 903.
See id.
at903-04.
126 S.Ct. 884 (2006).
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A. Attempting to Clarify InvalidFactorIssues - Eliminatingthe Weight
The majority in Brown eliminated the developing distinction between weighing and non-weighing states 120 that has been in the background of invalid factor cases since Zant v. Stephens.12z The Stringer v.
Black decision considered that distinction to be of "critical importance," 122 but the lengthy analysis of the distinction in that opinion has
not been easy to understand. The majority and Breyer's dissent in Brown
followed different interpretations of the rule presented in Stringer, 23 and
lower courts could easily share the confusion.
The decision in Brown recognized that categorizing states as weighing or non-weighing 24 was not accurate and did not solve the problem
125
inherent in sentences imposed after consideration of invalid factors.
As one scholar noted, "[t]hat nonweighing states retain the weighing
metaphor to describe the sentencing process suggests that the distinction
the Court has created an illusion. Moreover, the distinction has engen-

dered confusion and led to incoherent decisions.' ' 126 The weighing/nonweighing distinction raised concerns that the same analysis took place in
both types of jurisdictions, that the terms used in distinguishing the jurisdictions provided undue weight to sentencing factors, and that the states
could not be broken into the two categories previously recognized by the
Supreme Court.
1. Similar Analysis Across Jurisdictions
The Scalia opinion argued that the distinction between weighing
and non-weighing jurisdictions can be eliminated because the same essential process of balancing aggravating and mitigating factors is used by
all juries. 127 This view was the foundation for the opinion's emphasis on
what evidence the jury has access to during the sentencing process. 128 in
the instant case:
[T]he jury's consideration of the invalid eligibility factors in the
weighing process did not produce constitutional error because all the
facts and circumstances admissible to establish [the invalid factors]
were also properly adduced as aggravating facts bearing upon the
"circumstances of the crime" sentencing factor. They were properly

120.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892.
121.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 888 n.24 (1983); see also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,
229 (1992).
122.
Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231-32.
123.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 891 n.3.
124.
See Stringer,503 U.S. at 231-32.
125.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 891-92.
126.
Widder, supra note 18, at 1365 (noting an Illinois decision which mischaracterized the
state as a weighing jurisdiction, relying on the analysis provided in Stringer).
127.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892.
128.
See id.at 892.
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considered
whether or not they bore upon the invalidated eligibility
29
factors. 1
This is the justification the Court relied upon for the Brown decision, 3 ° but there were other points in favor of eliminating the distinction
as well.
2. Weighing Terminology Skewed Analysis of Sentencing Factors
Some scholarship on the weighing/non-weighing distinction focused on the terms used by the courts as much as on their analysis.
When a jury is given a set of facts and circumstances, increased significance is given those which are recognized by statute or considered to be
automatically "aggravating," no matter whether the jurisdiction officially "weighs" those factors or not. 131 One analysis of Clemons v. Mississippi highlighted the importance of these labels to a sentencing jury,
and the inconsistent treatment of it by the Court:
The underlying rationale of the Clemons opinion must be that the
jury goes about its decisionmaking [sic] process in a different way
when it is explicitly instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Otherwise the distinction makes little sense -- if the
thought process is the same as it is in a nonweighing state, then either
no reweighing is required or the32sentence must be reweighed under
both types of statutory schemes.1
In distinguishing between two types of statutes when Clemons was
decided, the Court may have allowed an inconsistency between the treatment of Zant and Clemons to become law. 133 The Court's somewhat
backward terminology 34 further muddied the waters, giving jurisdictions
two categories based on the word "weigh," while the distinction was
actually based on the limitation of factors presented to the jury, rather
than what it does with them.1 35 In relying on this inconsistency, courts
may have been lulled into using a metaphor136that is unrelated to the actual
statutes determining sentencing procedure.
3. The Distinction Was Illusory
A concern in Breyer's dissent to Brown was that it is rarely possible
1 37
to cleanly categorize jurisdictions as weighing or non-weighing.
While some states do mirror the classic weighing or non-weighing para129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 894.
Id.
See Widder, supra note 17, at 1370-71.
Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 455.
See Zant, 462 U.S. at 873-74; Clemons, 494 U.S. at 743-44.
See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889, 898.
See Id.
Widder, supra note 17, at 1363-64.
See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 898 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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138
digms of Zant and Clemons, others "fall somewhere in between.,
California is one example, using specific factors for eligibility, and adding factors to the list to be used in sentencing. 139 Also, as noted in Zant,
states are not required to follow sentencing schemes such as Georgia's in
order to meet the Furman v. Georgia requirement for guided discretion. 140 If a state were to choose a different system for narrowing its
class of capital offenders, it might have no place at all in the weighing/non-weighing scheme.

Breyer also noted that some jurisdictions have combined the eligibility and sentencing stages into one sentencing process.14 1 In such a
jurisdiction, there may be no way for an appellate review to determine
what evidence is limited to eligibility and what is limited to sentence
selection, and there is less chance that a jury would make such a distinction. Though the use of the weighing and non-weighing categories had
been useful for analyzing several specific statutes, it does not seem that it
was suited to bear the entire weight of capital sentencing. The Court
used it as an explanatory tool, but it may never have been intended as a
means of determining the constitutionality of all sentences. As one critic
noted, "[t]he Supreme Court's weighing doctrines allow procedure to
distort substance in an area of law in which it is acutely necessary that
procedural rules be finely tuned to promote substantive law." 142 It is
clear from Brown's ease in removing the distinction,1 43 as well as from
the complicated analysis engendered from its use' 44 that the termination
of classifying jurisdictions as weighing or non-weighing will not hinder
substantive law in capital sentencing.
B. Unseen Risks? Where Is the Emphasis on Appellate Review?
Though Brown attempts to clarify sentencing decisions, it contains a
flaw that could have serious repercussions. While it does not overturn
any existing law on appellate reweighing or harmless-error review, the
opinion fails to make this crucial element of invalid factor analysis clear
for lower courts to apply along with its new rule on evidentiary analysis
by trial juries. Appellate review, which may consist of reweighing of
sentencing factors or a harmless-error review to determine the impact of
the consideration of an invalid factor, is an important element of the decisions in invalid sentencing factor precedent. 145 Stringer'sdiscussion of
harmless-error review and appellate review has led to completely different interpretations of the requirement. With the consolidation of weigh138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 900..
Id.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 874-75.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 900.
Widder, supra note 17, at 1346.
See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892.
Widder, supranote 17, at 1365; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232-33.
Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749; Zant, 462 U.S. at 888, 890; see also Stringer, 503 U.S. at 236.
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ing and non-weighing jurisdictions, jurists must exercise care that this
constitutional requirement does not fall by the wayside.
1. Appellate Review in Capital Sentencing Precedent
The Brown decision highlighted the need for harmless-error review
in weighing jurisdictions, 146 but the requirement for appellate review is
not limited to those states. Zant recognized appellate review as an "important procedural safeguard."' 147 It also made clear that whether the
analysis of an invalid factor is a constitutional error depends on the specific circumstances of a case. 148 Though Zant is an example of a case in
which a sentence imposed using an invalid factor stood, the sentence was
only validated through appellate review.
The decision in Clemons hinged on the importance of appellate review in the form of reweighing of sentencing factors. 49 The case recognized that a harmless-error review of some kind took place, but the Supreme Court held that it was insufficient under the circumstances. 50 The
Clemons decision did not outline the exact requirement for appellate review after consideration of an invalid factor, but it was made clear that
reweighing or appellate review of some kind was necessary after a sentencer considered an invalid sentencing factor.' 5 1 The Court acknowledged that the state court's reliance on one valid circumstance for sentencing152 was "not conducting appellate reweighing as we understand
the concept,"' 53 and reversed the state court's decision.154 Later analysis

of this case indicates an understanding of the importance of appellate
review, but case law presents no clear distinction between the general
requirement for appellate review of death sentences and the specific
processes of reweighing of factors' 55 and harmless-error review.' 56 Unfortunately, while Scalia devoted discussion to harmless error review in
regard to his digression on Breyer's dissent, he did not clarify its role in
the new system. 57 This may be the basis for Breyer's fear that harmless
error review will no longer occur at all.' 58

146.
147.
148.
149.

Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 890.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 749-50.

150. Id. at 740, 753.
151.
Id.at 740.
152. Id.at 751.
153. Id. at 752.
154. See Widder, supra note 17, at 1353 n.133 ("The Clemons Court did not explain its mysterious distinction between harmess-error analysis and reweighing aggravating and mitigating factors.").
155. See Hornbuckle, supra note 3, at 453-54.
156. See Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 891 n.3 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Appellate review as a constitutional requirement was set out in Barclay159, and has remained an element of invalid sentencing factor decisions since. However, the precise requirements for appellate review have
not been set out, and the repercussions of the vague standard are apparent
in Brown's lack of discussion on the issue and in Breyer's dissent. 160 In
fact, the only mention of appellate review in the decision that is not dicta
for the benefit of Breyer is a procedural note of the Ninth Circuit's holding that a harmless-error review was necessary. 6' Nonetheless, scholarship recognizes the appellate review requirement based on the line of
cases on invalid sentencing factors. 162 What its requirements are, and
how the terms used differ in meaning, remain a murky area not yet clarified by the courts. 16 3 The appellate review requirement is an area that
has not been adequately explored, and which may be the source of the
confusion and differing interpretations of Stringer.
2. The Confusing Heritage of Stringer
Stringer recognized that an appellate review of a death sentence
took place at the state level. 164 It reiterated the general requirement of
"appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors"' 65 and clarified the Clemons requirement that at least in weighing
jurisdictions, there must be harmless-error review.1 66 However, where
Stringer fits into non-weighing jurisdictions and how it affects future
sentences167 is a subject of disagreement.
Some instances within Stringer seem to apply to invalid factor sentencing in general. 168 Consider the final statement of the Stringer court
before its reversal order: "the precedents even before Maynard and
Clemons yield a well-settled principle: Use of a vague or imprecise aggravating factor in the weighing process invalidates the sentence and at
the very least requires constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing in the state judicial system."' 69 There is no question that Stringer is
an example of a weighing state. 170 Nonetheless, as Clemons was the first
example of a weighing jurisdiction to be presented to the United States
Supreme Court,' 7' any precedent prior to it must have referred to a nonweighing jurisdiction. Thus, it would seem that the proposition in
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Stringer requiring appellate reweighing or harmless-error review 172 applies to both types of jurisdictions.
Justice Scalia, in his Brown opinion, vehemently disagreed with this
point: "Justice Breyer contends that harmless-error review applies in
both weighing and non-weighing States. It would be strange indeed to
discover at this late stage that our long-held distinction between the two
sorts of States for purposes of reviewing invalid eligibility factors in fact
made no difference."1 73 Justice Scalia did not mention in this note the
other purported differences between the types of jurisdictions, such as
the use of limited sentencing factors in weighing states versus broad or
unlimited factors or circumstances in sentencing in non-weighing
states. 174 Scalia, in recognizing that harmless error review is an important element at least in weighing jurisdictions, seemed to recognize that
there is a role for appellate review of sentences rendered using invalid
Scalia made no
factors even under the new system. 75 Unfortunately,
1 76
mention of this role in the body of the case.
Justice Scalia perhaps overstated Justice Breyer's interpretation of
Stringer. Breyer's contention that harmless-error review is necessary in
all jurisdictions is based on Zant and Clemons.177 As to Stringer, Breyer
discussed its reference to non-weighing cases specifically as a "single
178
ambiguous sentence of dicta" that should not be a basis for future law.
Other scholarship indicates the same divergent interpretations of
Stringer, some interpretations indicating that reweighing and harmlesserror review apply only to weighing states, 179 and others applying it to
both types.180 There have also been no definitions of "appellate reweighing" or "harmless-error review" beyond the references in cases such as
Clemons and Stringer. The terms may or may not be interchangeable:
"Regardless of the validity of assessing capital sentencing errors under a
harmless-error analysis, it remains unclear how harmless-error review is
functionally different from appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in evaluating the effect of invalid aggravating factors on a
death sentence." 18 ' With no consensus on terms, and no consensus on
what is a rule and what is dicta, or to which jurisdictions rules apply to, it
is no small wonder that Stringer has been the source of confusion and
discord. Nonetheless, Brown and its followers must still apply the requirement of appellate review to invalid factor sentencing.
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3. What Is Required for Appellate Review after Brown?
Despite the uniformity of capital sentencing jurisprudence at the
Supreme Court level, there are varied opinions on what is required as far
as appellate review of sentences based on invalid factors. One extreme
holds that an erring sentence cannot ever stand: "When a sentence of
death has been based in part on invalid aggravating factors, the only
remedy faithful to the Eighth Amendment is to reverse the sentence and
remand for a new sentencing proceeding."' 82 An approach foreseen by
Justice Breyer based on the majority opinion in Brown is a limiting of the
appellate review requirement. 83 Breyer's favored approach stands between these points, more in line with prior cases: "A reviewing court
must find that the jury's consideration of an invalid aggravator was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the form a State's
death penalty law takes. ' 84 Based on sentencing precedent, it seems
unlikely that there will be any changes in the requirements for a constitutional death sentence. But these alternative approaches to sentencing
indicate a continued recognition of the vital role appellate sentencing
takes.
Future cases will rely on Brown as well as on its predecessors, and
one could wish that the opinion had made the Court's stance on appellate
review clear within the decision that changed standing law from a twopronged to a unified system. Without the distinctions of weighing or
non-weighing states to rely on, lower courts may find themselves at a
loss for what rule of appellate review to apply. Justice Scalia, in devoting space to arguing with Justice Breyer over what is not required under
a now obsolete classification, failed to address the standard of review
required in all jurisdictions under the new rule. 185 Even if Stringer
clearly outlined the requirements for weighing states 86 (which is a debatable proposition in itself), there is no new law as to what is required
for the jurisdictions as they are now unified. So, it seems that lower
courts must continue to rely on the law as it was defined in Zant, "the
mandatory appellate review of each death sentence ....
If the Court chooses to clarify its stance on appellate review in a future decision, the prudent course may be an approach which applies the
most stringent standard. If weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions are
no longer distinct, the level of review required should be that required for
weighing jurisdictions, which previously held a greater risk of harmful
error. 88 According to the most recent appellate review precedent,
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Stringer, the new rule for all invalid factor sentencing cases would be
that "[w]hen the weighing process itself has been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level
suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sentence." 89 If, as Justice Scalia stated, all jurisdictions require a weighing
of aggravating and mitigating factors, 19° it seems only appropriate that all
jurisdictions now be considered weighing jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION

Brown v. Sanders represents forward progress in its elimination of
the unwieldy distinction between weighing and non-weighing jurisdictions in the treatment of invalid sentencing factors. However, it fails to
bring up to date the law on the appellate review requirement of erring
capital sentencing cases, and thus could present future problems. The
most prudent course would be for the Court to clearly outline the requirement for all cases sentenced under invalid factors to be subjected to
reweighing of the sentencing factors or a harmless-error review. The
necessity for meaningful appellate review cannot be understated in the
case of sentencing error. As the Court exhorted in Zant v. Stephens: "because there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, 'there is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. ... ",,91Precedent provides a foundation for reliability through
appellate review, but it is the responsibility of the Court to make it law.
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